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Abstract 
This work examines British foreign policy from the accession of George II; 
in 1727, to the diplomatic realignment of 1731. It is argued that foreign 
policy was the subject of debate, and that this debate was closely linked 
to struggles over power, patronage and domestic politics. An attempt has 
been made to survey foreign policy as a whole rather than to treat British 
relations with a particular state. However, as George II and his ministers 
were preoccupied with relations with only a few powers, there is little or 
nothing on diplomatic relations with many states. 
The interdependence of British diplomacy emerges clearly; relations with 
individual states were greatly influenced by relations with other powers. 
The thesis illustrates the interdependence of British relations with France 
and the Empire. It also indicates that, far from being a sudden development 
in 1730, the quest for an Austrian alliance had been followed at various times 
since the accession of George. This throws doubt upon the solidity of the 
Anglo-French alliance in the late 1720's, and suggests that the diplomatic 
importance of the fall of Townshend has* been exaggerated. 
An examination of foreign policy throws much light upon the influence of 
George II, his relations with his ministers and the role of Hanoverian interests. 
It also suggests that some of the crises faced by Sir Robert Walpole can be 
directly linked to diplomatic problems. 
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Note on Spelling 
Where possible well-established anglicized forms have been 
used for both place and personal names. The length of proper 
noble titles and of titles of office has dictated their shortening. 
In choosing titles and placenames it has proved impossible to 
please all. Some object to Sleswig, others to Schleswig, some 
to Sinzendorf others to Sinzendorff. Some to Plettenberg, others 
to Plettemberg. I have found it impossible to please all, and I 
only hope that readers will display tolerance in this matter. 
In quotations from both manuscript and printed sources the 
spelling, capitalisation and punctuation. have not been modernised. 
This has caused some problems, particularly with quotations from 
French. Fbaders of drafts of this study have expressed incredulity 
at some of the spellings, but in most cases, when reference has 
been made to the original document, the fault, if such it be, has 
been found to be with the original. Eighteenth century diplomats, 
nearly all aristocratic, would not have been impressed by being 
called to task for their spelling. 
Unless otherwise stated the place of publication is London. 
A refetence to Walpole, without any first name, is a reference 
to Sir Robert Walpole and not to his brother Horatio. A reference 
to Kinsky, is a reference to Count Philip Kinsky, and not to his 
brother Stephen. A reference to Stanhope is a reference to William 
Stanhope and not his brother Charles; to Dehn,. to Konrad Detlef 
Count*Dehn and not to his brother, Frederick Ludwig; to Sinzendorf, 
to the Austrian Chancellor, and not to his relative at the Hague; 
to Finch, to William Finch, and not to his brother Edward. 
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Note on Dates 
In this work the New Year is always taken as starting on 1 January. 
The convention by which the English New Year began on 25 March has been 
ignored. In the early eighteenth century Britain conformed to the Julian 
calendar. Dates recorded in this calendar are referred to as old style. 
Most of the continent conformed to the Gregorian calendar and recorded 
its dates in new style. In this work dates mentioned in the text are 
consistently given in new style (ns) which was eleven days ahead of old 
style (os). In the footnotes the dates given are those found on the 
documents cited except that the year is assumed to have started on 
1 January. In the footnotes, unless otherwise stated, all dates are in 
new style. -Where a number of newspapers or of letters from the same 
writer are grouped together (eg. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 12 Mar. (os), 
14 Ap. 1727), the notation (os) should be taken to refer to the whole group. 
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1. 
Introduction 
This body of work began as a dissertation to be submitted for an 
Oxford Doctorate on the topic 'British-Foreign Policy 1730-1740'. It was 
hoped to survey policy from the changes produced. in 1730 by the fall, of 
Townshend and the decision to seek to replace Britain's French alliance 
by an Austrian one,, until 1740, when the death of the Emperor Charles VI, 
of the Tsarina Anna of Russia and of Frederick William I, the King of 
Prussia, produced a much altered political situation in Europe. It rapidly 
became clear that in order to understand the situation in 1730-1 it was 
necessary to examine British foreign policy in the late 1720'x. It is 
a subject that has received far less attention than the foreign policy of 
Britain in the proceeding period, the reign of George I. In 1933, in 
describing the period between the summer of 1728 and NQvcmh r 1729, Oat 
'fairly hardened exp. orer of diplomatic mazes', Sir Richard Lodge confessed 
that he 'found this particular maze very baffling'. 
'' His conclusion is an 
understandable one, and in examining the period from 1727 till 1731 I rapid- 
ly found that it would be impossible to present my conclusions briefly. 
Therefore, when I came to Durham the title of this study changed from 
British Foreign Policy 1727-1741 to the more modest 1727-31. However, my 
work on the 1730's, aside from producing several articles which I believe 
to be relevant to this study, has also influenced my work on the earlier 
period. I believe that an examination of British foreign policy in the 
1730's sheds light on the wisdom of the decisions taken in 1727-31, and I 
hope to illustrate this in future work. 
The initial premise of this study is that in order to appre- 
b 
ciate British foreign policy in the Walpolean period it is necessary to 
1. R. Lodge, 'The Treaty of Seville (1729)', Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 4th Series, XVI (1933), 32" 
2 
consW r not only British diplomacy, but also British domestic 
policies. A-failure to study both has flawed several otherwise 
brilliant' surveys, such as Chance's work on the Alliance of Hanover. 
l 
It is too easy to treat the international system as the sum of the 
diplomacies of the various European powers, and to present foreign 
policy in a monolithic interpretation in which the actors are the 
'British', 'French' etc. Instead it is clear that policy options 
were debated and discussed within each country. This is true not 
only of Britain but also of*every major European country in this 
period. Furthermore, these discussions were not simply concerned 
with diplomatic options. Rather, the, debates about foreign policy 
were heavily intertwined with struggles over power, patronage and 
domestic politics. This process was 
encouraged by the fact that 
tho ro i-mulati. on and execution of foreign policy was generally not i 
the Joh of a distinct bureaucratic institution unrelated to the 
strife of 'domestic politics. Instead foreigh policy was shaped 
in the courts of Europe and a victim of the indistinct nature of 
much eighteenth century government. It would be helpful to reassess 
the process by which foreign policy was created in most of the 
Europwnn countries of this period. It is the intention of this 
study to consider the formulation and implementation of foreig 
policy in Britain from the accession of George II in 1727 to they 
Anglo-Austrian reconciliation of 1731. This is not therefore, 
strictly speaking a diplomatic study, insofar. as such a study can 
be separated from broader issues of foreign policy. Nor is this a 
study of the-European system in this period. The actions of other 
powers are considered largely in relation to the actions of Britain. - 
1. J. F. Chance, The Alliance of Hanover. A Study of British foreign 
policy in the last years of George 1( 1 923). 
r 
t 
3 
and their plans largely in relation to the fears and expectations 
of them held by the British Ministry. Thus, it is of importance 
that the'British feared in 1728 that the Emperor intended to marry 
his elder daughter, Maria Theresa, to Don Carlos the son of Philip V 
of Spitin. The fact that the Emperor had no such intention is of 
less importance for the purposes of this study. Clearly it is an 
artificial process to isolate the foreign policy of one state in 
order to study it, but limitations of time have produced such a 
method. The extensive consultation of continental archival sources 
that, has played a large part in the research for this work, has, 
it is hoped, redressed any tendency to misunderstand the policies 
of other states by concentrating upon those of Britain. 
The principal gap in the published work upon British foreign 
policy during the ministry of Sir Robert Walpole is that of the. 
years 1727 to 1731.1 In 1727 the magisterial work of J. F. Chance 
and the stimulating study of Ragnhild Hatton come to an end. In 
1731 Vaucher's important survey of Anglo-French relations commences. 
2 
There is an only partially filled gap between these works. This 
gap does not exist for the foreign policies of the states. The 
works of scholars such as Baudrillart, Dureng and Wilson on. France, 
Auer, Braubach, Rdfler and Mecenseffy'on Austria, Quazza'on. Sardinia, 
and Dunthorne and Goslinga on the United Provinces has ensured 
the Furopc'nn diplomacy of this period has been much studied. A 
hat 
1. Cady, pp. 1, S. 
2. P. Vaucher, Rob 
(Paris, 1924). 
Malpole a Politioue 
eta 
Iß'1 eurv . 1731-42! 
\" 
t 
4 
of British foreign policy in this period have been examined. Cady's 
thesis throws some light upon the diplomatic background to the Treaty 
of Seville and Cudmore's thesis attempted to do the same for the 
second Treaty of Vienna. 
' Dunthorne's excellent work on Anglo-Dutch 
relations in the 1720's and 1730's clarifies many aspects of British 
foreign policy, and, because of its quality, Anglo-Dutch relations 
in the late 1720's have been only glanced at in this work. Neither 
in his relevant articles, nor in his book on Anglo-Prussian relations, 
did Sir Richard Lodge contribute much to the study of this period, 
and the same is the case with Sir Adolphus Ward's work on Anglo- 
Hanoverian relations. 
2 Graham Gibbs' thesis is an important and 
valuable contribution to the study of the relationship between for- 
3 
eign" policy and domestic politics in the 172O's: However, Gibbs' 
concentration upon parliamentary debate to the exclusion of court 
politics meant that his thesis failed to clarify the. role of George II. 
George's role has also been overlooked by most of the scholars 
who have worked upon British domestic politics in this period. The 
two historians whose contribution to the period is best known, Coxe 
and Plumb, were writing about Sir Robert Walpole, not George II, and 
the role of the King has been minimised in their works. Neither 
contributed much to the study of foreign policy. Coxe, whose scholar- 
ship was of the very highest standards, did not enjoy access to any 
1. W. Cudmore, Sir Robert Walpole and the Treaty of Vienna, l6th March 
1731 (unpublished M. A. dissertation, London, 1978). I would like tc 
thank Professor Hatton for lending me a copy of this dissertation. 
2. R. Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford 1923); R. Ward, Great Britain and Hanover. Some Aspects 
of the Personal Union (Oxford, 1899). 
3. G. C. Gibbs, Parliament and Foreign Policy, 1715-31 (unpublished 
M. A. dissertation, Liverpool, 1953). 
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diplomatic archive. Plumb's work concentrated upon British domes- 
tic politics. Ne made only a. cursory study of the diplomatic papers 
of the period. Michael, whose survey of this period unfortunately 
has been neglected by many British historians, used European sources 
to cast much light upon British foreign policy. 
l Browning's bio- 
graphy of the Duke of Newcastle overrates his importance and mis- 
understands his attitudes, giving him an undeserved consistency of 
attitude. Williams' work on Newcastle and Carteret suffers from 
similar problems. 
2 
There are several good reasons why so little attention has been 
devoted to British foreign policy in the period 1727-1731. Several 
of the major collections of papers dealing with the period are 
inaccessible. Permission has rarely been granted for scholars to 
work on the papers of Stephen Poyntz at Althorp, Townshend at Raynham 
or Horatio Walpole at Wolterton. It is largely due to this that so 
little is known about Poyntz, one of the British Plenipotentiaries 
at the Congress of Soissons, and that Townshend lacks a biographer. 
Despite several efforts and the kind help of various historians, 
particularly that of Lord Dacre of Glanton, the author of this piece 
was refused permission to consult these archives. Permission for 
access to the papers of Edward Weston and to those of St. Saphorin 
were also refused. As a result, little can be said about the views 
of Poyntz and some of the conclusions advanced in this thesis have 
to be more tentative than would otherwise be'desirable. Fortunately 
1. N. Michael, Englische Geschichte im achtzehnten Jahrundert 
. 
(5 vols., Berlin/': asle and Berlin/Leipzig, 1896-1955). 
Volumes 3 and 4 (1934.1937) are relevant to this thesis. 
2. On 'the thinness of the secondary literature and the unevenness 
of the treatment accorded to the leading figures of the reigns 
of the first two Georges', A. Newman, review of Browning, 
Literature and History, V, (1977), p. 118. 
6 
there is much Townshend material outside Raynham, both in the 
Townshend papers in the British Library, and in the Bradfer 
Lawrence collection held in the Norwich County Record Office. 
The other major problem has proved to be the destruction 
of papers. As Colley has recently pointed out there is very little 
available relating to the Tories in this period. There are no 
0 
remains of the political correspondence of Lord Gower, Lord Bathurst, 
Sir William Wyndham, Sir Watkin Williams Wynn and Sir John Hinde 
Cotton. Potter has commented'on the absence of Shippen material. 
Aware of the interception of letters by the Walpole ministry, mem- 
bers of the opposition, preferred not to send letters by the post, 
but to entrust them to messengers. In addition, politicians were 
loath to commit their thoughts to paper. These reasons were no 
doubt partly responsible for the paucity of material left by such 
opposition figures as Blingbroke, William Pulteney and Daniel 
Pulteney. l 
In addition, the papers of many members of the ministry do 
not exist. Many possibly never kept papers in the first place, 
some collections have been destroyed, and some may yet be undis- 
covered. Little remains of the correspondence of Carteret, or of 
what has been termed the 'Wilmington-Dorset-Dodington group'. It 
is therefore very difficult to comment on the cohesion or views 
of this group. 
2 
The notes left by the Lord Chancellor, Lord King, contain. 
large gaps, for example between July 1726 and June 1727, and in the 
1. L. J. Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy, 'The Tory Party 1714-60 
(Cambridge, 1982) pp. 205,311 n. 34; Sedgwick, I, IX. 
2. Williams, pp. 3-4; W. Paring Pemberton, Carteret: The Brilliant 
Failure of the Eighteenth Century (1936) VII; T. Riker, Henry Fox, 
First Lord Holland (2 vols., Oxford, 1911) I, 8. For the 
destruction and loss of many of Walpole's papers, Coxe, I, -XXIII. 
'I 
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winter of 1729-1730. Sir Robert \alpole's papers are a very 
incomplete series, as he destroyed many of them when he fell from 
office. Many of the major aristocratic figures in the ministry, 
such as Grafton, Devonshire, Scarborough and Godolphin left little 
that is useful. 
Undue stress has been placed upon Parliamentary debates due 
to the lack of records for most council meetings in this period, 
and to the absence of much reliable material about court politics. 
0 
It is therefore difficult to assess the struggles between ministers, 
as their strength at court is often a mystery. This is particularly 
the case with the problem of assessing the position of the candi- 
dates mentioned as potential secretaries of states. The situation 
is not improved by the nearly complete absence of material origi- 
nating from George II and Queen Caroline, although in. the Tovznshend 
material in the British Library there are a few comments made by 
George II upon dispatches he had been'sent. 
l Lord Hervey's 
Memoirs cover the period from 1727 onwards, but, aside from their 
dubious reliability, 
2 they were not begun until 1733, and therefore 
suffer from the problem of hindsight. Halsband has pointed out 
how Hervey treated the early years of the reign in very broad outline; 
and this is not surprising, as he went abroad in July 1728, and did 
not return until October 1729. This, combined with the destruction 
by the first Marquis of Bristol, of the section from May 1730 to 
. the late summer of 1732, make the Memoirs a poor source 
for this 
period, and the fact that they were intended for publication can 
1. J. Black, *'George II Reconsidered. A consideration of George's 
influence in the conduct of Foreign Policy in the first years 
of his reign', Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 
(forthcoming) 
2. Cady, p. 284. 
TI 
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hardly increase confidence in their accuracy. 
I 
There is less material available for the parliamentary sessions 
of the late 1720's, than there is for those of the subsequent decade. 
The account of the sessions of 1726-1730 in the introduction to the 
History of Parliament is largely based upon the Parliamentary diary 
of Sir Edward Knatchbull. This diary ends on March 28th 1730, short- 
ly before his death, but because of his failure to win reelection 
as a county representative of Kent in the elections of 1727, 
Knatchbull missed much of the first session of George II's first 
Parliament. This session began on February 3rd 1728, but Knatchbull 
was not sworn in until 19th March and he did not begin his diary 
for that year until then. This diary is particularly valuable 
because of the paucity of alternative sources. Viscount Percival's 
diary is of little use before 1730, the letters sent to the Earl 
of Carlisle are brief, Thomas Tower's notes are of some interest, 
but he was not elected until February 1729, and the printed collec- 
tions omit much. In 1728 and 1729 the House of Commons attacked the 
--coverage of-Parliamentary activities printed in Robert Raikes' 
Gloucester Journal, and on March 8th 1729 passed a resolution, 'that « 
it is an indignity to and a breach of the privilege of this House 
for any person to presume to give in written or printed proceedings 
of this House or of any committee thereof' . As a result of this 
ruling both the Political State of Great Britain and the Historical 
Register ceased for a while to print reports of debates, and in the 
session of 1730 there are several important debates for which there 
are no printed accounts at all. British accounts of parliamentary 
1. Hervey, I, XI-XIV, Lvii-Lviii, 1-3; R. Halsband, Lord Hervey 
Eighteenth Century Courtier (Oxford,. 1973) p. 151. He left 
on 12 July (os) 1728 and returned on 25 Oct. (os) 1729. 
9 
proceedings can be supplemented by the reports of foreign envoys 
in London. Some, such as the Prussian resident Reichenbach and the 
liesse-Cassel envoy Diemar, seem to have attended Parliament with 
some frequency. 
I 
Aside from the destruction or absence of material within Britain, 
there has been widespread destruction of material in European archi- 
ves. Much of the , material preserved 
in the Hanoverian Hauptstaats- 
archiv, including the relevant foreign policy documents, was destroyed 
in the 1940's. 2 Allied bombing similarly destroyed some of the 
relevant material in the Staatsarchiv in Darmstadt. However, in 
some of the archives that were able to-survive the Second World War 
without extensive damage the manuscript collections are not complete, 
and loss in the past must be assumed. This is the case both with 
the Wittelsbach diplomatic papers preserved in the Hauptstaatsarchiv 
in Munich and with the diplomatic papers of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel 
preserved in the Staatsarchiv in Wolfenbfittel. The political 
disturbances of the last two centuries, and in. particular the French 
" Revolution and the expropriation of aristocratic estates in eastern 
Europe, have helped to ensure that there are few collections of the 
private papers of diplomats accessible for study. 
1. Coxe, I, XXI; M. Ransome, 'The Reliability of Contemporary 
Reporting of the Debates of the House of commons 1727-41', 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 19, (1942-3), 
67-79; J. Black, 'A Diplomat Visits Parliament: An unprinted 
account of the Army Estimates Debate of 1733' Parliamentary 
History Yearbook, (forthcoming, vol. 3,19$5); Diemar to 
Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 2 May 1730, Marburg, 199. 
2. Übersicht liter die Bestände des Niedersächsischen Staatsarchivs 
in Hanover edited by C. Haase, W. Deeters, E. Pitz (2 vols., 
Göttingen, 1965,1968). Earlier destruction of Hanoverian 
material, Ward, Great Britain and Hanover p. 59. 
`ý 
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This work- draws on several major collections of manuscript 
material that have received little atention. In Europe the 
diplomatic archives in Paris, Nancy, Turin, Modena, Parma, Lucca, Hanovei 
Genoa, Venice, Vienna, Dresden, Munich, Darmstadt, Marburg,. OsngbrUck, 
LtUnster and 1VolfenbUttel have been consulted. In Paris extensi e 
work has been carried out on the manuscript collections held in the 
Biblioth? que National and the Biblioth4que de L'Arsenal and on te 
collections in Archives des Affaires Etrangeres and the Archives 
National. In the latter archive the Archives de la Marine Series BT, 
Pays Estrange res, has proved particularly rewarding. The reports 
of the French Consul General in Spain, D'Aubenton, have shed much 
light on Spanish politics in this. period. D'Aubenton was both 
observant and well informed, enjoyed good relations with the British 
minister, Benjamin Keene, and regarded himself, with some reason, . as 
being more perceptive than the French ambassador. The Archives des 
Affaires Ftrangýres produced much that-was useful on French foreign 
.t. 
policy. In addition, the intercepted correspondence of Frederick 
William I and his envoy in Paris, Chambrier, was a useful source for 
Prussian policy, and the material preserved in the correspondence 
r 
Politiqu© series for Brunswick-Hanover, Cologne and Allemagne for 
1720 und 1730 cc)ntainod usoful matorinlon Townshond'e Garman policy 
The importance of the reports of Ossorio, the Sardinian envoy 
in London from 1730, has been commented upon-by Gibbs. 
l His pre- 
decessor, n'Aix, Envoy Extraordinary from 1725 to 1730, was a man 
of considerable perception whose reports are öf great interest. In 
addition the reports of the Sardinian envoys in Spain, France, 
Austria and-the United Provinces provided much material on inter- 
national relations in this period. 
G. C. Gibbs, )Newspapers, Parliament and Foreign Policy in the 
Age of Stanhope and Walpole', M ]anges offerts AG. Jacquemyns 
(Brussels, 1969) p. 293, n. 2. 
ý_ 
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The most important German archives consulted were those of 
Dresden, Minster., '. 1olfenbiittel and Marburg. They provided much 
information about the German policy of the British government in 
the late 1720's. The reports of the Saxon envoy in London., Le Coq, 
are a very important source for British foreign policy in the winter 
of 1727-28. The papers of the Cologne first minister Count Plettenberg, 
now preserved in ? 9tinster, shed much light upon the Anglo-Wittelsbach 
negotiations in 1729-30. 
The reports of several foreign envoys are preserved in British 
archives. In the Public Record Office, the series SP 107 contains 
most of the despatches intercepted by the British government. This 
series is of some use for 1730 and 1731, though there is little 
in it for the late 1720's. In the. Bodleian Library the papers of 
Zamboni, the Saxon agent who also provided reports for. the rulers of 
Hesse-Darmstadt, Modena, and WYtirttemberg, have been found most use- 
ful. The Hotham papers in Hull University Library include valuable 
material for Sir Charles Hotham's nission in Berlin in 1730, as well 
as copies of most of the 1729 and 1730 correspondence between 
Reichenbach, and both Frederick William I and one of his principal 
ministers Grumbkow. 
In the Public Record Office all classes of-State, Papers Foreign 
have been consulted, both those of major; diplomati. c importance and 
the reports from minor postings such as Hamburg, Genoa and Dunkirk. 
The latter have often proved to be very rewarding. In addition, 
other series have been consulted, including Domestic, Ireland, Scotland, 
Regencies, Admiralty and Miscellaneous, whilst through the kindness 
of Mr. Evans, material as yet unclassified has been made available 
for examination. 
.. 
12 
Aside from the state papers all the accessible private papers 
of relevance for the period, both those held in the British Library 
and those held in County Record Offices, have been examined. The 
most useful of these has proved to be the papers of James, first 
Earl of Waldegrave. Waldegrave, a gentleman of the bedchamber 
under George I, had already been sent to Paris in 1725 as an Envoy 
Extraordinary, to congratulate Louis XV on his marriage. In 1727 
he was chosen to reestablish British representation at Vienna, but, 
because of diplomatic complications, he spent the second half of 
that year in Paris, and was left in charge of the Paris embassy 
when Horatio Talpole returned to Britain for the parliamentary session. 
Waldegrave finally reached Vienna in April 1728 and remained there 
until the summer of 1730, when he was appointed Ambassador Extraordi- 
nary and Plenipotentiary to Louis XV. At Chewton Mendip there are 
over seventy boxes of his papers. These'include his correspondence 
with most of the British diplomatic corps, and an excellent series 
ofIletters from the Undersecretaries of State in London, which 
contains much information about political events in Britain. There 
is also at Chewton a journal which S7aldegrave kept whilst at Paris 
in 1727. 
In addition to these private papers, the archives of the Bank 
of England, General Post , 
Off ice, House of Lords and Huguenot Society 
have all been examined,: and extensive work has been carried out 
upon the press of the period. 
/ 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EUROPEAN and BRITISH SETTING 
The general peace treaties of the 1710's that ended the 
various wars then afflicting Europe left many questions unsettled. 
Territorial and dynastic disputes affected large areas of Europe. 
Throughout the 1710's and 1720's diplomatic tension produced 
military mobilisations and the threat of war. Professor Hatton 
has viewed the period as one 'when progress was made in limiting 
wars and achieving a longish period of peace by conscious rational 
efforts .... (and when) .... the idea of thfe Society of Europe in 
which peace was regarded as the natural state was being transferred 
from the blueprints to reality on a practical-level'. 
1 However, 
whilst Hatton has seen a generally rational, hopeful 'climate of 
opinion' that reached its apogee in a series of Congresses that 
served to 'deflate' problems and make them more amenable to solu- 
tions, the politicians of the period felt defeated by the inter- 
minable nature of the Congress system and its inability to settle 
issues. The French first minister Cardinal' Fleury felt that 
Congresses were unhelpful, 'Un Congres qui entraine toujours de 
grandes longeurs, et qu' il est_ aise encore d'alonger quand une des 
parties le croit necessaire 
a ses interets, serait peu propre 
a 
calmer des inquietudes'. 
2 
1. R. Hatton, War and Peace 1680-1720 (London, 1969), pp'. 26,22. 
2. Fleury to the Austrian diplomat Pentenriedter, 3 Mar. 1727, 
A. Drodtloff, Johann Christoph Pentenriedter Freiherr von 
Adelshausen (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Vienna, 1964), p. 227. 
Pentenriedter shared this opinion, Pentenriedter to Fleury, 
22 Mar. 1727, Drodtloff, Pentenriedter, p. 238; Fleury to the 
Emperor Charles VI, 12 Mar. 1727, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 
11, f. 3-4; Pentenriedter to the Austrian representative in 
Paris, Fonseca, 4 Aug., 6,20 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 21, 
f. 266,374,378; Townshend to William Finch, 6 Feb. (os) 1728, 
PRO. 84/299 f. 95. 
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If the Congress system produced pessimism, the other major 
diplomatic innovation of the period that has been praised by 
historians, the system of collective security involving reciprocal 
. guarantees, 
1 failed. The Congress of Cambrai, begun in 1724 was 
a failure, and by 1725 Europe was at the brink of war, split by 
two conflicting alliances, those of Hanover and Vienna. 
The basic causes of European tension were twofold. Firstly, 
it proved difficult to adapt to the rather sudden shifts in the 
power of particular European states. Four changes posed major 
problems. In the Baltic, the rise of Russian and the collapse of 
Swedish power had been both sudden and frightening. Russia under 
2 
Peter the Great had proved able to deploy troops. inside Europe, 
in Mecklenburg and Jutland. The defeat of Charles XII: of Sweden 
at Poltava in 1709, the conquest of the Swedish'Baltic provinces, 
and the internal conflicts affecting Sweden in the 1720's had all 
helped to destroy the possibility of Sweden continuing to serve as 
an effective anti-Russian barrier. Frederick William I of Prussia 
was too scared of Russian power to seek the role, and Augustus II, 
King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, too weak to do so. The 
1. J. H. Shennan, Philippe Duke of Orleans (London, 1979) p. 61;. 
Hatton, p. 216, - 
2. There is a substantial literature on this subject. I have 
found particularly useful, D. Aldridge, Sir John Norris and 
the British Naval Expeditions to the Baltic Sea, 1715-1727 
(unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London, 1971, ); M. Anderson, Peter 
the Great (London, 1978); Ti. Bagger, Ruslands Alliancepolitik 
efter freden i Nystad (Copenhagen, 1974), English summary; 
J. F. Chance, George I and the Great Northern War (London, 1909); 
P. Hatton, Charles XII of Sweden (London 1968); I. Jacob, 
Besiehungen Englands zu Russland und der ýTtirkei in den Jahren 
1718-1727 (Basel, 1945); W. Mediger, Moskaus Weg nach Europa 
(Brunswick, 1952); W. Mediger, Mecklenburg, Russland und 
England-Hanover 1706-21 (2 vols., Hildesheim, 1967). I would 
like to thank Dr. Aldridge for giving me advice, and for lending 
unpubli hE: d material that he has written. 
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attempt by Britain and France to force Russia to restore her Baltic 
conquests to Sweden had proved a failure. 
The rise of Russian power would have been less threatening if 
Russia, once she had beaten Sweden had devoted her attentions to 
the conquest of territories from Turkey and Persia, as indeed 
seemed to be the case in. 1723. However, for dynastic reasons, 
Peter I became deeply involved in German politics. In 1716 Peter's 
niece Catherine married Charles Leopold, Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 
and in 1725 Peter's daughter Anna married Charles Frederick, Duke 
of Holstein-Gottorp., Both these two German princes had interests 
that were espousedf by Peter, interests that clashed with those of 
Hanover. The ducal lands of Holstein-Gottorp in Schleswig had 
been seized by Frederick IV of Denmark and Britain, as well as 
France, had guaranteed Danish possession of them. Hanover had been 
authorised by the Emperor to intervene in Mecklenburg, where the 
conflict between the Duke and his nobility had deteriorated into 
a state of civil war. Russian support for the Duke challenged the 
Hanoverian position. 
' 
Hopes were expressed in 1725, when Peter was succeeded by his 
widow Catherine I, that Russia would collapse into anarchy. The 
theme of a possible Russian return to barbarism was a common one 
in the diplomatic correspondence of the period and in the British 
2 
press. 
1. - Hughes, pp. 77-84,108-280; 'Relation sur les affaires du 
Mecklenbourg', undated, 1727, by St. Saphorin, PRO. 80/61. 
2. Sir Cyril Wych, British resident in the Hansa towns, to George 
Tilson, Under-Secretary of State in the Northern Department, 
27 Feb. 1725, PRO. 82/42 f. 65; Rennel de Lescut, Lorrain envoy 
aV Cambrai, to Duke Leopold of Lorraine, 1 Mar. 1725, Nancy, 
32, No. 123; Post Boy 8 Ap. (os) 1718; London Journal 5 Sept. 
(os) 1724; J. Black, 'Russia and the British Press, 1720-1740', 
British Journal of Eighteenth-Century' Studies, forthcoming. 
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Such hopes proved to be unfounded, and though the British government 
received reports of a decline in Russiainaval strength, 
' Catherine 
showed herself able to control Russia, and willing to aid her German 
relatives. She espoused the cause of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp 
with vigour, and ordered major military mobilisations in 1725-27 
that threatened the other. Baltic powers. Unpleasant rumours about 
Russian intentions began to circulate., In July 1725 Rochefort, the 
French agent in Hamburg, noted reports of an intended Russian 
attack upon Denmark, and suggestions of a Prusso-Russian agreement 
to despoil Poland and Denmark. 
2 By November 1725, the Duke of 
Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 
could inform Horatio Walpole, the British Ambassador in Paris, 
that war with Russia was probable. 
3 The Russian accession in 1726 
to -the Vienna Alliance, the alliance formed in 1725 by Austria and 
Spain, linked Baltic rivalries more firmly into the general pattern 
of European conflict. 
4 Russia appeared as an unpredictable, unstable 
power, able and willing to risk war, and averse to seeing its 
.. position 
limited by any Congress. 
At the opposite end of Europe, the aggression by another state 
that had suddenly increased in power. gave rise to tension. Under 
Charles II, who had ruled Spain from 1665 until 1700, Spain had 
been regarded as a cipher, and this view was reinforced by the 
'War of the Spanish Succession, when Spain was fought over by other 
powers, and deprived of the bulk of her European empire, Sicily, 
1. Hamburg newsletter, 20 Mar. 1725, PRO. 821.42 ß. 88. 
2. Rochefort to Maurepas, 2,9, 20 July 1725, AN. AM. B7 286. 
3. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 15 Nov, (os) 1725, BL. Add. 32744. 
4. Horatio Walpole, 'Considerations'..,. - Aug. 1727 , PRO. 84/294 f. 138. 
kh, 
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the island of Sardinia, the Milanese, Naples, and the Southern 
Netherlands. Louis XIV's second grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, 
had become King of Spain as Philip V, defeating the rival claims 
of the Austrian Archduke Charles, who became the Emperor Charles VI 
in 1711. Philip was a markedly eccentric character, prone to acute 
melancholia and bouts of. hysteria, and strongly influenced by his 
1 
second wife Elisabeth Farnese whom he married in 1714. Under 
Philip there was a marked increase in Spanish power, a development 
that owed much to the nadir reached during the 1700's, from which 
it could only improve, and something to the administrative reforms 
and Bourbon governmental methods that were partially introduced 
under Philip. A particular concern for other powers was the increase 
in Spanish naval power and a growing Spanish interest in schemes for 
2 
commercial and oceanic trade. The growth in Spanish power, coupled 
with a desire to reverse recent territorial losses, most threatened 
the Austrians, who had acquired the bulk. of Spain's Italian 
possessions. In 1717 the Spaniards conquered the island of Sardinia, 
and in 1718 invaded Sicily, beginning a war that lasted until 1720. 
The Austrians fought badly and their military system was shown to 
be singularly unable to defend their Italian possessions. It was 
3 
a combination of British naval power, which smashed the Spanish 
fleet off Cape Passaro in 1718 and isolated the Spanish army in 
Sicily, and a French invasion. of Spain in 1719, that forced Philip V 
to abandon, for a while, his Italian schemes.. 
By the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, Britain had gained various 
concessions from the Spaniards. Gibraltar and Minorca, captured 
in 1704 and 1708 respectively, and ceded to Britain in 1713, were 
1. Armstrong; Quazza, pp. 19-24. 
2. G. J. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade (1979) pp. 
93-113,159-173. 
3.. D. McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy (1977) pp. 172-3. 
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believed to strengthen Britain's control over her Mediterranean 
trade and to improve her naval position. In the same year Britain 
acquired the asiento, the contract to supply the Spanish colonies 
with slaves. A clause in it permitted limited trade in British 
manufactures with New Spain, in an annual permission ship. The 
growth in Spanish naval power and commercial pretension, a growth 
particularly associated with Patino, intendant of the marine from 
0 
1717, challenged British rights as well as the more general British 
aspiration to gain a large share in the trade to America and the 
South Seas. 1 
Although the British would not have accepted the premise, the 
rise of British power was another cause of European instability. 
2 
Under the later Stuarts Britain, wracked by internal conflict and 
willing to become the pensioner of France, could be dismissed as 
an effective force in European affairs. . William III's success in 
mashing his opponents within the. British Isles ended this state 
of affairs. It was not that William dragged Britain into European 
politics, as is customarily assumed. In the 1650's, 1660's and 
1670's various British governments had sought-to play a. prominent 
role in Europe. Rather it was the brutal crushing successes of 
William in Scotland and, in particular, Ireland, *and the consoli- 
dation of authority around the. parliamentary monarchy, that permitted 
1. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade; L. Vignols, 
'L'asiento frangais, 1701-1713, et anglais, 1713-1750, et 
le commerce franco-espagnol vers 1700 ä 17301, Revue d'histoire 
economigue et sociale 17, (1929) pp. 403-436. - 
2. Thomas Robinson, Secretary of the British Embassy in Paris, to 
Charles Delafaye, Under-Secretary of State in the Southern 
Department, 17 July 1728, PRO. 78/196 f. 58; R. ! Nodrow, 
"Anacleta or Materials for a History of Remarkable Providences 
Mostly Relating to Scotch Ministers and Christians (3 vols., 
Edinburgh, 1842 , III, 361. 
,. m 
hh, 
19 
ýý 
Britain to act in an effective manner as an opponent of France. 
There was a massive increase in the size of the British navy and 
army. The French fleet was defeated at La Hogue in 1692, and 
British control of the Channel was not to be seriously challenged 
again until 1744. From 1694-5, when the fleet wintered in the 
Mediterranean for the first time, using Cadiz as its base, British 
naval power became a major instrument of policy and influence in 
the politics of Southern Europe. 
' British fleets were despatched 
to the Baltic, and under George .1 intervened in Baltic affairs with 
great frequency. British armies were regularly deployed on the 
Continent. 
The accession of George I in 1714 led to increasing British 
involvement in Baltic and German affairs. Hatton has painted a 
rather charitable picture of George, but contemporaries, both in 
Britain and Europe; had little doubt that British strength was 
being used to support Hanoverian pretensions. Hanover's formal 
acquisition in 1719 of the former Swedish Duchies of Bremen and 
Verden was widely attributed to British aid. For the Spaniards, 
concerned to defend their commercial position in the Indies and 
anxious to wipe out the humiliating concessions of Utrecht, the 
growth of British power was a major threat, a view shared by 
concerned 
Austrian ministers/to resist Hanoverian pretensions, -by Dutch 
ministers concerned about the threat to Dutch commerce, and by 
French ministers, uneasily aware of their need for a British 
alliance, but unhappy at growing British assertiveness. Though 
1. S. F. Gardish, 'The establishment of British seapower in the 
Mediterranean, 1689-1713', Canadian Journal of History, 10, (1975) 
pp. 1-16. However, as the Duke of Parma pointed out, 'the 
English fleet could not reach him at Parma', George Tilson, 
Under-Secretary of State in the Northern Department, to Lord 
Waldegrave, 'British Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten- 
tiary at Vienna, 9 July 1728, Chewton. 
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some British ministers appreciated these feelings (George T, 
Stanhope and Townshend being willing, for instance, to return 
Gibraltar as the price for better Anglo-Spanish relations), most 
of the Rritisb political public failed to appreciate the degree 
to which Britain was regarded in Europe as a selfish,. arrogant 
and aggresive power, and a source of tension. They were therefore 
surprised in the, late 1720s when their Dutch and French allies 
proved willing to consider the abandonment of British pretensions 
as a reasonable price to pay for European peace, and when they 
were increasingly isolated in European diplomacy. 
' 
The fourth major power whose rise in strength was an important 
cause of instability was Austria. Between 1683 and 1720 Austria 
had witnessed a spectacular growth in territorial power, a growth 
only surpassed by Russia. 
2 In Italy she had gained Naples, Sicily, 
Mantua and the Milanese, in the Balkans, Hungary, Transylvania, 
Little Wallachia, much of Serbia and the 'Banat of Temesvar, and 
further west she had acquired the Southern Netherlands. Accompanying 
3 
1. Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 7 Sept. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 264; 
P. Muret, La Preponderance Anglaise (1715-63) (Paris, 1937); 
G. Masi, I1 sistema di equilibrio e la Politica Britannica 
dalla pace di Utrecht alla Crisi del 1725-1731 (Naples, 1947) 
pp. 142-3; Goslinga, pp. 160-1,176,217,219,229,240,261, 
264,259-60,280,283-4,336,364; Villars, pp. 19-20; Keene 
to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 20 Oct. 1729, DL. Add. 32763 
f. 431; Waldegrave Journal, 16. Oct. 1727, Chewton. 
2. 'The Wittelsbach diplomat Gansinot wrote, 'L'Empereur est un monarque 
des plus puissant, que nous ayons eu depuis que 1'Empire 
germanique a pris naissance', Gansinot to Plettenberg, 22 Dec. 
1725, tiiinster, NB 259, f. 142. For Austria I have found parti- 
cularly useful, M. Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen (5 vols., 
Vienna, 1963-65); H. Braubach, Versailles und Vien von Ludwig 
XIV bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952); McKay, Eugene; Quazza, pp. 25-43. 
The absence of biographies of Charles VI and of his Austrian 
Court Chancellor, Count Sinzendorf is a major gap and the loss 
of Sinzendorf's private papers in the Second World War creates 
many difficulties. 
3. P. McKay and H. Scott, The rise of the great powers 1648-1815 
(1983) pp. 98-9. 
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this expansion was a growth in military strength and reputation, 
and a determination to enforce Austrian power and Imperial authority 
in every area possible. In Italy, where she had become the strongest 
power, Austrian rule was marked by financial exactions and became 
bitterly unpopular. Diplomats of all powers believed, that Italy 
was ready to rebel against Austrian-rule, a belief which was shared 
by the European press. 
' Within the Empire, Charles VI appeared as 
an insensitive ruler, determined to use the legal instrument of 
Imperial authority, such as the Aulic Council, to enhance Austrian 
power. Charles was widely accused of seeking to establish a 
despotism within the Empire. The situation was exacerbated by the 
increase in religious hostilities within the Empire. The Emperor 
used Imperial authority to interfere in confessional disputes in 
a manner that appeared to Protestant powers, such as Hanover and 
Prussia, to be flagrantly unfair. To the Austrians these Protestant 
powers were selfish and disloyal members of the Empire. 
2 The 
Commercial pretensions of Austria, Charles VI's attempt to establish 
maritime trading companies at Trieste and Ostend, worried Britain 
and the United Provinces. - 
3 
Aside from major changes in the power of particular European 
states, the second basic cause of European tension, was dynastic 
1. L. Marini, I1 Mezzogiorno d'Italia di fronte a Vie, 
1707-1734 (Bologna, 1970) pp. 84-9; R. Colapietra, 
e classi Politiche de Viceregno Napoletano 1'656-1734 
pp. 252-60. 
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2. H. Naumann, Osterreich, England und das Reich 1719-32 (Berlin, 1936) 
pp. 43-58; H. Schmidt, Kurfürst Karl Philipp von der Pfalz 
als Reichsforst (Mannheim, 1963) pp. 114-49; K. Borgmann, Der 
Deutsche Religionsstreit der jahren 1719-20 (Berlin, 1937). 
3. M. Huisman, La Belgique Commerciale sous 1'Empereur Charles VI. 
La Compagnie_d'Ostende (Brussels, 1902); Dunthorne, pp. 57-74. 
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insecurity. Several major states had insecure dynasties, or 
successions that were unclear or could be challenged. The only 
children of Charles VI to survive for any length of time were 
three daughters, the youngest of whom died in 1730 aged four. 
Charles VI hoped to secure the undivided succession of his various 
territories for his own children rather than for the daughters 
of his elder brother, the Emperor Joseph I, Maria Josepha and 
Maria Amalia. This, rather than the stipulations of the indivisi- 
bility of the inheritance and the reversion to female in the absence 
of male descendants, was the most troublesome aspect of Charles' 
promulgation of the Pragmatic Sanction. Maria Josepha and Maria 
Amalia, born in 1699 and 1701, were considerably older than Charles' 
two eldest daughters, Maria Theresa and Maria Anna, born in 1717 
and 1718. To reinforce the exclusion of the Josephine archduchesses, 
Charles ensured that their marriages were accompanied by solemn 
renunciationecaf all claims to the Succession. In 1719 the marriage 
of Maria Josepha and the heir to the Electorate of Saxony, Frederick 
Augustus, the future Augustus III, was preceded by a renunciation 
sworn to by bride, groom and groom's father. In 1722 the marriage 
of Maria Amalia to the heir to Bavaria, Charles Albert, was preceded 
by a similar renunciation. Neither the Saxons nor the Bavarians 
paid much attention to these renunciations. Both believed that 
neither the acts of parents nor renunciations could abnegate in- 
alienable rights, and both were convinced that dynastic and inheri- 
tance rights were not transferable. In 1725, to fortify the position 
of the Bavarians, who had only won the younger of the Josephine 
archduchesses, Charles Albert's father Max Emanuel 'forged a copy 
of the Emperor Ferdinand I's will, purportedly awarding the 
Wittelsbachs the Austrian hereditary lands upon the extinction of 
.. a 
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the dynasty's male line. 
l 
Charles VI's continued failure to produce a male heir and his 
efforts to secure European support for the Pragmatic Sanction helped 
to make the Austrian Succession more critical. 
2 Under Charles VI 
Austrian policy became increasingly dominated by the issue, whilst 
powers opposed to Austria resorted to the device of encouraging 
pretensions upon the Austrian Succession, Saxon and Bavarian in 
the Empire, Sardinian and Spanish in Italy. 
3 Within the Empire, 
Bavaria fostered the development of a. close alliance, a Hausunion, 
between the closely related ffittelsbach Electors of Bavaria, Trier, 
Cologne and the Palatinate, and made it clear, in response to 
Anglo-French efforts in 1725-26 to secure their alliance against 
Austria, that a commitment to help the Bavarian succession was 
expected. 
4 
Until the birth of a Dauphin in September 1729 the succession 
to the young Louis XV of France wäs also'-very uncertain. As part 
of the Utrecht settlement Louis'-. uncle'Philip V of Spain-had 
renounced his claims to the French throne, leaving as the next in 
line Philip V's second cousin, Louis XIV's nephew, Philip II, Duke 
1. L. Htittl, Max Emanuel. Der Blaue Kurftirst.. Eine politische 
Biographie Munich, 1976); C. Ingrao, 'The Pragmatic Sanction 
and the Theresian Succession: A Reevaluation', Topic, XXXIV, 
(1980), pp. 3-18; A. Philipp, August der Starke und die 
Pragmatische Sanktion (Leipzig, 1908). 
2. For Austrian pressure upon Britain over this issue, Memorandum 
by Newcastle of meeting at Walpole's on 9 Sept. (os) 1727, 
FL. Add. 32687 f. 155. 
3. Instructions for Peraty de Valette, Saxon agent in Turin, 
17 Ap. 1725, Dresden, 2797, f. 1-2. 
4. The Elector of Cologne, Clemens August, was a brother of Charles 
Albert of Bavaria. The Elector of Trier from 1716-1729 was 
Franz Ludwig, brother of the Elector Palatine. He succeeded to 
the Electorate of Mainz on 7Ap. 1729. Recueil... Ifftnts Allemands 
edited by G. Livet (3 vols., Paris, 1962,196 3,1966). 
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of Orleans, and, after his death in 1723, his son Louis. Philip V 
doubted the validity of the Utrecht renunciation and maintained 
his claim to the French throne. He showed particular interest 
whenever Louis XV was very ill, particularly during the time of 
his smallpox attack in late 1728. A formidable. 'Spanish' party 
existed in France, and the Orleans family felt threatened. To 
safeguard their position, Orleans, as Regent for the young Louis 
XV, signed the Triple Alliance in January 1717 with Britain and 
the United Provinces. The alliance stated that all those articles 
of the treaty of Utrecht which concerned the three powers, inclu- 
ding those relating to the successions to the crowns of Britain 
and France, should retain full force. Orleans therefore closely 
associated the British alliance with the exclusion of all claims 
by the -Spanish Bourbons. After Orleans' death, the Duke of Bourbon, 
chief minister from 1723 to 1726, maintained a hostile stance to 
Philip V. Philip continued to aspire to the French throne, parti- 
cularly after his shortlived abdication of the Spanish crown in 
1724 convinced him that he had no real right to the Spanish throne. 
. 
It was widely believed that secret Austro-Spanish agreements in 
1725 included an understanding that Austria was to support Spain 
in any French succession dispute. Until Louis XV sired his eldest 
son much speculation persisted about the French succession. 
' 
1. A. Baudrillart, 'Les pretensions de Philippe Va la couronne 
de France', S6ances et travaux de l'Academie des sciences 
morales et politiques CXXVII, (1887), pp. 723-743,851-897; 
Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese p. 214; J. M. J. Rogister has 
recently pointed out 'that it was not until late 1750's that 
the succession of the throne was firmly assured in Louis 
XV's line', J. M. J. Rogister, 'A minister's Fall and its 
Implications: The case of Chauvelin, 1737-46', Studies in 
the French Eighteenth Century edited by D. J. Mossop, G. E. 
Rodmel and D. R. Wilson (Durham, 1978) p. 213. 
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As a result of the Triple Alliance of 1717 France was 
committed to supporting the Hanoverian succession in Britain. 
The challenge of Jacobitism posed a major problem for successive 
British governments. It was suggested at the time that the 
l 
threat of Jacobitism was deliberately exaggerated to discredit 
opposition within Britain, and it has been recently suggested 
that the group most impugned, the Tories, were-largely free from 
2 Jacobitism. Such a view would have found little support from 
George I and George II both of whom believed that, although indi- 
vidual Tories were loyal and could be trusted, the party as a 
whole was factious and disloyal. 
3 Equally serious was the manner 
in which foreign powers, hostile to Britain and to her Hanoverian 
rulers could be encouraged to support Jacobitism, and were them- 
selves encouraged in their stance by a belief in. the strength of 
Jacobitism. 4 Jacobite chances were seen to depend on help from 
European powers. The Jacobites were delighted by the Austro-Spanish 
alliance of 1725, and sought to enlist the support of both powers, 
for an invasion of Britain. The Jacobite factor was of greater 
importance by the late 1720's in British foreign policy, where it 
could influence the views of other states, than in British internal 
affairs. 
5 
1. P. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the 
Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975); G. H. Jones, 
The Mainstream of Jacobitism (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Lodge, 
p. 6. I would like to thank Professors Fritz and Jones for 
discussing the issue with me. 
2. L. Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy. The Tory Party 1714-60 
(Cambridge, 1982); L. Colley, 'The People Above in Eighteenth 
Century Britain', Historical Journal 24, -(1981), p. 977. 
- 3. J. Black, review of Colley Defiance, British Journal of Eighteenth 
Ce! tury Studies (forthcoming). 
4. James III to the Scottish Jacobite. George Lockhart, 21 Mar. 1725, 
G. Lockhart, The Lockhart Papers (ed. A. Aufrere, 2 vols. 
. Edinburgh, 1817) II, 150. 
5. Memoranda presented by. the Duke of Wharton and Sir John Graham 
to the Austrian government, 1 Jan., 17 May, 1726, Vienna, England, 
Noten, 2; A. S. Foord, His Majesty's Opposition' 1714-1830 (Oxford, 
1964) p. 58. 
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The insecurity of the Russian succession was closely linked 
in the eyes of the rest of Europe to the general belief in an 
imminent collapse of Russian power. The position of Peter's 
widow Catherine was believed to be threatened by his grandson 
Peter, who succeeded Catherine, supposedly killed by means of 
poison administered in a bottle of her favourite beer from 
Burton-upon-Trent, in 1727. Whether Peter II was to have a 
Russian or a foreign bride became a major issue of debate linked 
to the long-standing tension between foreign and 'Old Russ' 
influences within Russia. In 1730 Peter II died suddenly of 
smallpox leaving no child. He was succeeded by Peter I's niece, 
Anne, the childless widowed Duchess of Courland, but her position 
was challenged by an attempt to restrict her power in favour of 
the higher aristocracy. Peter I's daughters by his marriage to 
Catherine I, Anne the wife of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and 
Elizabeth, who eventually became Czarina in 1741, also possessed 
strong claims to the throne. A Holstein coup in Russia such as 
was rumoured in 1727, or Russian support for the Holstein interest, 
were major threats to Baltic stability, as Charles Frederick of 
Holstein-Gottorp claimed not only Schleswig but also, as the son 
of Charles XII of Sweden's elder sister, Hedvig Sofie, the throne 
of Sweden. Britain and France supported Frederick I, the elder 
son of Landgrave Karl of Hesse-Cassel, who had become King of Sweden 
in 1720 upon the abdication of his wife Ulrika Eleonore the younger 
sister of Charles XI I. There was a powerful Holstein interest in 
'Sweden and Russia attempted to coerce the Swedes to accept Charles 
Frederick either as King or as the heir to the childless Frederick I. 
Russian policy was greatly affected by the succession of so 
many monarchs within a short interval. Catherine I did not pursue 
27 
her husband's policy of Caspian expansion and devoted much 
attention to Baltic affairs. Peter II, who showed much favour 
to Old Russ families such as the Dolgorukiis, reaffirmed Catherine 
I's alliance with Austria amd promised to send Russian troops into 
Europe in support of the Vienna alliance, but during his reign 
Russian military action declined, the Baltic fleet was allowed to 
rot and a reversion of Russia to barbarism was widely anticipated. 
Anne in 1730 reaffirmed the Austrian alliance and adopted a much 
more active stance in European politics. 
Aside from influencing the disputed succession in Sweden, 
Russian power was also of great importance in another country 
whose unsettled succession was a major cause of instability in 
eastern Europe, Poland. There were two kings of Poland alive. 
Stanislas Leszczynski, after 1725 the father-in-law of Louis XV, 
had been set up by Charles XII of Sweden as King of Pbland in 
rivalry to Augustus II Elector of Saxony. The Russian defeat 
of. Charles XII at Poltava in 1709 had led to Stanislas being 
driven into exile.. Stanislas maintained his claim to the 
Polish throne, and the existence of a strong anti-Saxon 
- movement within Poland,. able to express itself freely thanks to 
the somewhat anarchic nature of the Polish system of government, 
encouraged European opponents of. Augustus to consider supporting 
Stanislas. l Poland was an elective monarchy and Augustus' 
attempts to have his son accepted as his successor failed. 
Saxon aspirations clashed with Prussian determination to prevent 
Saxony from becoming a major power. Frederick William I was 
very interested both in the Polish succession, and in the 
1. Stanislas' daughter married Louis XV in 1725. 
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succession of the Polish Vassal-Duchy of Courland, where the 
dynasty was dying out. The growing ill health of Augustus II 
and his unrelenting addiction to the bottle and the chase of 
both deer and women, led to frequent reports of his death: 
that he was to survive until 1733 came as a great surprise. 
1 
Aside from these major territories there were several other 
states whose succession was uncertain and contested. Several 
European dynasties were failing to reproduce themselves. The 
Cirksena family, the Dukes of East Friesland, were one of these 
and their extinction in 1744 had been long anticipated. In 
1691 a mutual succession agreement between Hanover and East 
Frisia providing for the eventual succession of the Welfs to 
East Friesland if the Cirksenas died out was confirmed. Three 
years later the Emperor Leopold I granted Frederick III of 
Brandenburg-Prussia a right of succession. Danish and Dutch 
interest in the area compounded the tension, and a civil war 
broke out in the 1720s between the ruler George Albert and the 
powerful Estates. The East Friesland issue embittered 
Hanoverian-Prussian relations, and the exercise of Imperial 
authority in the dispute fortified fears about Austrian intentions. 
2 
1. Jacquemin, Lorraine envoy in Vienna, to the Duke of Lorraine, 
30 Dec. 1726, Nancy; Lady Sandwich to James II, 6 Jan. 1727, 
RA. 101/68; Magnan to Morville, 28 Jan. 1727, Sbornik, 64, 
(1888), p. 496; Duke of Liria, Spanish diplomat, to Marquis de 
la Paz, 11 Oct. 1727, PRO. 107/1 D; Du Bourgay to Townshend, 
20 Mar. 1728, PRO. 90/23; Vlych, British Resident in the Hansa 
ports, to Tow9shend, 31 Aug, 3 Sept. 1728, PRO. 82/45, f. 280, 
283; P. Boye, Un RQi de Polo ne et la Couronne ducale de 
Lorraine. Stanislas Leszczv ski et le tröisi me Traite de 
2. Hughes, pp. 84-95,99-100,281-362; Du Bourgay to Townshend, 
17 Feb. 1725, PRO. 90/18; 'Memoire abregg sur les differents 
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Further south the Nittelsbach family was in dynastic 
difficulty largely due to its policy of donating too many 
younger sons to the rule of such ecclesiastical principalities 
as Liege, Cologne, !i nster, Paderborn, Hildesheim and a clutch 
of South German bishoprics. The Elector Palatine,. Karl Philipp, 
who was to die childless in 1742, ruled, besides his Electorate 
to which the Wittelsbach house of Palatine-Sultzbach had a clear 
right to succeed, the Rhenish. Duchies of Julich and Berg. 
These were a part of the old. succession of the house of Cleves 
which had been provisionally divided between the two principal 
claimants, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Count Palatine of 
Neuberg in 1614, a division confirmed, after much conflict, in 
the partition of. 1666. The rights of the house of Palatine- 
Sultzbach to succeed in the Jülich-Berg inheritance were open to 
dispute, and Frederick William I made'it clear that he intended 
to pursue his claims with vigour, and, - if necessary, with violence. 
Though Frederick William claimed to be ready to accept 'a compromise, 
the Wittelsbachs displayed no such readiness. 
l 
In Italy the Medici Grand Dukes of Tuscany and the Farnese 
Dukes of Parma were dying out. The succession to both Duchies 
was claimed by the eldest son of Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese, 
Don Carlos. Though John Gaston, the last Medici Grand Duke was 
not to die until 1737, and the last of the Farnese died in 1731, 
the succession issue had been much discussed in the 1720s. 
Imperial authority (and Austrian power) was involved, as both 
Tuscany and Parma were within the Empire, and the Austrians did 
not wish to see their strong position within Italy challenged by 
Carlos. Elisabeth Farnese sought'. to have Carlos' succession 
confirmed by the introduction of Spanish garrisons into the 
principal strongpoints in the Duchies, and by permission being 
1. A. Rosenlehner, Kurfürst Karl Philipp von der Pfalz und die 
jülichsche Frage, 1725- 72 '9[unich, 190G); Wilson, pp. l53-5; 
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granted for Carlos to reside in them. The Dukes, disinclined 
to see their authority infringed, and supported by the Austrians, 
opposed any such scheme. 
t 
The role of dynastic concerns is difficult to evaluate.. 
G. H. Jones has pointed out that the. problem of the succession to 
the territories of an extinct ruling house was one of the major 
diplomatic problems of the period and J. H. Shennan has referred 
to 'rampant dynasticisn'. Certainly there were dynastic claims 
that were not pushed very hard, such as the Saxon claims to the 
Jülich-Berg inheritance., However, in general, -it could be 
suggested that the dynastic element should be stressed at the 
expense of any analysis that centres on for example, commercial 
factors. Foreign policy was the most essential prerogative of 
majesty, and the attitudes of individual rulers are central to 
any analysis of international relations in this period. Any 
attempt at model building fails before- t-he stubborn facts of 
personal whim. 
The Austro-Spanish treaties of April 30th/May 1st 1725 came 
as a considerable surprise to the rest of Europe. The two 
parties had been considered irreconcilable because of their- 
differences over Italy. Early in 1725 a Dutch adventurer, 
Ripperda, arrived in Vienna. He had been sent secretly by 
Elisabeth Farnese to offer a Spanish guarantee of the Pragmatic 
Sanction and concessions for Charles VI's favourite commercial 
scheme, the Ostend Company, in return for guarantees for Don 
Carlos' succession to Parma and Tuscany, and marriages between 
1. G. H. Jones, 'Inghilterra, Granducato di Toscana e Quadruplice 
Alleanza', Archivio Storico Italiano. (1980), pp. 59-87; 
Quazza, pp. 61-7. 
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her eldest sons, Carlos and Philip, and two of the Emperor's 
daughters. The eventual treaties avoided committing Charles 
on the fate of his daughters, but provided for Carlos' rights 
in Italy, the mutual recognition and guarantees of each ruler's 
possessions and successions, trading concessions to the Ostend 
C6mpany and Austrian support for the return of Gibraltar and 
Minorca from England. 
The treaty created a lot of unease in Britain and France. 
Bourbon's ministry was concerned about the prospect of Austrian 
support for Philip V's claim on the French throne and the 
British were worried by rumoured secret articles in support of 
the Pretender, fears that were unfounded insofar as the actual 
Austro-Spanish agreements were concerned. 
l Both powers feared 
that the threat to the balance of power represented by the new 
treaty could force them into making concessions in the myriad of 
disputes in which they were involved. -On September"3rd 1725 
Britain, France and Prussia signed the Treaty of Hanover 
guaranteeing each other's territories and rights inside and 
outside Europe. This provoked a new Austro-Spanish treaty two 
months later. Spain promised Austria subsidies, and in return 
Charles VI agreed that two of his daughters. should marry the 
sons of Philip and Elisabeth. 
1. Townshend to Diemar, 4 Jan. (os) 1727, PRO. 100/15; 
Hervey, I, 58; 'e. Ralph], A Critical History of the 
Administration of Sir Robert Walpole (1743) p. 408; 
G. Syveton, 'Un trait6secret de mariage et d' alliance 
entre les cours de Vienne et de Madrid en 1725', Revue 
iiistorique 54, (1894) pp. 77-97; G. Syveton, Une Cour et un 
aventurier au XVIII siecle; le Baron de Ripperda (Paris, 1896), 
and the review by E. Armstrong, EHR 12, (1897) pp. 796-800; 
P. Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism p. 134. 
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The next eighteen months saw a period of acute diplomatic 
tension, aptly described by McKay as a 'cold war'. 
1 Each of 
the alliances sought to acquire new allies. The Hanover 
alliance gained Sweden, Denmark and the United Provinces, the 
Vienna alliance, Russia, and, largely thanks to Prussian fears 
of Russia and the prospect of Austrian support over Jülich-Berg, 
Prussia. Most of the German powers, whichever alliance they 
formally joined, followed-an ambivalent policy. This was true 
of Saxony, Bavaria and Hesse-Cassel, 
2 
whilst Sardinia attempted to 
conduct an auction for her support. The period saw massive 
military mobilisations. Britain dispatched three large fleets, 
one to the Baltic to persuade Sweden and Denmark that an 
accession to the Hanover alliance would not leave them 
vulnerable to Russia, one to the West Indies to blockade the 
Spanish treasure fleet and thereby prevent Spain from being able 
to provide Austria with subsidies, and-one to Spanish waters to 
menace invasion and prevent a blockade of Gibraltar. The 
Spaniards fired the first shots when they besieged Gibraltar in 
February 1727. George I anxious about Hanoverian vulnerability 
to Prussian and Austrian attack persuaded France to move large 
forces towards the Rhine. 'War plans were drawn up and Townshend 
considered naval action against Sicily and an invasion of the 
Austrian Netherlands. 3 
1. McKay, Eugene, title of chapter 22, pp. 208-19; Fleury to 
Charles VI, 12 Mar. 1727, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 11 f. 1- 
Rbrvey, I, 65. The best brief introductions to this period 
can be found in Wilson, chapter 4, pp. 151-167, and R. Lodge, 
review of Chance's Alliance of Hanover-, EHR 39, (1924)pp. 293-7. 
2. H. Philippi, Landgraf Karl von Hessen-Ca"ssel (Marburg, 1976) 
p, 547. 
Bý- Dunthorne, pp. 113-126. 
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Throughout the period of tension negotiations had 
continued between some of the powers of the two alliances. 
Cardinal Fleury, Louis XV's former tutor, became chief minister 
of France in 1726 and he was determined to avoid war. He 
attempted to restrain the more aggressive British ministry, and 
this led to some British doubts about the degree of his commitment 
to the Anglo-French alliance. 
l Rleury realised that Austria was 
less interested in conflict than Spain. An ultimatum was sent 
to Austria threatening war if she would not agree to 'quelques 
articles preliminaires, qui puissent faire envisager une prompte 
conciliation'. Charles VI, averse to war, in a difficult fiscal 
position due to disappointments over Spanish subsidies, and 
hopeful that he would be able to gain advantages at the Congress 
table, agreed. 
On May 31st 1727 the Preliminaries of Paris, the terms for 
a. pacification of Europe, were signed by the representatives of 
Britain, France, the United Provinces and Austria. 
2 Spain did 
not have an envoy in Paris and it was agreed that the Spanish 
envoy in Vienna, Bournonville, should be asked to sign there on 
behalf of Spain. Two-weeks later on June 14th George I embarked 
at Greenwich for a visit to his Electorate and eight days after 
that, on the 22nd, he died at Osnabrück. On the 23rd the news 
of his death reached The Hague, on the 26th, Paris and on the 
28th, Vienna. On Wednesday June 25th towards 3 p. m. the news 
1.. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 14,28. Ap. 1,5 May 1727, 
AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
2. Dunthorner p. 138; Chance, Alliance of Hanover 
pp. 731-5. The text of the Preliminaries can be found in A. Pribram, Osterreichische Staatsvertrage: England 
bis (Innsbruck, 1907 ) pp. 457-64. 
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reached Whitehall by means of a courier, sent by Townshend 
who had been following GeorgeV to Hanover. Walpole gave the 
t 
orders to double the. guard throughout London and then left for 
Richmond to inform George Prince of Wales that his father had died. 
That evening George came to London and the following'morning was 
l 
proclaimed King. 
It might seem that George I left on his last trip to Europe 
and George II came to_the, throne against the background of 
impending peace. After the Preliminaries had been signed the 
ministerial press was full of praise for a government that had 
brought peace to Europe. Hope was held out that British trade 
would revive. The day before George died Stanley's News Letter 
reported, 
'The merchants and traders of the City of London are 
overjoy'd at the prospect there is, that both our domestick 
. and 
foreign trade, which has for a considerable time met with 
obstructions from the undeserved ill usage this nation had met 
with, will by the great wisdom and conduct of our wise 
administration flourish again; some of these good effects 
being already to appear among our woollen and silk 
manufacturers here'. 
Prosperity at home would be accompanied by peace abroad. It was 
confidently predicted that the Jacobites. would see their chances 
of foreign support disappear, and, indeed, many of the Jacobites 
were very pessimistic about the consequences of the Preliminaries. 
2 
1. There is a good account of these events in the newsletter sent 
to the Prince-Bishop of Osnabrück on 27th June. Osnabrück 294, 
f. 43-4. 
2. Sir Henry Goring, Jacobite agent i. n Paris, to James III, 8 June, 
James III to Hay, 20 June, Charles Caeser to James III, 29 June 
1727, RA. 107/34,107/88,107/141; C. V. Bennett, The Tory 
Crisis in Church and State 1688-1730 (Oxford, 1975) p. 293. 
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Owen O'Rourke, the Jacobite agent in Vienna reported, 
'all doors seem to be shutt upp by the 
preliminarys agreed upon'. 
1 
However, alongside these tidings of peace, sounds of war and 
notes of discord were still heard. 
2 
Some diplomats doubted 
whether Austria was sincere in its desire for peace. 
3 Fears 
were expressed that the Preliminaries would lead to France 
abandoning Britain and joining Spain and Austria. It was well 
known that there had been much Anglo-French tension over the 
conduct of negotiations. These doubts and fears were to grow 
in intensity after the accession of George II, and it was to be 
speedily realised that the Preliminaries of Paris had not improved 
the British diplomatic situation to any appreciable extent. 
1. O'Rourke to JamesIII, 14 June 1727, Vienna, England, Varia, 8. 
2. Horatio Walpole to Delaf aye, 13 June 1727, PRO. 78/308 f. 845; 
Townshend to Newcastle, 19 June 1727, PRO. 43/9; 
Townshend to Admiral Norris, 24 June 1727, BL. Add. 28156 f. 221. E 
3. Tilson to Delafaye, 19 June 1727, PRO. 43/9; 
Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 30 July 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f. 127 
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The British Ministry 
0 
When George II acceded, the principal British ministers 
were Sir Robert Walpole, who ran the Treasury and led the 
ministerial group in the House of Commons, Lord Townshend, the 
Secretary of State for-the Northern Department, and the Duke of 
Newcastle, his colleague in the Southern Department. Opinions 
l 
varied and still vary as to the abilities of each and their 
relations with each other. The last five years of George I's 
reign, the period after the deaths of Stanhope and Sunderland, ' 
have received very little scholarly attention. . 
The ministerial 
rivalries of this period, and in particular the falls of Carteret 
and Cadogan, have received far less attention than the feuds of the 
first five years of the reign, and the' latest biographer-of 
-- George I, Hatton, is disappointingly brief in her survey of these 
years. Hatton sees the last years of George's reign as years of 
political quiescence, 'The consensus among ministers achieved by the 
Townshend-Walpole coup of 1724 .... the absence 'of factional strife 
made for relative ease of cabinet business'. 
2 
1. Hervey, I, 29. They were referred to in an anonymous French 
memoir as 'le triumvirat', 'Memoire sur 1'etat present de la 
Grande Bretagne', 31 Dec. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 364 f. 388. 
On Newcastle see Browning. There'is no biography of Townshend. 
On Walpole see Plumb, Sedgwick, II, 513-17, H. T. Dickinson, 
Walpole and the Whig Supremacy (1973), B. Kemp, Sir Robert 
-Walpole (1976), G. Holmes, 'Sir Robert Walpole' in H. van Thal (eä) 
The Prime Ministers (2 vols., 1974), I. Walpole was First 
Commissioner of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
2. Hatton, p. 276. Hatton argues that George I was not a captive 
of his ministers, pp. 256, n, 1,276,296. 
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It was certainly the case that Walpole and Townshend acted 
to remove those of different views and put in their place people 
they could trust. Former adherents of Sunderland were removed, 
l 
such as the Duke of Roxburgh, Secretary of State for Scotland, 
sacked in 1725, Lord Carteret, sent to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant 
in 1724 (a form of exile in the view of many), 
2 
and the Earl of 
Macclesfield, impeached successfully as Lord Chancellor in 1725 
in a move that some blamed, on Walpole. 
3 Diplomats closely 
associated with Carteret, such-as Sir Luke Schaub and the Earl of 
4 
Marchmont, were denied posts. However, as George Baillie had 
pointed out in 1723, 'WValpole doubtless has secret enemies', 
5 
and the conduct of several ministers in 1727, when George 
Dodington, a Lord of the Treasury, and the Duke of Dorset, the 
Lord Steward, deserted Walpole for Compton, confirms this view. 
1. Chammorel to Morville, 4 Jan. 1725, AE. CP. Ang. 350 f. 20. 
2. Carteret, a diplomat of considerable experience, had been 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 1721-4. 
He was jockeyed out of this position by'Townshend, Walpole 
and Newcastle. 
3. Chammorel to Morville, 18 Jan., 5 Feb. 1725, AE. CP. Ang. 
350 f. 70,117; W. A. Speck, Stability and Strife, England 
1714-60 (1977) pp. 230-1. 
4. R. Massini, Sir Luke Schaub 1690-1758 (Basel, 1953). 
5. Sedgwick, I, 35. Tiaillie was MP. for Berwickshire and a 
Lord of the Treasury. 
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The respective roles of the three principal ministers are 
difficult to distinguish, because of the paucity of private 
correspondence surviving between them. Newcastle seems to have 
followed the lead of his colleagues. He was not noted for his 
abilities, and was profuse in his protestations of loyalty towards 
Walpole and Townshend. 
1 
He also stressed his willingness to 
follow the advice of the senior Secretary, Townshend. However, 
Newcastle was a stubborn man determined to protect his position 
and desirous of seeming to influence policy. Despite his 
apparent pliancy, he was increasingly adopting views of his own. 
2 
In 1725 he sought to block the dispatch of Lord Waldegrave to 
Paris on an embassy to congratulate Louis XV"on his marriage. 
The details are obscure, but it appears that Newcastle resented 
an appointment in his own department of someone he did not approve 
of. Newcastle failed to block the appointment. 
3 Possibly the 
increased speculation about Newcastle being replaced as Secretary, 
speculation that is particularly noticeable in the winter of 1726- 
1727, reflected real tension within the ministry, but, if it did, 
there are few other signs of such tension. Newcastle accepted both 
a position as ministerial second fiddle in the House of Lords, and 
the independent attitude and position of Sir Robert Walpole's brother, 
" 
Horatio, who held Paris, the most important embassy in Newcastle's 
department. 4 
1. Browning, p. 48; Dickinson, Walpole p. 163. 
2. Williams, pp. 60-66; Plumb, P. 195; Browning, pp. 49-50. 
3. 'Notes relating to my coming here', no date, notes in 
Waldegrave's handwriting, Chewton. 
4. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 7 Jan. 1727, Osnabrück 299 f. 84. 
Newcastle. describing his position in the 1720's noted that he 
'then, never thought, nor could be thought by anybody, but to 
act a subordinate part in the House of Lords', Newcastle to 
Hardwicke, 14 Oct. (os) 1739, BL. Add. 35046 f. 165. W. Coxe, 
Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole (1802) pp. 46-171; 
w ... e". i ýý TTC I\I1 
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The relations between Townshend and Walpole are unclear. 
Differences of opinion existed about a range of matters, and 
historians have been able to draw attention to clashes between 
the two ministers. 
I 
However, it would be absurd to suppose that 
differences should not have existed. Any attempt to define 
respective spheres of interest, with Townshend dealing with 
foreign affairs, and Walpole with the House of Commons and fiscal 
matters, needed to cope with the interdependence of these spheres. 
2 
Foreign policy entailed fiscal obligations that had to be supported 
by Parliament. Plumb has suggested that tension between the two 
men steadily increased, that Walpole acquired sufficient self- 
confidence to challenge Townshend's control of foreign policy, 
that Townshend resented Walpole's growing strength in Norfolk 
politics, symbolised by the building of his grandiose seat at 
Houghton, and that the death in 1726 of Walpole's sister, who had 
been Townshend's wife, helped to weaken the links between the two 
3 
men. 
Against this must be set the continued successful partnership 
of the two men and the relative absence of contemporary suggestions 
of division between them. Contemporary commentators were always 
very keen to see signs of conflict, and they are, within limits, 
a guide to the perception of tension in this period. George I's 
ministry, when he set out for Hanover, in the summer of 1727, was 
a successful administration. The three principal ministers were 
united and the jealousy of them that existed within the ministry 
was held in check by governmental success and royal favour. 
1. J. B. Owen, The Eighteenth Century 1714-1815 (1974) p. 28. 
2. During Townshend's absences in Hanover, Walpole was involved 
in the conduct of foreign policy, Walpole to Newcastle, 
19 Sept. (os) 1725, PRO. 35/58, f. 50. 
, 
3. Plumb, pp. 132-3,151,171; Hervey, I, 80-5; Dickinson, Walpole 
pp. 123-4; Owen, Eighteenth Century p. 29. 
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Bolingbroke was foolish to believe that George was going to 
dismiss Walpole. 1 Nevertheless Walpole, aware of opposition 
within the ministry, was conscious of the need to maintain 
royal support. 
Walpole's relations with George, Prince of Wales, were 
not particularly good, 
2 though they were not as bad as the 
Prince's relations with Newcastle. 
3 During the mid-1720s 
the Prince had played little part in politics and had led a 
rather retired life. The spectacular disputes with his father 
of the late 1710s had been replaced by a mutual coldness. 
4 
There is little sign of any difference of opinion between father 
and son over policy, but there was tension over the Prince's 
position. George I refused to have his son as Regent in England, 
during his absences in Hanover, and he vetoed his request to have 
a military post in any European conflict that might involve Britain. ] 
-I 
1. Sir Henry Goring to James III, 24 Mar. 1727, RA. 105749; 
Bolingbroke to Sir William Wyndham, 20 Feb. (os) 1736, 
Coxe, II, 340; Hervey, 1,13-16; Dickinson, Bolingbroke 
(1970) P. 219; Foord, His Majesty's Opposition p. 115; 
Coxe, I, 264-5. 
2. Collections of the Rev. H. Etough, vol. 2, BL. Add. 9200, f. 48; 
Marini, p. 79; Hervey, I, 29; Owen, Eighteenth Century p. 28; 
Cesar de S aussure, A Foreign View of England in the Reigns 
of George I and George II (1902) p. 175. 
3. Hervey, I, 29; Williams, p. 39. 
4. Coxe, I, 193,271; Foord, His Majesty's Opposition p. 107, n. 6, 
p. 116. Hatton, however, stresses 'the harmonious family life' 
of George I's last years, pp. 193,271; J. M. Beattie, 
'The Court of George I and English Politics, 1717-20', EHR 81 
(1966) p. 37. 
5. Chammorel to Morville, 11 June 1725, Broglie to Morville, 
2 June 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 351, f. 172,359, f. 180; Fiorelli to 
the Doge of Venice, 20 June 1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 96, f. 569; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 26 June 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
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The ministry sought to smooth matters. Townshend was 
instrumental in securing the Garter for the Earl of Scarborough, 
the Master of the Horse to the Prince of Wales, and one of his 
principal favourites. 
' The Prince was kept informed of 
government policy through the Duke of Devonshire, who had close 
connections with the Princess, Caroline of Ansbach. 
2 Foreign 
diplomats had little hope that the accession of George II would 
alter British policy, which suggests a belief that the Prince 
was as committed to the French alliance as his father. 
3 
Though his views on policy might be a mystery, the Prince 
was known to possess a distinct group of friends and confidants, 
some of whom were distinctly at odds with his father's ministers. 
4 
This group has never received major scholarly attention, and its 
importance and potential strength have been underratied... Its 
leading member was the Honourable Spencer Compton, son of the 
third Earl of Northampton and M. P. for Sussex. 
5 Throughout 
George I's reign he was Speaker of the House of Commons and 
Treasurer to the Prince of Wales. In 1722 the ministry, seeking 
to please the Prince, bestowed on Compton the extremely lucrative 
office of Paymaster General. In her diary Lady Mary Cowper 
1. Coxe, I, 193-4. 
2. Coxe, I, 283; Plumb, p. 163; Le Coq to Marquis de Fleury, 
3 May 1726, Dresden, 2674 f. 41. William, second Duke of 
Devonshire was made Lord Privy Seal in March 1725 and held 
the post until his death in 1729. 
3. Le Coq wrote of George, ... 'etant encore Prince de Galles, il a toujours approuve le present sisteme et toutes les 
mesures prises, en consequence, chose certaine et connue de 
touts ceux, qui ont eu 1'honneur de l'approcher.. '.. Le Coq 
to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, vol. 18a, f. 128. 
4. Essex was 'a scarce-disguised enemy to Sir Robert Walpole', 
Hervey, 1,96. 
5. Coxe, I, 284-5; Sedgwick, I, 568-9; P. D. G. Thomas, The House of 
Commons in the Eighteenth Century, (Oxford, 1971) pp. 291-4. 
There is no biography of Compton. 
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presented Compton as an active politician seeking to create 
a party that would include some of the Tories, but views of 
Compton's effectiveness and abilities varied. Browning has 
referred to 'the peculiarly gutless manner that characterised 
so much of his public life'; and this view is widely, if 
less vividly, held. 
1 Compton's abilities and influence are 
difficult to assess, but in 1727 he was held to be a plausible 
candidate for chief minister. 
Prince George's circle had a distinctly artistocratic 
tone. Aside from Compton, prominent members included 
Frederick Nassau, third Earl of Grantham, Richard Lumley, 
second Earl of Scarborough, 
2 William Capel, third Earl of Essex 
and Philip Stanhope, fourth Earl of Chesterfield. Aside from 
Compton, few members of this group possessed any governmental 
experience and none had distinguished himself in Parliament. 
Aside from Compton, the group was relatively young, younger 
than George II, who acceded in his forty-sixth year. Scarborough 
had been born in 1688, Chesterfield in 1694. The abilities 
of these men were unknown, their political interest untested. 
None was a great borough patron. 
1. S. Cowper (ed. ), Diary of Mary Countess Cowper, 1714-20 
(2nd ed., 1865) p. T44; Browning, p. 51. 
2. Chammorel was impressed by Scarborough's parliamentary 
behaviour in March 1726, Chammorel to Morville, 4 Mar. 
1726, AE. CP. Ang. 354, f. 183 
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The other confidant of the Prince who was believed to 
enjoy great influence was his mistress Henrietta Howard, 
Countess of Suffolk. She had links with the parliamentary 
opposition and was in touch with the critics of Walpole. 
After George II came to the throne she enjoyed little power, 
l 
but this had not been predicted, and George's earlier favour 
for her had been seen as a sign that Walpole would not 
survive the change of monarch. 
1. Hervey, I, 39-44; Coxe, I, 276-81; 
L. Melville, Lady Suffolk and her Circle,; Letters to 
and from Henrietta Countess of Suffolk edited by 
J. W. Croker (2 vols., 1824). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ACCESSION of GEORGE II 
George II came to the throne determined to be his own 
master. He had no intention of being a roi faineant, and 
made it clear from the beginning of his reign that he wished 
to control all the activities of government. Such a wish was 
not new, and, particularly since Louis XIV's bombastic remarks 
of 1661, every monarch at his accession to power spoke of his 
intention to rule himself. George energetically threw himself 
into the buginess of government, and contemporaries noted this. 
Mr. Le Coq, the Saxon Envoy Extraordinary, a diplomat who had 
had considerable experience of the British court, where he had 
been accredited for several years, noted of George, 
'I1 s'occupe beaucoup aux affaires du government 
et prend connoissance de tout .... I1 voudroit introduire, 
dans les affaires de son Royaume, le meine ordre, qu'il 
avoit etabli, dans celles de sa maison'. 
1 
The Sardinian envoy, the Marquis D'Aix, noted that George wanted 
to be informed of everything and that he worked hard; points 
frequently made in the diplomatic correspondence of this period, 
'I1 paroit que S. M. B. veut etre informee de tout, 
et il travaille sans disontinuation depuis dix heures 
du matin, ju squ' ä trois apres midi. '2 
1. Le Coq to Augustus, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a, 
f. 133. 'The King, when he came to the throne, had formed 
a system both of men and things, and to make alterations in 
several offices, as to their power... ', King, p. 47. 
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 Aug. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Marini, p. 80; newsletter to the Prince-Bi shop, 11 July 
1727, Osnabrfck, No. 299, f. 49. 
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Indeed he worked so hard that fears were expressed about 
his health. On 22nd July Le Coq noted 'on craint, que cette 
trop grande application ne nuise a sa sante', and a month later 
he reported that George had gone to Richmond to rest, 
'Comme S. M. apporte une Brande application a tout a 
qui eile fait, et quelle aime une prompte expedition dans 
les affaires, on n'a pas ßt4 sans quelque apprehension, 
qu'une si grande contention d'esprit, surtout apres avoir 
mene ju squ' a present une view assez tranquille, ne 
causat quelque prejudice a sa sante' .1 
Hill Aussenden informed his brother Carteret Leathes, 
soon to he elected an M. P. for Sudbury, that George was 
determined to sit in person on the Admiralty, Treasury and 
War Office 'Boards. When George came to the throne he spoke 
of his intention to supervise the Treasury in person, and of 
his determination to cut pay, particularly for officials who 
held more than one post. It was believed'that he would cut 
the number of pensions paid from the civil list, and Le Coq, 
who referred to George as 'un Prince d'ordre et tres bon 
occonomie', believed that these changes were due not to George's 
avarice, but to a coherent fiscal and political strategy, an 
attempt to reduce the need for governmental borrowing and the 
dependence upon Parliamentary grants. 
2 There is no independent 
evidence for this suggestion, but it is symptomatic of the 
belief that George was seriously attempting to intervene in 
the processes of government. 
1. Le Coq to Augustus, 22 July, 26 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 
Vol. 18a, f. 133,224; newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 22 Aug. 
1727, Osnabrück, No. 291, f. 257,260. 
2. Hill Mussenden, M. P. Harwich 1741-47, to Carteret Leathes, 
20 June (os. ) 1727, Ipswich, East Suffolk CRO., Leathes papers, 
THA403 /1 /10. Mussenden was writing from London: Le Coq to 
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George's initial determination to rule himself survived 
the summer of 1727. He continued to work hard. D'Aix 
noted in December 1727, 
'Le Roy d'Angleterre travaille fort par 1ui-meme, 
et l'on croft qu' il continuera cette methode'. 
1 
In contrast to some of his ministers, such as Harrington, there 
were never any complaints of George being indolent, and he did 
not allow his strong interest in the chase to detract from the 
business of government. 
2 Throughout the autumn and winter of 
1727 he showed that he was determined to maintain his authority. 
Carteret's new instructions as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 
drawn up in October, limited his power over the Irish army and 
increased that of the King. 
3 Two months later the French 
manuscript newsletter sent regularly from London to George's 
uncle, Ernst-August, the Prince-Bishop-of Osnabrück, reported 
that George was intervening in the pay of his household and 
guard officers, and devoting 'beaucoup d'attention au Reglement 
de 1'Etat Civil et Militaire'. 
4 The role of George in government 
patronage is indicated by a remark in Sir Edward Knatchbull's 
parliamentary diary. In March 1728 Knatchbull was brought in 
1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 15 Dec. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
2. Colley is inaccurate in referring to George as 'fundamentally 
indolent', Colley, Defiance p. 208. 
3. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 30 Sept. 1727, Osnabrück, No. 291, 
f. 210; Le Hermitage to the States General, 7 Nov. 1727, BL. 
Add. 17677KKK9 f. 432; Copy of tenth article of Carteret's 
instructions, 23 Oct. (os. ) 1727, PRO. 63/389 f. 72; 
Leeds Mercury 31 Oct. (os. ) 1727; Williams, p. 75. 
4. Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop. 16 Dec. 1727, Osnabrück, 
No. 295, f. 320-2. 
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on the government interest for Lostwithiel, which Knatchbull 
claimed, 'was directed to be done by the king on the Duke of 
Dorset mentioning to him the hardship I had in Kent ...... 
Walpole concurred in this, and executed the king's commands 
in my behalf with great willingness. ' It is noteworthy that 
Dorset consulted George rather than Walpole, and, despite 
Knatchbull's claim, it is probable that Walpole was less than 
pleased at having to bring in for a safe government seat, a 
man whose voting record showed strong signs of political 
independence. 1 
Countering these signs of royal activity there were others 
that suggested that George was, as one biographer has claimed, 
2 
a 'king in toils'. The Earl of Strafford informed James III 
that, 
'The same violent and corrupt measures taken by the 
father will be pursued by the son; who is passionate, proud 
and peevish, and though he talks of ruling by himself, he 
will just be governed as his father was. '3 
The continued power of Walpole, the few ministerial changes and 
the decision not to change government policies led many to'adopt 
Straf ford's conclusion. By the autumn of 1727 Walpole's 
continued power was regarded as unremarkable, and this has led 
historians to ignore just how surprising such a continuation was. 
4 
1. Knatchbull, p. 73. Lostwithiel being a borough in the Duchy 
of Cornwall was within the patronage 'system of the Prince of 
wales, but until Prince Frederick arrived from Hanover in 
1728. 
2. J. D. Griffith Davies, A King in Toils (London, 1938). 
3.. Strafford to James III, 21 June (os. ) 1727, cited in 
C. Chevenix-Trench, George II (London, 1973) p. 134. 
4. J. Owen, Eighteenth Century p. 28. 
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Eight days before the death of George I, the London 
weekly newspaper, Applebee's Original Weekly Journal printed 
a letter from 'Terre-Filius', warning 'all designing statesmen, 
and unwary Politicians', that 
'as their power only depends upon the Breath of 
their sovereigns, an angry blast of that flings them 
at once from the summit of their glory, and height of 
their ambition; or at most, their authority generally 
determines with the life of their Prince, it being very 
rarely found that the most expert statesman can continue 
a favourite to two Princes successively. '. 
1 
Many endorsed this view, and the accession of George II led to 
widespread expectations of Walpole's fall. 
2 . Most of the major 
Tory peers and MP. s flocked to court, hoping that George would 
drastically reconstitute the ministry. On. June 26th the Earls 
of Strafford and Lichfield, and Lords Gower and Scarsdale came 
to court and kissed George's hand. Strafford and the Duke of 
Somerset accompanied George to the Royal Chapel on July 6th. 
These visits were public and were well reported, both in Britain 
and Europe. Stanley's Letter, a manuscript newsletter used by 
many of the provincial newspapers, such as the Ipswich Journal, 
as a source of London and European news, reported on July 5th that 
'there is the greatest court that has been known, most of the 
Popish and Tory Lords so called, have been to wait on. their 
Majesties and were very graciously used'... The newsletter sent 
to George's uncle Ernst-August noted that many notables who had 
not been to court for years such as Somerset, Strafford, Scarsdale, 
1. Applebee's Original Weekly Journal 3 June (os. ) 1727. 
2. Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 29 June, Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 
7 July 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11 f. 251,254. 
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the Duchess of Marlborough and the Earl of Arran had paid 
their respects to George and been received very graciously. 
Tories such as Lord Bathurst hoped that George would turn to 
them. The Earl of Oxford wanted to go to court, 'though 
' 
according to the Countess of Strafford, he was dissuaded by 
his wife. Charles Caesar, soon to be elected M. P. for 
Hertfordshire, informed Jameslll that 'several of the Tories ... 
had formed to themselves. ridiculous notions of favour from the 
Prince', but he suggested that some of the Tories who went to 
court had mixed motives, 'hoping to so lull the government 
asleep that they would disband some of their forces and seeking 
to defeat the plans of those Tories who would serve George. '? 
George did make a few moves in the direction of the Tories. 
He was most gracious to those who came to court, sufficiently 
so that there was speculation that some such as Sir Thomas Hanmer, 
(Tory M. P. for Suffolk, would be raised to the peerage, 
3 
and he 
took steps to increase the number of Tory. Justices of the Peace. 
1. Viscount Percival to his brother Philip, 14 June (os) 1727, 
BL. Add. 47032 f. 18; Charles, Earl of Orrery to James III, 
30 June 1727, RA: 107/50; Robinson to St. Saphorin, 14 July 
1727, PRO. 80/61; Duchess of Somerset to Earl of Nottingham, 
18 July (os) 1727, Leicestershire CRO., Finch Mss., DG/7/4952; 
George Lockhart to James III, 28 July 1727, Lockhart, Lockhart 
Papers II, 354; Lord Boyle to W. Byrd, Deputy Governor of 
Virginia, -- Sept. (os) 1727, The Orrery Papers edited by E. C. 
Boyle, Countess of Cork and Orrery (2 vols., 1903) I, 53-4; 
Le Coq to Flemming, 18 July, Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 
1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 116,126-9; Charles, Lord Bruce 
to the Earl of Wilmington, 29 Dec. (os) 1729, Wiltshire CRO., 
Savernake Mss. 1300,1238; Newsletters to the Prince-Bishop, 
4 July 1727, Osnabruck, No. 291 f. 778,886; Farley's Bristol 
Newspaper 24 June (os), The Original"York Journal: or, 
Weekly Courant 27 June, Leeds Mercury. 27 June, 4 July 1727; 
Colley, Defiance p. 207; E. Cruickshanks, Political 
Untouchables. The Tories and the '45 (1974) pp. 10-11. 
2. Caesar to James III, 29 June, Orrery to James III, 30 June, 
Graham to O'Rourke, 1 Aug. 1727, RA. 107/141,107/150,109/3. 
George Lockhart made the same suggestion, Lockhart Papers 
II, 351. 
3. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 5 Aug. 1727, Osnabrück, No. 291 
f. 971. 
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6 
On July 27th he instructed the Lord Chancellor, Lord King,. to 
'put into the commission of the peace all gentlemen of rank and 
quality in the several counties, unless they were in direct 
opposition to his Government. ' Lord King consulted several 
notables, including Harmer, but when the Lord Lieutenant of Suffolk, 
the Duke of Grafton, complained of Hanmer's suggestions, 
(which included Tories such as Sir Robert Kemp, the former M. P. 
for Dunwich) George ordered King to follow Grafton's advice. 
1 
Indeed the Tories were-swiftly disabused of their hopes of 
George. 2 On August 5th the newsletter sent to Osnabrück noted 
that most Tories were no longer going to court because they 
realised that George would not include them in the ministry. 
3 
Bathurst did not obtain the Earldom he had hoped for from George 
and he was angry that the king did not help him over the 
Cirencester election. 
4 Charles Caesar noted on August 12th that 
. 
the tories were increasingly conscious -of the vanity of their hopes 
P 
1. Colley, Defiance p. 208. For Chancellor King displaying 
independence in his choice of the Lanarkshire J. P. 's, 
Wodrow, Analecta, Mar. 1728, pp. 489-90. 
2. 'Till we saw King George the second's speech to this Parliament 
it was pretty generally said that. severall of the principle 
Torys would be employed, but now that rumor is less credited', 
James Hamilton to James III, 14 July, -Thomas, Earl of 
Strafford t6 James III,. 1 Aug., Sir Henry Goring to James III, 
15 Sept. 1727, RA. 108/73,109/2,110/49. 
3. Newsletter to Prince-B3ishop, 5 Aug. 1727, Osnabrück, No. 291 
f. 972; R. Wodrow, Analecta III, 435, Aug. 1727; King, pp. 46-7. 
4. Bathurst to Mrs. Howard; 24 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 22626 f. 14-16; 
Colley, Defiance p. 221; Sedgwick, I, 246,445. 
5. Caesar to James III, 1 Aug. (os) 1727, RA. 109/6; 
Sedgwick, I, 513-17. 
\. 
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It is most doubtful whether George ever intended to do 
anything more than make a few concessions to the Tories, 
and to favour individuals whom he liked, as his father had 
done. As Prince of Wales in the 1720s, George had had little 
to do with the Tories and the aristocratic clique he mixed with 
was overwhelmingly Whig. Compton, earlier in his career, 
had considered an alliance with the Tories, and there were 
later to be suggestions-that he was willing to make such an 
alliance, ýbut there are no signs that he considered one in the 
summer of 1727. When George gave Lord King his instructions 
about altering the composition of the Bench, he told him to 
'still keep a majority of those who were known to be most firmly 
in his interest', though he ordered him to keep that part of his 
instructions secret, a move which suggests that George was really 
seeking to curry popularity. There are no signs in this period 
that George seriously thought of turning to the Tories, and this 
appears to have been a decision that stemmed from George's 
personal distrust of Toryism and his concern about the Jacobite 
sympathies of many Tories, rather than being the product of 
Walpole's persuasion. 
1 
.. 
Soon after the accession it was clear that the Tories had 
hhý 
little to expect. On July 3rd Hill Mussenden noted, 'Tis said 
the Tories begin to despair of having more-success in this reign 
2 
than in the last'. It was unclear whether Walpole would continue 
in power. His principal rival for that position was Compton. 
1.. King, pp. 49-50. ... .: Le Coq reported that the Tories had not been opposed to 
George I, but only to his government, and he added 'c'ent 
bien autant la recherche des emplois que la difference de 
sentiments, et de principes sur les affaires du gouvernement 
qui Torment les partis! Le Coq to Augustus II, Dresden, 
2676, vol. 18a, f. 127. 
2. Hill Mussenden to Carteret Leathes, 22 June (os. ) 1727, 
Ipswich, HA 403/1/10. 
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On the day that George was proclaimed king, June 26th, 
Newcastle wrote to Townshend of 'the concern and distraction 
we are all in here .... we can make no judgement of affairs 
here, in all probability the speaker will be the chief man'. 
' 
As Lord King noted, 'the king, when he came to the throne, had 
formed a system both of men and things', and, to most, the 
first point in this new system seemed to be a replacement of 
Walpole by Compton. - Arthur Onslow, the M. P. for Guildford, 
who was in London at the time, noted 
'that everybody expected, that Mr. Compton the 
Speaker would be the Minister, and Sir Robert Walpole 
thought so too, for a few days .... the new king's 
first inclination and resolution, which were certainly 
for Mr. Compton .... who had long been his treasurer, 
and very near to him in all hisý. counsels. It went so 
far as to be almost a formal appointment, the king, for 
two or three days directing everybody to go to him upon 
business ... but by the Queen's management, all this was 
soon over-ruled, with a sincere regard, I am persuaded, to 
what she believed to be most for the king's real service, 
with, perhaps, at the same time',. a little vanity to have 
the person deemed the- ablest Minister in Parliament .... 
to be a dependent of hers, which the bother was not, or 
2 
much in her esteem'. 
1. Newcastle to Townshend, 15 June (os. ) 1727, BL. Add. 
32687 f. 212. 
2. H. M. C. Onslow, 516-17; 
__ . .' CL. A. Speck,, Stability and Strife p. 215; Hervey, I, 22-49. 
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Onslow's interpretation was shared by many others. It was 
generally believed that George was heavily influenced by his 
wife. 
1 In March 1726, in a memoir drawn up by the French 
foreign ministry for their envoy in Britain Count Broglie, 
Caroline was stated to possess a lot of influence over George. 
2 
In November 1727, Walpole, telling Lord King 'of the great credit 
he had with the king' attributed it to 'the means of the Queen, 
who was. the most able woman to govern in the world'. A month 
later Le'Coq noted, 'V. M. n'ignore pas, que la Reine entre en 
tout, et qu'il ne se fait rien sans qu'on fait consultee'. 
3 
The contrast between the Queen's bright sparkling, witty 
nature and George's more dour, boorish demeanour greatly influenced 
contemporaries such as Lord Hervey, and led both them and later 
historians to attribute great power to the Queen. Coxe 
regarded George as a puppet manipulated by his wife, 
'Caroline .... almost entirely governed the. 
king .... contrived that her opinion should appear 
as if it had been his own'. 
By such guileful methods Caroline earned a reputation as a shrewd 
intriguer, and it was due to this reputation that contemporaries 
and later historians have largely attributed Walpole's continuance 
in office to the Queen. Coxe stated that the Queen 'solely 
occasioned the continuance of Sir Robert Walpole in the ministry' 
and Vaucher argued that Walpole owed his success to the fact that 
he had 'devine 1'influence irrestible que la Reine Caroline 
saurait exercer sur i'esprit violent mais borne du Roi'. 
4 
1. Hervey, I, 69 . 
2. Memoire pour servir d'Instruction au Comte de Broglie, 9 Mar. 
1726, AE. CP. Ang. 354 f. 170; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 
30 June 1737, AST. LM. Ing. 35. - 
3. King, 24 Nov. (os) 1727, p. 50; Le Coq to Augustus, 12 Dec. 1727, 
Dresden 2676, vol. 18a, f. 413; Chesterfield to Mrs. Howard, 
15 July BL. Add. 22626, f. 87 Marini, pp. 78,84; 
continued/ 
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3, Ferdinand Albrecht, Duke of Brunswick-Beven to Ludwig 
Rudolf, heir to the Duchy of Brunswick-WolfenbtLttel, 
22 Oct. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt. 22 Nr. 529 f. 61. 
4. Hervey, I, 39,44-5,47-8; Coxe, I, 282,285-6,288; 
Williams, p. 67; Vaucher, Robert Walpole, p. 35; 
W. Sichel, Bolingbroke and his Times (2 vols., 1902), 
II, 270; King, p. 111; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, I, 
44; Ihard, Great Britain and Hanover p. 133; 
King, 2 Sept. (os) 1729, p. 110. 
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Without overthrowing this analysis, it is possible to 
suggest that Caroline's influence has been exaggerated and 
that there were other reasons for Walpole's continuance in 
power. In her diary Lady Mary Cowper, 'a Lady-in-Waiting to 
Caroline as Princess of Wales, suggested that Caroline and 
others overestimated her influence. 
' The picture of George 
as a headstrong, blinkered boor, manipulated by his wife and 
by Walpole, is one that has enjoyed much support but is largely 
based on the malicious views of a few contemporaries such as Hervey. 
2 
Many of the statements used by historians to support this 
interpretation of the events of 1727 are open to question. 
Hervey and Onslow both wrote their accounts several years later. 
Hervey did not begin his memoirs until 1733 or 1734, whilst 
Onslow's account is based upon papers and correspondence that 
no longer exist but were transcribed by his son in 1769. These 
papers were certainly drawn up after Walpole's death in 1745 
and their accuracy is open to question. 
The notes made by Lord King are a more useful source as 
they were made at the time of the. occurrences recorded or only 
shortly afterwards. King's account of the failure of Compton 
does not mention the Queen, but suggests that George was persuaded, 
by personal experience, to continue Walpole in power, 
1. Diary of Mary Countess Cowper, pp. 163-4. The Duchess of 
Marlborough came to the same conclusion, Marlborough to 
Captain Fish, 'bearleader to her grandsons', 31 July (os. ) 
1727, BL. Add. 61444 f. 147. 
2. Hervey, passim; Owen, Eighteenth Century P. 27; Coxe, I, 
271-2,276. For evidence of George's interest in books, 
J. Black, 'Diplomats as Book Procurers in the Age of Walpole', 
Factotum, 14, (1982) p. 15. 
6hý 
53 
'.... by his constant application to the king by 
himself in the mornings, when the Speaker, by reason 
of the sitting of the House of Commons, was absent, he 
so worked upon the king, that he not only established 
himself in favour with him, -but prevented the. 
cashiering of many others, who otherwise would have 
been put out. '1 
There were several obvious reasons why it would have been 
foolish to remove Walpole at once. The accession of a new 
monarch meant that Parliament had to be summoned, the Civil 
List settled and elections held for a new Parliament. Walpole 
was needed for these purposes. Parliament sat from July 8th 
to July 28th, and during this time Walpole made himself 
extremely useful to George, securing an enlarged Civil List of 
£800,000 per annum. 
2 Vaucher has suggested that this was one 
of the reasons for Walpole's success. As Prince of Wales, 
George had accumulated substantial debts; Le Coq suggested 
that they exceeded a million pounds. 
4 Furthermore the king 
had a reputation for avarice and meanness. Whatever the 
5 
1. King, p. 46. 
2. Coxe, I, 290-1; Marini, p. 79. 
3. Vaucher, Robert Walpole p. 35. Newcastle noted that George 
'talked a great deal to Sir Robert about the Civil List', 
Newcastle to Townshend, 15 June (os) 1727, BL. Add. 32687 f. 212; 
Hervey, 1,30,47. 
4. Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 136. 
5. Chavigny to Chauvelin, 12 Aug., 4 Sept. 1729, A. E. CP. 
Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 125,212; Wodrow, Analecta March 1728 
(os), III, 489; W. King, Political and Literary Anecdotes 
of his own Times (1818) p. 41; B. Lenman, The Jacobite 
Risings in Britain 1689-1746 (1980) p. 214. George was to 
argue subsequently that Walpole spent too much money, 
R. Sedgwick, 'Sir Robert Walpole', Times Literary Supplement 
2251, (1945) p. 134. 
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importance to George of the enlarged Civil List, it is certain 
that Walpole's command of the House of Commons and the ease 
with which he secured parliamentary consent for the new fiscal 
arrangements were very impressive, 
1 though it is doubtful 
whether politicians seeking to win royal favour would have 
found it helpful to oppose the Civil List in Parliament. 
Possibly more significant was Walpole's success in the 
elections. Le Coq suggested that Walpole was given an 
opportunity to display his skill to the king, and that George 
had decided to delay any governmental changes until after the 
elections, in order to be in a state to gratify those who had 
helped with the elections and those whose help would be needed 
in the subsequent Parliament. 
2 If this was so, Walpole 
certainly passed the test with flying colours. After the 
election petitions were heard, the new House of Commons consisted 
of 415 ministerial supporters, 15 opposition Whigs, and 128 
Tories, a government majority of 272, the largest since George I's 
accession. The comparable figures after the 1722 election were 
389 Whigs and 169 Tories, a majority of 220.3 
In his lengthy and thoughtful dispatch of July 22nd Le Coq 
had reported that other reasons were. being advanced as to why 
it was against the king's interest to change the government. 
1. Knatchbull, 20 Mar. (os) 1727, p. 68; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 
26 June 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 359 f. 209; Fiorelli to Doge of 
Venice, 1 Aug. 1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97 f. 1; E. W. Hill, The 
Growth of Parliamentary Parties 1689=1742 (1976) p. 197; 
Speck, Stability and Strife p. 216. 
2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a. f. 130; 
Le Coq to DeBrosse, 29 July 1727, Dresden, 663, f. 135; D'Aix 
to Victor Amadeus II, 21 July 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
3. Sedgwick, I, 34,37; St. Saphorin to Tarouca, Portuguese envoy 
in Austria, [- Aug. 1727, ], PRO. 80/61; Hill, Parliamentary 
Parties'pp. 197-8. 
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Firstly, Walpole's influence with Parliament and with the 
great chartered corporations - the Bank of England, East India 
Company and South Sea Company - were held to be very important 
for the credit-worthiness and stability of the government. 
Secondly, to change the government was held to be inadvisable 
for British foreign policy. The current policy was the 
product of the Walpole/Townshend ministry, so it was held to be 
dangerous to replace them by men who were poorly informed about 
British foreign policy and the European situation. Furthermore, 
it was felt that such a change would alarm Britain's allies at 
a tricky diplomatic juncture. 
' 
The importance of these last factors in the mind of George II 
is difficult to evaluate. However interested he might be in 
the Civil List or in the general election, George was probably 
more concerned about the European situation, and during the 
first few years of his reign he was to display far more interest 
in European than in domestic affairs. Britain's allies 
certainly expressed some concern about the possibility of a 
change in the British government. Fleury Pressed George II to 
maintain the Walpoles in power. Concern was expressed in'the 
Hague. It is possible that the French view was of great 
importance to George as British foreign policy depended on a 
continued alliance with France. 
2 
1. Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676 vo1.18a, 
ß. 130-1; Robinson to St. Saphorin, 14 July 1727, PRO. 80/61. 
2. On the role of French influence in the continuance of the 
ministry, James Hamilton to James III, 14 July, Atterbury 
to James III, 20 Aug. 1727, RA. 108/73,109/87; 
Hervey, I, 30-1,49; Coxe, I, 286-7. 
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Whatever the reasons, Walpole's continuance in power was 
clear within a fortnight of George's accession. The 
achievement was however subject to two problems: firstly 
whether Walpole would be forced to accept many changes in the 
ministry, and secondly whether George would follow the advice 
of his ministers. Both these problems were to be of great 
significance during the first six months of the reign and each 
was to raise many questions about the stability of the Walpolean 
system. Though it rapidly became clear that the Tories had 
little to hope for from George, other politicians, both those 
associated with George, as Prince of Wales, and those Whigs 
who had fallen out with Walpole, had high hopes from the new 
monarch. 
l The dismissal of Viscount Malpas, Walpole's 
son-in-law and the Master of the Robes to George I, the day 
major changes. On July 1st Newcastle had to confess to Lord 
Waldegrave, 'we can yett make no certain judgment what turn 
things will take here'. 
2 Hill Mussenden noted rumours 
'that Sir Robt. will be continued, in the Treasury, but not with 
the same authority, and that Ld. Carteret and. Mr. Pulteney will 
certainly be brought into-play in the room of some of Sir. Robt. 's 
after the accession, led many to assume that there would be 
ministry was to be replaced by Pulteney, Chesterfield, Compton, 
friends'. 3 The Saxon agent Zamboni reported rumours that the 
1. The Leader of the opposition Whigs was William Pulteney, 
Sedgwick, II, 375-6. 
2. Newcastle to Waldegrave, 20 June (os) 1727, Chewton. 
3. Hill Mussenden to Carteret Leathes, 22 June (os. ) 1727, 
Ipswich, HA403/1/10. 
It was suggested that Carteret would replace Newcastle, 
Farley's Bristol Newspaper 24 June (os. ) 1727, russenden 
to Leathes, 17 June (os. ) 1727, Ipswich, HA403/1/10. - 
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and other friends of George whilst Prince of Wales. 
1 D'Aix 
suggested that those who had the ear of George were 
Scarborough and Compton, and that Chesterfield would join the 
ministry. Suggestions were made that George's aristocratic 
2 
friends would be raised in the peerage and that several would 
receive dukedoms. 
3 The press published these suggestions far 
and wide. On June 28th Stanley's News Letter, for example, 
reported, 'We hear that Sir Spencer Compton, the Earl of 
Grantham and Lord Carteret will have some high post conferred 
on them'. 
The rumours proved to be wildly exaggerated. 
4 Though such 
sound supporters of Walpole as Malpas and Sir William Yonge, 
one of the Lords of the Treasury, lost their places, 
5 
they soon 
1. Zamboni to DeF3rosse, 11 July 1727, Rodl. Zamboni Papers, 
Ms. Rawlinson Letters (hereafter Rawl. ) 120 f. 10. 
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 26 June, 4 Aug. 1727, AST. LM. 
Ing. 35. Villars noted that Compton was to be chief minister, 
July 1727, p. 77. 
3. Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 22 Aug. 1727, Osnabrück, 
No. 291, f. 257; Hop, Dutch Ambassador in Britain, to-the 
States General, 5 Aug. 1727, _BL. 
Add. 17677KKK9 f. 346. 
4. The changes that were predicted inaccurately included the 
appointment of Burlington as Grand Constable, newsletter to 
the Prince-Bishop, 9 Sept. 1727, Osnabrück 291 f. 123. 
5. Sir Henry Goring to James III, 21 July 1727, RA. 108/105; 
Hervey, I, 357; Malpas losing his Mastership of the Robes 
was 'reckned a bad omen', Hill Mussenden to Carteret Leathes, 
20 June 1727, Ipswich HA403/1/10. Broglie referred to 
Yonge as 'un des bras droits de Mr. de Walpole', Broglie to 
Chauvelin, 4 Aug. 1727, A. E. CP. Ang. 361, f. 135. 
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gained others. Malpas became a Lord of the Admiralty and 
Yonge gained the same position in 1728.1 Francis Negus, 
M. P. for Ipswich, lost his Commissionership'for executing the 
office of Master of the Horse, but gained a remunerative 
Purveyorship-general.. Whilst dismissed supporters of Walpole 
2 
thus gained compensation, the same was. not true for Walpole's 
opponents. The accession of George and'the subsequent changes 
in the ministry provided an opportunity to remove some of the 
opposition Whigs and it is difficult to believe that Walpole was 
not betlind these removals. 
3 The Earl of Berkeley, First Lord 
of the Admiralty since 1717, was dismissed and his post given to 
Viscount Torrington, after the Earl of Orford had declined it on 
4 
the grounds of age. The Chetwynd brothers were dismissed as 
'Sir Robert Walpole's declared ill-wishers', William Chetwynd, a 
friend of. Bolingbroke and Lady Suffolk, losing his Lordship of 
the Admiralty, and Walter Chetwynd his Rangership of St. James 
Park. 5 
1. Hervey, I, 35-7; Sedgwick, II, 567-8. 
2. Plumb, p. 170. n. 1; Sedgwick, II, 291. 
3. ' Plumb, p. 170. 
4. Newcastle to Lord Blandford, 24 July (os) 1727, BL. Add. 32993, 
f. 14; Duchess of Somerset to Earl of Nottingham, 25 July 
(os) 1727, Leicestershire CRO. Finch Mss., D 6/7/4952; 
Hervey, I, 37-9. D'Aix claimed that. George II was 
responsible for Berkeley's dismissal and Le Coq suggested 
that George was angered by "Berkeley's links with Bolingbroke, 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 Aug. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35, 
Le Coq to Augustus II, 5 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 2676, vol. 18a, 
f. 177. 
5. Lady Chetwynd to Lady Suffolk, 29 July (os) 1727, BL. Add. 
22627, f. 79; Atterbury to James III, 20 Aug. 1727, RA. 109/87; 
Hervey, I, 37; Sedgwick, I, 545-8. 
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George's aristocratic friends gained a few positions. 
Essex gained the Rangership of St. James's, one of the more 
important of the posts of its type as it gave access to the 
monarch. Grantham was raised to the Privy Council and made 
Lord Chamberlain to the Queen. Scarborough was made Master 
of the Horse. Sir Charles Hot ham, a friend of George II's 
and M. P. for Beverley, was made a Groom of the Bedchamber. 
With all these men it is-unclear how much personal ambition 
they possessed. Most seemed to have been content with 
honourable, fashionable and profitable posts in the Household 
and to have shown little interest in gaining the more arduous 
posts of power. Essex, a flashy womaniser, was to be 
Ambassador to Sardinia from 1732 until 1736, but during his 
embassy his principal concerns were seduction and securing 
1 
leaves of absence so that he could visit the carnivals of Italy. 
Hotham's ambition was restricted to the-army where he sought a 
regiment, a goal not attained until 1732. Scarborough is a 
difficult man to evaluate. He was highly intelligent and 
profoundly melancholic, a courtier who ended his life in suicide. 
He was never noted for his ambition and there is little record 
of him participating actively in the, politics of the period until 
1733, when he joined the opposition to Walpole and was credited 
with persuading George to drop the Excise Bill. 
2 
Two members of George's aristocratic group were politically 
ambitious. Compton's maladroit conduct in June 1727 did not mean 
that he was the 'amiable nonenity' depicted by Basil William s. 
3 
1. J. Black, 'An Unknown Letter of Lord Chesterfield's; 
A Community-of Diplomatic Rakes', Trivium, 17, (1982), p. 141. 
Essex was a close friend of Pulteney and Bolingbroke, 
Hervey, I, 96. 
2. Hervey, I, 70-1. It was suggested that Scarborough would replace 
Newcastle, newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 27 June 1727, 
Osnabruck, 299, f. 43. Sarah Marlborough to Fish, 4 July (os) 
1727, BL. Add. 61444 f. 139. 
n ntýt ý, mt.., nr _ C»ni-om-inv 1714-17(; 
n (Oxford 
. 
1962)1). 202. 
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It is probable that Compton was disinclined to accept 
responsibility for the financial management of the crown. 
l 
John Scrope, the Secretary of the Treasury, suggested that 
it was this in particular that led him to decline the Treasury. 
Compton was outmanoeuvred by Walpole, and lacked his ability, 
but it is difficult to accept Hervey's characterisation of him 
as a weak and vicious man. He has been used as a foil to 
Walpole's ability, but Walpole was clearly concerned about 
Compton and regarded his continuance in the Commons as a threat. 
2 
Chesterfield sought office as Secretary of State. He had 
no diplomatic or governmental experience, but in this he was 
little worse prepared than Newcastle who was only a year his 
senior and had never been abroad. Chesterfield's lively spirit 
attracted the notice of several foreign diplomats and he was 
seen as possessing considerable potential. Instead of being 
appointed Secretary he was. named for the Hague Embassy as 
successor to William Finch. Some saw this as a form of 
diplomatic exile, 
3 
and Chesterfield himself was less than keen 
to go and did not arrive at the Hague until May 1728. However, 
it was generally understood that the posting was a form of 
training, and that if. Horatio Walpole was appointed as a 
Plenipotentiary at the forthcoming Peace Congress, Chesterfield 
would succeed him at Paris, the most important of the British 
embassies. It was believed that George hoped to appoint 
Dresden 
1. Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, A267,18a, f. 132; 
Atterbury to James III, 19 Jan. 1728, RA. 113/97; Hervey I, 
. 
46; Coxe I, 286. 
2. Coxe, Walpole II 519-20; Egmont, II, 156-7. 
3. Atterbury to James III, 20 Aug. 1727, RA. 109/87. 
Hervey, I, 72. 
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Chesterfield Secretary of State after this training, 
' Le"Coq, 
who had already referred to the potential problem of ignorant 
politicians directing British foreign policy, wrote to Augustus II 
at the end of July 1727, 
'Ce Lord Chesterfield est un des seigneurs, de la 
Cour qui passe pour avoir le plus d'esprit. On le croit 
aussy fort en faveur, . et l'on s'etoit attendu 
ä le voir 
honors dune des plus brillantes charges de la cour. 
I1 dst assez apparent, que le Roy a voulu, qu'il se 
format premier. ement aux affaires, et que luy m@me a 
compris qu'il falloit en passer par lä, pour aller plus 
loin. Sous le regne precedent il n'etoit aucunement bien 
en cour, et les ministres n'etoient point des ses amis, 
ni lug de leurs. '2 
Le Coq's last point was certainly correct. Chesterfield had 
never troubled to cultivate Walpole,. and he had a reputation for 
being his enemy. 
3 Horatio Walpole was deeply disturbed by 
Chesterfield's apparent rise. On August 9th he informed his 
brother that should Chesterfield come to Paris, 'he will stand 
in the eye of the world, as the person designed by his majesty 
to be hereafter Secretary of. State' , and three months later he 
4 
returned to the same point4 Chesterfield's ambition and the 
favour in which George held him was to be a major problem for 
the Walpoles for several years. 
1. Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 1 Aug. 1727, Osnabrück 
No. 291, f. 951; Le Coq to DeBrosse 29 July 1727, Dresden, 663, 
f. 135; St. James' Evening Post 29 July (os. ) 1727; D'Aix<, 
to Victor Amadeus II, 4 Aug. 1727,, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
Chesterfield wrote of beginning his 'apprenticeship to 
diplomacy', Chesterfield to Francis Colman, British Resident 
in Florence, 20 Nov. 1727 (not 1728 as printed), G. Colman the 
younger, Posthumous letters from Various Celebrated men 
addresded to Francis Colman and George Colman the elder 
London, 1820 pp, 16-7; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 8 Aug. 
1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f. 9; Marini, p. 84. 
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2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 29 July 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 159. 
3. Hervey, 1,71,73; Plumb, p. 170. 
4. Horatio Walpole to Robert Walpole, 9 Aug., 11 Nov. 1727, 
Coxe, II, 543-4. 
f 
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George's aristocratic friends were not therefore promoted 
to high office. Chesterfield received his embassy, and Compton 
was ennobled as Lord Wilmington in January 1728, but neither had 
gained what he sought. Their continued ambition, combined with 
their ease of access to George, was a major threat to Walpole. 
1 
Others were similarly disappointed. Carteret was sent back to 
Ireland with diminished powers; the opposition Whigs under 
Pulteney were not heeded; while, on July 8th Hervey, having 
dined the previous night with Walpole, was able to inform 
Stephen Fox that 'the political world rolls on just as it did'. 
2 
A month later Newcastle informed Lord Blandford that George 
'has been pleased to make but very few and those immaterial 
alterations amongst the late king's servants'. Having mentioned 
Berkeley's dismissal, he stated that 'the other changes are not 
worth troubling you with'. 
3 
1. Owen, Eighteenth Century p. 28. 
2. Hervey to Stephen Fox, 27 June (os. ) 1727, Iichester, " p. 21. 
3. Newcastle to Blandförd, 24 July (os. ) 1727, BL. Add. 32993, f, 4. 
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If Walpole had secured not only his own position but also 
that of his own colleagues and political allies, he was nevertheless 
still faced with the problem of defining a relationship with his 
new master. Mussenden, five days after the Proclamation, stated 
that 'All that can be gathered for the present is that whatever 
side be uppermost, they will not have the same authority, that the 
last ministry had, since the king seems resolved to enter into all 
manner of affairs himself. Lord King was soon to be made aware 
-of this fact. Early in July George told him that he expected to 
nominate to all benefices and prebendaries that the Chancellor usually 
nominated to, and when Lord King defended his prerogative George 
retorted that Lord Cowper, a formst Chancellor, had told George 
that such nominations were a royal right. 
2 
George's wishes were not always translated into action. He 
. 
did not persevere in his dispute with Lord King about the nominations, 
and allowed Grafton's views about the appointment of Suffolk J. P. 's 
to conquer his own wish to appoint Tory J. P. 's In 1732 Viscount 
Percival recorded a visit from his cousin Mary Dering, Dresser 
Extraordinary to the Princesses, 
'She gave an instance how princes are imposed upon by their 
Ministers. She said that when the. King came to the Crown, his 
resolution was to continue in his service as chaplains all those 
who had been so while he was Prince, and to fill up the number 
belonging to him as king with as many of his father's chaplains 
as could be admitted, but one of his chgplains he particularly named 
1. Hill Mussenden to Carteret Leathes, 20 June (os. ) 1727, 
Ipswich, HA403/1/]O. 
2,. King, pp. 47-8. 
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to be continued on account of some extraordinary services 
he had done him when Prince. But when the then Lord 
Chamberlain... brought him the list to sign, he did it without 
further examination than observing the chaplain's'name was 
there, yet afterwards it proved that the man was removed, and 
neither all his old chaplains, nor many of his father's, 
continued, buta good many new persons placed. '1 
There was simply not enough time for George to supervise all that 
he wished to control and for him to see that his orders were 
carried out. Some of the bold claims'he made soon after his 
accession about what he would do as monarch can be attributed to 
inexperience and nervous excitement. In some spheres, such as 
the church and the law, George's interventions were episodic, 
though he could be extremely determined in the defence of his 
prerogatives. The ministry were to find-it difficult to persuade 
George to prefer ecclesiastics he disliked. 
In two spheres, the army and foreign affairs, George displayed 
particular interest from his accession. 
2 There was no doubt 
of his great interest in and affection for the army. 
3 He enjoyed 
attending military reviews and drilling troops, both his own, whether 
British or Hanoverian, and those of his allies, such as the Hessians 
whom he usually reviewed on each trip to Hanover. 
4 George was keen 
to dicuss military matters, and he enjoyed the company of military men 
1. Egmont, 1,228 
2. Dickinson, Walpole, p. 70 
3. D'Aixto Victor Amadens, 4 Ap. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
4. Newsletters to Prince Bishop, 1,5 Aug. 1727, Osnabrück, Nos. 291, 
ß"971,986; Visconti to Sinzendorf, 29 Aug. 1727, Vienna, EK. 
Kart. 65; Le r^r to Augustus II ,5 Aug, 1727, 
Dresden, 2676,18a f. 177; 
"D'Aix to Viui; or Amadeus II, 11 Aug. 1727, AS'". LM. Ing. 35; 
L'Hermitage to the States General, 9 July 1728, ßL Add, 17677 (cont) 
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such as Sutton, Hotham and William Stanhope. He also showed favour 
to foreign envoys who had a military background such as D'Aix and 
Broglie. George kept a 
. 
close eye on military developments in other. 
countries and followed European campaigns with great interest. 
1 
He was determined to control military patronage within Britain 
and he refused to accept ministerial suggestions in this sphere. 
He had the Guards' regimental reports and returns sent to him 
personally every week, and when. he reviewed his troops he did so 
with great- attention to detail. 
George associated the army with his 'gloire', and believed that the 
military reviews he conducted were the most bvious and impressive 
display of his power and importance. Possibly the fondest memory 
from his youth was'of his campaigning in the Spanish Netherlands 
against the French in the War of the Spanish Succession. He 
ha displayed great personal bravery, wheir, in 1708 at the battle 
of Oudenarde, he had charged the French at the head of the Hanoverian 
dragoons, and had his horse shot under him. George bored people with 
his reminiscences of this period for many years. In this he was 
not alone. His brother-in-law, Frederick - William I of Prussia-, had 
fought in Eugene's-army against the French at Malplaquet in 1709, and 
held annual celebrations on the. anniversary of the battle. 
2 For 
these German princes, the campaigns of the l7oos represented a time 
of youthful freedom and excitment that they later sought to rediscover. 
(cont 
4. kkk 10 f. 303. 
1. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 4 Jan. (os. )., - Jan., 21 May 1728, 
PRO. 78/189., ß. 4-5,12,205, drafts. 
2. Du Rourgay to Townshend, 13 Sept. 1729, PRO. 90/22 
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For the British ministers, George's close personal interest in 
the army was only an occasional. nuisance, although they would have 
preferred to enjoy some of the military patronage George wielded, 
and they were embarrassed by opposition attacks upon George's 
militaristic tendencies. Due to George's military interests, the 
government had less room for concession and parliamentary 
manoeuvering over such issues as the size of the British army and the 
policy of paying subsidies. 
, 
to secure the use of Hessian troops. 
' 
It was the effect of George's martial temperament upon his conduct 
of foreign policy that most concerned the government. 
When George came to the throne he did not alter the direction 
of British foreign policy and, as a result, historians have 
concluded that the-change of monarch made no difference to British 
foreign policy. In fact, George's accession made a substantial, 
twofold difference. Firstly, however much he may have followed 
similar policies, he did so in a distinctly aggressive fashion, 
2 
and secondly, from George's accession until the spring of 1730, there 
was considerable uncertainty as to which ministers enjoyed 
George's confidence in the field of foreign policy. This produced 
a general situation of tension and ministerial strife. 
Pugilistic diplomatic methods were; not unknown in early 
eighteenth-century British foreign policy. Due to Britain's insular 
position and all army they did not resemble the martial bravado of 
Prussian methods but tended to take a naval form. The best known 
instance was Commodore Martin's arrival at the head of a squadron 
in the Bay of Naples in 1742 and his peremptory demand that 
Naples should agree to remain neutral in the War of the Austrian 
1. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 17 Aug. 1728, Bodl, Rawl 120, f. 27 
2. Chavigny had predicted this, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 8 July 1727, 
AE. CP. Allenmagne, 373 f. 24; Villars, July 1727, p. 77; Muret, 
Preponderance Anglaise p. 180; Ward, Great Britain & Hanover p. 133 
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Succession or face destruction. The politics of bombardment were 
not unknown in the V"alpolean period. John Hedges, British Envoy 
Extraordinary at Turin, suggested naval action against Genoa, 
' 
whilst Lord Tyrawly, Envoy Extraordinary at Lisbon, was a strong 
believer in the efficacy of violence. In February 1729 he urged 
treating the Portuguese roughly and in July 1729 he suggested that the 
Portuguese should be brought to reason 'by-the roughest means', 
adding that as Portugal lacked allies nobody would intervene if George 
'had a mind to lay this country to ashes'. These views were 
controlled during peacetime, and Newcastle kept Tyrawly in order. 
2 
Despite Townshend's reputation for being a noisy bully - Charlie 
Bluster was his popular nickname - the British ministry was far 
from inclined to use violence, a tendency reinforced by the 
vulnerability of Hanover and the unpopularity of increases in the 
size of the army. 
The House of Lords' Address of February 7th 1728 referred to 
George as 'formed by Nature for the greatest military Achievements '3 
and contemporaries were in no doubt of George's eagerness for conflict. 
The French general and politician, Marshal Villars, a member of the 
Conseil d'Etat, where the dispatches of French diplomats were 
read out, noted in his diary that George was believed to desire 
war ardently and to wish to lead his army into battle. Le Coq noted 
the fear that George would puseBritish foreign policy with more vigour, 
but he argued that George's warlike penchant would be restrained by 
1. Hedges to Delafaye, 8 Feb. 1727, PRO. 92/32 f. 128. 
2. Tyrawly to Newcastle, 14 Sept. 1728,5,25 Feb., 2,26 June, 17 July 
1727, Newcastle to Tyrawly 17 June (os. ) 1729, Tyrawly to 
Delafaye, 7 Aug. 1729, PRO. 89/35, f. iO1,135,139,161,181,188,89/36, 
f. 21,89/35, f. 198. 
3. House of Lords Journals XXIII p. 167 
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his allies' opposition to war, by just considerations of state, 
and by the fact that the views of a Prince of Wales were naturally 
different from those of a king of Britain: 
'La situation differente fait envisager le s objets 
differenment .... le penchant qu'un jeunne Prince temoigne 
quelque fois pour la guerre dost et. re plus tot attribue 
au desir louable de sevoir a la tete'd'une armee, qu'a 
une conviction interieure de la necessite de la guerre. 
l 
Whatever might be the generic case for heirs succeeding to a 
kingdom, George II did not lose his desire to serve at the head of 
an army. In the late 1720's and then again during the War 
of the Polish Succession of 1733-1735, ministers were made 
uneasily conscious of George's wish, 
2 though the king was not to achievE 
his objective until the Dettingen Campaign in 17433. This was a 
major reason for ministers seeking to dissuade George from visiting 
Hanover, for. they felt, quite correctly, that in Hanover George's 
propensity for violent solutions would be harder to tame, and the 
Anglo-Prussian war scare of 1729 confirmed their fears. 
George's willingness to entertain the idea of war was closely 
linked to his personal wish to fight, and it was of great 
importance in the winter of 1727, when French knowledge of this 
point played a role in leading than to accept British demands that 
they reject Fottembourg's agreement with Spain. 
More significant than George's pugilistic diplomatic methods 
was his decision to seek advice from whom he wished. Historians 
have been misled by the manner in which Walpole routed Compton into 
1. ' Le Coq to Augustus II, 22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a f. 128-9 
2. Villars, 28 Sept, 1727, p. 96; Marchese Solaro di ßreglio, 
Sardinian Minister at Vienna, to Victor Amadeus II, 5 Jan, 1729 
AST. LM. Aut. 59 
3. J. Black, 'The Royal Hero as Victor: The Battle of Dettingen', 
-programme note for performance of Handel's Dettingen Te Deum (Durham, Feb. 1982) 
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assuming that after a few days' uncertainty Walpole's position 
was scarcely affected by the accession of George. This was not the 
case. 
l George allowed Walpole to run Parliament and the Treasury, 
but he retained a tight control over. foreign policy and proved 
willing to listen to politicians who disagreed with Walpole. 
From his accession George had made it clear'that he. wished to control 
foreign policy. He read the dispatches of British envoys with great 
attention and Le Coq noted in August 1727, 
'I1 a ete en usage, de tout tems, a cette cour cy, que les 
Ministres aux Cours entrangeres ont ecrit aux secretaires 
d'Etat et en ont recu les ordres. Le Roy ne change rien de cet 
usage; mais. il veut, que les Ministres ecrivent aussy 
2 
immediatement a luy meme. 
There is no evidence to corroborate this 'statement, but it is clear 
that- George began to show an independence that alarmed his ministers. 
His changes in the diplomatic corps were not of great significance, 
but they indicated a willingness to reject ministerial advice. 
The major diplomats of the last years of George I's war continued in 
office with few changes in posting. William Stanhope, who was to 
be mdch favoured by George II and to be one of the British Plenipotent- 
iaries at Soissons, had been very well received by George I on his 
return from Spain. 3 Waldegrave, who had been , ordered to go to Vienna 
1. Foord, His Majesty opposition p. 122 
2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 19 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 2676, f. 210. A week later Le Coq noted that George read all the diplomatic dispatches, 
Le Coq to Augustus II, 26 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 2676, f. 224. 
3. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 21 Ap. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
, newsletter sent to the Prince-Bishop, 3 June 1727, Osnabruck, 299 
f. 39. 
71 
as soon as good relations were restored had been a favourite of 
George I. He was regarded favourably by George II; on July 13th'1727 
Townshend informed Waldegrave 'that H. M. expresses a very particular 
regard for your Lord'1 Suggestions had already been made as to who 
would be the British Plenipotentiaries at the forthcoming Congress. 
Although the Daily Journal late in May had mentioned reports that 
Carteret and Stanhope would be selected, most suggestions included 
the names of those whom George II was eventually to appoint, 
Stanhope, Stephen Poyntzand Horatio Walpole. 2 
Despite these signs of continuity there were indications of 
" George's determination to appoint whomever he wished. Chesterfield 
was sent to The Hague. William Finch, a protege of Carteret's, 
Who had been brought in as M. P. for Cockermouth by his brother-in-law 
the Tory Duke of Somerset, was informed that he would be replaced at 
The Hague, but he was assured of the Madrid embassy, a post which he 
never took up but for which he was paid after he returned from The 
Hague. 3 
1. Townshend to WAldegrave, 2 July (o. s) 1727, PRO. 80/62 f. 25 
2. L'Hermitage,. Dutch agent in London, to the States General, 
.6 
June 1727, BL. Add. 17677 kk 9 f. 261: newsletters to the 
Prince-Bishop, 6 June, 11 July 1727, Osgabrück, No. 299 f. 36,49; 
Daily Journal 24 May (o. s. ) 1727. William Finch was mentioned 
as a possible choice, Daily Journal 26 June (o. s. ) Wye's letter 
27 July 1727. 
3. Townshendto Finch, 11 Aug. (o. s. ) 1727, PRO. 84/294 f. 81; 
John Christian to Thomas Elder, 17 May (o. s. ) 1728, _Egremont (Cockermouth Castle) Mss., History of Parliament transcripts. 
It was also suggested that the Earl of Marchmont would be 
sent to Spain, newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 1 Aug. 1727 
Osnabrück, No. 291, f. 951. 
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His brother Edward, another protege of Carteret's was sent to Sweden 
in 1728, after the Sardinian envoy had indicated that his Protestant 
zeal would make him an inappropriate envoy at Turin. Whilst 
Edward Finch's posting was undecided, British interests in Stockholm 
were represented by the new Hanoverian Envoy appointed by George II, 
Baron Von Diescau. Diescau was to embarrass considerably the British 
government by failing to cooperate with Finch. George decided to 
appoint the Hanoverian diplomat Friedrich von Fabrice as Hanoverian 
envoy in Dresden and considered giving him responsibility for 
British interests there. 
' 
This was a particularly sensitive step 
for two reasons. Firstly, Saxony in 1727 was a very significant 
diplomatic posting, because Augustus II was trying to negotiate a 
neutrality for the Empire, a step that would provide for the security 
of Hanover, and because Augustus was willing to act as a go-between 
.. 
in the restoration of Anglo-Prussian and Anglo-Austrian relations. 
Secondly, Fabrice was an old enemy to Townshend with very different 
views on European matters. Townshend had failed in 1726 to get 
Fabrice sacked as one of George's chamberlains, and, thanks to their 
excellent system of postal interception and decyphering, the British 
ministry had discovered that Fabrice was in touch with hostile foreign 
envoys, in particular the Austrian Resident. Palm and the Modenese 
agent Riva. He had used information supplied. by them to seek to 
dissuade George I from anti-Austrian steps and to persuade him to 
sever his links with France. 
2 
1. Le Coq to Augustus II, 15,19 Aug, 31 Oct. Dresden, 2676 
18a. f. 203,203-9,330. 
2. Pozobueno to Ripperda, 23 May 1726, Coce 1II, 500-1; Coce, I, 
248. Fabrice was secretly in touch with Berlin, Du Bourgay 
to Tilson, 6 Dec., 1725, PRO. 90/19. On Fabrice see 
Die Memoiren des Kammerherrn Friedrich Ernst von Fabrice (ed. ) 
R. Grieser (Hildesheim, 1956). Fleury was concerned a ou the 
appointment of Hanoverian diplomats, Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 
--- -- -- ,. -- --. 
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George II's attempt to send Fabrice to Dresden failed due to 
Fabrice's excessive personal demands, but it is clear from 
Le Coq's dispatches that it had been a: source of tension. 
Combined with the appointments of Chesterfield and Diescau it must 
have led Townshend to wonder whether he would have any influence 
in his department. 
Irritating as these moves of George must have been, it was his 
attempt to consult whom he wished that created most trouble. 
Although George II paid little heed to Sir Luke Schaub, a diplomatic 
protege of Carteret's who had been disgraced in 1724 and had hoped 
that the new reign would witness a revival of his fortunes, he showed 
sufficient confidence in St. Saphorin to upset Townshend and Walpole. 
Lieutenant-General Francois Louis de Pesmes, Seigneur de St. Saphorin, 
a Swiss Protestant, had represented British interests at Vienna from 
. 1718 until h. e was expelled 
in April 1727. He had been widely blamed 
for the deterioration in Anglo-Austrian relations in 1725.1 
Townshend criticised St. Saphorin in the instructions he sent to 
his successor Waldegrave, and instructed him to inform the French 
Ambassador, the Duke of Richelieu 'that you chuse rather to imitate 
his example of politeness and good breeding, than to follow the 
steps of Mor. de St. Saphorin, who has been censured as having acted 
too rough and forbidding a part'. 
2 
1. Marquis de Fleury to General DeBrosse, Saxon envoy at the 
Hague, 12 July 1727, Dresden, 663, f. 81. Pentenriedter 
described him as 'L'origin de tout mal', Pentenriedter to Fonseca, 
14 April 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 21, f. 347 
2. Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Oct. (o. s. ) 1727, PRO. 80/62 
f. 73-4; Graham to Hay, 12 Ap. 1727, RA. 105/159. 
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Having left Vienna St. Saphorin set off for a Swiss spa to 
take the cure, and went via Schaffhausen. to Lausanne. 
1 
He was 
then ordered to wait on George I at Hanover, but this was prevented 
by George's death. Hoping that he would find favour with the 
new King he travelled to London2. Count Dehn, sent on a special mission 
to London by the Court of-Wolfenbuttet, claimed that St. Saphorin's 
'faux pricipes'malignes' had no impact, and that 'il ne trouve 
pas ches le Roi l'ingres"qu'il voudroit', but there are indications 
3 that Dehn was wrong. D'Aix reported that George saw St. Saphorin 
often, and it is clear from Le Coq's dispatches that George used 
4 
St. Saphorin as a confidential intermediary with foreign envoys. 
St. Saphorin was the acknowledged expert on Austrian affairs, 
5 
and Townshend sent W aldegrave St. Saphorin's 'Relation secrette sur 
la Cour de Vienne', noting that it included 'a great deal of truth'. 
6 
1. 'His health will no longer suffer the fatigue of business', 
George Woodward, British Secretary at Vienna, Jan-Apr. 1727, 
to Tilson, 29 July 1727, PRO. 80/61. 
2. Townshend had instructed him. to return to Switzerland, Townshend 
to St. Saphorin, 23 June,. (o. s. ) 1727, PRO. 80/61. 
3. Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 20 Sept, 10 Oct. (quote) 1727, 
Wolfenbuttel, 1 Alt 22 No. 534 f. 43,67-8. " 
4. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 6 Oct. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35, 
Marini, pp. 89,102-4. The French were concerned about 
St. Saphorin's influence, Horatio Walpole to (Tilson) 
3,21 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 48928 f. 86,90 
5. Woodward to Tilson, 29 July 1727, PRO. 80/61; Marquis de Fleury 
to Le Coq, 23 Jan 1726, Dresden, 2674, f-1 
6. Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Oct, (o. s. ) 1727, Chewton. 
George had instructed St. Saphorin to write the report, 
St. Saphorin to Townshend, 4 Sept. (o. s. ) 1727, PRO. 80/61. 
Fonseca was suspicious of St. Saphorin's actiyitiies, and 
noted, 'il ya un murmure sourd qu'il est alle en 
Angleterre pour tacher de faire quelque nouvell negociation, 
et se racrocher a notre cour', Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 10 Sept 1727, 
Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 359 
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Seeking St. Saphorin's advice would not have mattered so much, 
was there not by the autumn increasingly obvious tension between 
George and his ministers. D'Aix reported in September 'Le chagrin 
des Ministres continue ..... ils trouvent que le Roy les bride trop, 
qu'il est trop 
econome, 
et qu'il ecoute trop des gens'. Le Coq 
pinpointed another area of tension when he suggested that George's 
attempts at financial reform-were weakening the position of his ministers 
2 by denying them an undisputed control of governmental patronage. 
These tensions were made more serious by the apparently deepening 
Problems with which British foreign policy was faced and by the growing 
possibility that this policy might change direction and Britain 
acquire different allies.. The identification of the Walpole 
brothers and Townshend with the French alliance meant that such 
changes would have important repercussions in domestic politics. 
1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus'II, 29,. Sept. 1727, AST. L. M. Ing. 35,; 
Marini, pp. 85 88. 
2. Le Coq Augustus II, 23 Sept. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a 
f. 242. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PAM THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE II TO THE CCJVENTICN OF THE PARDO 
(Stunner, 1727 - Spring,, 1728) 
Hard upon the news of George II's accession Britain's envoys and allies 
received profuse assurances that the new King would remain 
firm to his old alliances. 
1 Foreign envoys in Britain assured 
their rulers that this would be the case. 
2 
Britain's French and 
Dutch allies received firm promises that Britain would not depart 
3 
from the Alliance of 
. 
Hanover, whilst the Hessian envoy General 
Diemar was assured that George II was as conscious ; of the 
importance of Hessian troops for the defence of Hanover as his 
father had been. 
4. 
Despite these assurances, many doubted that Britain would 
be able to help her allies. In particular, it was widely 
assumed in Catholic Europe that the accession of a new monarch 
would be accompanied by major disturbances, and, possibly, by a 
1. Newcastle to Waldegrave, 20 June (o. s. ) 1727, Chewton; Townshend 
to Sutton, 20 June (o. s. ) 1727, PRO. 81/122; Le Coq to Augustus, 
22 July 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. ' 128, St. Saphorin 
to Tarouca, to Toerring, drafts, PRO. 80/61. 
2. D'Aix to Victor-Amadeus, 30 June 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35 
3. Newcastle to Townshend, 15 June (o. s. ) 1727, BL. Add. 32687 
f. 201-3 (misfiled in the 1726 diplomatic papers); Newcastle 
to Horatio Walpole, 16 June (o. s. ) 1727, BL. Add. 32750 f. 521-3; 
Sutton to Newcastle, 10 July1727, PRO. 81/122; Fonseca to 
Sinzendorf, 7 July 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 254; Fleury 
to George II, 2,11 July 1727, PRO. 102/7 f. 186,196. 
4. Diemar to Landgrave Karl, 4., 18 July 1727, Marburg, England, 
178,195. 
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successful Jacobite uprising. Belief in such a development 
varied. The French government had few doubts about the stability 
of the Hanoverian succession and their representatives in 
London swiftly reassured them of the popularity of the new 
government. Broglie assured Fleury that George was popular 
and Chammorel the French charge d'affaires noted, 'En un mot le 
zele et l'affection de ses sujets ne laisse rien a desirer'. 
1 
The Austrians were well informed of the weak state of 
British Jacobitism. Prince Eugene told the Jacobite envoy in 
Vienna, Owen O'Rourke, that whatever change might be expected 
hereafter, he was confident, the son would succeed quietly 
2 
the father in the beginning'. 
Two prominent groups anticipated disorders in Britain, 
. 
the Spaniards and the Jacobites. The news of the death of 
George I led James III to leave his court at Bologna and set 
off for the Channel coast hoping that by the time he arrived an 
uprising would enable him to return to Britain. James was 
aware that France was unlikely to assist his scheme, but he 
hoped that Austria would send. money and troops. Austrian 
assistance was crucial as,, in the Austrian Netherlands, Austria 
controlled the only ports near Britain that were not held by a 
British ally. Over the previous years the Jacobites had pressed 
the Austrians to sponsor an invasion of Britain from Ostend 
which they believed to be militarily practical, proximity to the 
target offsetting the strength of the British navy, and they 
now hoped to execute the scheme. 
3 
1. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 14,21, (quote), 28 July 1727, A. E. C. P. 
Ang. 359, f. 261,282,295, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 26 June, 
28 July 1727, AST". LM. Ing. 35; Fleury to-George II,. 21July 1727, 
PRO. 102/7 f. 186. 
`'2. O'Rourke to Graham, 11 July 1727, Vienna, England, Varia 8. 
3. " Graham to Hay, 1 Feb., Caesar to James II, 9 Feb. 1727 RA. 102/102, 
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Alarmist rumours circulated that the Pretender would receive 
major support from the Catholic powers, but these rumours were 
totally inaccurate. France refused to heed Jacobite requests, 
while on July 10th Eugene reminded O'Rourke of the principle 
he had frequently enunciated during the previous two years, 
namely that the Jacobites would receive no open support or 
military assistance until war was declared between Britain 
and Austria, and that until such a time the Austrians believed 
that all previous agreements between Austria and Britain subsisted. 
Eugene, therefore, refused to promise support telling O'Rourke 
that he believed James's journey precipitate and foolish, a view 
l 
held by most commentators. Eugene and Sinzendorf refused to 
- answer James's letter requesting support - They reaffirmed their 
refusal to help on the 15th, Sinzendorf declaring that there 
would be'no help unless there was war, and that Austria was bound 
by the Preliminaries. These points were echoed by Eugene, who 
added the ominous advice that he did not believe James would be 
safe in the Austrian Netherlands. 
2 
1. Graham to Hay, 5,26 
to Graham, 17,24,31 
to James II, 7 June 
George Lockhart, 14 
II, 345,356; Liria 
Jacquemin to Duke L 
r. 
Ap. 1727, R. A. 105/118,106/64; O'Rourke 
May, 11,15 July, 27 Sept, 1727, O'Rourke 
1727, Vienna, England, Varia, 8; James III to 
June, 22 July 1727, Lockhart Papers, 
to James II, 15 July 1727, RA. 108/79; 
eopold, 14 Aug. 1727, Nancy, 139, No. 109. 
2. O'Rourke to Graham, 15 July 1727, Vienna, England, Varia, 8; 
Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 23 July 1727, AST. LM. 
Aut 58; Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 5,13 Aug. 1727, BL. 
Add. 32751 f. 169,197; Sinzendor-f to Fonseca, 14 July, 3 Aug. 
-1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 262,308 
fi 
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Despite reports to the contrary the Pretender did not 
reach the Austrian Netherlands, but ended his journey in the 
Duchy of Lorraine, whence, as a result of pressure on Duke 
Leopold, he moved to the Papal enclave of Avignon) Austria 
had proved to be a great disappointment for the Jacobites, 
which pleased the British. The British press praised the 
Austrians for their stance. Farley's Bristol Newspaper 
informed its readers in September that Charles VI had written 
in his own hand to George to assure him that he knew nothing 
of Jacobite plans. 
2 
The British were less satisfied with the attitude of the 
Spaniards. The Jacobite diaspora had spread over most of 
Europe but there was a major concentration of Jacobites in 
Spain, where considerable favour had been shown to them. 
3 
Several Jacobites were prominent at court, where they 
encouraged the Spanish government to believe that the change 
of British monarch would lead to disturbances and make Britain 
weaker.. Spain was dissatisfied with the. Preliminaries of 
Paris and her belief that the Alliance of Hanover would be 
weakened by the accession of George II, encouraged her to press 
1 Graham to O'Brien, 9 Aug. 1727, James III to Atterbury, 
9 Aug. 1727, RA. 109/53,55. 2 Farley's Bristol Newspaper 9 Sept. (OS) 1727, cf. 12 Aug., 
16 Sept. 1727; Stanley's Newsletter, 5 Aug. (OS) 1727; 
3 Evening Post, 12 Aug. (OS) 1727. Keene to Horatio Walpole, 6 Oct. Horatio Walpole to Keene, 6, 
20 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 32752 f. 108,96,174; Waldegrave 
4 
Journal, 10 Nov. 1727, Chewton. 
De Buy to Flemming, 14 July 1727, Dresden, 3105, f. 180; 
Waldegrave Journal, 29 Oct. 1727, Chewton; Armstrong, p. 216; 
Robert Daniel, British agent in Brussels, to Tilson, 31 Dec. 
1727, PRO. 77/74, f. 355. 
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for her own interpretation of the Preliminariesl. Philip V 
maintained the blockade of Gibraltar, refused to return the 
South Sea Company permission-ship the Prince Frederick, and 
disputed the British right of trade in the West Indies. In 
addition, the privateering activities of Spanish ships upon 
British merchantmen, which had caused so much disquiet during 
the previous two years, continued. The Spaniards demanded 
that the British possession of Gibraltar and Minorca should be 
discussed at the-forthcoming Congress. They also claimed 
damages for the disruption caused to Spanish trade by British 
maritime blockade. They suggested that pending discussion of 
British commercial pretensions at the Congress the Prince 
Frederick should be held by a third power such as the French 
or the Dutch2. 
These Spanish demands were skilfully presented in an 
attempt to sow dissension amongst the Hanover Allies. It was 
known. that neither the French nor the Dutch were keen to fight 
either for British maritime pretensions or for the British 
possession of Gibraltar and Minorca. Both powers were jealous 
of the privileges the British had acquired at Utrecht and both 
had suggested the return of Gibraltar in order to placate 
Spanish feelings. The British refused to accept the Spanish ;"1 
De Buy to Flemming, 8 July 1727, Dresden, 3015, f. 179. 
2 Townshend to William Finch, 11,18 July (OS) 1727, PRO. 
84/294 f. 41,51-2; De Buy to Flemming, 28 July, 30 Aug. 1727, 
Dresden, 3105, f. 184,203; Vandermeer to Horatio Walpole, 
29 July 1727, PRO. 94/98; Thomas Burnett, British Consul in 
Lisbon, to Newcastle, 23 Sept. 1727, -PRO. 89/34 f. 264; 
Villars 31 Aug., 3,25 Oct., 2 Nov. 1727, pp. 92,98,102-3; 
Baudrillart, 111,346,360-1; S. Conn, Gibraltar in British 
Eighteenth Century Diplomacy (New Haven, 1942) pp. 90-1; 
Goslinga, pp. 139,184; Wilson, p. 173. Konigseg to Rialp, 
7 July 29 Aug., 1727, Vienna, GC. 49. 
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position and demanded that the Preliminaries should be 
executed without alteration. As the Spaniards refused to 
withdraw their troops from before Gibraltar, the British 
refused to yield to Spanish demands that they should withdraw 
their squadrons from Spanish waters'. The British response to 
Spanish intransigence was slow, delayed by the government's 
concern with elections, which fully occupied Walpole and 
Newcastle, and by the illness of Townshend. British relations 
with Spain had been handled since the departure of William 
Stanhope, in March, by Francis Vandermeer the Dutch ambassador. 
George II confirmed this arrangement, but it was far from 
satisfactory, as Vandemeer's alarmism and self-importance made 
him-an unreliable envoy2. There seemed to be only three means 
to end the Anglo-Spanish dispute: naval action., French 
diplomatic pressure and Austrian diplomatic pressure. Austrian 
-aid could not be relied upon, as Austria was believed to be 
encouraging Spain in its obduracy in order to delay European 
peace4. Waldegrave informed Tilson on September 12th that 
'the professions made by the Imperial ministers of their 
masters sincere desire of peace are hard to be reconciled with 
{ 
1 
De Buy to Flemming, 4 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 3105, f. 187. 
2 Gansinot to Plettenberg, 5 Sept. 1724, Munster, B 2591, f. 135 
3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 5 Sept. (OS) 1727, BL. 
Add. 32751, f. 482,486. 
Vandermeer to Horatio Walpole, 13,27 Oct. 1727, PRO. 94/98; 
Newcastle to William Finch, 21 Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294 
f. 288. The Austrians denied these accusations though they 
lent diplomatic support to most of the Spanish demands, 
Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 3,10,20 Aug., 20 Sept., 12 Oct., 
17 Dec., Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 9,13 Nov., Fleury to Fonseca, 
27 Nov., Eugene to Fonseca, 12 Oct., 12 Nov., Pentenriedter 
to Fonseca, 17 Dec. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 308-9,318-9, 
330,374,400-1,, 416,428,430,457,21, f. 392,3, f. 26-7, 
30. Waldegrave Journal, 8 Nov. 1727, Chewton. 
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the encouragement it's evident they give Spain to cavil and 
stand out'. 
1 
The British refused to exchange with Spain the ratifications 
} 
of the Preliminaries of Paris. Due to the absence of 
diplomatic links between Britain and Spain it had been intended 
that Waldegrave should exchange the ratifications when he took up 
his post at Vienna, but as Waldegrave told the Austrian envoy in 
Paris Baron Fonseca on August 20th, 
'..... till the Spaniards had agreed to the two points 
relating to Gibraltar and the Prince Frederick my going 
there could be of no use, for that it was not reasonable 
to suppose we could exchange ratifications with Spain 
whilst they dispute the construction and meaning of two of 
the articles, that our exchanging would be acquiescing to 
their interpretation which England would never submit to'. 
2 
Fleury had followed up the Preliminaries by making a major attempt 
to develop good relations with Spain, which he believed to be the 
best way to limit Austrian influence there. 
3 Despite British 
fears to the contrary4, he did not aim to abandon the Hanover 
alliance but rather to broaden it to include Spain. He offered to 
1 Waldegrave to Tilson, 12 Sept. 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 63. 
2 Waldegrave Journal, 21 Aug. 1727, Chewton; Fonseca to Sinzendorf 
28 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 388. Fleury and Fonseca 
were angered by the way in which the dispute over the Prince 
Frederick prevented the settlement of other European pro lems, 
Fleury to Charles VI, 18 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 
11, f. 33; Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 23 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 
11, f. 380-1. 
3 The Austrians were suspicious of these French approaches, 
Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 10 Aug. 1727,. Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 320. 
4 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 July (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751 
f. 161; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 22 Sept. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 16,20 Sept. 1727, WolfenbUttel, 
1 Alt 22,534, f. 40,42-3; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 
26 Sept., 7 Nov., 1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f. 42,66. 
83 
attempt to settle Anglo-Spanish differences and those that still 
persisted between Britain and Austria. Despite governmental 
fears of the real purpose of the Franco-Spanish negotiations, the 
British government yielded to French pressure not to resort to 
naval action 
l. On October 6th Newcastle informed Horatio Walpole 
thatI 
'His majesty is willing as the Cardinal desires to 
suspend any further declaration, either to the Court of 
Vienna or Madrid, till the success of Count Rottembourg's 
negotiation and the letter wrote to the Duke de Richelieu 
is known'. 2 
Rottembourg, the French envoy at Berlin3, was sent to Spain. He 
,, ý 
reached the Spanish court, at St. Ildefonso, on October 12th. 
Although his ostensible instructions, shown to Horatio Walpole, 
. committed 
him to support the British position4 he-carried secret 
instructions which suggested that he should attempt to produce a 
compromise settlement, more in line with Spanish demands5. The 
ambivalence of his mission was suspected from-the outset, though 
ij 
the British government was surprised in December when news 
Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 10 Sept. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 
32751, f. 555-7; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 10 Sept. (OS) 
1727, PRO. 7.8/187 f. 39, draft. 
2 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 Sept. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 
32752, f. 91; O'Rourke to Graham, 27 Sept. 1727, Vienna, 
England, Varia B. The Dutch politician Count Welderen, in 
London for George II's coronation, noted the impatience there 
to discover the result of Rottembourg's negotiation, Welderen 
to Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 17 Oct. 1727, Marburg, 
Niederlande 661. 
3 He was regarded as a supporter of the Anglo-French alliance, 
Waldegrave to Townshend, 25 Sept. 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 66; 
Post Boy 30 Sept. (OS) 1727. 
_ 4 Tilson to Waldegrave, 27 Nov. (OS) 1727, Chewton; Newcastle to 
William Finch, 28 Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294 f. 305. 
5 Baudrillart, III, 349,355-63; Wilson, pp. 175-6. 
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arrived that Rottembourg had accepted a protocol which entirely 
surrendered the British position over the Prince Frederick. 
By entrusting the settlement of Anglo-Spanish differences 
to Rottembourg, the British had surrendered the diplomatic 
initiative to the French 
l. This was a policy advocated by 
Horatio Walpole who prided himself on his close links with Fleury 
and believed that the replacement that summer of the anglophile 
foreign minister Morville. by the relatively unknown Chauvelin did 
2 
not threaten his position or 'the Anglo-French alliance, a view 
doubted by many others3. The policy was a continuation of the 
reliance upon French diplomacy earlier in the year when the 
Preliminaries had been settled as a result of Fleury's initiative 
. 
in arranging Franco-Austrian negotiations. 
The Walpole ministry's close identification with the French 
alliance4 had produced considerable criticism5. Sir Edward 
Marquis de Fleury to'DeBrosse, 30 July 1727, Dresden, 663, f. 84, 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 8 , 
Aug (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751 
f. 216; Le Coq to Augustus, 23 Sept. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, 
f. 241; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 15 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 
2 78/187 
f. 42, draft. 
Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 9,19 Aug, 23 Sept. 1727, Horatio 
Walpole to Townshend, 26 Aug. 1727, Töwnshend to Horatio Walpole, 
21 Aug. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751,179,253,574,294,296,350; 
Horatio Walpole to Walpole,. 23 Sept; 24 Oct, 1721, C(H) corresp. 
1481,1485; Le Coq to Augustus 26 Aug. 30 Sept. 1727, Dresden, 
2676,18a, f. 225,256. 
3 Sinzendorf to Fonseca, _23 
Aug. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 340; 
Atterbury to James III, 20 Aug. 1727, RA. ' 109/87; Solaro di 
Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 23 Aug. 1727, AST. LM. Aut. 58; 
E. G. Cruickshanks, The Factions at the Court of Louis XV and the 
Succession to Cardinal Fleury (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London, 
1956) p. 8; Vandermeer to Horatio Walpole- 9 Sept. 1727, PRO. 
94/98; D. B. Horn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth 
Centur_(Oxford, 1967) p. 51. 
4 Atterbury to James III, 19 Jan. 1728, RA. 113/97. Pro-ministerial 
press reports stressed French care for British interests, 
The Flying Post or Post Master 19 Sept. (OS) 1727; The Post Man 
and the Historical Account 19 Sept. (OS) 26 Oct. 1727; 
Whitehall-Evening Post 12 Oct. (OS) 1727. 
5 (See next page) 
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Knatchbull recorded that the Commons' debates on the Treaty of 
Hanover in February 1726 and on the Address in January 1727 were 
marked by opposition claims that France was an unreliable ally 
l 
whose aggrandisement was dangerous. The French were aware of 
British jealousy and fear; Morville, believed that it was 
essential to persuade the British that the Anglo-French alliance 
operated for the benefit of both powers. He wrote to Chammorel 
in June 1727, 
'Vous vivez au milieu d'un peuple qui'ne souffre 
pas patiemment qu'on le croye conduit par qui que ce 
soit, et toute apparence de vanite a cet egard seroit 
dune dangereuse consequence. Vous devez donc faire 
envisager 1'heureux succes de nos demarches communes 
pour la paix comme le fruit de l'union qui subsiste 
entre la France et l'Angleterre, et vous pourrez en 
tirer une preuve pour etablir autant qu'il sera possible 
- 1'opinion que le maintien de cette bonne intelligence 
est egalement convenable aux interests reciproques. 2 
Such a belief was held by the Walpole ministry. The war plans 
drawn up early in 1727, when war was envisaged against Spain and 
Ii 
Austria, had placed great reliance on the French army, 
particularly for the defence of Hanover. The success of the 
Preliminaries led to an increase of ministerial confidence in 
the alliance. Newcastle drafted a dispatch for John Hedges, 
5 (See previous page) Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 24 June 1727, 
'Osnabruck, 291, f. 741; Broglie to Chauvelin, 6 Nov. 1727, 
AE. CP. Ang. 360, f. 229. 
1 Knatchbull, 17 Feb. (OS) 1726,17 Jan. 1727, pp. 52,59; 
Le Coq to Augustus II, 5 Feb. 1726, Dresden, 2674, f. 6. 
2 Morville to Chammorel, 12 June 1727, AE. CP. Ang. Sup. 8. f. 14. 
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British Envoy Extraordinary at Turin, 
'.... the preserving and cementing the union 
betwixt England and France, which has proved so useful 
and advantageous to both kingdoms, is what His majesty 
looks upon as a principle not. to be departed from .... 
this prosperous turn of affairs, which, next to the 
wisdom of His Majesty's Councils, and the cheerful 
concurrence of his Parliament, must, in justice, be 
ascribed greatly to the constancy, firmness and upright 
behaviour of France. ' 
The next section of the draft was deleted, but it serves to 
illustrate the attitude in 1727 of Newcastle, a minister not 
later noted for his French sympathies. 
'where the present administration appears to act 
upon different maxims from those which may have been 
produced in a former reign. '1 
This view was to be increasingly challenged in the autumn of 
1727, and as the Anglo-French alliance failed to settle 
Anglo-Spanish difficulties, the foreign policy associated with 
the Walpole ministry came under increasing - and for the 
2 
Walpoles worrying - strain. This strain was compounded by two 
other developments. Severe ill-health incapacitated and 
threatened to remove Townshend, leading to ppeculation as to 
who would be his successor. This was made yet more serious by 
'Newcastle to Hedges, 27 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 92/32, f. 387-8; 
Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 28 May (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32750, 
f. 415; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 9 June 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 22 June 1727, BL. Add. 48982, 
f. 37; Marini, p. 77. 2 Craftsman 30 Sept. (OS) 1727; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 22 Sept., 
13 Oct. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, f. 128,173. 
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increasing signs that the varied attempts made since the summer 
'-v 
to improve Britain's relations with various German powers, 
attempts that George was closely identified with, would bear 
fruit and produce either a rapprochement with Austria or a 
"1 
system of German alliances that would have but a tenuous connection 
with Britain's French alliance. 
Townshend had been dogged with ill-health before the autumn 
of 1727. In September 1727. Waldegrave noted that he had often 
and unsuccessfully pressed Townshend to look after his health. 
1 
However, none of Townshend's illnesses was as serious as that 
2 
which nearly killed him in 1727. Various diagnoses were offered 
at the time, ranging from gout, rheumatism and dropsy to more 
exotic illnesses, but the diagnoses only revealed the clumsy 
state of medical science in this period, as did the treatments 
which included the provision of 
After Townshend returned to Lon 
of illness were soon visible. 
3 
to Townshend's under-secretary, 
horse medicines by Walpole. 
don on, June 30th the first signs 
On August 9th Waldegrave wrote 
George Tilson, 
'I am sorry to find mylord has been laid up with the 
gout, but hope it will be no longer than what may 
contribute to his health. and settle those humours I 
used to fear were floating about him. '4 
1 Waldegrave to Townshend, 25 Sept. 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 65. 
2I 
would like to thank Dr. A. M. Cooke F. R. C. P. and my wife, 
Dr. Sarah Black, for discussing Townshend''s illness with me. 
3 Poyntz to Tilson, 9 Aug. 1727, (referring to Tilson to Poyntz 
of 14,18', 21 July (OS) 1727), PRO. 95/47, f. 343; Sir Edward 
Dering to Viscount Percival, 22 Aug, (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 47032 
f. 45. 
4 Waldegrave to Tilson, 9 Aug. 1727, PRO. 80/62 f. 29. 
" Richard Edgcumbe, ministerial election manager in the South-West, to -, 27 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 36/3, f. 32. 
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Such optimistic notes were soon stilled when it became apparent 
that the illness was far more serious than had been believed. 
Medical cures were tried without success. Townshend was confined 
to his chamber and fears were expressed about his life. At one 
stage the doctors gave him up. It is impossible to state what 
Townshend was suffering from but it is conceivable that he had 
suffered a stroke. This seems to be the diagnosis that best fits 
the few symptoms that are recorded. 
After being particularly severe in September the illness 
seems to have abated in October. During this period Townshend 
was able to discharge some of the functions of his office. He 
discussed with Diemar the Freudenberg affair, a dispute between 
Hesse-Cassel and Hanover. On October 20th, at his home, he was 
able to question Dehn about the'size of the Wolfenbüttel army and 
to offer a subsidy treaty. 
' He wrote himself the most sensitive 
section of Waldegrave's instructions, that dealing with George I's 
will. 
2 On November 14th he met the judges in the Exchequer 
Chamber at Westminster, where the Sheriffs were being chosen. On 
November 18th though 'in a very bad way with his rheumatism, ' he 
was able to dine with Charles Delafaye. 
3 Thereafter his health 
seems to have declined again. On the 24th, the Daily Journal 
reported that on the 22nd Townshend 'was judged to be at the last 
4 
extremity'. In December Townshend seems to have recovered a 
1 Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 24 Oct. 1727,.. Wolfenbüttel 1 Alt 22, 
Nr. 534, f. 69-70. 
2 Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Oct. (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62 f. 80. 
3 Daily Journal 6 Nov. (OS) 1727; Delafaye to Duncan Forbes, Lord 
Advocate of Scotland, 7 Nov. (OS) 1727, H. R. Duff (ed. ), 
Culloden Papers (1815) p. 102. 
4 Daily Journal 13 Nov. (OS) 1727. 
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little, 1 although he continued weak and reports persisted that he 
was very ill. In mid-December he was still confined to his 
2 
chamber, though able to walk. He did not recover until the 
spring, missing the opening of Parliament. 
Townshend's illness produced a governmental crisis that has 
been ignored by historians. His illness put-a lot of pressure 
upon his colleague as Secretary, Newcastle, who took over the 
correspondence with the British envoys in the northern department. 
Doubts were expressed about Newcastle's ability to cope. 
3 
;ý 
Towryshend's illness was given by Le Coq as the reason for the 
serious delay in diplomatic negotiations. 
4 
Townshend excused 
himself to Du Bourgay, the British envoy at Berlin, for failing to 
write. 
5 The British diplomatic system appeared' to be drifting 
into a state of chaos. Horatio Walpole complained that Newcastle 
was not keeping him informed, and he anxiously questioned his 
brother about Townshend's health. 
6 
1 Daily Journal 4 Dec. (OS) 1727; L'Hermitage to the States 
General, 16 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 17677 kkk 9 f. 480; Le Coq to 
Augustus, 19 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a. f. 434. 
2 jownshend / to Horatio Walpole, 13 Dec. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 
48982 f. 117; Ipswich Journal 9 Dec. (OS) 1727. 
3 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 8 Dec. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35. Broglie 
reported that Newcastle would be removed, Broglie to Chauvelin, 
6 Nov. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360 f. 229. 
4 Le Coq to Augustus, 23 Sept., 13 Oct., 28. Nov., 9,19 Dec. 1727, 
Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 240,243,300,385,404,434; Marini, p. 94. 
5 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 27 Oct. (OS) 1727, PRO. 90/22. 
6 Waldegrave Journal, 11 Nov. 1727, Chewton;. Horatio Walpole to 
Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, Coxe, II5544. On 21 Sept. (OS) 1727, the 
'Attorney General, Philip Yorke, wrote to Delafaye, 'I was told 
by Mr. Paxton, it was not yet proper mylord should hear much of H 
business', PRO. 54/18 f. 161. Discussing the Wolfenbüttel 
negotiations with Lord King, Walpole stated 'that Lord 
Townshend being sick, he could not attend to it', King, 24 Nov. 
(OS) 1727, p. 50. 'However, the following day, Townshend sent 
King the French draft of the intended treaty, p. 51. 
'ý, 
ýý: s 
90 
In November Le Coq suggested that Townshend's death would 
cause a major problem, 'parce-qu'il est seul au fait des affaires'. 
1 
Fleury pressed Horatio Walpole on the matter, 'with the greatest 
concern', doubting Horatio's assurances that Townshend would 
recover. Speculation began as to who would replace Townshend, 
2 
and suggestions were made that Newcastle would be replaced. Broglie 
informed his government that as soon as the diplomatic situation 
3 
settled down Newcastle would be replaced. 
Townshend's illness and the effective vacancy in the northern 
department, (for Newcastle displayed little interest in the affairs 
of Townshend's department and did not maintain an extensive private 
correspondence with the diplomats in it), meant that George's views 
on the conduct of Anglo-German relations were given free rein. 
Since his accession, George had been defining his own views on 
foreign policy, and in the winter of 17,27-1728, he piloted a policy 
of his own with considerable independence. George's policy 
differed from that of his ministers in two important respects, one 
relating to the prime area of concern and the second to the best 
means for executing policy. Unlike his ministers George displayed 
very little interest in Anglo-Spanish relations. and his concern 
for the issues at stake was at best fitful. He believed that the 
key to the diplomatic situation was Austria. Though Townshend 
certainly agreed with his analysis, he, in common with the other 
minister, gave great attention to parliamentary views on the 
diplomatic situation. These tended to concentrate on the 
1 Le Coq to Augustus II, 25 Nov.. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 379. 
Z Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, Coxe, II, 544. 
3 Broglie to Chauvelin, 6 Nov. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360 f. 229. 
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commercial disputes at stake between Britain and Spain and on 
Gibraltar, and to ignore the niceties of German politics. 
George was particularly concerned with the rights of 
Protestant German princes, such as himself, faced w. th what he 
saw as a despotic Catholic Austrian threat. 
1 Hanoverian 
grievances against the manner in which the Emperor exercised 
Imperial jurisdictional rights in the Mecklenburg and East 
Friesland disputes fortified his determination to force 
Charles VI to be a good Emperor. Allied to these particular 
Hanoverian interests was George's belief that Austria was to 
blame for European instability and that it was secretly 
encouraging Spain to resist British demands. 
2 
It was felt that 
Austria hoped, by delaying peace, to weaken the Hanover allies 
and gain opportunities to split the alliance. This was a view 
shared by the British ministry. Townshend had informed Finch in 
September that 'all the difficultys we meet with come from the 
Imperial court'. 
3 Two months later Newcastle wrote to Finch, 
'tho' the Emperor does not openly himself act 
contrary to the Preliminaries, yet the king sees plainly 
enough by the whole tenour of the conduct of Vienna and 
by many instances of the behaviour of Count K8nigsegg at 
Madrid during this negociation, that at the bottom the 
design of the Impl. Ministry is, to encourage Spain in 
1 St. Saphorin argued that 'toujours est i1 de la derniere 
importance de travailler avec soin Bans l'Empire', St. Saphorin 
to Townshend, 2 May 1727, PRO. 80/61. 
2 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 5_Sept, 23,30 Nov. 1727, BL. Add. 
32751, f. 483,485,32752, f. 100,173" St. Saphorin to Tarouca, 
Portuguese envoy in Vienna, draft, , 
[L Aug. 172V, PRO. 80/61; 
. Delafaye to Horatio Walpole,, 5 Sept. 1727, PRO. 78/187, f. 30. 3 Townshend to Finch, 5 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294", "f. 165. 
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their dispute about the execution of the Preliminarys, 
and to endeavour to embroil the Allys of Hanover'. 
Newcastle made the same point to Horatio Walpole, 
' 
who had been 
informed in August by Vandermeer that Austria was directing 
Spanish policy. 
2 Given-this view it was not surprising that some 
attempt should be made to define British relations with Austria. 
Early in 1727 they had plummeted to a distinct low when the 
British expelled the Austrian resident Palm for making public a 
memorial he presented to George I which accused George of falsely 
impugning Austrian conduct in his speech to Parliament. This had 
led the Austrians to retaliate by expelling St. Saphorin, and the 
British to step up plans for a military conflict with Austria. 
In order to forestall an Austrian attack upon Hanover and 
Hesse-Cassel, an invasion of the Habsburg hereditary lands was 
considered.. Relations were still frosty when George I left for 
Europe. The British were averse to reopening diplomatic relations 
with Austria. Waldegrave's instructions, drawn up at the end of 
May, noted 
'We had many scruples and objections to the sending 
any minister thither till we have had some satisfactory 
explanation upon the ill treatment we have received 
from that Court in several respects. '3 
The British had however yielded to French pressure4 and 
1 Newcastle to Finch, 21 Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294, f. 288; 
Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 23,30 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 
'32753, f. 100,178. 
2 Vandermeer to Horatio Walpole, 25 Aug. 1727, PRO. 94/98. 
3 Instructions for Waldegrave, 26 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 9. 
4 Instructions for Waldegrave, 26 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 9; 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 27 May (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982 
f. 5-6,8; Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Sept. (OS) 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 274. 
93 
decided to send Lord Waldegrave, a diplomat noted for his charm, 
affability and easy manner, and also for possessing the confidence 
of the French government, to Vienna. 
' Waldegrave went as far as 
Paris, where he had been ordered to discuss matters with Fleury, 
but the unfavourable diplomatic scene that was produced by the 
death of George I persuaded him to go no further, and on June 22nd 
he informed Townshend: 
'What weighed most with me and determined me to stay 
here, was the caution yr. Lordship had given me, not 
to proceed unless I had the strongest assurances of 
being well received, and in this I thought the king's 
honour too much concerned to run any hazard. j2 
British suspicions of Austria were increased, after the 
accession of George II, by the fear that the Austrians were 
secretly encouraging the Pretender. In'addition, the French 
negotiations with Austria that had produced the Preliminaries had 
been viewed with some disfavour by the British. Suspicions 
that the French would betray the British position were openly 
voiced, and they were shared by some members of the government. 
3 
} Newcastle stated that Waldegrave had been selected because he was 
'known to be perfectly aggreeäble to the court of France', 
Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 2.7 May (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32750, 
f. 409; Instructions for Waldegrave, 26 May (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62, 
f. 10; St. Saphorin to Tarouca, draft, [- Aug. 17277, PRO. 80/61. 
2 Waldegrave to Townshend, 22 June 1727, PRÖ. 80/62, f. 23. Both 
Dehn and Slingelandt, the Dutch Pensionary, regretted the fact 
that Waldegrave had not continued to Vienna, Dehn to Ferdinand 
Albrecht, 23 Sept. 1727, Wolfenbüttel 1 Alt 22 Nr. 534 f. 47. { 
Fonseca told Waldegrave 'that my being at'Vienna might and would 
-certainly have facilitated matters, 24 Sept, 1727, Waldegrave 
Journal, Chewton. Waldegrave's decision was in accordance with 
his orders, draft memorandum for Waldegrave, sent to him 29 May 
(OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187, f. 8. 
3 (Delafay7to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug.. (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 10. 
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In particular, the French ambassador at Vienna, Richelieu, was 
distrusted. 1 
However, there was considerable ambivalence in British 
attitudes towards Austria. 
2 This ambivalence was best summed up 
in letters dispatched to Waldegrave on August 18th. In the 
instructions sent to the envoy he was ordered to co-operate with 
the Austrians. The hope was expressed that 'you will find an 
equal inclination at Vienna to suppress all reflections on past 
measures and to look forward only upon the best means for 
reestablishing a strict friendship for the 
day Townshend informed him that George was 
ill treatment which has been received from 
Suspicion was therefore coupled with a hop, 
be possible to restore amicable relations, 
future'. On the same 
'very sensible of the 
the court of Vienna'. 
3 
e that it would somehow 
a possibility that 
appeared more likely when the Austrians clearly disavowed the 
Jacobites. Some understanding with Austria was needed if Britain 
was not to be totally outmanoeuvred at the forthcoming Congress, 
for otherwise France could act the role of arbiter of Europe, and 
Britain would be isolated if France should decide to support 
1 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 30 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32753, 
f. 178; Waldegrave Journal, 8 Nov. 1727, Chewton; Le Coq to 
Augustus II, 17 Oct. 1727,. Dresden 2676,18a f. 303; Woodward to 
Tilson, 9 Ap., 2 May, St. Saphorin to Townshend, 16,22 Ap., 
29 May 1727, PRO. 80/61; ZDelafaye7 to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug. 
(OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. ll. 
2 For discussion of the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian 
reconciliation Post Boy 30 Sept. (OS) 1727; Fiorelli to the Doge 
of Venice, 19 Sept. 1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f. 39. 
3 Instructions for Waldegrave, 7 Aug. (OS) 1727, Townshend to 
Waldegrave. 7 Aug'. (OS) 1727, PRO. 80/62, f. 37-44,53-6. 
Waldegrave was ordered to remain in Paris pending diplomatic 
developments, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 30 Nov. (OS) 1727, 
BL. Add. 32753, f. 180. Austrian proposals concerning the Ostend 
trade aroused British anger, Townshend to Finch, 5,15 Sept. (OS) 
1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 45, draft. 
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Spanish or Austrian pretensions. The advantage of some sort of 
agreement with Austria was clear, and, indeed, it was openly 
advocated by the opposition Whigs, but the French orientation of 
the Walpole ministry prevented any independent approach to Austria. 
l 
The ministry did not wish to jeopardise French support by 
appearing to follow an independent German policy. Horatio Walpole 
assured Morville in July that Britain would only listen to Prussian 
proposals in concert with France. 
2 
In October 1727 O'Rourke wrote of the Austrians, 
'their politicks are all passive, that is to say that 
like pretty women, they will make noe advances, but 
receave those that are made to them if to their liking, 
and take hold of such overtures, and' occurrences, as 
offer of themselves. '3 
The Austrians, disinclined to upset their allies and 
quizzical about the stability of the Walpole ministry, had made 
no overtures to George II, but waited for Waldegrave's arrival 
in Vienna, hoping that he would bring proposals for them to 
1 It was in concert with France that Horatio Walpole proposed 
sending Waldegrave to Vienna, 'without a caracter... to see if 
the Emperor can be persuaded not to encourage Spain in so 
unreasonable demands as those now made', Waldegrave Journal, 
21 Sept. 1727, Chewton. In the draft of a letter to Tarouca, 
the Portuguese envoy in Austria, St. Saphorin claimed that 
George II 'ne sera jamais dloigng de bier vivre avec la cour 
Imperiale, tandis quelle voudra avoir de bons procedes avec 
luy, et quelle n'entreprendra rien de prejudiciÄble ä ses 
amis, et a la seurete de 1'Europe ... il sera toujours dispose ä se kreter a toutes les ouvertures d'une"-pleine reconciliation, 
pourvu qu'on ne luy propose rien qui soft contraire ä ses 
Traittes, et qui ne soit conforme a sa dignite et "a' sa gloire, 
St. Saphorin to Tarouca, (- Aug. 172)PRO. 80/61. 
2 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 30 July 1727, BL. Add. 32751 f. 127. 
3 O'Rourke to Graham, 1 Oct. 1727, Vienna, England, Varia 8. 
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consider. 
l The Prussians had been more adventurous. Frederick 
William I greeted the news of George I's death with the tears 
then conventional upon the news of a father-in-law's death, and 
with assurances to Du Bourgay that a high ranking envoy would be 
2 
sent to Britain to offer condolences. Baron Wallenrodt was 
sent to London to sound the British about the possibility of a 
3 
new treaty. Noises were made in Berlin About the projected 
marriages between George's eldest son Frederick, now Prince of 
Wales, and Frederick William's eldest daughter Wilhelmina, and 
between the Prussian Crown Prince Frederick and the British 
Princess Royal, Anne. In his audience in July Wallenrodt gave 
George 'very strong assurances from the king his master of his 
friendship and affection, and of his earnest desire to live in a 
perfect good understanding with his Majesty'. 
George's response to the Prussians was curt. Wallenrodt 
was told 'that as to any engagements or joint measures, he could 
enter into none, 'unless they were concerted with France likewise. 14 
Du Bourgay was sharply reprimanded for exceeding orders in his 
} Despite Waldegrave's-appointment, the Austrians did not name an 
envoy for Britain, St. Saphorin to Tarouca, draft, Aug. 17273 
PRO. 80/61; O'Rourke reported that the Austrians wanted a 
reconciliation with Britain, O'Rourke to Graham, 1 Oct. 1727, 
Vienna, England, Varia, 8; Fonseca pressed Waldegrave to go to 
Vienna, 24 Sept. 1727, Waldegrave Journal, Chewton. 
2 Charles Du Bourgay, British Envoy Extraordinary in Berlin, to 
Townshend, 28 June, 12 July 1727, PRO. 90/22. The Saxon envoy 
in Berlin, Sühm, reported that Prussia wanted a reconciliation 
with Britain and France, Suhm to Augustus II, 21 July 1727, 
Dresden, 3378, Vol. IV, f. 127. 
3 Wallenrodt was suspected of being anti-British, Horatio Walpole 
to Tilson, 26 July 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f. 62,64. 
4 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 14 July (OS) 1727, PRO. 90/22; Suhm to 
Augustus II, 22 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 3378, IV f. 171-2; Le Coq to 
Augustus II, 23 Sept. 1727, Dredsen, 2676, Vol. 18a. f. 242-3. 
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discussions with the Prussians, and for 'meddling'. George 
denied that he had any plans for the marriage of his children, 
and stated that such marriages must wait until the European 
situation was more stable. 
l George was criticised for his 
negative response to the Prussian-approaches. The Reverend 
Henry Etough, rector of Therfield in Hertfordshire, kept extensive 
records of his conversations with Robert Walpole, Horatio Walpole, 
and John Scrope. He noted in his papers that Frederick William I 
had been tactlessly irritated by George's refusal to publish his 
father's will. George II did so because he wished to suppress 
2 
the provisions it included for the eventual separation of Hanover 
from Britain. George I had stipulated that if his grandson 
Frederick should have more than one son, the first-born should 
inherit the royal crown and the second the electoral cap. If 
Frederick had only one son, that son should become King of Great 
Britain, while the Electorate would pass into the Wolfenbdttel 
branch of the house of Brunswick. Frederick William I believed 
that George II had deprived Frederick's wife-Sophia Dorothea of 
her father, George Its, legacy to her, by suppressing the will. 
3 
Townshend to Du Bourgay, 19 Sept. 1727, PRO. 90/22. Le Coq was 
certain that George and Caroline wanted greatly to marry their 
children. Le Coq to Augustus II, 25 July, 1727, Dresden, 2676, 
18a, f. 154; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 29 Oct. 
1727 AST. LM. Aut. 58. 
2 Collections of the Rev. H. Etough, Vol. 2, BL. Add. 9200, Coxe 
Papers, Vol. CXXIII f. 49. 
3. R. Drögereot. 'The Testament of King George I and the problem 
of personal union between England and Hanover', Research and 
Progress V (1939), 83-6; Hatton, pp. 157-8; R. Drdgereit 'Das 
Testament König Georgs I und die Frage der Personal union 
zwischen England und Hanover', Niedersächisches Jahrbuch ffr f 
Landesgeschichte, 1937, pp. 84-199; Le Coq to Augustus II, 
15 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 201; Solaro di Breglio to 
Victor Amadeus II, 29 Oct. 1727, AST. LM. Aut. 58; Marini, p. 83. 
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Etough noted that 'the friends and foes of the present 
establishment were nearly unanimous in their opinion, that had 
this opportunity been improved to procure the amity of the King 
of Prussia, and had not been perverted to increase his enmity, 
all payments to Hesse Cassel might-have been absolutely saved. '1 
Townshend excused the British response by claiming that Britain 
was being faithful to her allies. He informed De Bourgay of 
'the rule H. M. has laid down to go hadd in hand with the most 
Christian king in all things that concern the publick affairs of 
Europe. '2 The French had already expressed concern that British 
support for Prussia would upset the Wittelsbachs, concerned over 
the Jülich-Berg inheritance. 3 
In fact the British response was not simply due to compliance 
with French wishes, however much the British might attempt to 
persuade the French that this was the case. 
4 
The British did not 
want to become embroiled in conflicts as an ally of Prussia. The 
Prussians had made it clear that they expected assistance over 
Jülich-Berg from their allies, 
5 
and, in addition, the Courland 
Etough, collections, f. 49. St. Saphorin pressed for an Anglo- 
Prussian alliance as a way to limit Austrian power in the Empire, 
'Relation sur les affaires du Mecklenbourg'; no date, by 
St. Saphorin, PRO. 80/61. Etough was referring to the subsidy 
treaty with Hesse-Cassel, which had been negotiated in order to 
commit Hessian troops to the defence of Hanover. 
2 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 14 July (OS) 1727, PRO. 90/22. l 
3 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, ' 19 Aug. 1727, 'BL. Add. 32751, f. 222; 
Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 24 Oct. 1727, C (H) corresp. 1485; 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. (OS)-1727, BL. Add. 48982 
. 
f. 69. 
4 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 14 Aug (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751, 
f. 284-5. Le Coq reported that the British government did not wish 
to anger Sweden and the United Provinces by being too amenable to 
Prussian demands, Le Coq to Augustus, 22 Aug. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 
f. 218. Townshend complained about French distrust, Townshend to 
Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f. 69. 
5 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 12 July 1727, PRO. 90/22; Solaro di 
Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 1 Oct. 1727, AST. LM. Aut. 58; Newcastle 
to Horatio Walpole, 16 Oct. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32752, f. 217. 
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succession dispute, in which Prussia had a major interest, had 
erupted-into violence. Furthermore, it was felt that Frederick 
William could not be trusted, 
1 
and, as Etough pointed out, his 
'inconsistent and deceitfull practices, with regard to the 
treaties of Vienna and Hanover .... discouraged all political 
dependence'. 2 Newcastle informed Horatio Walpole in October that 
George believed that Frederick William should be made 'to feel 
the effects of his late behaviour '. 
3 
In his rejection of Prussian approaches and his antagonism 
towards the Austrians George could be seen as a faithful ally, 
but he was showing considerable independence in-his attempts to 
develop a league of German princes. 
4 A note of vigour was 
injected into Britain's German policy. Wallenrodt reported that 
George had told him that he was determined 'to maintain the 
constitution of the the Empire , but if the Emperor trod upon 
his toe, H. M. would let him know, whom he had to do with. '5 
Horatio' Walpole was informed that George wanted French support 
for the 'liberties of the Germanic Body', and George drafted 
6 
Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 30 July 1727, BL. Add. 32751, f. 127; 
Chavigny to Chauvelin, 12 Aug. 1727, AE. CP. Allemagne, 373, f. 58-9 
2 Etough Collections, f. 49-50; Gansinot to Plettenberg, 26 Feb. 
1726, Münster, 'NB. 259, f. 207. 
3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 16 Oct.. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32752, 
f. 218. 
. 4 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. (OS), Delafaye. to Horatio 
Walpole, 29 Aug., ZDelafaye or Newcastle/to Horatio Walpole, 
25 Dec. 1727, PRO. 78/187. St. Saphorin. puggested an exchange of 
envoys with Bavaria, St. Saphorin to Toerring, draft i-Aug. 17277, 
PRO. 80/61. 
5 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 9 Aug. 1727, PRO. 90/22. Du Bourgay 
claimed to be repeating the contents of Wallenrodt's dispatch. 
Le Coq's report confirms this account of George II's words, Le Coq to Augustus, 25 July 1727, Dresden, 2676, l8a, f. 154; Newcastle to 
William Finch, 21 Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294, f. 289. 
6. Townshend thought that George was too strident on this point, [Delafaye7to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug (OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187, f. 10. 
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him instructions that demanded that France should provide a 
declaration that she would respect the rights of Protestants in 
the Empire. 
1 Töwnshend informed Horatio Walpole that 'a stop 
must be put to the absolute power which the Emperor is daily 
acquiring in Germany!. 
2 
During the period of near-conflict that had preceded the 
Preliminaries of Paris the French had been eager to beat the 
same drum, and had sought to develop an alliance with the 
Wittelsbach princes-, but after the Preliminaries the French 
advocated a moderate approach to Austria. As a result the lead 
in finding new supporters for the Alliance of Hanover was taken 
by George II. D'Aix noted that George was trying to acquire a 
party in the Empire and to persuade the Princes'to demand 
independent representation at the forthcoming Congress and not 
to permit the Emperor to represent them'. 
3 This was of great 
importance for George because he feared that in any Congress 
restricted to the Signators of the Preliminaries of Paris, 
Britain would be isolated, and France and Austria would decide 
German matters themselves and display no concern for the 
grievances of the Protestant princes. Were the latter included, 
George would be able to play a more prominent role at the 
Congress. For this reason he pressed for the widest representation 
possible, denied that the Emperor had the right to represent the 
1 Draft Instructions for Horatio Walpole, -, 1727, PRO. 78/187, 
f. 1-7; LNewcastle/to Horatio Walpole, 21 May (OS) 1728, PRO. 78/189 
f. 206. (OS), 21 Aug. 
2 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 8 Aug. fl(quote) 1727, BL. Add. 32751 
f. 215-6,345; Le Coq to Flemming, 7 Oct. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a 
f. 284; Townshend to the Dutch nobleman d'Ittersum, 18 Aug. (OS) 
1727, PRO. 84/296 f. 73; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 9 Nov (OS) 
1727, BL. Add. 32752, f. 482; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 1 Sept. 
(OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187, f. 27.1, 
3 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, -3 Nov 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Marini, p. 96 
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princes1 and urged 
that the Scandinavian powers should be 
admitted to the Congress. 
2 
France gave only grudging support to 
this policy. 
A major motive for George's actions was concern over the 
security of Hanover. The Electorate was'an exposed territory, 
lacking sound fortifications. Visitors to Hanover commented 
frequently upon its defencelessness. In 1729 Townshend wrote 
that George had 'a great extent of country to defend which is 
open and unguarded by any strong place. ' A British visitor noted 
of the town of Hanover that 'the fortifications-are not 
considerable'. Chauvelin argued that the conquest of the 
Electorate could be settled by one battle, because there were no 
fortifications that required a siege, whilst Bo. issieux, the 
French envoy to the Elector of Cologne, stated that the 
Electorate of Hanover would take less than three weeks to conquer. 
3 
The agreements between Austria, Prussia and Russia signed 
in 1726, had badly shaken George I. George II was very concerned 
at signs of military movements by these powers, and at their 
attempts to bring Mecklenburg, Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and 
Saxony-Poland into their system. In early October 1727, Le Coq 
reported a revival of earlier British fears that Augustus II was 
permitting the Austrians to construct magazines in Saxony, that 
an Austro-Saxon agreement existed for the assembly of Austrian 
1Le Coq to Augustus II, 17 Oct. 16 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, 
f. 305,426;. Marini, p. 90. 
2 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 17 Aug. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32751, 
f. 308. 
3 Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 Sept. 1729, PRO. 84/305, f. 93; 
Anon. travel account, Bodl. Rawl. letters, 72, f. 2; Chauvelin to 
Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, Boissieux to Chauvelin, 13 Sept. 1729, 
AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f. 134, Cologne, 70, f. 190. 
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troops to attack Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and that August Wilhelm 
of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel was negotiating the entry of Austrian 
troops into the fortress of Brunswick. 
1 In October Augustus II's 
leading minister Count Flemming visited Berlin, ostensibly to 
discuss toll disputes between Saxony and Prussia. This 
explanation of his mission was believed by few, and, though 
Du Bourgay was unable to find out the true motive, Villars noted 
the belief that it was to discuss plans for war and commented on 
the improvement of relations between Austria, Russia and Prussia. 
Le Coq informed Flemming that he had had to reassure the British 
2 
about the purpose of his mission. 
Among the foreign envoys who arrived in Britain to attend 
the coronation were the Württemberg envoy Count Gravanitz and the 
Wolfenbdttel envoy Count Dehn. George opened discussions with 
both men about the possibility of an alliance with Britain. 
Gravanitz's dispatches do not survive, and it is difficult to 
discover information about his mission. Le Coq reported that the 
British were anxious to win the alliance of Württemberg, and both 
he and D'Aix believed that Württemberg was interested in such an 
arrangement, though, as Le Coq pointed out, she required subsidies. 
3 
To contemporaries Dehn's mission was charged with significance. 
:t 
"ý 
.w, 
ýý ýýý, 
Le Coq to Augustus II, 3.7 Oct. 1727, 'Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a, 
f. 265,275-6; Waldegrave Journal, 8,10 Nov. 1727, Chewton. 
2 Villars, 12 Oct., 16 Nov. 1727, p. 100,106; Du Bourgay to 
Townshend, 28 Oct., 4 Nov. 1727, PRO. 90/22; Le Coq to Flemming, 
18 Nov., 2 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. f. 364,392. 
3 Le Coq to Augustus II, 24 Oct., 7 Nov. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, 
f. 318,344-6; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 21 Jan. 1728, 
AST. LM. Aut. 58; Dureng, p. 62. The British urged France to 
satisfy the Württemberg claim to Montbeliard. This policy had 
been advocated by St. Saphorin the previous Spring, St. Saphorin 
to Townshend, 22 Ap. 1727, 'Projet de Representation ä la cour de 
France en faveur du Duc de Wirtenberg', by St. Saphorin, no date 
but after accession of George II, PRO. 80/61. 
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Dehn himself does not seem to have been a terribly impressive 
diplomat. 1 Pöllnitz, the Prussian courtier who printed his travel 
notes in the 1730's, referred to Dehn in very disparaging terms 
0 
as a frivolous politician who delighted in splendour, enjoyed 
balls and liked making treaties. 
2 Pöllnitz is not a reliable 
source. In some respects he was a German equivalent of Lord Hervey. 
However, his view was corroborated by Sutton who served as the 
British Envoy Extraordinary ' in Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel in 1729. 
Sutton, who managed to combine debauchery and ability thought 
3 little of Dehn who only managed the former. Largilliere's 
portrait of Dehn, now hanging in the Herzog Anton-Ulrich museum in 
Brunswick, is a portrait of a shallow and flashy courtier. 
Delayed by contrary winds Dehn arrived in London in early 
October. There he negotiated the Treaty of Westminster with 
Townshend. The agreement included a mutual guarantee of dominions, 
mutual assistance in case of attack, 4 British Subsidy, an 
arrangement under which'the fortress of Brunswick was to be kept 
for the common safety of the house of Luneburg, and the delivery 
1 Ferdinand Albrecht to his mother-in-law, Christine Louise von 
Oettingen, wife'of Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 
3 Ap. 1728, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt. 22,529, f. 132. P. Zimmerman, 
'Zum Leben und zur charakteristik des Graften konrad Detlev v. 
Dehn', Jahrbuch des Geschichtsvereins fflr das Herzogtum 
Braunschweig 14, (1915-6), pp. 77-99. Dehn's parties were 
certainly most impressive, London Evening Post 22 Feb. (OS) 1728. 
2 Pöllnitz, Lettres et Memoires du Baron de Pöllnitz, contenant 
lesobservations qu'il a faites dans ses voyages, et le 
caractere des personnes qui composent les principales cours de 
1'Europe. (5th ed., Frankfurt-on-Main, 1738), 30-July 1729, I, 
86-7. 
3 Sutton to Townshend, 8 Mar., to Tilson, 11 Mar., 17 May 1729, 
PRO. 81/123. Newcastle noted that 'Dehn is in his nature pretty 
forward', LNewcastle/to Horatio Walpole, 17 Ap. (OS) 1728, PRO. 
78/189, f. 136. 
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of the copy of George I's will held by Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. 
l 
This was seen by the British as a considerable triumph. Newcastle 
informed Horatio Walpole that it would make Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel 
'a Barrier against any attempts of the Emperor, who has certainly 
flattered himself with the hopes of making Brunswick aplace of 
arms'. 
2 
Fleury told Horatio that he was delighted by the treaty, 
and the government proclaimed it as a triumph of foreign policy, 
though they were less keen on advertising the amount of money 
promised to Brunswick-Wol2enbdttel. 
3 
More attention was devoted to the suggestions that Dehn sought 
to achieve an Anglo-Austrian rapprochement. Reports to this effect 
circulated widely. 
4 Zamboni informed the Landgrave of 'Hesse- 
Darmstadt that the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, August Wilhelm. 
had decided to attempt such a rapprochement and that he had ordered 
i 
Dehn to secure it. According to Zamboni the Austrians disliked the 
Treaty of Westminster, 25 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f. 260-3, 
Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 534, f. 104-8.. The British ministers 
who signed were Walpole, Townshend, Newcastle, Devonshire and 
Lord Trevor, the Lord Privy Seal. The will was not mentioned in 
the treaty but George's ratification was. -conditional upon the will's delivery, Dehn to Townshend, 6 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f. 269; 
Townshend to Dehn, 25 Nov. (OS), Newcastle to Dehn, 25 Nov. (OS), 
Draft of a declaration to Dehn, - Nov. (OS) 1727, PRO. 100/15; 
King, pp. 50-54; Naumann, Osterreich, England und das Reich 
pp. 135-6; Fleury to Horatio, Walpole, 2 Aug. 1727, BL. Add. 48982, 
f. 65. 2 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 2 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32752, 
f. 406; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 13 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 663, f. 151. The 
strength. of the town's defences is clearly visible in a plan of 
Wolfenbüttel drawn in 1729 by F. B. Werner, Wolfenbüttel, Herzog 
August Bibliothek. 4 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 20 Nov. 1727, BL. Add. 332752 f. 473. 
In the previous year Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel had signed an alliance 
with Austria. The Duke was the uncle of Charles VI's wife. 
Schleinitz to Dehn, 3 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 48982 f. 98. It was 
suggested that, in addition to an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, 
Dehn would arrange a marriage between George II's eldest daughter, 
Anne, and Ferdinand Albrecht's eldest son, Charles, Anon to Anon, 
no. date, Vienna, England, Varia, 10 f. 39. This interesting 
document had been dated by the archive as 1750?,. but it clearly 
relates to the winter of 1727-8. Le Coq to Augustus II, 9 Dec. 
1727, Dresden, 2676,18a. f. 403. Dehn was very optimistic about the 
possibility of a reconciliation, Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
(cont. next page) 
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idea and persuaded August Wilhelm to desist. 
l From St. Petersburg 
the French agent Magnan reported that the Danish envoy there, 
Westphalen, was displeased at reports of an Anglo-Austrian 
reconciliation, and that the Wolfenbdttel minister Cramm was 
2 
attempting to secure an Anglo-Russian reconciliation. On 
November 11th Waldegrave recorded in his journal, 
'Mr Wal. told me that the Card, had taken notice 
of him that the D of N had acquainted the French ambassador 
at London with a proposal made the king by the Wolfenbdtel 
minister about a private pacification with the Emp. but 
had been rejected by the king, Mr. Wal. was surprised 
that the D of N had taken no notice of it in any of his 
letters to him'. 3 
The British certainly assured the French that they had 
4 
} 
4 {cont. from previous page) 2 Sept. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, 
Nr. 534 f. 16-18. O'Rourke reported that both George II and the 
Austrians were believed to be very interested in a reconciliation, 
O'Rourke to Graham, 15,22 Oct. 1727, Vienna, England, Varia, 8; 
Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 12 Dec. 1727, Osnabrück, 291 f. 451. 
"1 Zamboni to Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 16 Dec. 1727, Bodl. Rawl. 
119 f. 198. 
2 Magnan to Chauvelin, 15 Nov. 1727, Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo 
Istoricheskogo Obshchestva (St. Petersburg 1867-1916), 75, p. 126. 
Gramm was suspected of being a British agent, Liria, pp. 208-9. 
In order to cover the costs of their envoy in Russia, whom they 
claimed represented British interests, the government of Brunswick- 
Wolfenbüttel sought money from Britain, Dehn to August Wilhelm, 
13 July 1728, Wolfenbüttel, 2 Alt 3632 f. 7. 
3 Waldegrave Journal, 11 Nov. 1727, Chewton. Chavigny, French envoy 
at the Imperial Diet, and Broglie were both very suspicious of 
Dehn's mission, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 16 Sept., 2 Oct. 1727, 
AE. CP. Allemagne, 373 f. 87,103; Le Coq to Augustus II, 14 Nov. 
1727, Dresden, 2676,18a f. 354-5. Dehn's brother, the Wolfenbüttel 
envoy at Vienna, wrote that Austria sought better relations with 
Britain and information from Count Dehn;. he added, 'Le Prince 
d'Eugene m'a dit encore une fois que pour cette fin on donnera, 
selon que les circonstances l'exigeront, commission specielle au 
Cte. de Dehn', Baron Dehn to Count Dehn, 20 Aug. 1727, PRO. 84/294 
f .. 167 .. 
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rejected an approach from Dehn, but it is difficult to disentangle 
the course of events. 
' 
Only a portion of Dehn's correspondence 
survives and it is not particularly helpful. It does however 
reveal that internal Wolfenbdttel politics may have played a major 
role in developments. The politics of the Duchy were notoriously 
2 intricate and unstable. August Wilhelm had no children and there 
was a strong reversionary interest in the duchy centered on his 
brother's son-in-law Ferdinand*Albrecht, the Duke of Brunswick- 
Bevern, who was eventually to'succeed to Wolfenbüttel in 1735.3 
In October 1727 the principal Wolfenbüttel minister Munchausen fell. 
This upset Dehn who feared that he would follow Munchausen, a point 
Ferdinand Albrecht also made. This helped to make Dehn very 
cautious, and lent weight to Ferdinand Albrecht's advice that he 
should return to Wolfenbüttel and do nothing to upset the 
Austrians. 
4 
Dehn was notoriously keen to exaggerate the favour with whioh 
Le Coq reported that the British, suspicious of Austro-Spanish 
links, rejected Dehn's suggestion of an Anglo-Austrian 
reconciliation, Le Coq to Augustus II, 19 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, 
Vol. 18a. f. 437, Tilson assured Horatio Walpole that Townshend 
had George's orders to reject any approach from Dehn. However, 
it is possible that Horatio was being misled, Tilson to Horatio 
Walpole, 12 Oct. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f. 92. Townshend gave 
similar assurances, Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. (OS) 
1727, PRO. 78/187. 
2 Private Instructions for Sutton, as Envoy-Extraordinary to the 
Duke of Wolfenbüttel, 21 Jan. (OS) 1729, PRO. 81/123. 
3 Ferdinand Albrecht was a staunch supporter of Austria and a 
correspondent of Prince Eugene's. He had a private correspondence 
with Dehn. 9 
4 Dehn to Townshend, 14 Feb., government of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel 
to Dehn, 3 Feb. 1728, PRO. 100/15; Ferdinand Albrecht to Dehn, 
12. Sept. 27 Nov. 1727, Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 31 Oct., 18 Nov. 
1727, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22 534, -f. 23,102,59-60,100-1; 
Ferdinand Albrecht to Christine Louise von Oettingen, wife of 
Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 4 Nov. 1727, Wolfenbüttel, 
1 Alt 22 Nr. 529, f. 76. 1 
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his approaches were received. It is probable that had George 
received his approach with greater favour he would have made more 
of the matter. Equally, it is possible that Geotge used the Dehn 
mission in order to frighten the French into lending him more 
diplomatic support. Whatever the truth of the matter it is 
certain that the episode increased uncertainty over George's 
intentions and over British policy in general. 
1 
I 
The Dehn mission was no secret, but British approaches to 
the Saxons that winter were, and have remained so. They have 
2 
received no scholarly attention and the only evidence about the 
approaches is to be found in the Saxon archives. ' The 
uncorroborated nature of the evidence calls-its veracity into 
question, but it should be noted that Le Coq's dispatches reveal 
an intelligent and perceptive mind at work, and that the British 
never complained about the accuracy of Le Coq's despatches as they 
were to complain about those of other envoys, such as the Prussian 
Reichenbach. On December 12th 1727 Le Coq sent a messenger to 
Augustus II with a lengthy dispatch. This despatch, subsequently 
endorsed 'lettre de Mr Le Coq contenant quelques ouvertures faites 
1George 
was pleased by Dehn's views, and hopeful that Dehn would be 
able to persuade August Wilhelm to remove his pro-Austrian 
ministers, LDelafaye or Newcastle/to Horatio Walpole, 14,5 Nov. 
(OS) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 107,95-6. In Deqember 1727 Newcastle 
informed-Horatio Walpole that, faced with the apparent failure of 
Rottembourg's negotiations, George believed that the powers in the 
Alliance of Hanover should ask Charles VI whether he was willing 
to execute the Preliminaries of Paris, and., if so should settle 
with him on those terms, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14 Dec. (OS) 
1727, BL. Add. 32753 f. 459; Townshend to William Finch, 2 Jan. (OS) 
1728, PRO. 84/299 f. 3. 
2There 
are hints that the Dutch sought to encourage an AngloiAustrian 
reconciliation, Dehn to Ferdinand Albrecht, 2 Sept. 1727, 
WolfenbÜttel, 1 Alt 22,534, f. 17; Le Coq to Augustus II, 18 Nov. 
1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a. f. 361-2; Zamboni to the Landgrave 
of Hesse-Darmstadt, 16 Dec. 1727, Bodl. Rawl. 119 f. 198. 
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par Mr. de St. Saphorin, ' contained the details of several 
conferences between Le Coq and St. Saphorin. The conferences 
were undated, except for the last on the 10th. St. Saphorin, on 
the 10th, dwelt on the threat to the German princes represented 
by the alliance of Spain and Austria and argued that'both powers 
intended that Don Carlos should marry Maria Teresa and succeed 
to the Austrian inheritance. He stated that to face this threat, 
a league in the Empire was necessary to defend its rights and 
liberties.. He stated that he was sure that Bavaria would join, 
a view that probably owed something to his mission there in 1725, 
and suggested that Prussia would, despite the instability of its 
recent policy. St. Saphorin added that France would have to be 
excluded from any-agreement between Britain and the German powers 
because France was distrusted in the Empire, a point he did not 
enlarge upon. 
l 
Le Coq was at pains to affirm that St. Saphorin's approach 
was not a personal one. He reiterated that he was sure that 
St. Saphorin was speaking in the name of the king and he stated, 
'il est apparent, que ce tour a 
ete concerte avec S. M. B. meme, 
pour pouvoir pressentir mieux les dispositions de V. M. avant que 
de pousser la chose plus loin'. 
2 
St. Saphorin informed Flemming that Saxony had been 
approached first because the British hoped that Saxon approval 
would have a good effect upon other powers. 
3 He might have added 
10Lettre de Mr. Le Coq contenant quelques ouvertures faites par 
Mr. de St. Saphorin, ' 12 Dec., 1727, Le Coq to Flemming, 7 Oct. 
1727, Flemming to Le Coq, 25 Oct. 1727, Le Coq to Augustus, 28 Nov. 
1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 406-17,284; 286,386. 
2 Lettre de Mr. Le Coq ... f. 412. 
3 Le Coq to Flemming, 12 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 421. 
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that there was no Wittelsbach representative in London and that 
Wallenrodt's death in October. had reduced Prussian representation 
to a low level. Le Coq was further convinced that St. Saphorin 
was acting on royal instructions by the fact that on December 9th 
Le Coq had had an audience of over an hour with the Queen who had 
stated that George needed allies in the Empire and that an Anglo- 
l 
Saxon alliance without France was necessary. 
This approach to Saxony, -rather than the response to Dehn's 
mission, confirmed that George was willing to adopt schemes of 
his own, and to ignore his ministers. Le Coq reported that 
0r 
Newcastle knew nothing of the matter and that George wanted 
St. Saphorin to handle the negotiation unbeknownst to his 
ministers or the French. 
2 
George was not only challenging the French orientation of 
British foreign policy in the Empire. His anger at the French 
failure to settle Anglo-Spanish differences to the satisfaction 
of the British led him-to demand that action should be taken 
3 
against the Spaniards, a policy France opposed. During the 
autumn of 1727 criticism of France had been growing in London. 
4 
Broglie had assured George that France was still true to the 
1 Lettre de Mr. Le Coq ... ; f. 412-3. 
2 Lettre de Mr. Le Coq ... , f. 414-5. 
3 Villars, 28 Sept. 1727, pp. 96-7; In September Townshend wrote, 
'His Majesty thinks we ought to be determined as to our measures, 
in case the Emperor and Spain persist in their unreasonable way 
of acting', Townshend to William Finch, 19 Sept. (OS) 1727, PRO. 
84/294, f. 182. George also suggested that a date should be 
agreed upon by when the Prince Frederick should have been handed 
over, LNewcastle or Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, - Sept. (OS) 
1727, PRO. 78/187, f. 53, draft; Horatio Walpole to rTilsonJ, 
3 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 48982, f. 86. 
4 Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. 1727, Osnabrück, 291, f. 409; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Dec. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, f. 277. ý; ' 
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British alliance. 
l Horatio Walpole informed all and sundry that 
,4 
this was the. case. 
2 Horatio was, nevertheless, anxiously aware 
that this was doubted and he feared that his brother was no 
longer happy with the French alliance. On September 23rd he wrote 
to him to reassure him on the point. However Horatio himself was 
increasingly doubtful about the French. On September 21st he went 
for a walk with Waldegrave who recorded that he 'seemed under a 
good deal of uneasiness at his. own situation' and that Horatio had 
told Fleury that if he deceived him Horatio would probably be sent 
to the Tower. The next day 'Mr. Wal. told the Cardinal that 
everybody said that nothing but his answering for his Em. made 
people believe him in earnest. ' On the 25th Horatio showed 
Waldegrave letters he had received the previous day from his 
brother and from Newcastle. Newcastle's praised the conduct of 
France towards Spain, but 'his brother's seemed a good deal 
suspecting the worst in every point, and that Fr. Sp. and the Emp. 
might have some underhand dealings to humble us'. 
3 
Robert Walpole's fears were shared by others. In the summer 
the ministry had derided fears voiced by such varied sources as 
John Bagshaw, the British Consul in Genoa, and d'Ittersum, the 
Overyssel nobleman who was one of Townshend's principal informants 
on Dutch affairs, of an alliance between Austria, Spain and 
i` 
1 Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. 1727, Osnabrück, 291, f. 409; 
Villars, 12 Oct. 1727, p. 100; Visconti to.. Sinzendorf, 29 Sept. 
1727, Vienna, Ek., 65; Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 19 Sept. 
1727, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f. 37. 
2 Horatio Waipole to Newcastle, 10,18 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753, 
f0162,284-5. 
3 Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 23 Sept. 1727, C(H) corresp. 1481; 
Waldegrave Journal, 22,24,25 Sept. 1727, Chewton. 
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France. l The failure of these powers to unite in support of the 
Pretender seemed to lend credence to the ministerial viewpoint, 
and the government had dismissed reports, encouraged by the 
Spaniards, that Spain had been responsible for the replacement of 
Morville by Chauvelin. However, Rottembourg's failure to settle 
Anglo-Spanish affairs to British satisfaction led to a revival of 
2 doubt about the French. George was very angry at the unsettled 
state of affairs and he vested-his spleen on Broglie, who reported 
in December, 
'Le Roy d'Angleterre est daps un estat si violent 
depuis l'arrivee du dernier courier de M. de Walpole'. 
George told Broglie that the delays angered him. 
3 
The Ministry were placed in a very difficult position by 
Rottembourg's agreement, a position made worse by the fact that 
the British Minister Plenipotentiary, Benjamin Keene, had signed 
1 .., 
the agreement, though 'without the least colour of order or 
instruction'. Waldegrave wrote of the Spaniards, 'they must think 
4 
1Townshend to d'Ittersum, 18 Aug. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/296, f. 296; 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 17,21 Aug. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 
32751, f. 308, PRO. 78/187, f. 16; Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 6 Sept; 
Schleinitz to Dehn, 3 Oct. -1727, BL. Add. 48982, f. 75,98; D'Aix 
to Victor Amadeus II, 8 Sept. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
2 Waldegrave Journal, 2 Nov.. 1727, Chewton; Newsletter to Prince- 
Bishop, 4 Nov. 1727, Osnabrück, 291, f. 409. 
Broglie to Chauvelin, 22 Dec. 1727,1 Jan. -1728, AE. CP. Ang. 360 
f. 305,362 f. 1; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14,21 Dec. (OS) 1727, 
BL. Add. 32753 f. 459,9138 f. 3; Villars, pp. 106-7; Daily Journal 
12 Dec. (OS). Craftsman 23 Dec. 1727. 
4 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 8 Dec. (OS), to Keene, 8 Dec. (OS) 1727, 
BL. Add. 32753, f. 345-8,349-50; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 20 Jan. 1728, 
Dresden, 663, f. 153; Anon draft to Pottmore, 24 Dec. (OS) 1727, 
PRO. 36/4 f. 120-8; Waldegrave Journal, 24 Dec. 1727, Chewton; 
Horatio Walpole to Keene, 15 Dec.. 1727, BL. Add. 32753 f. 248. 
The agreement ignored the British position on the Prince Frederick. 
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., 
that we should have very little reason to depend on allies, that 
would give way to such chimerical notions'. 
' Had Britain refused 
to accept the agreement she would have risked angering the French 
by forcing them to choose between supporting, or breaking it. 
The latter course of action would have entailed the trench 
sacrificing their new-found good relations with Spain. 
2 The 
former course could have led to the diplomatic isolation of 
Britain. If the ministry. had-accepted the agreement they would 
have faced tremendous domestic criticism and they would have found 
it very difficult to persuade Parliament that the French alliance 
was serving any purpose. 
3 The proximity of the Parliamentary 
session and the campaign in the opposition press attacking the 
French alliance made the decision more difficult. 
Compounding the problem for the ministry was the fact that 
they were having to consider a successor to Townshend. On 
December 8th Waldegrave noted in his journal that Sir Robert 
Walpole, 
'Seems under a good deal of difficulty on account 
of My lord Townshend's illness, which he says will be 
such as should he ever recover will not give him leave 
1 Waldegrave to Tilson, 4 Dec. 1727, Chewton; Le Coq to Augustus II, 
23 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a, f. 448-51. 
2 Chavigny to Belle-Isle, French general, 6,27 Jan. 1728, AG. A' 
2643 No. 13,40. Fleury complained about the British attitude, 
Waldegrave to Newcastle, 21 Feb. 1728, Chewton; Horatio Walpole 
to Newcastle, 18 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 327534 f. 284. Townshend 
claimed that, even should Britain yield, Spain would remain allied 
closely to Austria, [Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 13 Dec. (OS) 
1727, BL. 'Add. 48982 f. 118; Newcastl]to Horatio Walpole, 4 Jan. 
(OS) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 4, draft. 
3 Townshengto Horatio Walpole, 13 Dec. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982 
f. 122; Le Coq to Augustus II, 23 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676, Vol. 18a 
f. 448-51. Fleury was unhappy about Rottembourg's agreement, 
Fleury to Fonseca, 27 Nov. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11, f. 456. 
113 
to do any business this winter, the Cabals are great 
about a successor or a substitute in case there should 
be a prospect of his recovery'. 
' 
There was no shortage of available candidates, and the names 
mentioned included Carteret, Chesterfield, Dödington, Stanhope and 
Sir Paul Methuen. 
2 Horatio Walpole does not appear to have been 
seriously considered as he was to be in 1729-1730 and again in 1733. 
Possibly this reflects th"e'fact that Horatio was too closely 
identified with the French alliance, or that Sir Robert Walpole 
was politically on the defensive. There is very little evidence 
about the struggle to succeed Townshend. General George Wade, the 
Commander-in-Chief in Scotland was in London in November 1727. In 
a letter he sent to Duncan Forbes he claimed that he knew 'nothing 
of what passes in the Grand Monde', because he was confined to his 
chamber with the ague. This may be doubted, since he was then in 
touch with Newcastle, and visited by Stanhope, among others. He 
noted speculation that'Methuen, Carteret, Stanhope or Horatio Walpole 
might succeed Townshend, but concluded that 'Methuen may have it if 
he pleases'. 
3 Zamboni agreed, though wrote to the Landgrave of 
Hesse-Darmstadt, that Townshend's successor was likely to be, 
'Mr. Stanhope .... homme de merite et; ami aussi du'Chev. Walpole, 
en cas que le chevalier Methuen refuse cet employ, comme il ya toute 
apparance qu'il fera'. 
4 
1 Waldegrave Journal, 8 Dec. 1727, Chewton; *'Horatio Walpole to 
Newcastle, 10 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753, f. 162. 
2 'Our coffee-house politicians have been laying out a secretary of 
state in case of Lord Townshend's death-', Farley's Bristol News- 
Paper, 2 Dec. (OS) 1727. 
3 Wade to Forbes, 23 Nov. (OS) 1727, Duff, Culloden Papers. p. 356. 
4 Zamboni to Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 16 Dec. 1727, Bodl. Rawl. 
119 f. 198. . 
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Broglie reported that Methuen would succeed Townshend. 
1 
Opinions of Methuen's ability differed. Hervey's unfavourable 
judgement is usually cited whenever he is discussed, 
2 but Broglie 
thought highly of him, and Methuen's experience of office was very 
impressive. 3 He had represented British interests at Lisbon, 
Turin and Madrid, served as a Lord of both the Admiralty and the 
Treasury, and been Secretary of State for the Southern Department. 
In the 1720s he held household appointments, first as Comptroller 
and then as Treasurer, and acted as a leading Administration 
spokesman in the Commons. 
4 He would have made a good choice as 
Secretary but he lacked political connections and would have 
brought the Ministry little added weight in. the Commons. 
Methuen and Stanhope could probably have been relied on to 
support the Walpoles, though Methuen's resignation in 1729 was 
ostensibly on. the grounds that he disapproved of general government 
policy. Carteret, Chesterfield and Dodington would have been less 
5 
fortunate choices for the Ministry. Dodington had diplomatic 
experience, having proved an able envoy to Spain, and he had 
considerable governmental experience. However he was a friend of 
the Countess of Suffolk, and had urged Compton to supplant Walpole, 
turn to the Tories for support and make Dodington Secretary of 
State. 
6 Chesterfield was continually postponing his departure for 
Broglie to Chauvelin, 8 Dec. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, E. 273. 
2. Hervey, I, 101-2. 
3 Broglie to Chauvelin, 8 Dec. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360, f. 273. 
4 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 31 May 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 67; 
Knatchbull, 24 Mar. (OS) 1726,28 June (OS) 1727,25 Mar. (OS) 1729, 
pp. 56,72,93; Sedgwick, II, 254. 
5 Hervey, I, 101-2; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 31 May 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 
120 f. 67. The History of Parliament is inaccurate in stating that 
he resigned in 1730, Sedgwick, II, 254. 
6 Sedgwick, I, 501. 
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the United Provinces hoping to receive a domestic post. 
Horatio Walpole was extremely concerned by the uncertainty 
as to Townshend's successor. He wrote to his brother in November, 
'Should anything happen, the replacing of him will 
be of vast consequence to the management of affairs at 
home, as well as to the credit and. influence of the 
Government among the foreign powers .... '1 
A month later Le Coq informed Augustus II that, 
'L'arrangement dans les grands employs; ou pour 
mieux dire, l'assortissement des sujets, est, ce qui 
donne le plus de peine ä la cour. Il ne suffit pas, de 
trouver des sujets capables; c'est a quoy l'on fait 
quelque fois moins d'attention, qu'au reste. I1 faut 
des sujets, qui assortissent avec ceux, qui sont deja 
en place, sans quoy eile court risque, d'etre mal 
'. 2 service 
This truism was of particular importance for Walpole because 
George showed signs that he was ready to break from the Walpolean 
policy of cooperation with France. As the parliamentary session 
approached, with no settlement in the Anglo-Spanish disputes, 
domestic pressure increased for naval action against Spain. 
3 
George expressed openly his irritation at the diplomatic impasse. 
1. Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, Coxe, II, 544. 
2 Le Coq to Augustus II, 19 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a f. 435. 
Speculation about a successor did not cease till Townshend's 
recovery in the spring. 
3 Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 22 Nov. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11 f. 437; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Dec. 1727, AE. CP. Ang. 360 f. 278; 
Le Coq to Augustus II, 26,30 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a f. 459- 
61,470; S8hm to Augustus, 30 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 3378, IV f. 210; 
Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. 1726, Osnabrück, 291 f. 409; 
Post Boy 16 Sept. (OS), Craftsman 23 Sept., Ipswich Journal 7 Oct. 
1727. 
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It could be suggested that one of the reasons for his irritation, 
was that Anglo-Spanish differences prevented a concentration upon 
German issues and the need to protect Hanover from a possible 
Austrian and/or Prussian attack. 
The British fleet had remained in Spanish watera after the 
Preliminaries were signed. Reports that the Spaniards intended to 
mount an invasion of the British Isles in support of the Jacobite 
cause had led to a strengthening of the fleet in Spanish waters. 
l 
Admiral Norris was recalled from the Baltic and his ships used to 
strengthen Sir Charles Wager's squadron off Cadiz. On August 16th 
Townshend ordered Wager to destroy the Spanish fleet if it should 
sail towards Britain. 
2 The Spaniards did not sail, and the British 
fleet remained in its blockading-stations throughout the autumn. 
3 
Rottembourg's initial failure to secure Spanish recognition of the 
British position led to domestic pressure for a war with Spain. 
The Spanish Indies were believed to be poorly defended and ripe for 
4 
attack. Foreign diplomats reported that the British government 
1 Anon draft to the Earl of Portmore, Governor of Gibraltar, 5 Aug. 
(OS). 1727, PRO. 36/2 f. 118; Holloway, British Consul at Malaga, 
to Newcastle, 23 Sept., 11,18 Nov. 1727, PRO. 94/215; Dormer, 
British Envoy Extraordinary in Portugal, to Vandermeer, 7 Oct., 
Wager to Vandermeer, 21 Oct. 1727, PRO. 94/98; L'Hermitage to the 
States General, . 
31 Oct. 1727, BL. Add. 17677 kkk9"f. 423; Dehn to 
Ferdinand Albrecht, 13 Sept. 1727, Wolfenb8ttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 534 
f. 34; Baudrillart, III, 347,350; Goslinga, p. 167. 
2 Townshend to Wager, 5 Aug. (OS) 1727. Similarly aggressive orders 
were sent by Newcastle'to Wager, 12,18 July (OS), 12 Sept. (OS) 
1727, PRO. 42%78 f. 101-2,95,98,104-6. 
3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 Nov. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 32753 
f. 125. Wager was ordered to seize the Spanish treasure ships, 
Newcastle to Wager, 18 Nov. (OS), 25 Dec. 1.727, PRO. 42/78 f. 133, 
154. Newcastle feared that the arrival of these ships would make 
the Spaniards 'more insolent', Newcastle to Finch, 28 Nov. (OS) 
4 1727, PRO. 84/294 
f. 308. 
Newsletter to the Prince-Bishop, 4 Nov. -1727, Osnabruck, 291 f. 409; 
Villars, 16 Nov. 1727, p. 106; Le Coq to Augustus II, 26 Dec. 1727, 
Dresden, 2676,18a f. 462; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 13 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 
663 f. 152. The French feared that the British would attack the 
Indies, Horatio to Robert Walpole, 11 Nov. 1727, C(H) corresp. 1489; 
Fleury to Charles VI, 18 Sept. 1727, Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 11 
f. 33. 
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was ready to fight Spain. Townshend informed Du Bourgay that 'we 
shall never submit to any terms, but what shall be intirely for 
I 
the honour and interest of the nation'. Jacquemin, the Lorraine 
envoy at Vienna noted, 'on soupconne toujours que l'Angleterre 
veut absolument la guerre'. 
1 
War was considered, 
2 though there is little information 
available as to who supported and who opposed this option. Marquis 
Saramuccia Visconti, an Austrian diplomat in London without 
character,, was in correspondence with Sinzendorf. Judging by his 
letters he was a very well-informed source. He was aware that one 
of the major reasons for the. large subsidy paid to Brunswick- 
Wolfenbüttel was the need to gain its copy of George I's will. 
The British government thought him sufficiently important to order 
the interception bf his mail. 
3 He was in close touch with many of 
the foreign diplomats in London and with several members of the 
British government, being received by Townshend on February lst. 
4 
On January 13th 1728 he informed Sinzendorf, 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 5 Jan. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Townshend 
to Du Bourgay, 17 Jan. 1728, PRO. 90/24; Jacquemin to Duke Lepold, 
14 Feb. 1728, Nancy, 139, No. 122. Fiorelli reported the 
possibility of a British naval bombardment of spanish ports, 
Fiorelli to the'Doge of Venice, 23 Jan 1728, ASV. LM. Ing. 97 f. 106. 
2 In early January, in order to facilitate possible naval action, 
Newcastle ordered Wager to get the British merchants to withdraw 
their ships from spanish ports, Newcastle to Wager, 25 Dec. (OS) 
1727, PRO. 42/78 f. 154. D'Aix reported that George II wanted war 
with Spain, Marini, p. 95. Townshend informed Finch that ... 'His Majesty must, and will, sooner' enter into a war ... than suffer his own Honour and Royal Dignity, and the Interests of his own 
people to be treated in so ignominous a manner', Townshend to 
Finch, 12 Dec. (OS) 1727, PRO. 84/294 f. 332. 
3 Townshend'to the Postmasters General, 18 July (OS) 1727, PRO. 36/2 
f. 46. 
4 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 6 July 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 120, f. 19. 
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'Ces jours passes, ii n'etoit question, que de 
guerre. On parla de Gibraltar dans le Conseil, 
Monsr. Walpole voulüt insinuer, que la conservation 
de cette place n'etoit pas enfin s. i importante, qu'on 
le croyoit bien; le Duc d'Argil, qui aspire a etre 
un second Marleborough le balanca terriblement et prit 
occasion de dire, que son sentiment etoit, que l'on 
devoit sans delais declarer la guerre a 1'Espagne, il 
füt fort applaudi du Roy, et 1'on dit meme, que sa 
Majeste luy a fait tenir ce discours,, le Roy et la plus 
part de ses favorits etoient pour la guerre, la Reyne 
et Walpole tachoient d'6teindre'. 
1 
It was probably on the basis of this report that Count Berkentin, 
the well-informed Danish envoy in Vienna, 
2 
noted that the 
Austrians had been informed from. London that 'la pluspart des 
ministres, et surtout le Duc de Argue pour complaire au Roy, 
avoient, presque tous generalement opine pour une guerre'. 
3 There 
is little evidence to support this account in the Btitish sources. 
Lord King recorded a ministerial meeting on January 13th to discuss 
Rottembourg's new instructions, but there is no mention in his 
account either of Gibraltar or of Argyle's presence. In his 
account of the Cabinet held. at Lord Townshend's on January 31st he 
1 Visconti to Sinzendorf, Vienna, Ek, 65. 
2 Ferdinand Albrecht noted, 'l'envoye de Dannemarck qui prend soin 
en secret aussi des affaires d'Hannovre ... ', Ferdinand Albrecht 
" to his mother-in-law, 3 Ap. 1728, Wolfenbtlttel, 1 Alt 22 529 f. 132; Carrard, St. Saphorin's secretary, in charge of British 
affairs in Vienna during St. Saphorin's absence, to Townshend, 
5 Sept. 1725, PRO. 80/56, f. 22; S"t. Saphorin to Townshend, 26 Aug. 
(OS) 1727, PRO. 80/61. 
3 Berkentin to -, 17 Mar. 1728, PRO. 80/326. 
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notes Argyll's presence and a discussion whether the British 
possession of Gibraltar could be discussed at the Congress, but he 
gives no details of the views of individual ministers. He 
recorded the presence of thirteen ministers, some of whom - 
Scarborough, Wilmington and Dorset - were not noted for their 
support of Walpole. Argyll, who had replaced Cadogan, as the 
Master General of the Ordnance, had close links with George II, 
due to their shared political views. 
2 Visconti's account may have 
been correct, but, even if he was in error, it was true that 
Walpole's policy was in difficulties. Parliament had to be 
prorogued until the international situation became clearer, and it 
was widely believed that Walpole's success in the Parliament would 
depend upon this situation. Duncan Forbes, then in London informed 
his brother, 'Whether we shall in the ensueing Parliament have 
any heats will probably depend upon the 
state 
of foreign affairs'. 
3 
The British Ministry urged the French to support their case 
with Spain, arguing that if they failed to do so the Ministry might 
fall and the Anglo-French alliance be destroyed. 
4 Urgency was lent 
King, pp. 54-5. 
2 Dickinson, Walpole pp. 52-3. It was believed that Argyll had 
first persuaded George to indulge in extra-marital affairs, 
Wodrow, Analecta III p. 459. 
3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 21 Dec. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 9138 
f. 3-5; Villars, 21 Jan. 1728, p. 120; Duncan Forbes to'John Forbes, 
6 Jan. (OS) 1728, More Culloden Papers edited by D. Warrand, Vol. 3 
(Inverness, 1927) pp. 27-8; Zamboni to the Landgrave of Hesse- 
Darmstadt, 2 Jan. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 119 f. 199. 
4 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 8,14 Dec. (OS), Horatio Walpole to 
Newcastle, 17,29 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753 f. 345-8,458,460, 
276,535-7,539-40; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 13 Dec. (OS) 1727, 
BL Add. 48982 f. 117-8; Tilson to Waldegrave, 14 Dec. (OS) 1727, 
Chewton. 
if 
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to this pressure by the proximity of the session. 
1 
Horatio Walpole 
pressed Fleury to force the Pope to expel the Pretender from 
Avignon, to produce a declaration that France would stand by 
Britain, and to order Rottembourg to present Spain with an 
ultimatum. Fleury was told that this was 'the only means to stop 
2 
the mouths of the malintentiones en Angle'. Fleury was persuaded 
to send fresh instructions to Rottembourg on December 19th 1727 
ordering him to insist on the implementation of the Preliminaries 
without any conditions. 
3 The British attempted to persuade the 
French and the Dutch that in case Spain refused to comply, their 
envoys should immediately leave Spain, a move that would have been 
regarded as a prelude to war. 
4 Britain's allies refused to accept 
this proposal, and Horatio Walpole was very concerned about the 
support he could expect from them. 
5 The Pretender was expelled 
from Avignon thanks to French pressure. 
6 Waldegrave noted in his 
.. _,.. 
1 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 5 Dec. (OS), Horatio Walpole to 
Finch, 22 Dec., Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 27 Dec. 1727, BL. 
Add. 32753 f. 255-7,414,537; Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 
13 Dec. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 48982 f. 122; Draft of a Declaration to 
Broglie, unused, 20 Dec. 1727, PRO. 100/5. 
2 Waldegrave Journal, 2 Dec. 1727,15 Jan. 1728 (quote), Chewton; 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 13 Dec. (OSI 1727, BL. Add. 48982 
f. 122; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14,21 Dec. (OS) 1727, BL. 
Add. 32753 f. 456-7,9138 f. 3. 
3 King, 2 Jan. (OS) 1728, pp. 54-5; De Bay to Flemming, 16 Jan. 1728, 
Dresden, 3105,2 f. 8; Villars, pp. 111-2; Goslinga, pp. 192-3,196; 
Wilson, p. 189. 
4 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 18 Dec. (OS), - Dec. (QS) 1727, BL. 
Add. 32753 f. 484, PRO. 78/187 f. 173; Horatio Walpole to Finch, 
22 Dec., to Newcastle, 24 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32753 f. 414,432. 
5 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 21 Dec. (OS) 1727, BL. Add. 9138 
f. 3-4; Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 24 Dec. 1727,2 Jan. 1728, BL. 
Add. 32753 f. 431,545; Waldegrave Journal, 25 Dec. 1727,4,5 Jan. 
1728, Chewton; Townshend to Finch, 2 Jan. (OS) 1728, PRO. 84/299 
f. 3; Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 25 Jan. 1728, Vienna, Fonseca, 12 
f. -23-4. 6 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 27 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32758 f. 466. 
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journal on December 9th 'tho' the Card. did not directly say that 
France must declare war, yet he satisfied Mr. Wal. that he was 
sincere in his design of acting vigorously'. However, Horatio 
feared that when it came to the crunch Britain would-be isolated 
and the French alliance discredited. 
Fortunately for the British, French hostility towards Spain 
was increased by the high indulto or duty imposed in 1727 on the 
cargo of the Spanish flotilla, in which French merchants had a 
major interest. Waldegrave argued that it was. this that persuaded 
Fleury to discard his policy of moderat on. 
l Furthermore on 
January 13th 1728 Elizabeth Farnese accepted a project largely in 
accordance with the British interpretation of the Preliminaries. 
She was discouraged by lack of Austrian support2 and by continued 
French backing for the British, but she was chiefly affected by the 
-chronic ill-health of her husband whose death appeared imminent. 
3 
The Dutch and the French approved the new project, details of which 
reached London on the evening of January 30th. 
4 The Cabinet 
. considered 
the project next day and approved it having concluded 
that it did not allow Spain to raise her pretensions to Gibraltar 
at the Congress. With a minor addition, designed to ensure that the 
engagements between Britain and Spain were made reciprocal, the 
Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 17,24 Dec. *1727, BL. Add. 32753 
f. 275,278,429; Waldegrave Journal, 6 Jan. 1728, Chewton; 
J. Koulischer, 'Les trai es de commerce et la clause de la nation 
la plus favorisee du XVI au XVIIIe siecle', Revue d'Histoire 
Moderne 6, (1931) p. 28, Villars attributed"the decision to Horatio 
Walpole's influence over Fleury, Villars, 14 Dec, 1727, pp. 111-2. 
2 De BQy to Flemming, 16 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 3105,2 f. 9. 
3 be By to Flemming, 16,26 Jan., 9,15 Feb. 1728, Dresden 3105 
f. 10,14,17,19; Känigsegg to Pentenriedter, 4 Mar. 1728, Vienna, 
Frankreich, Varia, -12; Villars, p. 120; Armstrong, p. 221. 4 Baudrillart, III, 385-99; Goslinga, p. 204. 
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project returned to Paris and the Hague where the British amendment 
was accepted. 
1 
" After delays, largely caused by Britain's unintentional 
failure to provide Keene with the correct credentials, 
2 
and some 
anxiety as to whether the agreement would in fact be settled, 
3 
the 
project, later known as the Convention of the Pardo, was signed in 
Spain on March 6th. Spain promised to raise immediately the 
blockade of Gibraltar, deliver up the Prince Frederick and its 
p r. 
cargo to the South Sea Company, and restore the indulto to its 
usual rate. Britain agreed to withdraw its fleet from Spanish and 
Spanish-American waters and accepted that the Congress could discuss 
'all'the respective pretensions on each side', including 'the 
contraband trade and other causes of complaint which the Spaniards 
might have in relation to the ship Prince Frederick. Both powers 
promised to abide by the decisions of the Congress. 
4 
The news that Spain had largely accepted the British position 
was received in London with delight. The government press hailed it 
as a triumph for British diplomacy, for the willingness to prefer 
negotiations to force, and for the French alliance. 
5 
King, Jan. 1728, pp. 55-6; Goslinga, p. 206; Townshend to Finch, 
21 Jan (OS) 1728, PRO. 84/299 f. 49. 
2 Goslinga, pp. 206-7. 
3 William Finch to Townshend, 10 Feb. 1728, PRO. 84/299 f. 92. 
4 There is a text and an English translation of the Convention in 
PRO. 103/110. Königsegg to Pentenriedter, 7 Mar. 1728, Vienna, 
Frankreich, Varia, 12. 
5 Daily Journal, 28 Mar. (OS) 1728; Ipswich mercury, 10 Feb. (OS) 
1728. The stocks rose, Whitehall Evening Post, 9 Mar. (OS) 1728. 
Königsegg argued that the Convention was largely the result of 
Fleury's hard work, Königsegg to Pentenriedter, 7 Mar. 1728, 
Vienna, Frankreich, Varia, 12. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EARLY 1728 
THE SESSION OF 1728; ABORTIVE APPROACHES TO AUSTRIF. 
The Parliamentary session of 1728 had been preceded 
by a major pamphlet and press war. 
1 The attack upon the 
government had been concentrated on its foreign policy and 
on the failure of the Anglo-French alliance to secure 
British interests. The news of Spain agreeing to most of 
the ! ritish demands destroyed the opposition case. George II 
was able to tell Parliament on February 7th that he had 
received from France and the United Provinces 'the greatest 
proofs of their sincerity, and a renewal of the strongest 
assurances imaginable, that they would effectually make good 
all their engagements, ' and that 'a general pacification' was 
at hand. 
2 The Lords' Address was a lengthy defence of 
ministerial foreign policy. It argued for 'the absolute 
necessity of supporting your allies' and stated that. 'the 
late disagreeable situation of affairs' could not have been 
prevented by 'human prudence', an'answer to opposition arguments 
that the government had been responsible for the diplomatic 
imbroglio Britain had been trapped in. George II's martial 
instincts were acknowledged and the Walpolean view that 
negotiation was preferable to war stated in the Address, 
1. Hervey to Stephen Fox, 9 Jan. (os) 1728, Ilchester p. 27; 
The Leeds Mercury, 30 Jan. (os) 1728, referred to a 'paper 
war. ' 
2. Newcastle to Waldegrave, 29 Jan. 
_ 
(os) 1728, BL. Add. 32754, 
f. 186-9; Hervey, I, 75; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 9 Feb. 1728, 
AST. LM. Ing. 35; Carlisle, p. 53. 
124 
which referred to the 'noble self-denial of all the success 
and glory that might attend your Majesty's arms in the 
prosecution of a just and necessary war, when put in balance 
with the ease, quiet, and prosperity of your subjects. It is 
a disposition of mind truly great in your Majesty..... to choose 
rather to procure peace for your subjects, than to lead them 
to victories. '1 
The debates on the Address were a triumph for the 
government. This was attributed to the new diplomatic 
2 
situation. Newcastle informed Waldegrave that 'the good news 
you have sent us, has made the opening of our Parliament very 
successful. ' 
3 The rest of the session went' very well for the 
Ministry. Much time was spent on petitions arising from the 
recent elections. These served to increase the governmental 
strength in the Commons. 
4 The Lords were very quiet 
5 
and in 
the Commons the government enjoyed large majorities. In the 
1. House of Lords' Journals 23, pp. 167-8; House of Commons' 
Journals 21, p. 30. Townshend wrote that the Lords' Ad ress 
is conceived in stronger and more zealous terms than any that 
has been ever made to His Maty. 's predecessors', Townshend to 
Finch, 30 Jan. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/299 f. 76. 
2. Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 20 Feb. 1728, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, 
f. 121. 
3. Newcastle to Waldegrave, 29 Jan. (os) 1728, Chewton. 
4. Hervey, I, 75-6; Knatchbull, 12, 14, 18 Mar. (os) 1728 pp. 74-6. 
5. Delafaye to Waldegrave, 29 Jan. (os) 17-28, Chewton; Newcastle 
to the Earl of Carlisle, 10 Feb. (os) 1728, Carlisle, p. 54. 
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debate over the subsidies for the Hessians the majority was 
280 to 86, and in the army estimates debate 290 to 86.1 
Townshend informed Sir Cyril Wich that 'the grand affairs of 
session have been dispatched in less time that ever was known 
in any Parliament, and with a greater majority than was ever 
remembered in any reign. '2 
Ministerial foreign policy was fully debated. Horatio 
Walpole spoke at length in defence of the French alliance. 
According to the newsletter sent to Ernst-August, he convinced 
most M. P. s that it was a sound policy. 
3 The opposition 'let 
themselves into the whole state of publick affairs from north 
to south, ' but their attacks had little success. The debates 
simply served to convince foreign diplomats that the government 
was in control. The French were impressed by the ministerial 
successes, as were the Austrians and the Spaniards. D'Aix 
noted that 'le Parlement est de deux, et souvent de trois 
contre un, ' and Visconti informed Sinzendorf that the degree 
of harmony between government and Parliament was unprecedented. 
4 
The government argued that, despite the forthcoming 
Congress, it was necessary to remain prepared for war. The 
royal speech referred to the need to continue British military 
1. Tilson to Waldegrave, 15 Feb. (os) 1728, Chewton; Chammorel 
to Chauvelin, 23 Feb., 12 Ap. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 362, f. 111, 
169; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 19 Feb, (os) 1728, Chewton. Colley 
has argued that many Tory MPs were absent, Colley, Defiance 
p. 209. 
2. Townshend to Wych, 20 Feb. (os) 1728, PRO. 82/45 f. 59; Townshend 
to Finch, 20 Feb. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/299 f. 109-10. 
3. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 2 Mar. 1728, Osnabruck, No. 295, 
f. 154. 
4. Waldegrave to Townshend, 26 June 1728, PRO. 80/61, f. 13; Keene 
to Newcastle, 22 Mar. 1728, RL. Add. 32754, f. 471; Broglie to 
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preparations and the Lords Address spoke of the possibility 
of having to fight. Both in Britain and in Europe opinions 
were divided as to whether the forthcoming Congress at Soissons 
would bring peace. The royal speech proroguing Parliament 
predicted a successful Congress and Sinzendorf declared that 
it would only last five weeks, 
1 
but other more pessimistic 
notes were sounded. Fears were expressed that Spain2 or Austria 
might delay the Congress and refuse to be conciliatory. The 
British opposition claimed that Britain would be duped and 
73olingbroke's wife stated that the Congress would meet to judge 
Britain. 
3 The British government were concerned about the 
possibility of the disintegration of the Hanover alliance. 
Horatio Walpole attempted to persuade Fleury that the Hanover 
allies should settle their claims among themselves and agree 
to stand by them at the Congress. He also argued that their 
envoys at the Congress should be given common instructions, 
4. cont. Chauvelin, 26 Feb., 15 Mar. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 362; 
Chauvelin to Chammorel, 4 Mar. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8., f. 33; 
Visconti to Sinzendorf, 5 Mar. 1728, Vienna, EK., Kart 65; 
Le Coq to De! 3rosse, 2,9,16,23 Mar. 1728, Dresden, 663,2, 
f. 165,167,169,171; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 15 Mar. 1727, 
AST. LP. R. Ing. 35. The Dutch were also impressed, Finch to 
Townshend, 29 Mar. 1728, to Tilson, 2 Mar. 1728, PRO. 84/299, 
f. 114,122,116. 
1. Robinson to Waldegrave, 14 June 1728, Chewton; Le Coq to 
neßrosse, 9 Mar. 1728, Dresden, 663,2, f. 168;. Waldegrave 
to Delafaye, 13 Feb. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 33. 
2. Fonseca to Eugene, 14 June 1728, Vienna, GK. 85a. 
3. Visconti to Sinzendorf, 13 Ap. 1728, Vienna, EK., Kart 65. 
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'I thought it might not be amiss, if some plan 
was drawn up in writing by way of instructions to 
our respective Plenipotentiaries, founded upon the 
Preliminary articles, to be a sort of a general rule 
and guidance to them. ' 
Fleury agreed that the union produced by the Treaty of Hanover 
should continue and that the Preliminaries of Paris should 
serve as the basis for the actions of the Hanover allies, but 
he refused to accept the idea of common written instructions 
arguing that it would be impossible to keep them secret. 
I 
Behind this dispute lay British fears that Fleury would settle 
with the Austrians. 
2 
By temporarily shelving the differences between the major 
powers the Convention of the Pardo had a kaleidoscopic effect. 
It freed the powers from some of their most pressing engagements 
and created opportunities for major realignments. This 
created a difficult situation for the British ministry at a 
time when they were still unsure about their relations with 
George 11.3 
Ministerial strife had persisted during the winter of 
1727-8, fuelled by speculation that Walpole would fall over 
his foreign policy. 
4 The ministers opposed to Walpole seem 
1. 'Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 23 Mar., 5,9, Ap., 12 May 1728, 
13L. Add. 32754, f. 482,32755, f. 103,144-5,416; King, p. 57. 
2. Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 6 Jan. 1728, BL. Add. 32753 f. 553; 
(I)elafaye or Newcastle] to Horatio Walpole, - Dec. (os) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 179, draft. 
3. Muret, Preponderance Anglaise p. 180. 
4. William MMorrice to his father-in-law, Francis Atterbury, 2 Jan. 
(os) 1728, Coxe, II, 238. 
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to have considered that Britain should break with France and 
turn to Austria, though there is very little definite 
information about their views. 
1 
In February Visconti 
informed Sinzendorf that he had been told by a very well 
informed source, whom he did not name, that a court cabal 
existed determined to ruin Walpole 'dans 1'esprit du Roy. ' 
According to this account the Walpoles had fabricated evidence 
that Compton, Berkeley and Pulteney were in correspondence 
with the Austrians and had urged them to refuse British demands. 
One of the three was supposed to have informed George of the 
Walpolean fabrications, and he, livid, had determined to 
dismiss Walpole at the end of the session. 
2 
On January 24th 
O'Rourke sent James III a variation of the story, 
'... without being entirely sure, there is this 
good while a private correspondence betwixt some 
ministers here and the new vying faction in Engd. wch. 
actually aims at the ministry, I have had some imperfect 
glimpses of Pultney and Compton's being mentioned 
and I doe not doubt but this court backs with all 
1. The previous April St. Saphorin had claimed that the 
Austrians wished.... embarassant le Ministere de la Grand 
Bretagne, et de les perdre dans l'esperance qu'un autre 
entreroit apres cela dans toutes les vices de 1'Empereur 
contre la France', St. Saphorin to Townshend, 22 Ap. 1727, 
PRO. 80/E1. 
2. Visconti to Sinzendorf, 3,10 Feb. 1728, Vienna, EK., 
Kart 65. 
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their industry any such change. 11 
There are no signs of any letters from Wilmington, Berkeley or 
Pulteney in the Viennese archives and the suggestions mentioned 
by Visconti and O'Rourke are probably inaccurate, but it is 
clear that there was still much tension in the ministry, 
particularly between Wilmington and Walpole. George's 
independent habits were a major difficulty, particularly to 
Townshend; according to D'Aix, 
'Ce susd. Milord qui a gouverne jusqu' ici 
absolument ne pouvant s'accoütumer ä partager 
l'autorite, a suivre les projets qu'il n'a pas 
fait, et ä voir le Roy d'Angleterre partager sa 
confiance, et agir par lui meme. '2 
There is no evidence to support D'Aix's claim that Townshend 
told George he would retire at the end of the Congress, but 
there are other suggestions of tension over George's attitudes. 
: he newsletter sent to Ernst-August reported on March 12th 
that the Queen proposed accompanying her husband to Hanover 
on his projected trip that summer and that this worried 
Walpole, 
'que ses envieux et ses vivaux, ne profitent de 
son eloignement de l'oreille du maitre pour ebranler 
son credit, auquel ses enemis tachent tous les jours de 
1. O'Rourke to James III, 24 Jan. 1728, Vienna, England, Varia. 8. 
The previous summer, Charles Caesar had written, 'I have 
reason to believe that the Empr. s measures in regard to England 
have been very much informed for some time by Mr. Pultney, ' 
Caesar to James III, 29 June 1727, RA. 107/141. Dr. Steinbauer 
has searched the Viennese archives, without success, for signs 
of a correspondence between Pulteney and the Austrian government. 
I would like to thank Dr. Steinbauer for discussing the issue 
with me. 
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 21 Ap. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
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donner quelque nouvelle atteinte: Et ses inquietudes 
sont d'autant plus grandes, que la sante mal-asseuree 
du Vicomte de Townshend ... ne lui permet pas d'encourager 
le Roy. '1 
George and his ministers clashed over the instructions for the 
British Plenipotentiaries at Soissons. George was determined 
that no marriage should take place between Don Carlos and 
any daughter of Charles VI. He was convinced that such an 
event would be a major threat to the balance of power, and a 
challenge to the position of the major German princes. 
2 
The 
British ministry felt that it was unlikely to take place anyway, 
and that it was impractical to raise the matter at the Congress 
as Austria would resent the discussion of such a sensitive 
dynastic matter. Furthermore they, and Fleury, hoped that by 
seeming to acquiesce in the marriage they would win Spanish 
support and embarrass the Austrians forcing them to publicly 
oppose the marriage, and thus endanger Spanish support, or 
approve of it, and anger those German powers, such as Saxony, 
Prussia and Bavaria, who had already made clear their opposition 
to the match. 
3 According to D'Aix, Townshend had persuaded 
1. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 12 Mar. 1728, Osnabruck, No. 295. 
f. 164. This is supported by Le Coq to DeRros se , 23 Mar. 1728, Dresden, 663,2, f. 171; Fiorelli to Doge of Venice, 16 Ap. 1728, 
ASV. LM. Ing. 97, f. 150. 
2. These arguments had also been advanced the previous summer by 
Horatio Walpole. He had urged the necessity of discussing the 
Austrian succession at the Congress, Horatio Walpole, 'consider- 
ations qui peuvent servir a donner quelque Idee des Mesures 
prealables que les Allies devroient concerter entre eux pour 
regler leur conduite au Congres... ', PRO. 84/294, f. 131-3. 
3. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 14 Aug. (os) 1727,23 June (os) 
1728, RL. Add. 32751 f. 291, Rradfer-Lawrence; Newcastle to 
Horatio Walpole, 26 Mar. (os), Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 24 
Ap. 1728, BL. Add. 32755 f. 124-5,291; Chesterfield to Townshend, 
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George that no other power would support Britain in attempting 
to block the marriage, but that by an unnamed 'autre voie', 
George had been informed that Townshend was lying. 
1 
Sardinia, 
fearful of the establishment of Don Carlos in Italy, was 
opposed to the marriage, and D'Aix was unsympathetic to 
Townshend. He hinted that George had given Stanhope secret 
instructions, and reported that on the eve of the Plenipotentiaries' 
departure, 
'Le Roy d'Angleterre en l'absence de ses ministres 
leur a change plusieurs choses dans leurs instructions, 
et entre autres Particle qui concerne les mariages, 
aux quels ii ne veut en aucune fagon conniver, ni faire 
semblant de conniver. I1 a donne sa confiance particuliene 
au Colonel Stanhopp, et a fait le meme changement dans 
les instructions de Milord Chesterfils. '2 
continued. 25 June, 6 July 1728, PRO. 84/300 f. 275-6, 
84/301 f. 20. The Dutch expressed support for this idea, 
Finch to Townshend, 13 Ap. 1728, PRO. 84/299 f. 175. 
1. The 'autre voie' was St. Saphorin, Marini, p. 106. The 
British ministry had been willing to insinuate to 
Elisabeth Farnese that the marriage of Carlos and an 
archduchess would be supported, 'under proper regulations 
for preserving the Balance of Europe', (Newcastle) to 
Horatio Walpole, - Ap. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 130. 
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 9 May 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Marini, p. 105. The Plenipotentiaries were Horatio Walpole, 
Stanhope and Poyntz. 
132 
Saxon sources suggest that Stanhope received secret 
instructions when he left London and, according to Le Coq, 
Stanhope informed him that Townshend knew nothing of the 
matter. 
' 
Owing to the few drafts that have been preserved 
in the British State Papers Foreign Series it is usually 
impossible to check statements, such as D'Aix's, that 
instructions have been altered. 
2 
However, there is among 
the Townshend papers a letter from George to Townshend which 
confirms that George was in favour of blocking the prospect of 
an Austro-Spanish marriage. 
'You will have seen by Lord Chesterfield's letter, 
that the pensionary reasons in the same way, as I 
allwais did, both in relation to the provisional 
treaty, as of the fear he is in of the princes of the 
empire submitting to the match, in case we should not 
shew all sort of vigour in opposing it. I think, mylord, 
you should tell him more strongly, that it is my opinion, 
and as you conclude this letter, desire his sentiment 
how to bring those princes into our measures, and how to 
make everybody concern'd in this affair act with the 
spirit they ought to do. '3 
George's tone is unmistakable. The impasse in the European 
diplomatic situation had to be ended. Furthermore, the letter 
confirms his concern about the attitude of the German princes. 
1. Instructions for Count Hoym, Saxon representative at Soissons, 
30 June, Le Coq to Augustus II, 11 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 2733 
f. 27,58. 
2. In the volumes of drafts preserved in the PRO, there"are 
no drafts of these instructions, PRO. 109/7 and 8. 
3. George to Townshend, no date, reply to Townshend to George 
of 2 July (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 521. 
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Anxiety over the German situation had increased early in 1728 
with reports of an improvement in relations between Saxony 
and Prussia. 
I The British informed Le Coq that they were 
pleased with this development, 
2 but in fact they were 
extremely concerned. Frederick William's visit to Dresden 
was followed with great attention. 
3 Concern increased when 
suggestions that the Prusso-Saxon reconciliation had been 
viewed with disfavour by the Austrians were replaced by a 
growing conviction that Austria was behind the reconciliation. 
4 
Suggestions were made that a marriage between Maria Theresa 
and the Crown Prince of Saxony was being negotiated5 or that 
the Austrians were supporting a Saxon scheme to make the crown 
of Poland hereditary, and that Prussian compliance was to be 
1. H. J. Pretsch, Graf Manteuffel's Beitrag zur österreichischen 
Geheimdiplomatie von 1728 bis 1736 Bonn, 1970) p. 33; 
Le Coq to DeBrosse, 20 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 663,2, f. 153; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 29 Mar. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Zamboni to -, 16 Ap. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 119, f. 206. 
2. Le Coq to DeBrosse, 27 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 663,2, f. 156; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 14 June 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
3. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, II, 29 Mar. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Newcastle to Waldegrave, 27 Feb. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32754, 
f. 372; Le Coq to DeBrosse, 30 Mar. 1728, Dresden, 663,2, 
f. 173; Marini, p. 102; Villars, 18 Ap. 1728, p. 128; Zamboni 
to Omelin, 23 Mar., 16 Ap. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 119 f. 205,206. 
4. Du Bourgay to Townshend, 9 Mar. 1728, PRO. 90/23. It had been 
suggested that Augustus and Frederick William were negotiating 
a partition of Bohemia, Geffroy, French Consul at Hamburg, to 
Maurepas, 16 Mar. 1728, AN. AM. B7.294. 
5. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 3 Nov. 1727, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
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obtained by the cession of Elbing and the bishopric of Varmia. 
l 
The French Consul at Hamburg, Geffroy, noted that it was 
generally held that Augustus II was to abdicate and be 
succeeded in Poland by his son, whilst Prussia was to receive 
ru ssia. 
2 The Dresden archives are not very helpful Polish Prussia. 
2 
about the state of Prusso-Saxon relations in this period, as 
the key arrangements were made in discussions between the two 
monarchs. Du Bourgay noted that most of the Prussian ministers 
were not consulted about the talks at Dresden. 
3 
The British government was assured that the agreement 
signed between Prussia and Saxony was only defensive. 
4 However 
they feared that though its intentions might be directed towards 
Poland and the settlement of conflicting Saxon and Prussian 
claims over Jülich-Berg, it would nevertheless have a wider 
1. Du Bourgay to Townshend, 28 Feb., 2,6, Mar. 1728, PRO. 90/23; 
Berkentin to -, 7 Ap. 1728, PRO. 100/5; Solaro di Breglio to 
Victor Amadeus II, 7,21 Ap. 1728, AST. LM. Aut. 58; Jacquemin 
to Duke Leopold, 11 Ap. 1728, Nancy, 139, No. 138; Chauvelin 
to Pussy, French Charge d'affaires in Vienna, 17 May 1728, 
Recueil, Autriche edited by A. Sorel (Paris, 1884) pp. 240-1; 
Chesterfield to Townshend, 20 June 1728, PRO. 84/301, f. 93; 
Waldegrave to Du Sourgay, 26 June 1728, Chewton. 
2. Geffroy to Maurepas, 16 Mar., Rochefort, French envoy at 
Hamburg, to Maurepas, 19 Jan. 1728, AN. AM. B7.294. 
3. Du Rourgay to Townshend, 7 Feb. 1728, PRO. 90/23. 
4. Du Bourgay to Townshend, 24 Jan. 1728, PRO. 90/23. 
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impact. 1 In January the British had rejected Prussian 
suggestions of a reconciliation, Townshend informing 
flu Bourgay that 'the proceedings of your Court are such, 
that there can be no certain and solid judgement made of 
them, and consequently H. M. can have no positive orders to 
send you upon the various and fluctuating state of matters 
where you are. '2 This view was not an unreasonable one born 
simply of George II's malice. It was a widely held view that 
Frederick William was capricious and unreliable. 
3 However 
much they may have been correct, this British response, 
combined with the Prusso-Saxon reconciliation, made the German 
situation more serious. Fearful of an attack upon 'Hanover, 
George resorted to an attempt to develop his German alliance 
system and to French aid. 
4 Major efforts were made to secure 
the support of WYÜrttemberg. 
5 Pressure brought to bear upon 
1. Le Coq to De? 3rosse, 20 Jan. 1728, Dresden, 663,2, f. 154; 
August William of Brunswick-Wolfenbttttel to Schleinitz, 4 Feb. 
1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f. 6. 
2. Townshend to Du Bourgay, 30 Jan. (os) 1728, PRO. 90/23. 
3. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 July (os) 1727, BL. Add. 32751 
f. 157; Sauveterre to Chauvelin, 30 Mar. 1728, AE. CP. Prusse, 
87 f. 109; Du Bourgay to Townshend, 27 May 1728, PRO. 90/23. 
4. There was concern about possible Austrian troop movements 
towards Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, Townshend to 
Diemar, 14 Mar. 1728, Marburg, 195. 
5. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 25 Dec. (os) 1727, BL. Add. 32753 
f. 533-4; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 21 
Jan. 1728, AST. LM. Ant. 58; (Delafaye or Newcastle) to Horatio 
Walpole, 3 Oct., 2 Nov. 1727, PP. 0.78/187 f. 70-1,93. 
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France succeeded in persuading the French to threaten Prussia. 
Chambrier, the Prussian envoy in Paris, informed Frederick 
William that Fleury had told him that if Prussia used violence 
against the Hanoverians in Mecklenburg France would support 
them 'to the utmost. '1 Dehn had pressed George to enter into 
the treaty of amity and union concluded in July 1727 between 
UUrttemberg and Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel. George supported the 
idea and believed that it could serve as the basis for an 
association of 'a considerable number of princes in the Empire 
to defend and support the rights and immunitys of the whole 
Germanick ? body against any usupations or encroachments on the 
part of his Imperial Majesty. ' It could also serve to protect 
Hanover though George was less keen to advance this point as 
the major' rationale for the alliance. Horatio Walpole was 
instructed to suggest to Fleury that it would be best if George 
entered the treaty as Elector of Hanover, rather than as King, 
as this would reduce the danger of the Austrians discrediting 
it as an alliance with foreign powers. George suggested that 
a convention should be signed between him and Louis XV, in which 
the French should desire George to accede as Elector to the 
treaty and should undertake to provide help if trouble arose on 
account of the new treaty, 'as if it had been in pursuance of 
1. Du ßourgay to Townshend, 15 Jan. 1728, PRO. 90/24. The best 
accounts of Fanoverian-Prussian quarrels over Mecklenburg 
can be found in Hughes, and Naumann, Osterreich, England und 
das Reich. George was concerned about the Austrian 
sequestration of the county of Hadeln to which Hanover had 
a claim, Townshend to Waldegrave, 26 Oct. (os) 1727, enclosing 
'Remarques sur le Pais d'Hadeln', PRO. 78/187 f. 87-9. 
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the Treaty concluded at Hanover. '1 
George's personal diplomatic strategy was therefore well 
defined by the Spring of 1728. It centred on German problems 
and advocated a German solution, a league of German princes, 
supported, in the last resort, by French military aid. 
2 
Le Coq had reported in December 1727 that Britain felt that 
the prospect of a French war would dissuade Austria from any 
attack upon Hanover. 
3 
The same hope lay behind George's 
policy in 1728 and, for George, it was the essential purpose 
of the Anglo-French alliance. By maintaining this alliance 
George was secure whatever became of his diplomatic initiatives 
in Germany, and this alliance in turn made these initiatives 
more hopeful. 
The instructions George sent to his Plenipotentiaries at 
Soissons, where he was represented at the Congress table only 
as King, not as Elector, were in accord with this strategy. 
pay opposing the idea of a marriage between an archduchess and 
Carlos, and by demanding that the issue be raised in order to 
he publicly rejected, George hoped to establish his credentials 
as the great power both most willing and best placed to represent 
1. Private instructions for Horatio Walpole, 10 Mar. (oe)1728, ý? L. Add. 
48982, f. 125-8; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 
1728, BL. Add. 32765, f. 272-5. 
2. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 16 Ap., 13 June(os)1728. "BL. Add. 32755, f. 304,32756, f. 275; George II to Townshend, no state, 
BL. Add. 38507 f. 232. Newcastle noted in February, 'His 
Majesty thinks that great attention should be had to the 
affairs of the North, ' Newcastle to Waldegrave, 27 Feb. (os) 
1728,3L. Add. 32754, f. 372; Townshend to Diemar, 5 July 1728, 
PRO. 100/15. 
3. Le Coq to Augustus, 26 Dec. 1727, Dresden, 2676,18a, f. 463. 
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the interests of the German princes. 
1 He would then be able 
to negotiate from strength both in German disputes and with 
the great powers. In particular his freedom of diplomatic 
manoeuvre would be increased as France would not be able to 
treat him as a junior power, and as he would be able to force 
Austria into accepting his pretensions and reaching an agreement 
with him. 
Hints of a latter development were strong in the first 
half of 1728. O'Rourke's suggestion that the Austrians were 
keen on better relations with Britain was substantiated to 
some extent by approaches made in March to Horatio Walpole 
by the Imperial representative at Paris,, Pentenriedter. 
2 
Pentenriedter told Walpole that the Emperor wanted good 
relations, that Austrian conduct had been misrepresented by 
St. Saphorin and that it was Spain that prevented the conclusion 
of a firm peace. Walpole was unimpressed. He told Pentenriedter 
1. Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, 14 June (os) 1728, 
RL. Add. 32756, f. 286,289. George was particularly concerned 
about the fate of the German Protestants, Townshend to 
Chesterfield, 14 May(os) 1728 PRO. 84/300, f. 73-4. 
2. O'Rourke to James III, 24 Jan., 28 Feb. 1728, Vienna, England, 
Varia. 8; Waldegrave was convinced that Pentenriedter was 
attempting to split the Anglo-French alliance, Waldegrave 
to Townshend, 11 Jan. 1728, Chewton. Ferdinand-Albrecht of 
Brunswick-Bevern, then in Vienna, denied reports of an 
impending Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, Ferdinand-Albrecht 
to Ludwig Rudolf, of Brunswick-Wolfenbtittel, 6,10 Mar. 1728, 
W"rolfenbttttel ,1 Alt. 22, Nr. 529, f. 93,103. 
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that the Austrians were responsible for Spanish policy and 
informed Fleury that Pentenriedter despite his general 
assurances was still intransigent when it came to detailed 
discussions. Walpole also reported to Newcastle that 
Pentenriedter's approaches were not restricted to the British. 
The Austrian diplomat had sought to win over the Dutch and the 
French. ' Walpole clearly hoped that by telling Fleury about 
the approaches, he would encourage him to remain firm to 
British interests, and would discredit the Austrian approaches 
to France. k 
The Sardinian ambassador in Vienna, Marquis Giuseppe Solaro 
di Breglio, reported in February, 'malgre l'animosite qu'on a 
contre les Anglois a me sure 
l'Espagne on souhaite de se 
Comte de Sinzendorf n'a pas 
desire ardemment. 1 
2 It was 
be sent to Vienna to manage 
de la crainte des changemens de 
raprocher avec 1'Angleterre, et le 
pu se defendre d'avotler qu'il le 
suggested that Horatio Walpole would 
a reconciliation and that the 
3 
Austrians would support*George II over his demand to receive 
the formal investiture of Bremen and Verden. 
4 Waldegrave was 
5 
ordered to set out for Vienna, and it was widely believed that 
he had been instructed to arrange an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation. 
1. Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 20,23 Mar. 1728, BL. Add. 32754 
f. 459-60,480. Chambrier reported that-Pentenriedter had 
suggested an alliance of Austria, Spain and France, Chambrier 
to Frederick William I, 12 Mar. 1728, AE. CP. Prusse, 88. George 
II suspected that this was the purpose of his mission, Newcastle 
to Horatio Walpole, - Dec. (os) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 179. 
2. Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 25 Feb. 1728, AST. LM. 
Aut. 58. 
3. Newsletter to Prince-Bishop, 30 Mar. 1728, Osnabrück, No. 295, 
f. 42. 
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He arrived in Vienna at the beginning of May and made a 
conspicuous impact as a popular social figure. O'Rourke 
wrote slightingly, 
'Waldegrave is looked upon here as a mild polite 
man, of noe great reach, and therefore for their purpose. '1 
Others were more complimentary. Count Tarouca, the Portuguese 
Ambassador in Vienna, informed Townshend that Waldegrave's 
good qualities had won him universal esteem, and his skill at 
cards soon commended him to Eugene, a noted card-player. ') The 
Austrians told Waldegrave that they were in favour of an 
improvement in relations. Eugene told him of 'his sincere 
desire to see a perfect reconciliation with England, '3 and 
the leader of the Spanish interest at the Court of Vienna, the 
Marquis Ramon de Rialp, Secretary of Charles VI's Spanish 
Council, blamed bad relations on St. Saphorin and said that 
he would be delighted to see good relations restored. 
4 The 
4. Continued. Chambrier to Frederick William I, 5 Ap. 1728, AE. 
CP. Prusse. 88. Failing prior satisfaction, George wanted, 
Bremen, Verden and Halden discussed at the Congress, (Newcastle) 
to Horatio Walpole, - Mar. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 93, draft. 
5. Continued. Newcastle to Waldegrave, 7 Mar. 1728, Chewton. 
1. O'Rourke to James III, 8 May 1728. His opinion improved after 
he met him, O'Rourke to James III, 17 June 1728. Vienna, England, 
Varia. 8. 
2. Plettenberg's brother, Christian von Plettenberg, representative 
of the Elector of Cologne at the Diet, to Plettenberg, 22 Ap. (not 
Aug. as endorsed) Münster, NA104, f. 38; Tarouca to Townshend, 
14 May 1728, PRO. 80/326; Wackerbarth, Saxon envoy in Vienna, to 
Manteuffel, 19 May 1728, Dresden, 3331, f. 21-3; Delafaye to 
VWaldegrave, 26 Feb. (os) 1728, Chewton. Waldegrave claimed that 
'play (was)... as necessary here for a minister as writing, ' 
Waldegrave to Townshend 24 July 1728, Chewton. 
3. Waldegrave to Townshend, 7 May 1728, PRO. 80/62. D'Aix reported 
that Waldegrave was on good terms with Eugene, but not Sinzendorf 
'. k 
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Emperor bowed to Waldegrave as he was about to mount his 
horse 'a mark of great distinction I am told. '1 
Zamboni reported from London that 
'les ministres parroissent etre fort contens de 
l'accueil qu'on a fait ä Vienne au nouvel ambassadeur 
Mylord Waldgrave, qui avoit deja commence 
a 
conferer sur 
les affaires dont il a 
ete charge: ils sont aussi persuades 
de la necessite qu'il ya de remettre les choses sur 
l'ancien pied, et de retablir la bonne intelligence 
entre les deux cours. Mylord Townshend en dernier lieu 
n 
s'est explique meme assez sincerement la dessus avec une 
personne qui traite ici sous main les affaires de S. M. I 
et l'on commence a regarder de mauvais oeil le pouvoir de 
la France qui devient tous les jours plus arbitraire et 
despotique. '2 
Zamboni was almost certainly referring to Visconti as the secret 
Austrian agent and it was probably from him that he derived his 
information. Zamboni's report might appear to be an exaggeration 
3. Continued. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 19 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 
35. 
4. Continued. Waldegrave Journal, 17 May 1728, Chewton. 
1. Waldegrave Journal, 17 May 1728, Chewton; Solaro di Breglio 
to Victor Amadeus II, 12 July 1728, AST. LM. Aut. 58. 
2. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 21 May 1728. Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 11-12. 
The French were concerned about reports that Austria was 
seeking to improve relations with Britain, Chauvelin to 
Chammorel, 8 July 1728, AE. CP. Ang., sup. 8, f. 40. 
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of whatever interest the Rritish government was showing in an 
Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, but it is partially substantiated 
by material in the Saxon archives. In the spring of 1728 Le Coq 
left London and travelled to Dresden to inform Augustus II 
personally of diplomatic approaches he had received from 
George II. There is no account of his audiences with Augustus 
and the evidence for this episode is the instructions drawn up 
by Augustus for the representatives he sent to the Congress of 
Soissons, Le Coq and Count Hoym, the Saxon representative in 
Paris. The instructions, drawn up at the end of June, referred 
to British requests made via Le Coq for Saxon help in settling 
Anglo-Austrian differences. The British had expressed a 
willingness to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction and an interest 
in reviving the old Anglo-Austrian diplomatic alignment. They 
had asked the Saxons to approach Sinzendorf only and to act in 
concert with Stanhope, 'a qui seul S. M. Brit. en a confie le 
secret. ' In addition, according to the instructions, the 
British had suggested an Anglo-Saxon alliance. 
1 
From Le Coq's subsequent reports from France it is clear 
that St. Saphorin had been responsible for handling the London 
1. Instructions for Le Coq and Hoym, 24,30 June 1728, Dresden, 
2733, f. 7-18,27. D'Aix noted that Stanhope, 'etoit entierement 
dans les Principes du General St. Saphorin, ' and that George II 
was very favourable to him, Marini p. 109, D'Aix to Victor 
Amadeus II, 21 Ap. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35, . Newcastle to Stanhope, 3 June (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 629; Broglie to 
Chauvelin, 26 Aug. 1728 AE. CP. 363 f. 117-18. Sinzendorf was 
the First Austrian Plenipotentiary at Soissons. 
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discussions about the possibility of a Saxon mediation of 
Anglo-Austrian differences. Le Coq reported that it was 
St. Saphorin's idea that only Sinzendorf should be approached, 
and that Stanhope had told him that he had received instructions 
from George II to cooperate with the Saxons on this approach 
and that Townshend knew nothing of these secret instructions. 
1 
It is difficult to obtain evidence to support this account. 
St. Saphorin's papers survive, but are in private hands and 
inaccessible. The present whereabouts of Stanhope's papers 
are a mystery, though they certainly survived until at least 
the end of the eighteenth century, when Coxe printed some of 
them. Whereas the Anglo-Austrian talks conducted through 
Waldegrave attracted a lot of contemporary attention and gave 
rise to much rumour, there are no signs that the projected 
Saxon mediation attracted any attention. This can possibly 
be accounted for by the precautions taken to ensure the secrecy 
of the project. According to the instructions for Le Coq and 
Hoym George II had insisted that nothing should be committed to 
paper and that the approach to Sinzendorf should be oral. No 
1. Le Coq to Augustus, 28 July, 11 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 2733, 
f. 50-1,58. Charles VI apparently attributed to 'Sansaforinis- 
chen Maximen' the reconciliation of Britain and Austria 
by the Second Treaty of Vienna, D. B. Horn, review of 
T. Gehling 'Ein Europäischer Diplomat am Kaiserhof zu Wien' 
(Bonn, 1964) EHR 81, (1966), 401-2, p. 402. 
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memorials summarising the British proposals were to be given 
to Sinzendorf. These were sensible precautions given the 
notorious breaches of security that occurred in this period. 
They were also intended to prevent the Austrians exploiting 
the approach in order to sow dissension between the Hanover 
Allies. It is also possible that George feared that if the 
approach failed the Austrians might reveal it to the British 
opposition, and thus embarrass the government in Parliament. 
William Pulteney had attempted to gain documentary evidence 
from foreign diplomats of George I's promise, given to Spain 
in 1721, to try to gain Parliamentary agreement for the return 
of Gibraltar. 
The lack of complementary documentary evidence is not 
therefore proof of anything more than a sensible disinclination 
to entrust important information to paper. It does not disprove 
the Saxon material. It is unlikely that Augustus II would have 
drawn up formal instructions to his envoys to attempt a mediation 
unless he believed that his efforts were desired. Were it not 
for Stanhope's confirmation to Le Coq that he had received secret 
instructions from George, it could be thought that the whole 
scheme only existed in St. Saphorin's fertile brain. It 
therefore seems likely that the Saxon material is accurate 
and that George did make approaches to the Saxons for their 
help in arranging an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation. 
Granted that this is the case, it is necessary to reconcile 
George's action with the fears of Prusso-Saxon reconciliation 
voiced earlier in the year. Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to date St. Saphorin's discussions with Le Coq about an approach 
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to Sinzendorf. They may have taken place in December 1727 
-at the same time as the two men discussed the need for a 
league of German princes, but, if so, it is likely that the 
confidential courier who took the report-of these talks to 
. Dresden would also have taken a report on the other matter. 
Le Coq was still in London at the end of April 1728 and it is 
likely that he would not have remained so long in London had 
the confidential approach been made to him in December 1727. 
St. Saphorin probably approached him after it became clear that 
a Congress would be held, and this was not clear until the 
-news of Spain's capitulation to Anglo-French pressure arrived 
in London in January. It is, however, conceivable that the 
approach was made earlier and that George envisaged an approach 
to Sinzendorf through the Saxon envoy in Vienna. 
Despite hostility towards Augustus II as a Catholic ruler 
suspected of desiring the re-catholicisation of Saxony, and bad 
relations after the Thorn affair of 1724, neither the Hanoverian 
monarchs nor the British ministry viewed Saxony with 
particular disfavour. Saxon territorial aspirations and 
dynastic hopes did not conflict with either Hanoverian or 
British interests. The Saxon claim to JHlich-Berg did not 
present any particular difficulties, whilst Augustus II's 
schemes tö make Poland a hereditary monarchy aroused little 
concern in London. The Saxon interest in the Habsburg 
inheritance did not feature prominently in the diplomacy of 
the period, although both the British and the French were 
aware that the death-of Charles VI would have a disruptive 
effect on the international situation. ' 
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It was therefore the prospect of increased support for 
Prussian schemes, rather than any fears about Saxon intentions, 
that led to concern about the Prusso-Saxon agreement. Why 
George, despite this concern, still entrusted Saxony with 
the handling of the approach to Sinzendorf is unclear. 
Various speculations could be advanced. Possibly he hoped 
to use Augustus to restrain the Prussians, or hoped that the 
growing strength of his alliance system in the Empire would 
persuade Saxony, Prussia and Austria, together or individually, 
to take him more seriously. Possibly, as Zamboni suggested, 
George sought to discard the French, and the abortive attempt 
of 1728 was a precursor of the successful Anglo-Austrian 
negotiations of 1731. 
Whatever George intended, nothing came of the Saxon 
approach. Le Coq arrived at Soissons on July 14th 1728. A 
fortnight later he informed Augustus that Stanhope had told 
him that, though his secret instructions were unaltered, he 
wanted to write to both George and Caroline to seek confirmation 
of them. Le Coq suggested that he should follow St. Saphorin's 
suggestion and approach Sinzendorf with the project of an 
Anglo-Austrian understanding as if it originated from the 
Saxons. Stanhope decided that it was best if he sought new 
instructions before any moves were made. 
1 On August 11th Le Coq 
reported that Stanhope, having received no new instructions for 
three months, was worried that George had changed his mind. 
Moreover St. Saphorin had promised Stanhope that on his return 
to his native Switzerland he would go via Paris, and his failure 
1. Le Coq to Augustus, 28 July 1728, Dresden, 2733, f. 50-1. 
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to do so worried both Stanhope and Le Coq. Stanhope feared 
that the British ministry had discovered the scheme and 
that he would fall into disfavour. The more phlegmatic 
Le Coq suggested that the Saxon intervention simply depended 
on how much George needed it as a diplomatic expedient. 
l 
Why the Saxon intervention was allowed to peter out is 
unclear. Possibly the answer lay in the fears Stanhope voiced 
to Le Coq, that an alliance between Saxony, Prussia, Russia 
and Austria would harm George's interests, and include a 
Saxon guarantee of the Jfilich-Berg inheritance to Prussia. 
2 
Possibly George was angered by the decree on the Mecklenburg 
affair issued by the Aulic Council on May 11th. This angered 
George because it threatened the Hanoverian position in the 
Duchy and because it emanated from the Aulic Council in Vienna 
and not from the Imperial Diet. 
3 The British ministry argued 
that this decree confirmed their views of the Austrians as a 
1. Le Coq to Augustus, 28 July, 11 Aug., 18 Sept. 1728, Dresden, 
2733, f. 51,58,100-2. 
2. Le Coq to Augustus, 28 July 1728, Dresden, 2733, f. 51; 
Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to 
Newcastle, 20 July 1728, 
BL. Add. 32757 f. 126. McKay has pointed out that as Austro- 
Spanish links weakened, 'an eastern bloc of Austria, Prussia 
and Russia (with tacit Saxon support)' acquired greater 
importance, McKay and Scott, Rise of the Great Powers, p. 131. 
3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 8 June 1728, PRO. 84/300 f. 196; 
Marini, p. 110; Goslinga, p. 242; Dureng, pp. 67-72; Hughes, 
pp. 380-1; Naumann, Osterreich, England und das Reich p. 140. 
There is a copy of the decree in PRO. 00/15; 'Reflections on 
the Imperial Resolution about Mecklenburg', late May 1728, 
PRO. 100/115. Ferdinand Albrecht had predicted the Austrian 
decision in March, Ferdinand Albrecht to Ludwig Rudolf, 
10 Mar. 1728, Wolfenbtittel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 529 f. 103. 
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despotic threat in the Empire. Townshend informed Chesterfield 
that, 
'if the Emperor should establish such a despotism 
over Germany, as he plainly aims at by his way of 
disposing of the Dutchy of Mecklenburg, all his 
neighbours will soon feel the effects of such an 
overgrown power, and be convinc'd, tho' too late, 
how boundless Imperial ambition is, when back'd with 
the weight and force of an arbitrary sway in the 
Empire. '1 
Townshend's letter was written in order to persuade the Dutch 
that, though they were not guarantors of the Treaties of 
Westphalia, they should nevertheless intervene in the Mecklenburg 
dispute. Nevertheless, it is clear that George was greatly 
concerned by the matter. 
2 On August 11th Townshend sent 
Horatio Walpole an anxious letter, 
'His Majesty's thoughts upon the points of 
Mecklenburg and Sleswig, on which he is very earnest 
and would not suffer the least delay to be made .... I 
never saw the king more displeased in my life than he 
1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 31 May (os) 1728, PRO. 84/300, f. 186; 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 July (os) 1728, Bradfer- 
Lawrence; Tilson to Waldegrave, 23 July (os) 1728, Chewton; 
Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, 26 July (os) 1728, 
BL. Add. 32757, f. 302-3; Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 
5 Aug. (os) 1728, L. G. Wickham Legg (ed. ), BDI France., 1727-1744 
(1930) p. 40; Private and Additional Instructions for Edward 
Finch as Envoy Extraordinary to Sweden, 30 Sept. (os) 1728, 
J. F. Chance (ed. ), RDI Sweden, 1727-1789 (1928), pp. 6-7; 
Townshend to Diemar, 5 July (os) 1728, PRO. 100/15. 
2. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 Sept. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32758, 
f. 197. 
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was upon reading what was said in this project and 
your despatches upon those two articles .... For God's 
sake, Dear Horace, do your best, both your reputation 
and mine are at stake. 11 
The Mecklenburg resolution, combined with the lack of real 
response Waldegrave encountered in Vienna, destroyed the 
basis for an Anglo-Austrian rapprochement. 
2 
The British felt 
that Austria was trying to stir up trouble between Hanover and 
Prussia in Mecklenburg. 
3 They also blamed the Austrians for 
Spanish intransigence. Despite Waldegrave's sweeping social 
successes he found that the Austrian ministers in Vienna, and 
in particular the influential Eugene, were far from accommodating. 
He informed Townshend that the Austrians were cautious about 
discussing matters, haughty in their attitude to any reconcili- 
ation and prone to differentiate between the English nation and 
the house of Hanover. On June 5th he complained that 'not a 
word has been said to me that has the least tendency to 
business'. Thus neither of the approaches that had been 
intended to improve Anglo-Austrian relations had succeeded. 
The 'official' approach through Waldegrave had met as little 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 31 July (os) 1728, Bradfer- 
Lawrence. The 'project' referred to was the proposal for 
a Provisional Treaty. Austrian support for the claims of 
the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp led to George's concern over 
Sl eswig . 
2. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 16 May, 3 June (os) 1728, 
Bradfer-Lawrence. Waldegrave complained, 'there is a set of 
people here that pretend to love the English nation ... without having the least regard for His Majesty. ' Waldegrave to 
Townshend, no d., Chewton. 
3. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 24 June 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 362, f. 245; 
Dureng, p. 70; Stihm to Augustus II, 17 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 3378, 
vol. V, f. 155. George was angry at the Austrian decision to 
include Prussia among the administering powers of Mecklenburg. 
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success as the 'unofficial' one through Stanhope and the ýff 
Saxons. 
1 
It was not surprising that the Austrians were unresponsive 
to Waldegrave and insensitive over Mecklenburg. In the 
Empire their ties with Saxony, Prussia and Russia made them 
oblivious to Hanoverian views. 
2 At the Congress the possibility 
of Austria detaching France from her allies appeared to be 
strong. Sinzendorf was convinced that he would be able to 
manage Fleury and thus acquire the glory of having given peace 
to Europe. 
3 This optimism caused the Austrians to pay less 
attention to British views. 
4 Without French help Britain 
would be forced to compromise, and this opinion, widely held, 
led to little attention being paid to British interests at 
the beginning of the Congress. Horatio Walpole had feared 
that this, would happen and had therefore pressed unsuccessfully 
for a set of common written instructions for the Plenipotentiaries 
of the Alliance of Hanover powers. 
5 His fears were to be 
1. Fiorelli to the Doge of Venice, 4 June 1728, ASV. LM. Ing. 97, 
f. 172. Toerring noted that 'suivant les maximes de la cour 
de Vienne, tout ce qu'elle fait, dost etre receu comme une 
grace', Toerring to Plettenberg, 28 May 1728, Monster, N. A. 148 
f. 88. 
2. (Newcastle) to Horatio Walpole, 21 May-(os) 1728, PRO. 78/189, H 
f. 208. 
3. Berkentin to -, 17 Mar. 1728, PRO. 80/326; Sinzendorf told 
Horatio Walpole that 'he had been much reproach'd for being 
too good an Englishman' and that Charles VI was 'Bon Anglais 
still', Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 4 July 1728, RL. Add. 
32756, f. 397. 
4. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 13 June (os) 1728, PRO. 
78/189 f. 254. 
5. Horatio º7alpole, ' 'Considerations qui peuvent servir a donner 
quelque Idee des Mesures prealables que les Allies devroient 
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proved correct. 
' 
5. Continued. concerter entre eux pour regler leur conduite 
au Congres... ' PRO 84/294 f. 119,133; George II to Fleury, 
22 Jan. (os), Newcastle to Chauvelin, 22 Jan. 1728. PRO. 78/ 
189, f. 30,34; Townshend to Finch, 19 Sept. 1727, PRO. 84/ 
294 f. 181; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 14 May (os) 1728, 
PRO 78/189 f. 191. 
1. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 27 June (os) 1728, 
PRO. 78/189, f. 271. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONGRESS OF SOISSONS 
'No one can be more eager than myself to get 
t 
out of this negotiation by the shortest way possible, 
provided it be good and safe'. 
Townshend to Horatio-Walpole July 4 1728.1 
The talks that began at Soissons in mid-June 1728 soon re- 
vealed the incompatible interests of the participating powers. 
The Views of Spain and Britain were irreconcilable. 
2 Spain demanded 
the restitution of Gibraltar and an end to illegal British commer- 
cial activities in the Indies. 
3 Britain demanded that Spain should 
renounce all claim to Gibraltar and Port Mahon and recompense 
._ British merchants 
for the effects of Spanish depredations. Such 
a difference had been predicted. The British ministry had been 
aware that Spain would make such demands, 
4 
and they had been 
informed that, despite the approaching Congress Spain was pre- 
5 
paring for war. There wäs a difference of opinion within the 
1. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 23 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 9138, 
f. 104. 
2. De Buy to Flemming, 19 Ap., De Buy to Manteuffel, 28 June 
1728, Dresden, 3105, vol. 2 f. 40,55-6; Pere Blainville to 
James III, 12'June 1728, RA. 117/46; Baüdrillart, III, 430-1; 
Goslinga, pp. 252,256. 
3. Tilson to Waldegrave, 25 June (os) 1728, Chewton; Baudrillart, 
III, 570-2; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 13 June (os) 
1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 254; Abstract of the instructionse; to 
the Spanish Plenipotentiaries, PRO. 78/188 f. 224-9. 
4. Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 20 Mar. 1728, BL. Add. 32754, 
ß. 457; Waldegrave to Townshend, 3 July 1728, PRO. 80/61 f. 17. 
'5. Chesterfield to Townshend, 21 May 1728, PRO. 84/300, ß. 71. 
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British ministry as to how to respond to the Spanish demands. 
Officially the British government trusted in the continued 
unity of the Alliance of ianover. Townshend had informed 
Chesterfield in May, 'it must be expected that that Court Cspaia 
will be always giving jealousys, and neither think nor act right, 
till they see by the strict union between England, France, and 
Holland, that their artifices are of no use, and that they must 
submit to such a peace as the Allys shall jointly judge necessary 
for the quiet of Europe .'1 
The British hoped that*France would repeat her performance 
of the previous winter, and support Britain in her demands upon 
Spain. 2 They hoped that a bait could be offered to Spain by 
France and Britain in the form of support for Spanish pretensions 
in Italy and possible compliance in Spanish marital schemes. This 
cosy view was shaken by anxieties over Fleury's response to 
Sinzendorf's approaches. 
3 Should France-and Austria reach an 
agreement they might seek to assuage Spanish resentment by 
supporting her claims against Britain. 
4 Both Fleury and Slingelandt 
believed that Britain ought to return Gibraltar, 
5 
a view which 
1. Townshend to. Chesterfield, 14 May, (os) 1728, PRO. 84/300, f. 76. 
2. Marini, p. 111. 
3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 3 Aug. 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 154; 
Marini, p. 105 
4. Chauvelin to Chammorel, 29 July 1728, AE. CP. Ang. Sup. 8. 
f. 54; Le Coq to Augustus II, 11 Aug., 18 Sept. 1728, 
Dresden, 2733 f. 59.102. 
5. Chesterfield to Townshend, 3 Aug. 1728, PRO. 84/301, f. 152-5; 
Atterbury to Hay, 24 Feb., Graham to Hay, 12 Ap. 1727, RA. 
104/27,105/159; Chauvelin to Broglie, 24 June 1728, AE. CP. 
Ang. 362, f. 239; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 
20 July 1728,, 1L.. Add. 32757, f. 125; Marini, p. 116; Goslinga, 
pp. 258-9,261-2,265-8. In this period both France and the 
United Provinces made clear their dissatisfaction with the 
British possession of asiento. Horatio.. Walpole to Townshend, 
24 July 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; British Plenipotentiaries to 
Newcastle, 10 Aug. 1728, BL. Add. 32757, f. 326. 
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found support within the British ministry. 
' Alongside the attitude 
that Britain's allies were obliged to support fully her claims 
against Spain was the view that Britain should seek to win over 
Spain by the return of Gibraltar. Poyntz one of the British 
Plenipotentiaries, suggested that, if Britain succeeded. in retaining 
Gibraltar at the Congress, the Spaniards would continue to oppress 
British commerce in the hope that that would persuade the British 
to return it. He believed, in common with most commentators, that 
however much the Queen of Spain. might be determined to succeed in 
Italy and to gain an archduchess, for one of her sons, the King 
and 'the true Spaniards' were more interested in Gibraltar. He 
therefore suggested that, provided some face-saving equivalent 
could be found, Gibraltar should be restored. 
Such a project. was to be suggested on several occasions in 
the late 1720s but discussion of it was quashed in 1728 on the 
grounds that it would be fatal in domestic political terms. 
Townshend, who himself believed that it sh-oüld be restored, reject- 
ed Slingelandt's and Poyntz's suggestions of ä restoration, arguing 
2 
that they would 'put the whole nation in a flame'. Correct as this 
assumption was, it restricted Britain's freedom of diplomatic 
manoeuvre. Unable to settle with Spain themselves, they were 
1. Poyntz to Townshend, 9 June 1728, Coxe, II, 628-9; Townshend 
to Poyntz, 3 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 48982 f. 132-3,136-7. 
2. Townshend to Poyntz, 3 June (os), to Chesterfield, 9 July (os), 
to Slingelandt, 23 July (os) 1728, BL. Add. 48982, f. 137, PRO. 
84/301, f. 80,84/580, f. 37-8; O'Rourke to James III, 28 Feb. 
1728, Vienna, England, Varia, 8; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 
22 July 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 363, f. 30; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 
11 Ap. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Goslinga, pp. 265-6. The retention 
of Gibraltar had been a reiterated theme in the addresses 
presented to George II on his accession, Boyer, 34, pp. 39-40, 
43,167-9. 
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obliged to rely on France or Austria being willing to bully Spain 
into compliance. Developments in the Congress made this less likely. F 
In an effort to divide France from Spain, Sinzendorf secretly 
sounded Fleury on the possibility of an Austro-Spanish marriage and 
on Spain's Italian pretensions. Sinzendorf hoped to trap France 
into agreeing to the marriage and thereby anger the German princes 
and undermining the Anglo-French attempts to develop a party in the 
Empire, or refusing and thereby alienating Elizabeth Farnese. Fleury 
declared his approval of the marriage but refused to commit himself 
to paper'. George was 'strongly .... inclined to have the marriage 
brought before the Congress, ' but Fleury, fearing that it would draw 
the Congress out, refused and George gave way2. Stanhope argued 
that the best way to please Spain and persuade her to drop her 
pretensions to Gibraltar was to agree to the marriage but he accepted 
that it would be difficult to make such an arrangement3., 
When these matters were being discussed, a new issue came 
increasingly to dominate the deliberations at the Congress. This 
1. Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 20 June 1728, BL. Add. 9138 f. 100, 
102; Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO. 84/301; De Buy 
to Manteuffel, 19 July 1728, Dresden, 3105, vol. 2, f. 57; 
Baudrillart, III, 435-6; Goslinga, pp. 248,251,270-1. Newcastle 
was livid with one of the Dutch Plenipotentiaries, Hop, for 
telling Sinzendorf that the marriage was acceptable, Newcastle 
to the Plenipotentiaries, 27 June (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 271. 
2. mownshend to Chesterfield, 25 June (os), 2,26 July, 2,13 Aug. 
1728, PRO. 84/300, f. 296,84/301; Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 
1728, PRO. 84/301; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 26 July 
(os) 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 299. 
3. Stanhope to Newcastle, 14 July 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 44-5; 
Sinzendorf also supported this scheme, Townshend to Chesterfield, 
9 July (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 80. 
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was the proposal, variously attributed to Sinzendorf and Fleury, 
for a provisional treatyl. As first drafted by Sinzendorf, this 
treaty proposed that the Ostend Company should be abolished, peace 
be established on the basis of the preliminaries, and all other 
outstanding differences be referred to special commissioners 
appointed by the parties concerned2.. Fleury, although he would 
have preferred a definitive treaty, agreed to the new proposal. 
3 
The British response was far less favourable. On July 7th the 
Cabinet met and its minutes noted, 'The King certainly wishes to 
conclude things, but is doubtful how that can be done by a provisional 
treaty'. 4 George was opposed to a provisional treaty because he 
believed that it would give France an opportunity to act as the 
arbiter of Europe whilst Britain was trapped in a diplomatic impasse, 
her pretensions endlessly debated by commissioners. He believed 
5 
Fleury to be unduly pliant and urged the French to be firmer in the 
defence of their allies6. George told Broglie that he expected 
1. Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 75; King, p. 69. 
2. Goslings, pp. 252-3; Huisman, p. 441; The proposed treaty 'was 
little more than the Preliminaries new modelled, and digested 
into the form of a treaty, without any specific explanation 
of those points which most immediately affected the interests 
of Great Britain', J Ralph ,A Critical History of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole (London, 1743) pp. 419-20. 
3. Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 9 July, Horatio Walpole and 
Stanhope to Newcastle, 28 July 1728., BL. Add. 32756 f. 498-500, 
32757 f. 196; Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 75; Goslinga, p. 253; Wilson, p. 202. Fleury told the British 
Plenipotentiaries that a delay would give Philip V time to 
abdicate and die, and Spain would then become more reasonable, 
Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 13 July 1728, BL. 
Add. 32757 f. 32. 
4. Cabinet Minutes, 26 June (os) 1728, PRO. 36/7 f. 70. Present 
were Devonshire, Newcastle, Townshend, Trevor and Walpole. 
Stanhope to Newcastle, 14 July 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 44. 
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5. Townshend to Chesterfield, 25 June (os) 2,26 July (os), 2 Aug. 
(os) 1728 PRO. 84/300 f. 297-8,84/301, f. 164; Goslinga, pp. 257-8; 
. 
(os) 
to Horatio Walpole, 23 June (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence. 
6. Chesterfield to Townshend, 27 July 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 121-2; 
Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 1728, PRO. 80/326. 
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France to support his pretensions, and that he was ready for 
war. 
1 
The Dutch approved the British. attempt 'to excite the 
Cardinal to act with more spirit and vigour'. 
2 
However, George's views were not shared by all of his 
ministers. On July 26th Townshend informed : Horatio Walpole, 
3 
'the king was so much set at first against 
hearing of the marriage and the provisional treaty .... 
all that could be done was to withhold H. M. from putting 
an absolute refusal upon them .... this matter has been 
softened little by little'. 
4 
There are signs that Townshend and George were not working well 
together. Tilson informed Horatio Walpole in August that 
George was still altering diplomatic instructions and. maintaining 
his opposition to the provisional treaty. - 
5 In July D'Aix 
reported that Townshend and St. Saphorin were still bitter enemies, 
that the Queen was in close touch with St. Saphorin and that 
1. Broglie to Chauvelin, 16 Aug. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 363, f. 91-2; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 12 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
George II to Townshend, no date, commenting on Townshend to 
Slingelandt, 12 July (os) 1728, BL. Add. 38507, f. 244. 
2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 27 July 1728, PRO. 84/301, f. 121. 
3. Stanhope and Horatio Walpole supported the idea of a provisional 
treaty, Stanhope to Newcastle, 30 July 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 221. 
4. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence. 
5. Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 26 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence. 
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Townshend was very worried by D'Aix's contacts with the King. 
' 
St. Saphorin told D'Aix that George was willing to embrace the 
first opportunity to drive the Emperor out of Italy. 
2. An 
anonymous writer informed Horatio Walpole that his conduct 
was being bitterly criticised by St. Saphorin. 
3 
It is possible that, in order to retain Sardinian interest 
in an alliance with Britain and to prevent her from settling 
with Austria, George and St. Saphorin exaggerated their 
willingness to oppose Austria. Their comments to D'Aix do 
not correspond to the approaches made earlier in the year to 
Le Coq. However Austria's provocative actions in the Empire 
could well account for discrepancy. D'Aix despatches suggest 
that George was pushing his schemes for a German league with 
renewed vigour. On July 20th he reported that George 'a fort 
goute le projet de se faire un partie en Allemagne'. George 
4 
" pressed for the accession of Hesse-Cassel to the Wirttemberg- 
Wolfenbüttel treaty, and the accessions of Denmark and Sweden, 
in their capacities as Princes of the Empire, and of Würzburg 
were discussed. 
5 Worried about the apparent concert of Prussia, 
1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 4,11,20 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 36; 
Marini, pp. 112,115. 
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 36; 
Marini, p. 106. 
3. J. D. to Horatio Walpole, 18 July (os). 1728, Bradfer Lawrence. 
4. D' Aix to Victor Amadeus, 20 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 36; 
Chesterfield to Townshend, 1 June 1728, PRO. 84/300 f. 143; 
Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 3 June (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 
f. 225. 
5. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32756 
f. 273; William Chetwynd to Sutton, 28 June, 8 July 1728, 
PRO. 81/122; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 3 Aug. 1728, AE. CP. Allemagne, 
374 f. 271. 
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Austria, Russia and Saxony, 
1 George pressed for Imperial 
rn 
matters to be discussed at the Congress and for the German 
princes to be permitted to send representatives. 
2 The 
British accused Fleury of failing to support them on this issue. 
3 
George feared that the provisional treaty would allow Fleury to 
IS 
abandon his support of the German princes and of Hanoverian 
4 interests. 
1. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 20 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 36; 
Chesterfield to Townshend, 1 June 1728, PRO. 84/300 f. 143; 
Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 3 June (os) 1728, 
PRO. 78/189 f. 225. 
2. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, 
BL. Add. 32756 f. 273; William Chetwynd to Sutton, 
28 June, 8 July 1728, PRO. 81/122; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 
3 Aug. 1728, AE. C. P. Allemagne, 374 f. 271. 
3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 July-(os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 43; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 
1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 157. There was also concern about 
the possibility of Denmark joining the Austro-Prussian 
alliance, Townshend to Glenorchy, 2 July (os) 1728, 
PRO. 75/51 f. 163; Chesterfield to Townshend, 13 July 
1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 60. 
4. Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 29 Aug. (os) 1727, 
PRO. 78/187 f. 20; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 29 Mar. 
(os), Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 15 Sept. 1728, BL. Add. 
32755 f. 137-8,32758 f. 96; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 
17 May 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Newcastle to Horatio 
Walpole, 21 May (os), Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 
12 Sept. 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 210,395; Tilson to Horatio 
Walpole, 4 July (os) 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence; Townshend 
to Chesterfield, 6,13 Aug. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 175, 
185; Philippi, Landgraf Karl p. 546. 
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George's concern was apparent to many. According to 
Zamboni he blocked a ministerial proposal to reduce the size 
of the army, 
1 
and D'Aix reported in August, 
'Le Roy d'Angleterre est fort inquiet, et je 
scýai de bonne part, qu'il s'est explique, qu'il 
aimeroit mieux la guerre que les longeurs et 
l'incertitude ou i1 est, mais je scai aussi, que 
jusques ä present la France est dans des dispositions 
differantes, et toujours pacifiques'. 
2 
1. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 
120 f. 27. - 
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus 
Ing. 35; George II to 
1728, BL. Add. 38507 f. 
Zamboni noted the anger 
developments, Zamboni to 
Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 30. 
L7 Aug. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 
II, 23 Aug. 1728, AST. LM. 
Townshend, 3, ., _. , July (os) 242,244; Marini, pp. 116-7. 
of the government at diplomatic 
Manteuffel, 7 Sept. 1728, 
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Given George's attitude it is necessary to explain why 
Sinzendorf's proposal was accepted. Early in August 1728 
discussions between the Plenipotentiaries of the Hanover 
allies produced an expanded version of Sinzendorf's document, 
and in mid-August a draft. provisional treaty was formally 
communicated to all the powers at the Congress. The British 
attitude changed to a grudging acceptance of the need for a 
provisional treaty. 
1 On August 13th Townshend informed 
Chesterfield that George wanted 'a general and definitive 
pacification' but had been forced to change his mind by Fleury. 
2 
The change followed close upon the departure of St. Saphorin. 
St. Saphorin was given a very generous pension, but he failed 
to gain the Vienna embassy and was sent back to Switzerland, 
without being permitted to stop off at So-issons. 
3 His 
departure might be seen as a victory for Townshend4 but D'Aix 
had written of the latter in May, 
'I1 paroit que ce ministre prend le parti de se 
conformer aux volontes du Roy d'Angleterre, et de la 
Feine, qui sont tres fermes la dessus et veulent se 
5 
gouverner'. 
1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 13,20 Aug. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 185,209; Zamboni to Le Coq, 9 Sept. 1728, ! odl. Rawl. 120 
f. 31. 
2. Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 Aug. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 169. 
3. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 12 June 1728, AST. Lr4. Ing. 35; 'J. D. ' 
to Horatio Walpole, 18 July (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; Le Coq 
to Augustus II, 11 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 2733 f. 58. St. Saphorin 
had sought leave to retire on health grounds, claiming that the 
air of London was-very bad for him, St. Saphorin to Townshend, 
20 May (os) 1728, PRO. 80/61. 
4. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 19 July 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
"5. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 17 May 1728, AST. L"4. Ing. 35; Marini, 
p. 108. 
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Townshend, whose health still gave cause for concerns seems 
to have been somewhat milder and more co-operative with George in 
1728 than in the previous year. In May Delafaye had informed 
Horatio., Walpole that George approved of Townshend's corresponding 
with him without Newcastle's knowledge. 
2 Newcastle in his turn had 
a confidential correspondence with Stanhope, 
3 
who blamed Sir Robert 
'Walpole for his failure to get a peerage and for his brother's 
blocked promotion. 
4 Despite. Poyntz's claim that the British pleni- 
5 
potentiaries were united, 
ýthe opposite appears to have been the 
0 
case. It is difficult to disentangle the secret ties of the period. 
The few scraps of evidence that survive might suggest that the 
St. Saphorin-Stanhope link that had been responsible for executing 
George's German policy earlier in the year had been broken by 
St. Saphorin's departure and by the absence of a confidential 
correspondence between Stanhope and George. Stanhope made it clear 
ý. Sutton to Townshend, 19 Aug. 1728, PRO 81/122; ? lye's letter 
7 Sept. (os) 1728; Kinsky to Eugene, 25 Sept. 1728, Vienna, 
Gv. 64(6) f. 1; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 27 Sept. 1728, AE. CP. 
Ang. 363 f. 178. 
2. nelafaye to Horatio Walpole, 14 May (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 623; 
. ownshend to Horatio Walpole, 21 Aug. ( s) 1727,29 Oct. 1728, 
BL. Add. 48982 f. 70, Rradfer-Lawrence; 
tTilsonj 
to Horatio Walpole, 
12. Oct. (os) 1727, RL. Add. 48982 f. 92; Townshend to George II, 
no date, - July 1728, BL. Add. 38507 f. 230,245. Horatio Walpole 
suspected correctly that there was a confidential correspondence 
between Poyntz and Townshend, Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 
20 June 1728, R1. Add. 9138 f. 100. Townshend complained of 
'the difficulties that arise. often with the D. of Newcastle 
upon forming the draughts of orders', Townshend to Horatio 
Walpole, 10 Oct. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 9138. 
3. Newcastle to Stanhope, 14 May (os), 3 June*'1728, Coxe, 11,623-4, 
629. 
4. Poyntz to Townshend, 9 June, Townshend to Poyntz, 3 June (os) 
1728, RL. Add. 48982 f. 131,135;. Stanhope to Newcastle, 8 June 
1728, Coxe, II, 626-7. 
5. Poyntz to Delafaye, 19 May, 2 July 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 103, 
162;. Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 28 July 1728, 
8L. Add. 32757 f. 191. 
N 
fl, 
163 
to Le Coq that he feared that he had lost royal favour. Though 
Newcastle assured Stanhope that he still enjoyed 'the entire 
confidence' of the king, Stanhope was greatly disappointed by 
his failure to get a peerage. 
' 
The evidence suggests that George had transferred his* 
confidence, at least in part, from St. Saphorin and Stanhope 
to' Townshend. 
2 Within his own department Townshend's authority 
increased. He developed a good working relationship with 
Chesterfield at the Hague. He was on very good terms with Edward 
Finch, sent to Stockholm iii. 1728, Richard Sutton the envoy to 
Hesse-Cassel, and Waldegrave. Postings that might have created 
¬: 
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difficulties, such as St. Saphorin to Vienna and Fabrice to Dresden, 
were not made. His confidential correspondences with Horatio 
Walpole and Poyntz gave him more influence over the Soissons 
negotiations than that possessed by Newcastle. George's anger 
with Austria over the Mecklenburg question, by shelving his 
interest in an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, brought his views 
more into line with those of Townshend, though D'Aix's evidence 
would suggest that the process was mutual. George agreed to 
support the provisional treaty, and thereby save the Anglo-French 
alliance from serious trouble, whilst Townshend cooperated with 
George's German schemes. It was the need to retain the French 
alliance that was probably the most persuasive reason from George's 
1. Newcastle to Stanhope, 3 June (os), Stanhope to Newcastle 
8 June 1728, Coxe, II, 629,626-7. 
2. Marini, pp. 112-3 
e 
9 
t 
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point of view. Prussian pressure to move troops into MecklenburgT 
and heightened concern over Jiilich-Berg issue made the German 
situation more serious. The illness of the Elector Palatine 
made a conflict over Jülich-Berg appear imminent. Renewed 
2 
difficulties in East-Friesland over the conduct of the Imperial 
commissioners sent into the Duchy by the Aulic Council increased 
tension with Austria. 
3 
Given this situation it. was not surprising that the British 
clung to the French alliance and sought to persuade Fleury and 
the Dutch to adopt a more forceful approach to German problems. 
The price of French support was British compliance with the draft 
provisional treaty. This draft confirmed the major international 
agreements from the Treaty of Utrecht to the Convention of the 
Pardo and agreed that special commissioners were to be appointed 
to deal with such outstanding problems as Spanish depredations and 
4 
British contraband trade in Spanish'America. 
The widely held view that Austria was able to dictate Spanish 
policy was disproved by Spain's response to-the project, described 
1. Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 18 July (os) 1728,3radfer 
Lawrence; Chesterfield to Townshend, 17 Aug. 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 180, - 
2. Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 28 Aug., Townshend to Horatio 
Walpole, 22 Aug. (os) 1728, T1'. Add. 32757 f. 485-6,522-4; 
Horatio Walpole to relafaye, 28 Aug., [Newcastle] to., Hgratio 
Walpole, 22 Aug. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 260,78/189 f. 363, 
365; Sutton to Townshend, 2,13 Sept., 4 Oct. 1728, PRO. 81/122; 
Naumann, ist. erreich, England und das Reich p. 145. 
3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 13 Aüg., 19 Nov. 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 173,84/302 f. 109; Kinsky to Eugene, -1l Nov. 1728, Vienna, 
GK. 94 (b) f. 5; Goslinga, pp. 217-8. 
4. Goslinga, pp. 279-82; Wilson. p. 202; Baudrillart, III, 442. 
I 
5. De Tüiy to Manteuffel, 9.16 Aug., 18 Oct. 1728, Dresden, 3105, 
vol. 2, f. 70,73,89; Armstrong, pp. 223-4; Keene to Horatio 
Walpole, 20 Dec. 1727, RL. Add. 32753, f. 357; CNewcastle] to 
Horatio Walpole, 21 May (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 2-4. 
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by Tilson as 'a medley of Spanish phrases, neither refusing nor 
accepting positively; but shuffling as usual, in a wayward manner'. 
1 
Spanish policy had been plunged even more than usual into chaos in 
the summer by Philip V's ill health and his attempt to abdicate 
once more. 
2 Elizabeth Farnese had succeeded however in preventing 
the attempted abdication and had taken advantage of her husband's 
weakness to consolidate her control of Spanish policy. She dis- 
approved of the projected treaty because it failed to safeguard 
Carlos' Italian pretensions and brought a Habsburg marriage no 
nearer. Negotiations continued at Paris in an effort to produce 
3 
a more acceptable project, and a new article was agreed in which 
Britain and France confirmed their undertaking of 1721 to assist 
in the establishment of non Carlos in Italy and accepted the need 
to introduce Spanish garrisons. 
4 One of the Spanish plenipotentiaries, 
Rournonville, left Spain in October, with the new project. It was 
hoped that Spanish agreement would permit the signing of the pro- 
visional treaty, a move that would allow. the British government 
to assure Parliament that peace was secure. 
The Hanoverian Dimension 
The Congress had not developed therefore, as the British had 
hoped. Though Fleury had not abandoned his allies, as had indeed 
1. Tilson to Waldegrave 6 Sept. '(os) 1728, Chewton; Stainville 
. 
to nuke Leopold, 21 Sept. 1728, Nancy, 86,. No. 172. 
2. De T3üy to Manteuffel, 21,28 June, 19,26 July, 2 Aug. 1728. 
Dresden, 3105, vol. 2, f. 52,55,61,66,68; D'Auberton to 
Maurepas, 8,28 June 1728, AN. AM. R7292; Waldegrave to Townsherid, 
3 July, 1728, PRO, 80/61 f. 18; Pentenriedter to Eugene, 5 July 
. 1728, Vienna, GK 102 (a), f. 360; Dering to Percival, 20 June 
(os) 1728, BL. Add. 47032 f. 64-5. 
3. l3audrillart, III, 444-6; Goslinga, pp. 291-2. 
4. Baudrillart, III, 449-53; Goslinga, pp. 294-5 
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been feared, his willingness to negotiate in secret had kept the 
British plenipotentiaries in the dark for much of the time, and 
had enhanced Fleury's position as the arbiter of Europe. The 
Congress sessions at Soissons had soon ceased to be of any signi- 
f icance, with important matters being handled privately in Paris. 
2 
The British had been unhappy about this development, but they had 
been forced to accept it. Their wish to raise the marriage at the 
Congress had been thwarted, as had their attempt to turn the Con- 
gress into a platform for challenging Imperial authority. Initial 
hostility to the provisional treaty had been replaced by support 
for it. In September Townshend informed Chesterfield that, 
'there is more of name and sound, than of 
substance and reality between a definitive treaty, 
and a provisional and suspensive one, as now proposed; 
By the present project all our engagements are answered, 
our former treaties are renewed, and things brought 
back to the foot they were before the making the 
dangerous Treatys of Vienna .... as Treatys commonly 
last, and are interpreted according to times and 
circumstances, nothing could be so decided, as to 
expect a longer duration than this intended treaty 
3 
provides for'. 
1. Slingelandt had predicted that Fleury would be the de facto 
mediator of the Congress, 'Heads of ye Pensionary's paper', 
2 Ap. 1728, PRO. 103/110. George was opposed to such a devel- 
opment, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, -Ap. (os) 1728, 
PRO. 78/189 f. 132. 
2. Le Coq to Manteuffel, 16 July, Le Coq to Augustus II, 23 July 
. 
1728, Dresden, 2733 f. 37,39; Poyntz to Delafaye, 30 July, 
22 Oct. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 238,324; Wilson, pp. 199-200; 
Goslinga, p. 248. 
3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 271-2. 
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This sober reflection was doubtless true, but it represented a 
different attitude to the more blustering and self-confident tone 
that had characterised British diplomacy the previous winter and 
spring. It was the deterioration in the German situation and the 
smaller range of British diplomatic manoeuvre that accounted: for 
this change. The bold talk of reconciliation with Austria, Prussia, 
Saxony and Russia had been replaced by fears about the intentions of 
these powers, fears sharpened-by the suspicion that Denmark was about 
to join them'. The schemes for an alliance of German princes had 
met less success than anticipated2. Saxony had preferred to retain 
its links with Austria and Prussia. Chesterfield's approach to 
the Wittelsbach envoy Gansinot had been met with caution. The 
Bavarians did not wish to anger their powerful Austrian neighbours3. 
The Hessians were not too enthusiastic about angering Austria or 
fighting Prussia, however much they welcomed British subsidies. 
4 
1. Villars, 11,18 Ap., 28 Nov. 1728, pp-. 128,156; Horatio Walpole 
to Newcastle, 24 Ap., 5 Nov. 1728, BL. Add. 32755, f. 291,32759 
f. 51-2; Newcastle to-the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 1728, 
PRO.. 80/326; Townshend to Horatio Walpole,. 26 July (os) 1728, 
Bradfer Lawrence; Whitehall Evening Post 8 Aug. (os) 1728; 
Le Coq to Augustus II, 30 Aug. 1728, Dresden, 2733 f. 87; 
Townshend to Glenorchy 6 Sept. (os), Glenorchy to Townshend, 
i, 
21 Sept. 1728, PRO. 75/51 f. 218,228; Sutton to Townshend, 13 Sept. 
1728, PRO. 81/122; ? Valdegrave to Townshend, 16 Oct. 1728, PRO. 
80/61 f. 161; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 20 July 
1728, BL. Add. 3.2757 f. 126; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 
26 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 413. 
2. Marini, p. 114. 
3. Tarring to Plettenberg, 26 Aug., 23 Sept: 1728, Münster, N. A. 148, 
ß. 108-9,120; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 14 Sept. 1728, AE. CP. 
Allemagne, 374 1.329. The British were opposed to subsidies 
for the Wittelsbachs, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 22 Aug, (os) 
1728, PrO. 78/189 f. 364. 
4. There were also doubts about the reliability of 3runswick- 
Wolfen'buttel, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 31 Aug. 1728, AE. CP. 
Allemagne, 374 f. 319. - 
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As George realised, the German princes needed to have their 
resolve stiffened by Anglo-French assistance, for it was these 
princes who would be the first to suffer Austrian attack. 
l 
Without France, Britain did not seem strong enough to tempt 
German support, and Fleury's talks with S. inzendorf, talks. that 
were as well known as their contents were mysterious, suggested 
to many that Britain could not count on French support. 
The representative of the Duke of Mecklenburg at The Hague, 
Sande suggested to Chesterfield, 'that he thought the king's 
Hannover dominions were so much concerned in the fate of Mecklen- 
burg that they might almost give the law to his Majesty upon this 
occasion'. Although Chesterfield rejected this suggestion and 
Townshend corroborated his rejection, 
2 it is indeed possible that 
the key to British policy should be sought in the myriad complex- 
ities of German politics and, in particular, in the need to protect 
Hanover. The Hanoverians in the German-Chancery in London enjoyed 
little power and the few contemporaries who considered their role 
gave it little prominence. 
3 No Hanoverian in the late 1720s 
wielded the influence that Bernstorff and Bothmer had enjoyed 
in their heyday. Though Bothmer survived until 1732 he lacked 
influence with George II. Fabrice had returned to Hanover. The 
principal officials of the German Chancery in London, Jobst and 
1. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os), 22 Aug. 1728, 
BL. Add. 32756 f. 275, PRO. 78/189 f. 362; Townshend to the 
Plenipotentiaries, 5 Aug. (os), 12 Sept., BL. Add. 32757 f. 
401-2, PRO 78/189 f. 395. 
2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 6 July 1728, PRO. 84/301 f. 24. 
3. Anon, 'Memoire sur 1'Etat present de la Grande Bretagne', 
31 Dec. 1728, AE. CP. ANG. 364, f. 391; A. S. Foord, His 
Majesty's opposition p. 122. In 1729 D'Aix reported from 
"Aanover. Iles Allemands sont exclus du secret des negociations', 
"D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 23 June 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
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Andreas von der Reiche and Johann Philipp von Hattorf were credited 
with little power, and they represented less of a challenge to the 
British ministry than Schaub and St. Saphorin, though Hattorf was 
to pay a major role in the unsuccessful attempt to bring Britain 
into the Polish Succession War. 
Nevertheless, despite the weakness of the Hanoverian repre- 
sentatives in London, there is no doubt that George was very 
concerned about the defence of his Electorate. Under his father 
the Electorate had been greatly. strengthened by territorial con- 
solidation and expansion. In particular, the acquisitions of 
Lauenburg, Bremen and Verden had represented a considerable expan- 
sion towards the north and had given the Electorate a coastline. 
5 
There is little evidence in the late 1720s that George II intended 
to continue his father's expansionism, although contemporaries were 
unsure. about his intentions in Mecklenburg and the schemes he 
entertained in the 1740s suggest that he was not &verse to the idea 
2 
of territorial expansion. He was certainly determined that his 
1. Augustus II, in his instructions to Watsdorf, appointed Saxon 
envoy in London in 1730, wrote, 'I1 observera neantmoins de 
s'attacher principalement aux Anglois,. puisqu e ce sont eux, 
qui ont taute la direction meme en ce, qui regarde les intents 
generaux des Etats d'Hannovre. ä l'exclu sion des ministres 
Hannoveriens, gtie le Roi ne tient aupr5s de sa personne... ', 
Augustus to Watsdorf, 12 Oct. 1730, Dresden, 2676, vol. 1, 
f. 12. In 1729 Chavigny noted opposition by some of the Hano- 
verian ministers to Townshend's negotiations with the Wittels- 
bachs, and George's support for Townshend; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 
19 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f. 256. When the 
Hanoverian diplomat Reck was sent to the Congress, Townshend 
ordered the British Plenipotentiaries to tell him nothing about 
the . negotiations 
for a Wittelsbach alliance, and he wrote, 
'He has no powers nor anything to do at the Congress, and was 
sent by the King with no other view but to inform and assist 
your Ex. cies in the affairs of the Empire', Townshend to the 
... Plenipotentiaries, 
12 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 399. i 
. 
Horatio Walpole also urged that the negotiations with the 
: 7ittelbachs be kept a secret from the Hanoverians, Horatio 
Walpole to Delafaye, 12 Sept. 1728, PRO 78/188 f. 273. 
`2. Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 
47, f. 257; Dureng, p. 70; Hughes, pp. 376-7; Nauman, Osterreich 
\. England und das Reich p. 152. 
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father's acquisitions should not be lost. This accounted for his 
opposition to the restoration of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 
because he feared that this would endanger his hold upon Bremen 
and Verden, leading to Danish claims that it should serve as 
territorial compensation, or claims from the Duke of Holstein- 
Ggttorp that he should enjoy the duchies as heir to their late 
possessor the Crown. of Sweden. 
George's attempt to develop a party within the Empire was 
clearly linked to his interest in the defence of Hanover, but it 
is necessary. to consider whether this represented a distortion of 
British policy, insofar as there could be one without the King. 
The defence of Hanover dictated a choice of alliance between 
Austria and France. Although the idea of a Protestant league of 
Prussia, Britain, Sweden, Denmark, the United Provinces and Hesse- 
Cassel was to be advanced in the mid 1730s, it was not feasible in the 
late 1720s, due to the ties between Prussia and Austria and the 
poor relations between George II and Frederick William. George 
considered both an Austrian and a French alliance in 1728. He 
would have agreed with the London Journal1 in its claim that 'the 
balance of Europe has generally been agreed to be an equality of 
power in the hands of the Dnperor and France' and that it was 
essential for the balance that the two powers did not'become part- 
ners. Insofar as there were definable 'British' interests at issue 
in 1728 it is clear that both France and Austria were willing to 
accept the British point of view on most of them. This was not 
surprising as most of the issues - Gibraltar, Minorca and depre- 
dations upon commerce - involved Spain. Both powers were willing 
to discourage Jacobitian, and, though neither power was enthusiastic 
1. London Journal 24 Aug. (os) 1728. 
1% 
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about British commercial pre-eminence, both were willing to surrender 
their own commercial schemes. Sinzendorf agreed at Soissons to 
suppress the Ostend Company whilst in the summer of 1728 profuse 
French assurances quietened British fears about French intentions 
at Dunkirk. Neither France nor Austria cared deeply about the 
points at issue between Britain and Spain, though both found it 
useful to see the two powers divided, and neither wished to risk 
their own relations with Spain by supporting Britain fully. 
It could be argued thät'Britain should have made more of 
an effort to satisfy Austria in 1728. Waldegrave could certainly 
have carried more conciliatory instructions, but there was more 
to the continuation of Anglo-Austrian differences than George's 
concern for Hanoverian interests and his anger over the Mecklenburg 
issue. In the months before the Congress, Austria was far from 
responsive to the idea of a British approach. Sinzendorf was more 
hopeful, correctly as it turned out, of an approach to Fleury, 
l 
whilst Eugene was more interested in the- friendship of Russia, 
Prussia and Saxony. 
2 An enthusiastic response to T°aldegrave would 
have angered Frederick William. The lack of Austrian interest 
was shown by their delay in sending an envoy to Britain. They 
insisted that Waldegrave should- arrive in Vienna before they named 
their envoy, but their choice - Count Philip Kinsky - was a light- 
weight and he did not reach London until September 1728.3 Eugene 
-blamed 
George II for the bad relations between Britain and Austria, 
4 
1. Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 12 Jan. 1729, Dresden, 3331 f. 16. 
2. Braubach, Eugen, II, 300. 
3. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 20 Sept. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Townshend 
to Chesterfield, 3 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302-f. 190; Waldegrave to 
Townshend, 28 July 1728, PRO. 80/61'f. 43. Kinsky's first audience 
with George IIwas. on September 16th. He was only 24 when appoin- 
ted, Naumann, Osterreich, England und das Reich p. 141. 
4. Eugene to Kinsky, 29 Aug. 1728, Vienna GK. 94(b); Braubach, Eugen, 
IV, 290-1. 
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but the Austrians made little effort to remedy this situation at 
Soissöns. Though the British plenipotentiaries made several approach- 
es to Sinzendorf, the response was poor, and Newcastle complained 
that Sinzendorf's statements to Stanhope were dark and unclear. 
1 
The approach via the Saxons was discarded. because, as Stanhope told " 
Le Coq, George did not wish to upset his allies and the draft o, f 
the provisional treaty had caused George to change his mind about 
2 
a personal approach to the Austrians. Stanhope could have added 
distrust of the Saxons and anger with Austria, but the reasons he 
gave were sufficient. Britain's' abandonment of her approach to 
Austria in 1728 was not simply due to Hanoverian interests but 
reflected the need, when faced with Austrian lack of interest, to 
rely on the French. Had Britain abandoned the latter also she 
would have been isolated, unable to hope for help in her disputes 
with Spain and lacking influence in the diplomatic deliberations 
at Paris. 
The anger D'Aix noted in George is understandable. 3 By the 
autumn of 1728 his diplomatic strategy had been revealed as a 
failure. 
4 Fleury had ignored Britain? s opinion on most matters. 
5 
The Austrians had neither been intimidated by George's alliances 
nor responsive to his suggestions of a reconciliation, The King 
i. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July (os) 1728. PRO. 80/326. 
2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 18 Sept. 1728, Dresden, 2733, f. 100-2. 
3. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 23 Aug. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. In 
December Broglie noted of George, 'il est dans un etat tres 
violent, et le Ministere encore plus que lux', Broglie to 
Chauvelin, 19 Dec. 1728, AE. CP,. 363 f. 284. 
4. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Stanhope, 6 Nov. (os) 1728, 
BL. Add. 32759, f. 116-7; Tilson to Waldegrave, 8 Nov. (os) 
1728, Chewton. 
5. Stanhope to Newcastle, 9 Dec. 1728, BL. Add. 32759, f. 322; George II 
" had no illusions about the amount of support he could expect from France, Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/301 
f. 272. 
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had been forced to accept the idea of a provisional treaty, not 
so much because of ministerial pressure but rather because of 
diplomatic developments. Despite hopes to the contrary the Austro- 
Spanish alliance had persisted, whilst Fleury and Sinzendorf had 
developed a good working relationship that threatened to develop 
into a broader arrangement. 
I 
1. Stainville to Duke Leopold, 27 Sept. 1728, Nancy, 86. No. 173. 
In conversation with the author Dr. Auer has suggested that 
Fleury had no intention of creating an alliance with Austria. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AUTUMN 1728 
GROWING STRAIN IN THE ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE 
I 
'You will inform him that it is the unanimous voice 
li 
of our people whose interests as they are dearer to us 
than all other considerations we must consult in the first 
place, that we have been too long amused with fruitless 
negociations, and that after all ye moderation that has 
been shewn on our part, and the endless chicanes and 
delays on that of ye courts of Vienna and Madrid it would 
be intirely giving up the dignity of our. Crown and ye 
Honour of ye Nation to suffer things to continue any 
longer in ye same situation'. 
1 
In the autumn of 1728 three developments undermined further 
the British diplomatic situation and caused fresh doubts about 
the policies then being followed. Louis XV's smallpox attack 
threatened the Anglo-French alliance with the possibilities of 
civil war in France or the accession. of Philip V as King of France. 
Spain rejected the provisional treaty and ßournonville's mission 
failed to justify the hopes that had been raised that he would 
succeed in 2 persuading Elisabeth Farnese to accept the treaty. 
The Austrian ministry decided to disavow Sinzendorf's diplomatic 
approaches to the Hanover allies, to reject the provisional treaty 
and to reaffirm their Spanish alliance. The combination of these 
1. Deleted section of draft instructions to the British Pleni- 
Potentiaries, no date, early spring 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
2. De ßuy to Ltanteuffel, 15,29 Nov. 1728, Dresden, 3105,2 
f. 97,98. 
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developments led many within Britain to question the wisdom-of 
British policy, and these doubts, voiced by members of the 
government, as well as the Opposition, created a dangerous poli- 
tical situation as the Parliamentary Session approached. 
' 
The ministers assembled at Soissons had hoped that Spain 
would be persuaded, by the loss of Austrian support, to accept the 
project of a provisional treaty. The British ministry had hoped that 
Bournonville would succeed ' in- persuading Elizabeth Farnese to 
accept the treaty,, though sceptical voices had been raised. 
2 The 
Dutch had suggested that ßournonville had lost all credit at Madrid. 
However, it was from Vienna that the blow that destroyed the pro- 
visional treaty came. On October 10th the Austrian conference of 
ministers rejected the project, and made it clear that they would 
not act against Spain. 
3 All hope of coercing Spain was therefore 
4 
lost. This sudden and unexpected decision was widely attributed 
to. the result of a struggle for power within the Austrian. ministry 
-- between Eugene and Sinzendorf. 
It was believed, correctly, that 
Sinzendorf's French approach was rejected in favour of Eugene's 
policy of alliances within the Empire and with Spain and Russia. 
5 
This decision was a surprise, although there had been considerable 
1. 'Some loose Thoughts upon the present state of the negotiation 
and of affairs abroad', anonymous memorandum possibly by 
Stanhope, no date, autumn 1728, PRO. 103/110. 
2. Waldegrave to Townshend, 23 Oct. 1728, PRO. 80/61 f. 170. 
3.3audrillart, III, 479; King, pp. 68-9. . 
4. Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 12 Nov. 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence. 
5. Townshend to Stanhope and Horatio Walpole, 14 Nov. (os) 1728, 
PRO. 78/189 f. 457; Kinsky to Eugene, 1. Dec. 1728, Vienna, 
GK. 94(b) f. 8; ? JcKay, Eugene pp. 218-19. 
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disquiet over the possibility of collusion between Austria and 
Spain. George II, according to Townshend, believed that the two 
powers were in league to spin out the Congress and delay matters. 
l 
It was feared that both Spain and Austria wished to postpone 
developments until after the arrival of the treasure fleet due 
from the Indies. Austria hoped that Spain would use her treasure 
0 
to pay the subsidies due to Austria which would in turn enable 
Austria to satisfy her obligations to her German allies. 
2 
The reaffirmation of the-Au stro-Spanish alliance, 
3 
a develop- 
ment that bore testimony to Elizabeth Farnese's continued hopes 
that the Austrian alliance would produce advantages for Don Carlos, 
4 
was rendered more serious by Louis XV's smallpox attack in late 
October. This caused Philip V to prepare for the seizure of power 
in France, and produced suggestions of a civil war between his 
supporters and those of the Duke of Orleans, the son of the former 
Regent.. All Europe followed the news and rumours of the illness 
with great attention. St. Saphorin wrote to Townshend from his 
Swiss estate, 'je suis saisi des agitations les plus vives'. 
5 
1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 24 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 18. 
2. Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 8 Nov., Stanhope to 
Newcastle, 9 Nov. 1728, EL. Add. 32759 f. 66,90; Waldegrave 
to Horatio Walpille, 8 Dec. 1728, BL. Add. 9138 f. 132-3. 
3. Newcastle to Stanhope and Horatio "7alpole, 6 Nov. (os), Keene 
to Newcastle, 20 Dec. 1728,2L. Add. 32759 f. 112,396-7; 
-De Buy to tianteuffel, 29 Nov. 1728, Dresden, 3105,2 f. 99; 
Keene to Newcastle, 30 Nov. 1728, BL. Add. 9138 f. 116; Eugene 
to La Paz, - Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK. 102(a); A. Beer, 'Zur 
Geschichte der Politik Karl VI', Historische Zeitschrift 19, 
(1886) p. 44. 
4. Keene to Newcastle, 20 Dec. 1728, BL. Add. 32759 f. 379. 
5. Keene to Newcastle, 8 Nov. 1728, BL. Add. 32759 f. 80-1; De Buy 
to Manteuffel, 8 Nov. 1728,. Dresden, 105,2 f. 95; D'Aubenton 
to 'laurepas, 15,22 Nov. 1728, AN. Al4. B . 
293; St. Saphorin to 
Townshend, 16 Nov. 1728, PRO. 80/61; Baudrillart, III, 415, 
455-478 
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The news that Louis definitely had smallpox reached London 
on October 31st. 
1 It caused a fall in the stocks, 
2 
and widespread 
speculation as to the likely consequences of his death. Farley's 
41 
Bristol Newspaper suggested that if he died, the French government 
would rely on British aid to keep Philip V out. British policy 
3 
was paralysed, as the government awaited news of Louis' fate. To 
a certain extent the crisis was simply an exacerbation of fears 
that had been expressed for a long while that French policy would 
change with the death or replacement of Fleury. Such an opinion 
had been widely voiced within Britain, France and Europe. Late in 
4 
October 1728 Rialp, probing Waldegrave on the possibility of an 
Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, informed him that the Anglo-French 
alliance depended on the life of Fleury, 'and- that he was of opinion 
that were the cardinal to dye, those who would succeed him in the 
administration would not be so zealous for England as he was'. 
Waldegrave's reply was rather lame. He assured Rialp that Louis XV 
had been so persuaded of the importance of the British alliance that 
"- a change of ministry could not lead to an alteration in French policy. 
5 
1. Foratio Talpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 27 Oct. 1728, BL. Add. 
32758 f. 449; Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 27 Oct. 1728, PRO. 
78/188 f. 342 _ 
2. Farley's Bristol Newspaper 26 Oct. (os) 1728; Ipswich Journal 
2 Nov. (os) 1728. 
3. Farley's Bristol Newspaper 2 Nov. (os) 1728. Louis recovered 
very swiftly. He resumed attending councils on 14 November, 
Villars, p. 153. 
4. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 16 Nov. (os), Horatio Walpole to 
Newcastle, 4 Dec. 1727, BL. Add. 32752 f. 56,110-112; 8inzendorf 
to Fonseca, 29 Nov. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 11. f. 436; Newcastle 
to Horatio Walpole, 14 Play (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 194; 
Townshend to Horatio Malpole, 23 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 9138 
f. 105; Townshend to Chesterfield, 25 June (os) 1728, PRO. 84/300 
f. 298-299; Horatio Walpole, 'Considerations relating to the 
marriage between Don Carlos and the eldest Archdutchess and the 
notion of a Provisional Treaty', 19 July 1728, Bradfer-Lawrence. 
5. Waldegrave to Townshend,. 30 Oct. 1728, PRO. 80/63 f. 189-190. 
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Such assurances convinced few, 'and within Britain there was 
not only opposition to the French alliance but also doubts, among 
its supporters, as to how long it could last. Combined with the 
apparent failure of the Congress of Soissons to settle international 
problems, this produced a Major debate in the press about British 
foreign policy. The government was attacked for its failure to 
protect British commerce from Spanish depredations, for the threats 
posed by the developing strength of the French nation, and for signs 
of French commercial and maritime activity, ranging from repairs to 
the harbour at Dunkirk, to French colonial activities in North 
America and the West Indies.. The difficulties affecting trade and 
industry were blamed on the international situation. The uncertainty 
in European affairs was blamed on the government, which was accused 
of being subservient to the French and unduly tolerant of Spanish 
activities. 
2 Anxiety also affected the price of stocks. This was 
noted by the press and by foreign diplomats, such as Chammorel. 
Other diplomats noted the increase in opposition to the government. 
3 
1. Broglie to Chauvelin, 15 June, Chammorel to Chauvelin, 22 July, 
25 Oct, 6 Dec. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 363 f. 24,30,206,274; 
Newcastle to Horatio*Walpole, 26 July (os) 1728, BL. 32757 f. 295; 
Leeds Mercury 26 Nov. (os) 1728; Craftsman 1 Feb. (os) 1729; 
Flying Post 16,21 Jan. (os)_1729. 
2. Vignola, Venetian Secretary in London., to the Doge, 17 Dec. 1728, 
ASV. Lr!. Ing. 98 f. 82; Marini, pp. 121-2; Broglie to Chauvelin, 
7 Mar. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 365 f. 161; Farley's Bristol Newspaper 
9,16,30 Nov. (os) 1728; Craftsman 21 Dec. (os) 1728; Richard 
Buckner, Estate Agent to the Duke of Richmond, to the Duke, 
25 Nov. (os) 1728, Earl of March, A Duke and his Friends: The 
Life and Letters of the Second Duke of Richmond (2 vols. 1911)1,165; 
Villars, 3 Dec. 1728, pp. 156-7. 
3. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 14 Oct. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 363 f. 193; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 15 Nov. 13,27 Dec. 1728,24 Jan. 1729, 
AST. L?. Ing. 35; Ipswich Journal 14 Dec. (os) 1728; Chauvelin to 
Chammorel, 23 Jan. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 72; Lady Irwin 
to her father the Earl of Carlisle, 6 Feb. (os) 1729, Carlisle, 
p. 57; Villars, 28 Nov. 1728, pp. 155-6. 
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The increase they were reporting was that of London. Diplomats 
were often unduly influenced by the opinions held by colleagues, 
by their links with members of the opposition, and by the, to 
them, unusual freedom of the press in * Britain. However, the 
strong attacks mounted in such provincial newspapers as Farley's 
Bristol Newspaper suggest-that not only London was influenced by 
criticisms of the government's foreign policy. The degree of 
Ii 
concern felt throughout Britain is impossible to measure, but 0 
the ministry were certainly worried by the impending session. 
l 
It was widely held in diplomatic circles that the government 
would encounter major difficulties with Parliament. Chesterfield 
was told by an Austrian supporter at the Hague, 'that if nothing 
were concluded before the meeting of the Parliament, the nation, that 
was already uneasy at the expense, would be extremely exasperated 
at the continuance of it'. Kinsky informed Eugene that the ministry 
were worried about what they would be able to tell Parliament and 
feared that the continued uncertainty of affairs would make them 
unpopular. Chesterfield wrote to Townshend that it was believed 
in the Hague that there would be trouble in Parliament, and that 
Slingelandt had asked him whether the government majorities were 
secure in both houses of Parliament. 
2 
1. York Courant 7 Jan., 4 Feb. (os) 1729. 
2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 1 Oct., 28 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 
f. 11,217; Kinsky to Eugene, 25 Sept. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94(b); " 
Anon. French memoire, 8 Nov. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 364 f. 313,316; 
Fonseca to Eugene, 14 Nov. 1728, Vienna, GK. 85a f. 206; Solaro 
di Breglio to Victor Amadeus, 5 Jan. 17291- AST. Lri. Aut. 59; 
Knatchbull, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, p. 82. Poyntz reported, 'The Court 
-of Madrid have recd. letters from England we h. give them great 
hopes from divisions in the inswing session, with an acct. of 
a strong Imperial party in Enjand, and the approaching ruin 
of Los Walpole.:. ', Poyntz to elafaye3,25 Dec. 1728, PRO. 
78/188 f. 420. St. Saphorin noted that 'la Cour Imperiale se 
flatoit, ä chague ouverture du Parlement, que les choses y 
prendroient un tour desagreable a fen sa Majeste', St. Saphorin 
to Townshend, - Aug. 1727 PRO. 80/61. 
180 
The Jacobites spread reports that there would be trouble in 
Parliament. The Prussians hoped that. 'the business of Ostfrise 
and Mecklenburg might make a noise amongst u s. 
1 
Given these expectations it was obvious that the ministry 
had to ensure a successful session in order to maintain their 
credibility in Europe. Chesterfield wrote 'to suggest the 
necessity of the strongest addresses imaginable from both houses 
at the meeting of the Parliament, in order to undeceive people 
abroad'. '7alpole's political position seemed secure so long as 
2 
the diplomatic situation did not deteriorate. 
3 There are few 
hints of any serious challenges to Walpole from within the ministry 
in the second half of 1728. Despite press reports that C.. rteret 
would be promoted 
4 he remained in. Ireland . There are a few scraps 
of evidence that suggest that tension still existed between Walpole 
and. the ministers allied to Wilmington-5 Chammorel reported in 
November that it had been believed that Dorset, Scarborough and 
Wilmington would be removed. Zamboni reported that Scarborough 
would be dismissed.. The anonymous French 'MMelnoire- sur 1'Etat 
present de la Grande Bretagne', written on December 31st noted 
raldegrave to Horatio Talpole, 8 Jan., Tilson to Waldegrave, 
31 Jan. (os) 1729, Chewton; Poyntz to Delafaye, 29 Jan. 1729, 
PRO. 78/190'f. 92; De Buy to Hanteuffel, 29 Feb. 1729, Dresden, 
3105,2, f. 107; Sutton to. Tilson, 11 Mar. 1729, PRO. 81/123. 
2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 28 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 271. 
3. Duncan Forbes to John Forbes, 6 Jan. 1728, Warrand (ed. ) 
More Culloden Papers p. 27. 
4. Farley's Bristol Newspaper 2 Nov. (os) 1128; Newcastle Courant 
2 Nov. (os) 1728. 
5. Walpole claimed that Wilmington was responsible for George's 
inconvenient demand that Parliament make good the deficiency 
in the Civil List funds, Hervey, I, 100-1. 
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that George still had a lot of confidence in Wilmington. 
1 
However, these suggestions do not amount to much, and most 
contemporaries felt that 'Walpole was in secure control of the 
government. Relations with George had improved following the 
2 
departure of Carteret, Chesterfield and St. Saphorin. ' George's 
early-enthusiasm for intervening in all the departments of govern- 
ment had waned, and Walpole's control of financial affairs was 
3 unchallenged by the autumn of 1-728. 
George was not so easily' satisfied in the sphere of foreign 
policy. His response to the Spanish and. Austrian disavowals of 
the provisional treaty was to argue that they must be coerced into 
accepting the treaty. 
4 , He hoped that the return of Sinzendorf to 
Vienna might lead the Austrians to reverse their disavowal of his 
actions, but he had no intention of relying on persuasion only. 
On November 16th, when it was already clear that Louis YV had fully 
recovered from his smallpox attack, Townshend informed Chesterfield 
that 'a right spirit shew'd on the part of the Hanover Allys will 
---be a justification of Sinzendorf's conduct'. He added, 
1. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Nov., Broglie to Chauvelin, 15 June 
1728, AE. CP. Ang. 363 f. 252-3,22-3; Anon, 'Memoire sur 1'Etat 
present de la Grande Bretagne', 31 Dec. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 364 
f. 397; Vignola to the Doge of Venice,. 26 Nov. 1728', ASV. LM. Ing. 
98 f. 74. 
2. Kinsky to Eugene, 25 Sept. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94(b). The following 
February, D'Aix reported, 'Le Ministare a gagne' Le Roi d'Angleterre, 
'qui se laisse gouverner'. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 5 Feb. 1729, 
AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
3. Walpole, however, claimed that he had been forced to ask Parlia- 
ment to make good the deficiency in the Civil List funds by 
royal pressure, 'the King had intimated to him, if he could not 
or would not do it, His Majesty would find those who were both 
able and willing', Her'bey, I, 100-1.. 
4. George also advocated the seizure of the Ostend Ships as a way 
to coerce Austria,. George's comment, no date, on Newcastle to 
George II, 31 Oct. (os) 1728, PRO. 36/8 f. 268. 
182 
'H. M. is of the opinion that the Allys of Hanover 
should fix a time to the Emperor and to his Catholic 
Majesty for accepting the said provisional Treaty, 
declaring .... that if the Emperor and the King of 
Spain shall not accept .... the Allys of uanover..... 
will endeavour jointly to do themselves and their 
subjects justice' .l 
This approach failed due to an absence of support from 
Britain's allies. The Dutch opposed the scheme and Fleury argued 
that an ultimatum would only serve to exacerbate . matters. 
2 Both 
Fleury and the British Plenipotentiaries argued that the acceptance 
of the provisional treaty was delayed by 'misunderstandings' between 
Spain and Austria, and not by disputes involving Britain. 
3 Fleury 
felt that before the Hanover allies made any moves they should wait 
for a clarification of the relations between Spain and Austria. He 
hoped that the alliance between the two powers would collapse and 
that it would then be easier to negotiate with them from a position 
-of strength. 
The British therefore abandoned their scheme, Fleury having 
'given hopes to Mr. Walpole that our common interests shall not 
suffer by this forbearance, and that he will bring matters to a 
1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 5 Nov. (os), 17 Dec. 1728, PR0.84/302 
f. 101-2,245; King, p. 70; 'Some loose Thoughts .... ' anon 
memorial, autumn 1728, PRO.. 103/110. Waldegrave argued that 
Charles VI should be 'very hard pressed', Waldegrave to Horatio 
Walpole, 8 Dec. 1728, °, L. Add. 9138 f. 132. 
2. Horatio Walpole to -, 28 Nov. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 368; Chesterfield 
to Townshend, 23 Nov., 14 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 132,208. 
3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 26 Nov. (os), Chesterfield to Towns- 
hendý 14 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 149-150,208; Stanhope and 
Horatio Walpole to Keene, 29 No ,7 Dec. 1728, BL. Add. 32759 f. 232,293; Horatio Walpole toLDelafaye], 30 Nov. 1728, PRO. 
78/188 f. 370. 
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greater certainty before the meeting of the Parliament' .l., 
The abandonment was made with a bad grace. The British 
were dissatisfied with the Dutch and the French, and suspicious 
of French attitudes. 
2 Newcastle ordered the British envoys in 
Paris to persuade France to act vigorously, 
3 but the British 
government realised that France was disinclined to do so. Despite 
Horatio Walpole's assurances about Fleury's firmness, the govern- 
ment was displeased with the French, largely on account of what 
Horatio called 'the darling point of Mecklenburg'. 
4 George argued 
that the French were failing to support him over Mecklenburg. He 
believed that Fleury should have insisted in'his talks with 
Sinzendorf that a settlement of the question was a major priority, 
1 
and he adopted the somewhat surprising argument that his difficulties 
over Mecklenburg were due to his French alliance. Townshend, who, 
in his correspondence with the British plenipotentiaries, paid much 
attention to German matters and Hanoverian pretensions, argued that 
'the fling can never submit to see his Prtissian Majesty brought into 
Mecklenburg by the influence of the court of Vienna, and placed 
there as an instrument of their wrath and vengeance agt. H. M. for 
continuing to cultivate that strict union with France... 
'. 'a5 
1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 26*Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 150. 
2. 'Some loose Thoughts ... ' anon., no date, PRO. 103/110. Horatio 
Walpole confessed that he was 'quite sick with these useless 
cautions and fears' of the French, Horatio Walpole to CDelafayej , 28 Nov. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 368. 
3. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Stanhope, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 
32759, f. 347; King, p. 69; Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 15 Jan. 
1729, Dresden, 3331 f. 18. 
4. Horatio t"alpole to Newcastle, 8 Dec. 1728, BL. 32759 f. 319; 
..... Chammorel to 
Chauvelin, 22 Nov. 1728, AE. ' CP. Ang. Vol. 363 f. 259. 
5. Townshend to the British Plenipotentiaries, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, 
" 3L. Add. 9138 f. 122-125; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 11 Oct. 
(os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 428. 
184 
1 
Ne also claimed that should any power seek to drive the 
Hanoverian troops out of Mecklenburg, George would have the same 
right to the assistance of his allies, by the defensive clauses 
in the Hanover treaty, as if they should attack his troops in 
any part of his own dominions 
1 
Tension was not restricted to the Empire, where George also 
felt that the French were neglecting to keep him informed about 
their negotiations with the Wittelsbachs and failing to support 
the Dutch over the Fast-Friesland question.. 
2 The French and the 
Dutch were very anxious about suggestions that the British would 
undertake naval action against the Spaniards, and, in particular, 
seize the Spanish treasure fleet. Chammorel noted that there was 
a lot of talk in London about the need for naval action against 
Spain, while Zamboni reported that an attack on the galleons had 
only been prevented by pressure from Britain's allies. Hop, the 
Dutch envoy, pressed Townshend against such an attack. The French, 
who had a very large interest in the cargo of the treasure fleet, 
---also made their opposition clear. 
3 
The Hanover alliance was therefore in bad shape at the end of 
1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 29 Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 176; 
Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 10 Oct. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 9138 
f. 11; Kinsky. to Eugene, 11 Jan. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 17. 
2. ^. 'ownshend to. Chesterfield, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 188; 
Newcastle to'Stanhope and Horatio Walpole, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, 
BL. 32759 f. 341. 
3. Townshend to Chesterfield, 6 Dec. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 203; 
Zamboni to the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, 24 Dec. 1728, 'Därmstadt, 
D. M. M 10/6; London Evening Post, 26 Dec. (os) 1728; Vignola to the 
Doge of Venice, 31 Dec. 1728. ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 89; Le Coq 
to Augustus, 4 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 145. Horatio Walpole 
was concerned by Spanish naval armaments, Horatio Walpole to 
Delafaye, 29 Oct. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 345. 
185 
1728.1 The British had disliked their secondary role at Soissons 
and distrusted Fleury's secret diplomacy, but they had.. been willing 
to accept the situation, albeit grudgingly, whilst this diplomacy 
had appeared successful. The failure of the provisional treaty 
and the collapse of the Soissons negotiations2 made it clear that 
Fleury's diplomatic control was not going to produce the necessary 
solutions. Fleury's response, a hope that' Sinzendorf would regain 
control in Vienna and a reliance upon the incompatibilities of 
Austria and Spain as partners, 
3 
was too passive not only for George, 
but also for the 'British ministry. Many of the Birtish diplomats 
were heartily fed up with the French alliance. 
4 
Fleury believed that, in order to encourage the breakdown of 
the Austro-Spanish alliance, it was necessary to avoid antagonising 
either power, as he feared that'that would serve to unite the two 
powers more strongly. Therefore, he resisted George's demands for 
. 
forceful French intervention in German politics, and opposed any 
idea-of an attack upon the Spanish treasure fleet. Nevertheless, 
- French policy was not totally passive. Within the Empire, France 
was actively wooing the Wittelsbach Electors. 
5 In so doing she was 
looking not only to the immediate future but also to the more 
distant future. By gaining the Wittelsbachs France would succeed 
1. Zamboni suggested that the Anglo-French alliance, 'daps toute 
apparence ne sauroit etre dune longue durge', Zamboni to 
Manteuff el, 10 Dec. 1728, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 46. 
2. Fonseca to Sinzendorf, 18 Sept., Eugene to Fonseca, 23,27 Oct. 
1728, Vienna, Fonseca, Vol. 12, f. 108, vol. 3, f. 96,98. 
3. Villars, p. 159; Stainville to Duke Leopold, 4 Feb. 1729, Nancy, 
86, No. 37. 
4. 'Stanhope to Newcastle, 9 Dec. 1728, BL. 32759 f. 322; Waldegrave 
to Finch, 5 Jan. 1729, Chewton; Poyntz to Delafaye, 25 Dec. 1728, 
PRO. 78/188 f. 421. 
5. Poyntz to Chesterfield, 13 July 1728, PRO. 84/301, f. 76; Wilson, 
pp. 193-4. 
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in matching Britain's alliance system within the Empire and in 
weakening Austrian influence. In addition, there are signs that 
several French ministers, such a: s their envoy at the Imperial 
Diet Chavigny, 1 and Belle-Islet were giving, serious thought to 
the possibility of undermining Austrian power by supporting a 
Bavarian candidature for the Imperial throne on the death of 
Charles VI. There are few hints about British views on this 
matter. The absence of a British series in the State Papers 
comparable to the French 'Memoires et Documents' makes it diff i- 
cult to piece together British-views on long-term diplomatic 
strategy. In 1725 Towl3shend had written that, 
'if His Imps. Majesty will drive us to a 
necessity of doing our utmost against him, there 
are Princes enough to be found, who. having France 
and England at their head, would under their 
influence and with their assistance, undertake 
to tear the greatest part of his dominions from him'. 3 
... 
Such an attitude persisted in the early years of George II's reign, 
but alongside it was the view that Austria should be chastened in 
order to persuade her to follow sound policies. The idea of poli- 
cies 'natural'to each particular state was'very common in the period. 
Each state was believed to possess naturally only one policy, and 
any alteration from it was a distortiog, a perversion of sound policy 
wrought by corruption or incompetence, the product of misguided 
1. NSt. Saphorin thought highly of Chavigny, St, Saphorin to Townshend, 
22 Ap., Woodward to Tilson, 2 May, St. Saphorin to Tilson, 1 Aug. 
(os) 1727, PRO. 80/61. 
2. From his base at ! letz General 'ý3elle-Isle controlled a network 
of informants within the Empire. 
3. mownshend to Du Böurgay, 29 Oct. 1725, PRO. 90/19. 
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monarchs and evil ministers. For the British in this period there 
was no doubt that a British alliance Evas the 'natural' policy for 
Austria, a policy made inevitable by immutable Austrian interests) 
Such a mechanistic interpretation was'in accord with and essential 
to the concept of the balance of power. A few brave spirits dis- 
missed the balance of power as a childish and erroneous concept, 
but most saw it as essential to any correct operation of the 
international system. 
2 
By allying with Spain and antagonising Britain, Austria was 
being not only foolish but perverse, but opinions were divided 
as to what Britain should do about it., The problems posed by the 
French alliance, and the uneasy awareness that the marriages of 
the Austrian archduchesses could wreck the precarious stability 
of the European system, lent added weight to talk of an Anglo- 
Austrian reconciliation. From the end of 1728 till the following 
summer a reconciliation was to be seriously considered as a means 
to escape from the position of diplomatic nullity and failure that 
the French alliance had produced. 
1. St. Saphorin to Tarouca, [- Aug. 1727 , PRO. 80/61; Horatio Walpole 
referred to the French as being 'naturally-in a constant state 
of rivalship and opposition to the Austrian family', Horatio 
Walpole to Townshend, 1 July 1728, ? radier-Lawrence. 
2. J. Black, 'The Theory of the Balance of Power in the First Half 
of the Eighteenth Century; A Note on Sources', Review of 
International Studies (forthcoming, 1983). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EARLY 1729 
PARLIAMENTARY DISQUIET; APPROACH TO AUSTRIA 
'I1 y aura des debats et des harangues violent 
du parti contraire, mais. la cour s'en mocquera comme 
des cris en fair, sans force et sans effet' 
anonymous French memoir of December 1728.1 
The opening of the Parliamentary session on February ist 
1729 saw a sustained attack upon the government's foreign policy. 
Vernon attacked the French as a threat to British commerce and a 
false ally; John Norris proposed that the King should be addressed 
to break the alliance with France; Sir Wilfred Lawson argued that 
it was dangerous to trust to French mediation, adding that, if war 
broke out, France would never support Britain against Spain, a view 
held by many diplomats. Those ministerial speeches that are re- 
... corded did not 
dwell on foreign affairs, but attacked the opposition 
press. The government's majority was a large one, 249 against 87,2 
but its size owed something to divisions among the opposition. The 
Tories and the opposition Whigs had not cooperated on their parlia- 
mentary tactics, which led William Shippen, the Jacobite, to abuse 
1. Anon., 'Memoire sur 1'Etat present de la Grande Bretagne', 
31 Dec. 1728, AE. CP. Ang. 364, f. 395; Broglie to Chauvelin, 
3. Jan. 1729. AE. CP. Ang. 365 f. 6; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 
15 Nov. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
2. Egmont, 21 Jan. (os) 1729, III, 330-2; Knatchbull, 21 Jan. (os) 
1729, pp. 80-1; Townshend to Sutton, 21 Jan. (os) 1729, PRO. 
81/123; Broglie to Chauvelin, 3 Feb., Chammorel to Chauvelin, 
3 Feb. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 365 f. 70,72; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 
7 Feb. 1729, AST. LH. Ing. 35; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 
18 Feb. 1729, ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 113. There was no division 
: upop the Lords' adress. Norris, MP. for Rye, first spoke against 
the government on this issue. Lawson, MP. for Cockermouth, was 
one of the leading opposition Whigs. 
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Pulteney in the House. l Ten days later, in the debate on the size 
of the army, a debate that did not produce a division, the govern- 
ment was again helped by the divided state of the opposition. 
2 
Foreign diplomats commented on this and noted reports that the 
government was attempting to profit from the splits. 1.3roglie re- 
ported that George and Caroline were wooing the Tory leader Sir 
William Wyndham, and that the ministry hoped to detach Pulteney 
from Bolingbroke. 
3 
However, attacks upon the government persisted and became 
more serious. Sir Thomas Saunderson,, a brother of Scarborough's, 
who had been refused a peerage by George, went over to the oppo- 
sition and launched a strong attack upon the French alliance. 
4 
The alliance was unpopular but the government was better able to 
defend it than their position over Spanish depredations. 
5 A 
petition had been prepared by merchants trading to America and the 
`lest Indies, complaining of the depredations. 
6 On March 24th, 
during the debate on the petitioners' evidence, the government 
carried a procedural point by a majority of only 180 against 145. 
Zamboni reported that, 
1. Knatchbull, 21 Jan. (os) 1729, p. 80; Colley, Defiance p. 209. 
2. Knatchbull, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, p. 82; Duncan Forbes to John 
Forbes, 1 Feb. (os) 1729, Duff, 'Culloden Papers p. 104; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 14 Feb. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 365 f. 103. 
3. Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 Feb. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 365 f. 81. 
4. Broglie to Chauvelin, 21 Feb. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 365 f. 116; 
Sedgwick, II, 230. Saunderson was P. HP. for Lincolnshire. 
5. Lady Irwin to the Earl of Carlisle, 22 Feb. (os) 1729, Carlisle, 
p. 58; G. C. Gibbs, 'Parliament and Foreign Policy in the Age of 
Stanhope and Walpole', English Historical Review, LXXVII, (1962), 
pp. 31-2; Hervey, I, 94-5. 
6. Knatchbull, 21 Feb.,. 6,11,12,20,27, Mar. (os) 1729, pp. 86-7, 
89-94; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 8 Ap. 1729, ASV. LM. Ing. 
98 f. 136. 
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'Le parti oppose au present ministere a commence 
a gagner de l'avantage. Dans la dernier division il y 
eut 145 voix .... contre 180; et il est aussi 
ä savoir 
que 20 membres du premier parti etoient absens lorsque 
la division arriva. Ceci donne de 1'apprehension aux- 
presens minitres. ' 
He added that it was generally believed in Britain that wherever 
the opposition vote in parliament exceeded 150 the government 
would fall. 
1 
The government majority fell during the session. In the 
early debates they had enjoyed substantial majorities, 
2 
though 
less than those of the previous session. The government won 
their motion to refer the mercantile petition to a committee of 
the whole House, rather. than a private committee, by 240 against 
129; Lord Monpeth's motion asking for an address to enquire about 
the help France had given Britain for the preservation of Gibraltar 
was defeated on February 16th by 235 against 80; 
3 the subsidy for 
the Hessians was renewed by 298 against 91 on February 18th, 
4 
and a 
financial debate a week later produced a majority of 257 against 90.5 
1. Zamboni to Mianteuffel, 29 Mar. 1729, Bodl. :: awl. 120 f. 59; 
Knatchbull, 13 Mar. (os) 1729, pp. 91-2; Sedgwick, I, 38; 
Thomas, Kouse'of Commons p. 275. 
2. Townshend to. Taldegrave, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64; Tilson 
to Valdegrave, 24 Jan. (os), 11 Feb., 4 Ap., Horatio Walpole to 
Waldegrave, 15 Feb, 1729, Chewton; Lady Irwin to the Earl of 
"Cftrlisle, 6 Feb. (os) 1729, Carlisle, p. 57; Villars, 20 Feb. 
1729, p. 161; Sedgwick, I, 37. 
3. Horatio Walpole to Fleury, 6 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 7.8/193 f. 69; 
K_natchbull, 5 Feb. (os) 1729, pp. 83-4. Morpeth, MP. for Morpeth, 
was a prominent opposition Whig. 
4. Knatchbull, 7 Feb. (os) 1729, pp. 84-5; Vignola to the Doge of 
Venice, 25 Feb. 1729, ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 116. 
5. Knatchbull, 14 Feb. (os) 1729, pp. 85-6. 
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Thereafter. the majorities, as recorded in Knatchbull's parliamen- 
tary diary, fell. On April 1st, in the debate over the Lords' 
resolution relating to Gibraltar and Minorca, the opposition 
proposal to insist 'that all pretensions on the part of the crown 
of Spain to the said possessions be specifically delivered up' was 
defeated by 267 against 111. Lady Irwin informed her father that 
Walpole had been. so pressed that he had asked George for permission 
to retire to the Lords. 
' On April 6th in the debates over the 
contested elections for Newton and Great Bedwyn the majorities 
were 166 against 147 and 150 against 119.2 After the Easter recess 
the majorities in the debate on April . 
27th on the deficiency in the 
Civil List were 181 against 106, and 154 against 101, although, in 
the debates on the same subject on May 4th, the majorities rose to 
296 against 122 and 241 against 115.3 
The reason for these falling majorities is unclear. 
4 Division 
lists survive for only one 
for making good the arrears 
such as that undertaken by 
which three division lists 
1729 session. Judging from 
majorities were due not to 
debate in the session, that on May 4th 
s in the Civil List. Thus, an analysis 
Langford for the 1733 session, from 
have survived, is impossible for the 
the votes it is clear that the decreasing 
the small increase in the opposition 
1. Lady Irvin to Earl of Carlisle, 22 Mar. (os) 1729, Carlisle, 
p. 59; Vignola to Doge of Venice, 15 Ap. 1729, ASV. LMM. Ing. 98 
f. 137; Knatchbull, 21 Mar. (os) 1729, pp. 92-3; Marini, p. 127. 
2. Knatchbull, 26 sitar. (os) 1729, p. 93. 
3. Knatchbull, 16,23 Ap. (os) 1729, pp. 94-6; ' Hervey, I 100-1. 
4. Zamboni claimed that George's avarice limited the financial 
inducements at ? "alpole's disposal, Zamboni to Manteuffel, 24 May 
1729,3odl. Rawl. 120 f. 67. 
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vote but to the major drop in the ministerial vote. 
l 
Possibly the abstentions reflect a feeling among governmental 
M4. P. s that the ministerial majority was too strong to be shaken, 
and that they were therefore free to absent themselves, after 
the major debates at the beginning of the session. Colley has 
suggested that the voting discipline of the Tories was stronger 
than that of the ministerial Whigs, which may account for the 
situation. 
2 It was widely argued by the opposition, in Jacobite 
circles and in Europe that the government was able to dominate 
Parliament thanks to corruption, to the tempting prizes that it 
could offer. On February 11th William Pulteney stated in the 
Commons that 
'the power of pensions and places is so great that 
there are at least 200 men in employment of the House 
who are so convinced of the rightness of the measures 
taken, and always taken, they never give a wrong vote'. 
3 
This was an argument rejected by the government. The ministry 
'" argued that it enjoyed its majorities thanks to an ability to 
persuade Parliament of the wisdom of its, policies. Townshend 
informed Poyntz in February that Fleury was, 
'mistaken, if he thinks that the Parliament is 
influenced. by money, to be thus unanimous in the 
supporting tI. rs. in all he has done. This zeal proceeds 
from the chief men in both houses being convinced, that 
the measures H. M. has hitherto taken are right; but- 
these persons, tho' they have heartily concurred in what 
1. P. Langford, The Excise Crisis (Oxford, 1975), pp. 77-83,173; 
Hill, Parliamentary Parties p. 199. 
2. Colley, Defiance p. 81. 
3. -Egmont, 31 Jan. (os) 1729, III, 341; Marini, p. 124; Dickinson, 
Walpole, pp. 81-2; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 15 Nov. 1728, AST. 
LM4. Ing. 35; Pentenridter to Fonseca, 22 Mar. 1727, Vienna, 
Fonseca, 21, f. 341. 
. 
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has been done hitherto, are under the greatest anxiety, 
at the uncertain state of our affairs; and will not be 
kept much longer in suspence'. 
Tdwnshend was writing in order to persuade Fleury to act 'a 
friendly part towards the king'. 
' Foreign diplomats often 
argued that the British ministry exaggerated their difficulties 
with Parliament in order to persuade their allies not to force 
them to undertake policies they disliked, such as the restitution 
of Gibraltar. There was probably some truth in this view, parti- 
cularly when it came to the rritish government' explaining why they 
were forced to take commercial steps, such as import prohibitions, 
unfavourable to their allies. However, in general, Towhshend's 
claim was better founded. There is very little evidence surviving 
as to how the 'Robinocracy' operated in practice;. evidence for 
Walpole's management of the Parliamentary sessions of the late 
1720s is scant. The seductive lures of place and pension doubt- 
less existed for many but their operation' in practice is difficult 
to confirm for M. P. s. It is too easy to resort to the glib view 
that Walpole's control over the resources of the Treasury ensured 
his control over Parliament. In practice the ministerial M. P. s, 
and their counterparts in the Lords, were capable of considerable 
2 
independence. Many were extremely well-informed about European 
1. Townshend to'Poyntz, 12 Feb. (os), 21 Feb. (quote) 1729, Coxe, 
II, 639, SL. Add. 48982, f. 150; Fleury to Horatio Walpole, 
6 Feb. 1729, AE. CP: Ang. 368 f. 40-1; Newcastle to Poyntz, 
20 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 96. WYaldegrave discussed 
the same point with Sinzendorf, 7,7aldegrave to Horatio Walpole, 
Jan. 1729, Chewton. Later in the year Townshend replied with 
similar arguments to the French suggestion of a secret British 
declaration promising peacetime subsidies to the Elector of 
Cologne, Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (os) 1729, PRO. 100/9. 
2. Dickinson, Walpole pp. 82-4,90-1; Plumb, p. 143. 
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events, and foreign travel, personal contacts and correspondence, 
and the press helped to spread knowledge about Europe. 
' The 
quality of Parliamentary debates upon foreign affairs has recently 
been savagely attacked by J. R. Jones, 
'Wilful misrepresentation of facts, sensationalism 
and pandering to popular prejudices, partisanship and 
appeals to xenophobia characterised most parliamentary 
debates .... the issues could be dramatised. and presented 
in black and white terms of national honour or disgrace, 
2 
of commercial prosperity or ruin, bravery or cowardice'. 
An examination of the debates in the late 1720s would suggest 
that this is an unfair conclusion. The House of Commons con- 
tained several diplomats or former diplomats and some of these 
contributed their knowledge to the debates. Though envoys such 
as Edward Finch and William Finch rarely attended Parliament and 
are never recorded as having spoken, this was not the case with 
such former envoys as Sir Robert Sutton., Methuen, Hedges and 
Dodington. 
3 The debates' recorded for the session of 1729 reveal 
a high standard of argument. Much information was presented to 
the Commons, Horatio Walpole beginning his speech on February 11th, 
in defence of the continuation of the same number of land forces 
3. G. C. Gibbs, Newspapers, Parliament, and Foreign Policy in the 
Age of Stanhope and Walpole', : Belanges offerts ä G. Jacquemyns, 
(Brussels, 1968), 293-315; J. Black, 'The. 1 ritish Press and 
European News in the 1730s; The Case of the Newcastle Courant', 
*)urham County Local History Society Bulletin, 26, (1981), pp. 
38-43; J. 'lack, 'Manchester's First Newspaper; The Manchester 
Weekly Journal', Transactions of the Historical Society of 
Lancashire and Cheshire, 130, (1981), pp. 61-72. 
2. J. R. Jones; Britain and the World 1649-1815 (1980) pp. 13,185. 
1. Sedg: vick, I, 140. 
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as in the preceding year, by 'an account of the proceedings of 
several courts of Europe and the Ministers employed at them'. 
' 
The speeches that are recorded reveal a knowledge of European 
developments and of the major points at issue in British foreign 
policy. 
In the debates in 1729 the Walpoles found themselves forced 
to defend the Anglo-French alliance against strong attacks. 
2 They 
did so by claiming that France was a good ally to Britain as a 
result of structural factors in the international situation. 
Horatio Walpole 'affirmed France to be the most faithful to us 
though the whole course of these late differences, and for a good 
reason, she being the irreconcilable enemy to Austria. ' Sir Robert 
Walpole declared 'that where some had compared Galica fides with 
Punica fides, we were to consider that states govern themselves 
by-their interest and that the close alliance of Austria, the 
ancient enemy, with Spain made them as entirely sure to our alliance 
as heretofore they were enemies when they aimed at universal 
monarchy'. 
3 
These arguments were, however, being made increasingly re- 
dundant for two reasons. Firstly, public distrust of France had 
grown to obscure the earlier antagonism to Austria, 
4 
and, secondly 
1. Egmont, III, 338; Duncan Forbes to John Forbes, 1 Feb. (os) 
1729, Duff, Culloden Papers p. 104. 
2. Knatchbull, 31 Jan (os), 5 Feb. 1729, pp. 81.84; D'Aix to 
Victor Amadeus, 18 Ap. 1729i AST. LM. Ing. 35; Newsletter from 
London, 12 Mar. 1729, AG, A 2655, No. 24. 
3. Egmont, III, 338,347. 
4. Public distrust of France had never been obscured, Horatio 
Walpole to. Newcastle, 4 May 1728, BL. Add. 32755, f. 362. 
'N 
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the ministry was increasingly ready to consider the possibility 
of an Austrian alliance. Linking these two developments, Chammorel 
reported in early April that in the face of opposition arguments 
for an Austrian alliance the ministry might adopt such an allian- 
ce rather than fall from power. 
1 
Foreign diplomats were very impressed by the ministerial 
2 
control displayed in the early debates in. the session,. but by 
March their attitude had changed. Increasingly they suggested that. 
the ministry was losing control of the situation, and they identi- 
fied foreign policy as the area where the government was most under 
strain. On March 7th Broglie reported that the different parties 
in the nation had united to demand that as soon as the galleons 
had arrived in Spain, Austria and Spain should be presented with 
an ultimatum demanding that they accept or refuse the provisional 
treaty. He added that the government, not being strong enough to 
resist the opinion 'commun de toute la nation, sont obliges d'y 
consentir'. 
3 Other diplomats attributed British suggestions of 
naval action against the galleons to popular pressure. The desire 
to act, rather than pressure for any specific action, was indeed 
strong within Britain. 
4 Due to the availability of naval power 
and the strong anti-Spanish nature of public opinion, pressure 
for action was directed against Spain. Over the preceding three 
1. Chammorel to Chauvelin, 6 Ap. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 366 f. 21; 
Villars, 1 May 1729, p. 171. 
2. Robinson to Waldegrave, 10 Feb. 1729, Chewton; Kinsky to Eugene, 
8 Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 24. 
3. . 'Broglie to Chauvelin, 28 Feb., 7 Mar. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 365. f. 146,157-8; Villars, 6,13 Ap. 1729, pp. 167-8. 
4. Townshend to Waldegrave, 4 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 45. 
Craftsman 15 Feb. (os) 1729; Horatio Walpole to Fleury, 6 Feb. 
(os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 62; Poyntz to Keene, 12 Ap. 1729, 
i3L. Add. 32760 f. 326; Newcastle to Plenipotentiaries, 24 Ap. 
(os)1729, PRO 78/193 f. 177. 
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years there had been a marked development of anti-Spanish feeling 
within Britain. Spanish depredations upon British commerce were 
viewed with considerable anger, as was the Spanish attempt to 
regain Gibraltar. The Spanish siege of Gibraltar in 1727 had been 
followed with great attention by all sections of the British press. 
In comparison, expressions of anti-Austrian feeling were more muted, 
a *fact noted by the Austrians. 
l 
The ministry could not ignore the pressure for action. 
Townshend informed Waldegrave that it was 'the universal sense 
of this nation, that ä speedy decision, should one way or other 
be obtained .... how necessary it is thought here to get out of 
the present uncertain situation of affairs'. 
2 
It was. no longer sufficient to argue that Britain should 
trust to the path of negotiation and the aid of France. The 
Walpoles adopted this attitude in Parliament, although it is not 
clear how far they were disillusioned with the French alliance. 
Horatio Walpole informed Fleury that Parliament was satisfied with 
governmental assurances of French fidelity, but he pressed the need 
for an end to diplomatic uncertainties and argued that the Hanover 
allies should come tc a joint resolution to present an ultimatum 
. 
and take action as in the spring'of 1727. This method was still 
1. Sinzendorf told the Dutch envoy in Vienna, Bruyninx, that the 
Austrian ministry 'thought the Parliament of England might 
. advise 
H. M. to a rupture with Spain but was in no apprehension 
that the Parliament. would meddle with the Emperor'. Waldegrave 
to Townshend, 15 Jan. 1729, Chewton. 
2. Townshend to Waldegrave, 4 Feb. (os) 1729, C. hewton; Le Coq to 
Augustus, 4 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 144; De Rrais to Augustus, 
29 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 2735, I, f. 24-5. 
3. Horatio Walpole to Fleury, 6 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 62-9; 
Townshend to Poyntz, 12 (os), 21 Feb. 1729, Coxe, II, 638, BL. Add. 
48982 f. 148; Newcastle to Poyntz, 20 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 
f. 94-5; Poyntz to Newcastle 27 Feb., 11 Mar. 1729, PRO. 78/190, 
f. 230-4,280; King, 24 Mar. (os) 1729, p. 85; Marini, p. 126. 
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being rejected by the French in early 1729 as it had been late in 
the previous year. Nevertheless the French assured Britain of their 
continued support for the alliance, providing George with conspicuous 
diplomatic support over Mecklenburg in the winter of 1728-9. Chambrier 
was informed that France would oppose any Prussian attempt to occupy 
Mecklenburg and would give military support to Britain if Hanover 
l 
were attacked. 
French opposition also blocked any idea of an attack upon 
the Spanish treasure fleet. Faced with this situation and with the 
failure of the Austro-Spanish alliance to disintegrate, as had been 
hoped for by the French, the British ministry was in a difficult 
diplomatic situation. Ropes that Sinzendorf and Bournonville would 
persuade Austria and Spain to accept the provisional treaty had 
proved abortive. Suspicion increased that both powers were only 
trying to delay matters until the return of the galleons. D'Aix, 
noting the threat to the government's position in Parliament and 
the pressure for war, reported that the ministry were opposed to 
. 
following the French lead and continuing the negotiations to per- 
suade Spain and Austria to accept the provisional treaty. 
2 It was 
1. Chambrier to Frederick William I, 10 Dec. 1728,10 Jan. 1729, 
PRO. 78/190 f. 135, AE. CP. Prusse, 88; Schleinitz to the Duke 
of W9olfenblittel, PRO. 78/190 f. 24; Poyntz to Newcastle, 14 Jan., 
6,27 Feb., 11 Mar. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 38,135,235, -280. 
Pressure was also brought to bear on the Austrians: Fonseca to 
Eugene, 12 Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK., 85a, f. 210; Hughes, pp. 382-3. 
Pleasure was expressed at the French stance over Mecklenburg, 
Newcastle to Poyntz, " 25 Dec. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f.. 479. 
2. D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 27 Dec. 1728,18 Ap. 1729, AST. LH. Ing. 
35; Zamboni to Hanteuffel, 1 Mar. 1729, t3odl.. Fawl . 120 f. 56. Frederick William doubted that the Anglo-French alliance could 
survive its failure to satisfy the views of the British nation, 
Frederick William to Chambrier, 1 Jan. 1729, AE. CP. Prusse 88. 
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against this background that Britain responded to initiatives 
for a reconciliation from Prussia and Austria. 
' 
1. The diplomatic situation led to predictions of a possible 
Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, O'Rourke to James III, 11, 
17 Dec. 1728, Vienna, England, Varia, 8 f. 215,216. 
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Prussian Interlude 
In autumn 1728 George II received a letter from his sister 
Sophia Dorothea, the Queen of Prussia, proposing, in the King of 
Prussia's name, the marriage of Frederick, Prince of Wales, and 
6? ilhenina, the Prussian Princess Royal. Queen Caroline sent a 
very vague reply, which produced-an enthusiastic Prussian response. 
George then told Caroline to inform Sophia Dorothea that he wanted not 
only the marriage of Frederick and Wilhemina, but also that. of the 
Prussian Crown Prince, Frederick, and a British Princess, though 
not the Princess Royal, who was intended for William IV of Orange. 
l 
George's response was cautious and reflected , 
his suspicions 
of Frederick William and his viewsupon his reliability. 
2 Chesterfield 
however was sufficiently optimistic to seek appointment as the 
ambassador to be sent to Prussia to arrange the marriages and 
Townshend was willing to help. him in this. 
3 
The Dutch ministers 
expressed pleasure at the prospect of the marriages. For them 
Anglo-Prussian diplomacy was safer than the scheme for a British 
marriage for William IV of Orange, a scheme that was to embitter 
Anglo-Dutch relations in 1729. Townshend sent a despatch to Stanhope 
and Horatio Walpole which reflected an optimistic view of Prussian 
intentions, 'tho' his Prussian. Niajt. has a great mind to get some 
1. Townshend to Chesterfield, 12,29 Nov. (os), Chesterfield to 
Townshend, "25 Dec. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 126,184-5,257; 
Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 12 Nov., Townshend to the 
Plenipotentiaries, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, BL. Add. 9138 f. 120-1. ' 
123; Marini, pp. 123,125. 
2. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 11 Oct. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 
f. 427-8; Townshend to Chesterfield, 12 Nov. (os)'1728, PRO. 
84/302 f. 126; Horatio Walpole to Tilson,. 18 Dec. 1728, Bradfer 
Lawrence. 
3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 30 Nov., Townshend to Chesterfield, 
29 Nov. (os) 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 153,180. 
'ý. 
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hold of Mecklenburg at this, juncture, by the means of this 
new commission, yet he is desirous of doing it with our Master's 
good liking, and in concert with him; which by the help of this 
mätch, and of one of our Princesses with the Prince Royal of 
Prussia he hopes may be compassed. ' Fleury, when approached, 
said that France approved of the scheme for a double match with 
Prussia so long as Jülich and ^erg were clearly assigned to the 
Sulzbach claimants. The British replied by stating that it was 
not in Hanover's interests for Prussia to acquire Jülich-Berg, and 
that Britain would only support Prussian schemes if France 
failed to help Hanover. 
' However, the Jtilich-Berg issue proved 
to be a major stumbling block to the attempt to combine the 
British and French strategies for German diplomacy. The French, 
keen to acquire the support of the Tqittelsbachs, ' demanded that 
George should guarantee the Sulzbach claim to J1lich-Berg as a 
precondition for any French action under the guarantee she was 
already engaged to with respect of Mecklenburg. 
Prussia was believed to favour a reconciliation due to 
a deterioration in her relations with Austria, but the urgency 
of the Jtilich-Berg issue produced by. the ill-health of the 
Elector Palatine, and the need to retain French support for 
the session, helped to block. the development of good relations. 
Frederick William was more hopeful of gaining his way by a 
deterioration in Anglo-French relations, and the British were 
unwilling to guarantee the Purssian claim to Jiilich-Berg. The 
Approach therefore came to nothing. It is difficult to establish 
1. Townshend to the British Plenipotentiaries, 3 Dec. (os) 1728, 
BL. Add. 9138 f. 123-4. The same attitude had been expressed 
in May 1728, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 21 May (os) 1728, 
PRO. 78/189 f. 209-10. 
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how seriously George and Frederick William were willing to make 
an effort to establish good relations. Sophia Dorothea was always 
keener on British marriages than her husband, and Frederick William 
never displayed much enthusiasm for the double marriage project. 
He was keener on a single marriage, that of Wilhemina and the 
Prince of Vales. Neither. side displayed much willingness to 
yield over Mecklenburg, and both were unwilling to risk aliena- 
ting their principal ally for the-uncertainty of marital nego- 
tiations. By 1730 the situation was to have changed, but by then 
Austria appeared less able to-support Prussia, and the British 
ministry was divided over the French idea of an alliance with 
the W"ittelsbachs. 
t 
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APPROACH TO AUSTRIA 
In October 1728 Rialp, sounding Waldegrave on the possibility 
of an Anglo-Austrian-rapprochement, observed that 'it was the 
natural interest of both powers to be well together; that we 
could never be jealous of each other's greatness'. 
' The arrival 
of Kinsky, the only envoy of any of the powers in the Vienna 
alliance in London, led to speculation in the autumn of 1728 that 
Austria desired a reconciliation with Britain. 
2 Soundings were 
taken by both sides during the late autumn and winter, and in 
3 
the early spring of 1729 the British ministry took a major ini- 
tiative in an attempt to produce an Anglo-Austrian alliance. The 
British approach was to fail, : largely because of a poor Austrian 
response, but it was of great importance because it revealed the 
f1 
f 
i 
f 
i 
lack of support within the British ministry for the French alliance. 
Anglo-Austrian negotiations in this period-have received little 
scholarly attention, and it is necessary to examine them in some 
detail in order to piece together the train of events. 
The disavowal of Sinzendorf, suspected by the British of 
being overly keen on a French alliance, led to hopes in Britain 
that the Austrian ministry would be more sympathetic to British 
1. Waldegrave to Townshend, 30 Oct. 1728, PRO. -. 80/63 f. 187. 
2. Riva to the Duke of Modena, 5 Nov. 1728, Vienna, Interiora, 
Intercepte, vol. 1, f. 17. 
3. Eugene to Kinsky, 20 Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 19. 
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interests. Eugene was believed, correctly, to be more interested 
in approaching Britain rather than France. The Austrian envoy at 
the Hague 'made the strongest and most publick declaration imagin- 
able of the Emperor's good dispositions towards England and this 
Kepublick. '1 Kinsky was ordered to attempt to improve relations. 
The initial moves to improve relations failed. Kinsky 
reported in early December that. there was no prospect of his 
approach succeeding and the British displayed little confidence 
in him. 2 Chesterfield argued that neither Kinsky, nor the 
Austrian envoy at The Hague, Sinzendorf, the son-in-law of the 
Chancellor, had any real knowledge of Austrian intentions. 
3 
In late January 1729 the situation changed. Queen Caroline 
and Stanhope pressed Kinsky with the idea of an alliance, and 
Kinsky reported the revival of discussions with Townshend. 
4 Kinsky 
himself knew little of the intentions of his court, 
5 
and the British, 
who had a low opinion of him, made it clear that they preferred 
negotiations to be handled at Vienna. In the summer of 1729 
Stanhope informed Kinsky's brother, Count Stephen Kinsky, one of 
the Austrian plenipotentiaries at the Congress-of Soissons, that 
he had been instructed to approach Philip Kinsky by George II and 
6 
Queen Caroline. From the evidence that survives it seems that 
1. -Chesterfield to Townshend, 26 Oct., 12 Nov. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 67,99; Chesterfield to Waldegrave, 10 Dec. 1728, Chewton. 
2. ? Cinsky to Eugene, 1 Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 7. 
3. Chesterfield to Townshend, 5,12 Nov. 1728, PRO. 84/302 f. 85,99. 
4. Kinsky to Charles VI, 18,25,28 Jan.. 1729, Vienna, EK. Kart. 65; 
Kinsky to Eugene, 8,25 Feb. 1729,. Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 26; 
Tilson to 17aldegrave, 21 Jan. (os) 1729, Chewton; Townshend to 
? aldegrave, 25 tsar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 175. 
5. Kinsky to Eugene, 8. Feb. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94 (b) f. 26. 
6. Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, July 1729, H6fler, I, 26. 
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the negotiations in London were undertaken, under royal instruc- 
tions, by Townshend and Stanhope. The choice of Townshend, 
knowledgeable in German affairs, was an obvious one, as Vienna 
was in his department. It is, however, interesting that Stanhope, 
then, like Horatio Walpole, in England for the parliamentary 
session, should have been. chosen to talk to Kinsky. It seems 
that Horatio Walpole knew nothing of the approach. 
l 
Kinsky told Stanhope 'that his master was most earnestly 
desirous to be reconciled to the King', and he bitterly attacked 
both the Spanish alliance and the projected marriages between 
the Austrian archduchesses and the sons of Elisabeth Farnese. 
He sounded Stanhope on George's views on a marriage between 
Maria Theresa and Francis, the heir to the Duchy of Lorraine. 
Stanhope replied that George was very much in favour of the match. 
The Lorraine match had been canvassed for some time, but France 
was opposed to it, due to the traditional antagonism between the 
Dukes of Lorraine and the Crown of France, and to the fear that, 
-, whatever renunciations might 
be made, a Duke of 'Lorraine who was 
in control of the Imperial title and Austrian resources, might 
seek to reverse the seventeenth-century settlement of France's 
eastern border. By indicating his support for the match George 
was revealing that on the important issue of the future of the 
1. Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, PRO. 
. 78/192 
f. 458. According to Zamboni, when George questioned 
them as to whether France would, in case of necessity, act 
vigorously y- and sincerely to support Britain, Horatio Walpole 
said yes, but Stanhope refused to commit himself, Zamboni 
to Mant euf f el , 18 Jan. 1729, Rodl. Rawl. 120 f. 50. Horatio 'Valpole' was distrusted by the Austrians, 'puisqu'il etoit 
toujours ä presumer que Walpole feroit un mavais usage pres 
du Cardinal de la moindre ouverture qu'on pourroit luy faire 
directement', Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 
24 Aug. 1729, Hdfler, I, 110. 
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Empire his views were opposed to those of France. 
1 
Townshend told Kinsky that Austria must agree to sign the. 
provisional treaty. Kinsky replied that Austria did not want to 
lose her Spanish subsidies, and feared that in order to win 
Spanish support Britain might lend Spain unfair aid in her 
attempt to secure Carlos in Italy. 
2 The terms of the 'Treaty of 
Seville were to prove Kinsky correct but Townshend told him that 
Britain would be bound by the terms of the Quadruple Alliance 
in her Italian policy. . Th-is"alliance, signed in 1718, provided 
that Carlos's right to the Farriese and Medici successions be 
recognized but stipulated that the duchies be treated as Imperial 
fiefs and that Carlos's right should be protected by neutral 
rather than -Spanish garrisons. By declaring his continued support 
for these terms Townshend made it clear that Britain was willing, 
as part of the price for any Anglo-Austrian rapprochement, to 
support Austrian interests in Italy. In'support of his demand 
that Austria should sign the provisional treaty Townshend argued 
that, 
'by his Imp. }laty's signing the said treaty, the system 
of Europe would be put precisely upon the same foundation 
it stood upon before these late disturbances began; which 
would naturally', and without any violence offered to any 
engagements, throw their court and ours into the old Friend- 
ship and good correspondence. that had so long subsisted 
between them'. 
1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 90-1; 
Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 19 Ap. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, 'f. 497. 
2. Kinsky had predicted that Au stro-Spanish relations would inhibit 
an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, Kinsky to Eugene, 11 Jan. 
1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 17. 
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Kinsky accepted Townshend's argument and promised to do his 
best to persuade the Austrian government to accept the idea. He 
told the British that he lacked the necessary instructions to 
open negotiations and would seek orders from Vienna. The British 
l 
thought little of Kinsky and distrusted his links with 'those. 
whose views naturally lead them to keep up the misunderstanding 
between his majesty and the Emperour. 'Z Townshend complained 
that Kinsky, 
'who seems not to be much versed in business and 
therefore may be more susceptible of jealousies and 
misapprehensions, is very apt to give ear to the dreams 
of little and underlying agents. If he follows such 
advisers .... he will give things a wrong turn, and 
exasperate matters'. 
3 
Tilson complained that 'our Dear Count is often hot and cold; 
sometimes easy, and sometimes out of humour, as fancys are in- 
spired into him. '4 
One of these 'agents', the Modenese envoy Riva, persuaded 
Kinsky that Britain was secretly negotiating with Spain against 
Austria, and the British ministry was very suspicious of Riva, 
5 
1. Townshend to Waldegrave,, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, Chewton. 
2. Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 11 Feb. (os) 1729, Chewton; 
3. Townshend to Waldegrave, 4 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 45. 
4. Ti, son to Waldegrave, 18 rear. (os) 1729, Chewton; Waldegrave 
to TilsonJ, 5 Feb. 1729, PRO. 80/64. 
5. Townshend to Waldegrave, 4 Feb., 28 Urar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64; 
Tilson to Waldegrave, 18 Mar. (os) 1729, Chewton; Townshend 
to Newcastle, 24 May (os) 1726, PRO. 35/62 f. 56; Wackerbarth 
to Augustus II, 22 June 1729, Dresden, 3331;., f. 233-234. Vignola 
reported that secret Anglo-Spanish negotiations were being 
conducted in London, Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 25 Mar. 
1729, AS T. LM. Ing. 98 f. 126; Baudrillart, III, 495, n. 1. 
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and of the Prussian and Saxon agents in London, Reichenbach and 
Zamboni. They were all close to Kinsky and were believed to 
l 
possess strong links with members of the opposition. Townshend 
therefore decided. to transfer the negotiations to Vienna where 
the envoy, Waldegrave, was a friend who owed his position to 
Townshend' s support. 
On February 27th Townshend sent Waldegrave secret instruc- 
tions via Brigadier Richard Sutton, then at Cassel. Sutton was 
instructed to choose a servant 'whose diligence and secrecy' 
2 
could be relied upon and send him secretly to Vienna. Carrington, 
the courier taking Townshend's instructions was delayed nearly 
a week at sea by contrary winds. He arrived at Cassel on March 
5th, but further delay was caused by the fact that Sutton had 
travelled to 19olfenbffttel, and the instructions were not forwarded 
until the 10th. Caillaud, Sutton's domestic secretary reached 
3 
Vienna with them six days later. 
Townshend's instructions demanded satisfaction for Hanoverian 
claims, 
'If the court of Vienna is sincerely desirous to 
renew the perfect friendship and harmony, which so long 
subsisted between them and us, they will of themselves 
see the necessity of doing H. M. as Elector justice upon 
several points, upon which the King, and his father, have 
so long, and with so much reason, complained. These are- 
1. Watzdorf to Augustus II, 5 Jan. 1731, Dresden, 2676,1 f. 118. 
2. Townshend to Sutton, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 81/123; Sutton 
to Waldegrave, 10 ? tar. 1729 Chewton. 
3. Sutton to Tovinshend, 11 Mar. 1729, PRO. 81/123; Waldegrave 
to Townshend, 19 Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 168. 
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matters of so little importance to the Emperor, and his 1 
Imperial Matj" has them so entirely in his own power, that 
it will be impossible for him ever to convince us that he 
sincerely desires our friendship, unless he does explain 
himself clearly and explicitly to the King's satisfaction 
upon those several articles. ' 
1 
As Zamboni observed, 'Le Roy George demande beaucoup de 
1'Empereur' 
Z 
The secrecy of the British approach was soon lost. 
3 Zamboni 
had reported it as serious on February 25th, 
4 
and the Saxon envoy 
in Vienna, Count Wackerbarth, was soon investigating the matter. 
On March 19th he suggested that talks were being conducted through 
Kinsky and on April 20th' he noted the rumour that Waldegrave had 
received a secret courier. 
5 On April 14th Chauvelin sent Chammorel 
the copy of a report that he had received from London. The report 
claimed that Britain was determined on an alliance with Austria 
and had sent Riva to Vienna to negotiate'the matter. Chauvelin 
ordered Chammorel to investigate the report. 
6 
1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 16 Feb. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 89-91. 
2. Zamboni to Manteuff el, 25 Feb. 1729, Rodl. Rawl. 120 f. 55. 
3. Poyntz to Delafaye, 6 Feb. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 139. 
4. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 25 Feb., 1 Mar. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 
f. 55,56. . 
5. He had already reported in January his suspicion that Britain 
would seek a reconciliation with Austria, Wackerbarth to 
Augustus II, 15 Jan., 5 Feb. 19 Mar., 13,20 Ap., 4,14 May 
1729, Dresden, 3331,1 f. 20,66,109,111-2,133,139,, 162, 
187. 
6. Chauvelin to Chammorel, 14 Ap. 1729, Anon"report, 4 Ap. 1729, 
AE. CP. Ang. Sup 8 f. 111,112; Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 10 Ap. 
(os) 1729, BL. Add. 48982 f. 157; Vignola to Doge of Venice, 
1,8 Ap. 1729, ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 132,133. Seckendorf claimed 
that there would soon be an Anglo-Austrian alliance, Woodward 
to Tilson, 23 Ap. 1729, PRO. 88/35. Fleury questioned the 
'British Plenipotentiaries 'upon the report of H. M. 's being 
concerned in a private' negoöiation with the Emperor by the 
canal of Monsr. Riva', Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 25 Ap. 
1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 412. Eugene noted that reports of Kinsky's 
discussions were widely disseminated, Eugene to Kinsky, 2 May 
1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 25. 
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Riva set out for Vienna carrying a letter from Townshend 
instructing ' aldegrave to support his negotiations over some 
lawsuits pending between the Duke of Modena and the Emperor. 
' 
Townshend sent a separate letter to !. 'aldegrave informing him 
that George had no interest in the lawsuits the Duke of Modena 
had sought his support for, and that Riva was 'a dangerous and 
ill intentioned person'. 
2 Many were however convinced that he 
had been commissioned to undertake the Anglo-Austrian reeoncilia- 
tion. t"aldegrave declared that Riva had nothing to negotiate on 
behalf of Great Britain, but Wackerbarth doubted this and noted 
that it was not usual for the representatives of small courts to 
3 
dine with Sinzendorf, as Riva did on his arrival.. 
The Austrian response to Waldegrave's approach was a negative 
one. Waldegrave had warned Townshend at the beginning of January 
that Austria was unlikely to abandon its Spanish alliance, and 
that she was likely to delay all diplomatic moves until after 
the arrival of the galleons, so as not to "jeopardise her claim 
to a share in the treasure. 
4 He had also warned that Sinzendorf 
had not lost influence, as had been believed, and that Sinzendorf,. 
who had opposed the choice of Kinsky as envoy to Britain, intended 
5 
that Kinsky's mission should fail. Waldegrave informed Townshend 
1. Townshend to S"aldegrave, 26 liar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 176; 
Vignola to Doge of Venice, 22,29 Ap. 27 May 1729, ASV. L1d. Ing. 
98 f. 1411'146,154. 
. 2. Townshend to 
Waldegrave, '28 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64; ' 
Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 22 June 1729, Dresden, 3331,1 f. 233. 
3.17ackerbarth to Augustus II, 28 May, 8 June 1728, Dresden, 3331, 
1 f. 203,211; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 29 Mar. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 
120 f. 59; Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II; 22 June 
1729, AST. LM. Aut. 59. - 
4. T"aldegrave to Townshend, 1 Jan., 23, -26 Feb. 1729, PRO. 80/64 
f. -7,109,122; Zamboni to Manteuffel, 11 Mar. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 
120 f. 57. 
5. ZValdegrave to Town spend, 1,15 Jan. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 4-5,30. 
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that when Viscounti told the Emperor that George and the British 
nation supported a reconciliation with Austria, Charles gave the 
curt reply, 'leurs actions ne le montrent guere. 
Replying to Townshend's instructions, Waldegrave reported 
that the Austrian ministers did not keep him informed and that 
they were opposed to the. provisional treaty. Townshend mean- 
2 
while had had second thoughts, and on April 5th ordered Waldegrave 
not to open himself to the Austrians unless they did so to him. 
3 
The Austrians 'response froide' did not end all moves towards 
a reconciliation, although it led the naturally brusque George II 
to show his displeasure to Kinsky. 
4 The Austrians distrusted 
George. 5 Eugene informed Kinsky that the British were negotiating 
with Spain and Prussia and seeking to begin talks with the 
Russians. Fe therefore urged Kinsky to be very -cautious in his 
conversations with the Pritish ministers, 
6 
although he'was still 
very keen to discover whether the British were sincerely in favour 
? 
of a reconciliation. Tension within the Empire increased 
difficulties. Roth the Mecklenburg and East-Friesland disputes 
1. Waldegrave to Townshend, 18 Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 172. 
2. Waldegrave to Townshend, 19,18,26"Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 168- 
. 70,172,181. The Austrian government was also firm over the Mecklenburg issue, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 14 May, Memoire pour 
servir d'Iristruction au Baron de Fonseca, 14 May 1729, Vienna, 
Fonseca, 13, f. 225,238-9. 
3. Toivnshend to Waldegrave, 25 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 174. 
4. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 26 Ap. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120. f. 62. 
5. Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, 26 June 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 
13 f. 368; Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 31 Aug. 
1729, Höfler, I, 117,133; Beer, 'Geschichte der Politik Karl's 
VI, pp. 53-4. 
6. Eugene to Kinsky, 27 Ap. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94 (b). 
7. Eugene to Kinsky, 11 May 1729, Vienna, GK. 94 (b). 
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gave rise to serious concern in the spring of 1729.1 -George 1 
was very angry about the Austrian attitude to both disputes, 
and he was determined to protect the Hanoverian position in the 
Mecklenburg dispute. 2 Eugene argued that the Hanoverian position 
did not suggest any interest in a reconciliation, and added, 
'le Roy songeant ne moans aux interets de l'Angleterre 
qu'ä 1'aggrandissement de se pays en Allemagne'. 
3 
Anglo-Austrian contacts persisted during the late spring 
of 1729, but the negative Austrian response to the initial 
approaches and George's determination not to be snubbed too 
frequently reduced the pace of the British approach. The British 
were also dissatisfied with the Austrian position at the Congress. 
The Austrian Plenipotentiary Baron Fonseca made it clear that the 
Austrians did not intend to depart from the position they had 
taken after the disavowal of Sinzendorf. He stated that they 
were determined to maintain the Ostend company, to demand an 
equivalent for the claims of the Duke of Holstein-GÖttorp, and 
'to hang all matters upon the concurrence of Spain'. In London, 
Kinsky stressed that the Austrians were determined not to abandon 
their allies. Though he told the British that the Emperor was 
1. Villars, 6,30 Mar. 1729, pp. 163,166; Townshend to Diemar, 
1 May 1729,. PRO. 100/15'. 
2. Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, 5 May (os), Charles 
VI to George II, 8 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 184,186-9; Kinsky 
to Charles VI, 3,8 Feb., 22 Mar. 1729, Vienna, EK. 65; Kinsky 
to Eugene, 8 Feb'. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94 (b); D'Aix to Victor 
Amadeus II, 21,28 Feb., 23,30 May 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Marini, pp. 125-6; Villars, 30 Mar. 1729, p. 166; Zamboni to 
Manteuffel, 26 Ap. 1729, Bodi. Rawl. 120-f. 62. 
3. Eugene to Kinsky, 2 May 1729, Vienna, GK 94 (b). Sutton reported 
that the Hessians were hopeful that the Austrian actions in the 
Mecklenburg dispute would sustain the situation of tension 
their subsidy depended upon, Sutton to Townshend, 24 Feb. 1729, 
PRO. 81/123. 
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'not averse to the Provisional Treaty', he was in fact ordered 
to withdraw from active negotiations. 
l 
The reasons for the Austrian response were clear. As 
Waldegrave had stated, Austria, in grave fiscal problems and 
threatened with a serious weakening of its position within the 
Empire unless it could honour its subsidy treaties, was too 
dependent upon the prospect of Spanish gold to risk endangering 
its Spanish alliance by negotiating new treaties. Eugene had 
2 
assured the Spanish government that Austria was firmly determined 
to maintain its Spanish alliance and would not sign the provisio- 
nal treaty without Spanish consent. 
3 To agree to George's pro- 
posals would also have endangered Austria's Prussian and possibly 
its Russian alliance. In Russia, although Peter II's government 
was less sympathetic to the claims of the Duke of Holstein-Göttorp 
than Catherine I had been, there was still a powerful Holstein 
interest. 4 
"The affairs of Mecklenburg are at present the only 
object of the King's 
[Frederick William] and Prussian 
ministers' attention', 
1. Townshend to Waldegrave, 25 Mar. (os), 15 Ap. 1729. PRO. 80/64 
f. 174,200; Tilson to Waldegrave, 1,4 Ap. -(os) 1729, Chewton; 
Stephen Minsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 6 July 1729, Hdfler 
I, 26. 
2. Waldegrave to Townshend, 19,26 Mar. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 171, 
182. 
3.. Eugene to La Paz, - Dec. 1728, Vienna, GK. 102 (a) f. 172-4. 
4. Austro-Prussian links had been strengthened by the secret Treaty 
of Berlin of 23 Dec. 1728. Charles VI promised assistance in 
the Jülich-Berg dispute and Frederick William recognised the 
pragmatic sanction. For Austrian concern about the Prussian 
point of view, Instructions for Seckendorf, 30 June 1729, 
"PRO. 78/193 f. 271; Eugene to Kinsky, 20 Aug. 1729, Vienna, 
Kinsky, 2(b). The Austrian government was opposed to abandoning 
the interests of the Duke of Holstein-Gdttorp, Instructions 
for Fonseca, 14 May 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 235. 
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Du 73ourgay had reported in April. In March favourable sentiment s 
expressed by the Prussian minister Borcke about the possibility 
of an agreement over Mecklenburg had led Townshend to write to 
him 'desiring to have a plan formed upon the principles he had 
laid down'. However, the British rejected Borcke's plan as 
unsatisfactory, and relations sharply deteriorated. 
' The Austrians 
were therefore correct in concluding that satisfying George over 
his Hanoverian demands would endanger their Prussian alliance. 
There was to be a revival in Anglo-Austrian contacts in June, 
but, by then, the collapse of the Austro-Spanish alliance had 
greatly changed the diplomatic situation. In the two preceding 
months the British had lost hope of a reconciliation with Austria 
and had turned back to the French alliance. 
2 The government re- 
assured the French about their talks with Prussia and Austria. 
3 
George's fears about Prussian intentions in Mecklenburg led him 
to reverse his attitude towards the Wittelsbachs. He declared 
his willingness to authorise Fleury 'to answer for him, to the 
Electors as to the guaranty relating to Juliers and Bergues in 
the manner Fis Eminence desired' .4 As George came into line 
behind French policy in the Empire, abandoning his approach to 
Prussia and showing increasing favour to Wittelsbach views, he 
1. Du Pourgay to Townshend, 19 Mar., 5,14 Ap. 1729, PRO. 90/24; 
Townshend to Newcastle, 13. Ap. (os), to Du Bourgay, 15 Ap. 
1729, PRO. 43/77,90/24; Townshend to Chesterfield, 29 Ap. 
(os), Chesterfield to Townshend, 17 May 1729, PRO. 84/304 
f. 79,95. Reports circulated of an intended Anglo-Prussian1 
marriage, French war ministry newsletter, 1 Ap. 1729, AG. A 
2655, No. 51. 
2. Newcastle to Stanhope, 12 June (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 644. 
3. British Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 25 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/190 
f. 412; Villars, 4 May 1729, p. 172; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope 
to Townshend, 4 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 6. 
Townshend to Newcastle, 13 Ap. (os) 1729, PRO. 43/77; Chesterfield 
to Townshend, 17 May 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 95. 
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also began to cooperate with French schemes to win Spain from 
Austria. By May 1729 the Anglo-French alliance had been reaffir- 
med, and the passivity and disunion of the previous winter had 
been replaced by an active cooperation. 
The relationship between differences of opinion among the 
British ministers, and developments in British policy in the 
first five months of 1729 is obscure. Although there are 
suggestions of serious differences of opinion, it is difficult 
to paint even a partial picture of the situation. 
' Evidence does 
not accumulate to any real, extent until the- summer of 1729, when 
Townshend accompanied George to Hanover. The correspondence 
between Townshend and Newcastle that has been preserved in the 
series State Papers, Regencies is a useful source for the clashes 
in policy that summer, but there is nothing comparable for the 
preceding months. 
2 This is a serious omission because it is 
clear that the clashes of the latter half of 1729, clashes that 
were to conclude finally, with Townshend's resignation on May 26th 
1730, did not owe their origin to the issues and events of the 
summer, but rather to already existing suspicions and differences 
of opinion. 
. In the autumn of 1729 these personal and policy differences 
produced two gfoups, one led by the Walpoles, Stanhope and Newcastle 
and the other. by Townshend, Poyntz and Chesterfield. 
3 This 
1. In February 1729 Townshend wrote, with reference to'the 
Anglo-French alliance, of 'the reproaches I have with 
patience born upon the account of the share I had in 
. 
forming this allyance', Townshend to Poyntz, 21 Feb. (os) 
1729, RL. Add.. 48982 f. 152. 
2. R. Sedgwick, 'The Inner Cabinet from 1739 to 1741', EHR 34, 
(1919) pp. 295,301. 
_ 
3. Newcastle to Stanhope, 15 Ap. (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 643. 
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division was to a certain extent the accidental product of the 
fusion of several disparate disputes. One of the major disputes 
was that between the two secretaries of state. Such clashes were 
not new, because the policy of dividing responsibility for British 
foreign policy and British diplomats between two roughly equal 
ministers, was one that was naturally inconvenient and productive 
of disputes. 
l In the mid 1720s Newcastle, without experience in 
diplomacy, tended to follow Townshend's advice. He announced, 
'I shall in everything act in concert with myLd. Townshend and 
according to the advice and instructions I shall have the pleasure 
of receiving from him. ' Newcastle's biographer has suggested 
that this situation had altered by 1727, and that by the spring 
of that year Newcastle had defined a different policy to Townshend, 
one that was anti-Spanish rather than anti-Austrian. 
2 Browning 
saw Newcastle as gradually gaining in experience, confidence and 
authority, and argued that by late 1728 'it was customarily 
Newcastle, not Townshend, who transmitted notes to the King about 
foreign affairs, even if the problems discussed fell solely within 
the sphere of the northern secretary'. 
3 No evidence is produced 
to support this assertion, and Browning's account of the struggle 
between Newcastle and Townshend is largely based upon Coxe, and 
is overtly hostile- to Townshend. 
4 There is no evidence to support 
the claim that Newcastle had 'assumed command of foreign affairs' 
by late 1728. There is no sign of Newcastle playing any role in 
1. Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 May (os) 1729r. Coxe, II, 641-2; 
Browning, p. 45; B. Kemp, Sir Robert Walpole (1976) p. 51. 
2. Browning, pp. 49-50. 
3. Browning, pp: 54-5. 
4. Browning, p. 19. 
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the talks with Kinsky early in 1729. It is clear that the. 
secret correspondence between Townshend and Poyntz met with 
royal approval; and Townshend stated that his orders to Poyntz 
to press Fleury to action originated with the King. 
1 Rather 
than Townshend vainly resisting the growing strength and pro- 
founder ideas of Newcastle, as Browning suggests, it seems to 
be the case that Newcastle was angered by his own weak position. 
2 
Townshend corresponded with the British Plenipotentiaries at 
Soissons without consulting Newcastle, and there are no signs 
that Newcastle was--. consulted over the activities of Townshend's 
department, such as the instructions sent to Waldegrave. Townshend 
was determined to retain control of British foreign policy, or 
rather of those areas of policy that he regarded as being most 
important. Great play has been made of the. fact that in the 
summer of 1729 control of Anglo-Spanish negotiations was trans- 
ferred from Townshend and the King at Hanover to the British 
Plenipotentiaries in France operating under the orders of the 
Queen and the ministers in London. 
3 This has distracted atten- 
tion from the fact that no such transfer occurred in the case 
of Anglo-Austrian negotiations. These were securely vested in 
the hands of George and Townshend. When Kinsky. approached 
Newcastle and Robert Walpole, after George and Townshend had 
already left London for Hanover, they referred him to Hanover. 
1. Townshend to Poyntz, 21 Feb. (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 640. 
2. Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 14 May (os) 1728, Coxe, II, 623. 
3. Cady, p. 214; Townshend to Newcastle, 29 July, 2 Sept. 1729, 
PRO. 43/79 f. 64-5,43/80; King, 2 Sept. (os) 1729, p. 110; 
Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE.. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 
47 f. 211. In fact George and Townshend did intervene in the 
Anglo-Spanish negotiations, Townshend to Keene, 18 June, 
Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 Sept. 1729, PRO. 94/100, 
BL. Add. 32763 f. 253-7. 
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The British Plenipotentiaries received no instructions about 
negotiations with Austria despite the fact that the Austrian 
representatives in Paris, Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca were 
senior to Philip Kinsky, and, in the late summer of 1729, 
ready to negotiate with the British. 
' 
Determined to retain control of the important areas of 
British foreign policy Townshend clashed not only with Newcastle, 
but also with the Walpoles. Sir Robert was increasingly concerned 
about the domestic repercussions of British foreign policy, and 
he differed with Townshend over the best policy to follow. 
Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole favoured making up with Austria, 
2 
but Townshend 'differs toto coelo'. Linked to these clashes were 
the conflicting ambitions. of several major politicians. Methuen 
sought to become Secretary of State as did Chesterfield. Stanhope 
wanted a peerage and an end to diplomatic postings. When Methuen 
resigned, as Treasurer of the Household, Stanhope attempted, 
3 
unsuccessfully, to gain the post. Horatio Walpole denied any 
interest in becoming Secretary of State, but his protestations 
were doubted by many. The British representatives in France, 
Poyntz, Stanhope and Horatio Walpole operated in an atmosphere 
of mutual distrust receiving contradictory instructions from 
1. Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 22 Sept. (os) 1729, 
BL. Add. 32763 f. 264-5. When Fonseca and Stephen Kinsky 
approached the British Plenipotentiaries they were referred 
to Hanover, Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Keene, 17 Sept. 
1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 458. 
0 
2. Newcastle to Stanhope, 2 June (os) 1729, --Coxe, II, 641; Kemp, 
Walpole p. 51. In the summer of 1728 Horatio Walpole made 
clear his total opposition to any Anglo-Austrian reconciliation, 
Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 1 July 1728, Bradfer Lawrence. 
The Austrian government regarded Townshend as particularly 
anti-Austrian, Charles VI to Kinsky, 26 June 1729, Vienna, 
Fonseca, 13 f.. 368. 
3. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 31 May 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 678; 
Hervey, I, "101-2. Chammorel noted tension involving Carteret, Chammorel to Chauvelin, 11 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 366 f. 187. 
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London. Poyntz was in close touch with Townshend, 
1 
Stanhope 
with Newcastle.. 
These varied ambitions and disputes were already of con- 
siderable importance before George and Townshend left for Hanover, 
though it is very difficult to distinguish their relation to 
developments in British policy. In particular, their influence 
upon the abortive Anglo-Austrian talks of the early months of 
the year, is unclear. The talks held in London are particularly 
obscure. It is not clear whether Stanhope or Kinsky made the 
first advances. After the talks had collapsed, both sides claimed 
that the other had made the first approach. 
3 The Austrians sought 
to embarrass. Britain with their allies, whilst the British were 
determined to defeat any such attempt and to show that they had 
rejected Austrian approaches and been faithful to their allies. 
Nevertheless it could be asked why, if Kinsky made the first 
approach, he made it to Stanhope and not to Townshend whose 
department such negotiations were part. of, and why, if the British 
made the first approach, it should have come from Stanhope and 
not Townshend. One answer was advanced by the Austrian Pleni- 
potentiaries in Paris. In November 1729 they informed Charles 
that in the previous summer Stanhope, then in Paris, had explained 
the situation tp St'ephen Kinsky, 
1. Townshend to Poyntz, 21 Feb. (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 638,640-1. 
2. Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 May (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 642. 
3. Instructions for Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 31 Aug. 1729, 
Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 363-4; Kinsky to Townshend, 11 Sept. 
1729, PRO. 100/11; Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Stanhope, 
27 Sept. '1729, BL. Add. 32763 f. 233; Fleury to Charles VI, 
19 Dec. 1729, Höfler, II, 56; Horatio TYalpole and Stanhope 
to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, PRO. -78/192 f. 458. Stanhope had 
returned to Britain for the parliamentary session. 
aý 
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'il me donna ä connoitre ... que la Reine sachant 
qu'il n'y avoit pas encore alors la plus parfaite 
intelligence et familiarite etablie entre le comte 
Philippe Kinsky, et autant que je me souviens, mylord 
Townshend, eile n'avoit pas voulü se servir de ce 
Ministre pour faire ces ouvertures'. 
1 
Whether the Queen also attempted to keep Townshend in the dark 
is unclear, but, if so, she failed. It could be suggested that 
the moves Townshend made in February 1729 were designed to 
hinder the Anglo-Austrian negotiations or at least to bring 
them under his personal role and restrict the participation of 
the Queen and Stanhope. 
2 By moving the negotiations from London 
to Vienna he brought them under his own control. This was further 
secured by the fact that they would be conducted by his own 
protege Waldegrave, and that the security of his communications 
with Waldegrave would be controlled by his friend Sutton. Having 
brought the negotiations under control, he remoulded them to 
conform to his own views. Waldegrave's instructions were firm, 
if not harsh, making it clear that Austria would have to discard 
1. Fonseca and Stephen Kinsky to Charles VI, 6-July, 28 Nov. 1729, 
Hbfler, I, 26,363; Philip Kinsky to Eugene, 16 Ap. 1729, 
Vienna, GK.. 94(b). The, Austrian Plenipotentiaries referred to 
Stanhope as ... 'sans contredit le mieux intentionng, le plus 
raisonable, et qui connoit le mieux de tous les autres Ministres 
d'Angleterre les veritables interets de sa nation, ' Fonseca and 
Stephen Kinsky to Charles VI, 28 Nov. 1729, Hbfler, I, 361. 
2. Kinsky complained to Chesterfield, 'of the unkind reception he 
had met with in England, and that notwithstanding his master's 
-good disposition, and his own earnest endeavours to accommodate 
matters, he had found no willingness in England to contribute 
to so desirable an end', Chesterfield to Townshend, 11 June 
1729, PRO. 84/304, f. 43. 
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Prussian interests and submit to the indignity of having a Prince 
of the Empire dictate to the Emperor the settlement of several 
Imperial disputes. Townshend also denied the Austrian claim 
that the Queen had sent for Kinsky, and, going further than 
' 
Stanhope, had made advances for a reconciliation. 
Whether Townshend would have acted thus without'George's 
approval is doubtful, but, unfortunately, the King's role in the 
abortive Anglo-Austrian negotiations, is unclear. Given the 
insistence upon Hanoverian demands in the instructions to 
Waldegrave, it could be suggested that' Borge had intervened in 
order to block any reconciliation that ignored Hanoverian interests, 
but equally it could be argued that Townshend used the Hanoverian 
issue in order to persuade George to support his own more sceptical 
approach to the reconciliation. The interest expressed in the 
marriage of Maria Theresa points towards the active participation 
of George II who had caused such a fuss over the issue in the 
spring of 1728 and who was largely responsible for demands that 
the Austrians should commit themselves over the choice of partner. 
It also reveals that much more was at stake than a simple settle- 
went of Austro-Hanoverian disputes. 
Despite the prominence given to Hanoverian demands in the 
instructions sent to Waldegrave, it would be a mistake to conclude 
that the negotiations failed due to this issue or that they 
revealed that George and Townshend were selfishly concerned with 
Electoral points to the detriment of wider interests. Whichever 
party is held to have made the initiative, it would have been easy 
for Austria to respond favourably to the British position, talk 
about 'natural allies' and then, once the British had committed 
1. Waldegrave to Townshend, 18 Mar., Townshend to. Waldegrave, 
25 Mar. (os) 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 172,175. 
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themselves to a formal advance, betray it to France, Spain or 
the British opposition. 
1 The Austrians were suspected of seeking 
to destroy the Hanover alliance, 
2 
and the British would have 
been quite correct to suspect Austrian statements advanced through 
a relatively low-grade diplomat, even were he not as volatile as 
Kinsky. Kinsky lacked the rank of Sinzendorf or the contacts of 
3 Seckendorf. In addition, the disavowal of Sinzendorf's approval 
of the provisional Treaty must have warned the British to be 
cautious about committing themselves to the Austrians, and to be 
suspicious of the ability of Austrian diplomats to influence their 
country's policies. The stress in Townshend's instructions upon 
Hanoverian demands was therefore, at one level, a'sensible diplomatic 
move, for the settlement of them would prove-Austrian sincerity. 
Whatever the talk about shared interests, natural allies and the 
balance of power, it was only possible, in the first instance, for 
Austria to indicate its good intentions, by a satisfaction of 
4 
Hanoverian demands. This could be done speedily and would not 
fatally compromise Britain in the eyes of her allies. 
Whether the decision to tie progress in any Anglo-Austrian 
reconciliation to the settlement of Hanoverian demands was approved 
of within the British ministry, or even debated, -is unclear. It is 
1. Fears were expressed that the Austrians would follow such a 
policy, Chesterfield to Townshend, 12 July 1729, PRO. 84/304 
f. 220.. 
2. Sinzendorf denied that the Austrians had any intentiön of 
settling without France, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 19 Feb. 1729, 
Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 90. 
3. Waldegrave to Townshend, 15 Jan. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 30. 
4. Chesterfield complained to Kinsky of the Austrian 'professions, 
which consisted only in words, at the same time that no one 
action of that court corresponded with them; but on the 
contrary seemed rather calculated to exasperate than to 
quiet affairs', Chesterfield to Townshend, 11 June 1729, 
PRO. 84 / 304 f. 143. 
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possible that the great care taken to keep Waldegrave's instruc- 
tions secret from Britain's allies was matched by a determination 
to keep many of the British ministers in the dark. Newcastle and' 
the Walpoles do not appear to have had any role in the matter, and 
it is possible that Newcastle's complaints about not being 
. 
informed 
refer to this episode. In the Commons debate on the Address there 
was an interesting hint that Sir Robert Walpole was aware of the 
prospect of a reconciliation. Knatchbull noted in his diary, 
'Sir Robert urged that, for'argüment sake suppose 
the Emperor was any way inclined to a coolness with 
Spain and was any ways looking towards us, would it be 
prudent to anger him at this time'. 
' 
Prior to the summer of 1729 the views of ministers on foreign 
policy issues are largely unclear. It is possible to use the 
views advanced in the summer as an indicator of attitudes held 
-in the spring but this is a rather dangerous procedure. For 
example, the fact that Townshend in the summer was opposed to 
naval action against Spain does not prove that he held the view 
in the early spring, because the commencement of Anglo-Spanish 
negotiations in the late spring could have altered his views. 
The views advanced by various ministers during the summer 
represent as much their response to recent events or predicted 
developments as they do their long-term views on the European 
situation, 4tnd it is necessary, though difficult, to attempt 
to disentangle these different threads whilst accepting that 
for some ministers they may have been inextricably confused. 
During the summer of 1729 attitudes were to be affected by three 
1. Knatchbull, 3 Feb. (os) 1729, p. 8a.. 
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major developments. From May onwards the prospect of an alliance, 
between Spain and the Hanover alliance became more apparent. 
l 
The discussions about an alliance between Britian and the Wittels- 
bach Electors, hitherto desultory, became of growing importance, 
and the projected alliance became a major and divisive issue. 
In August a threatened Prussian attack upon Hanover led to a 
reinterpretation of George II's relations with his allies. These 
three related developments increased the urgency of foreign 
policy decisions but the unpredictability of developments made 
the decisions harder to take. Whereas in the previous summer 
negotiations had centred round the rather cosy world of Soissons 
and Paris, in 1729 there was an altogether more upsetting atmos- 
phere of volatility and violence.. 
........... ................. . 
1. In 1730 Poyntz was to claim that 'the conduct of the Imperial 
court in relation to the Provisional Treaty forced us into 
the arms of Spain', Poyntz to Waldegrave, 19 Jan. 1730, BL. 
Add. 32765 f. 26. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SUMMER OF 1729 
'THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ALLIANCE OF VIENNA; 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WITTELSBACHS 
'The common people huzza'd his Excellency, and 
cry'd, God bless our good King George, a lasting peace, 
and a flourishing trade'. 
1 
In the spring of 1729 many'of the British ministers who had 
spent the winter in London set off for the Continent. The 
trials of parliamentary attendance over, they crossed the sea, 
determined that the success of their negotiations would prevent 
a recurrence next session of-the difficulties the ministry had 
faced in defending their policies. The British Plenipotentiaries 
to the Congress of Soissons travelled to Paris where the Congress 
was. now in effect being held. Horatio Walpole arrived there on 
April 18th, Stanhope two days later. In- May George and Townshend 
set off for Hanover. 
2 The Queen was left in charge of the 
government at London with Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole as 
her principal advisers in the'field of foreign policy. 
By the time of this dispersal it was already clear that one 
of the basic elements of the European political system since 1725, 
the alliance of-Spain and Austria, was, ; if not already destroyed, 
in serious danger of dissolution. Spanish pressure for a firm 
Austrian commitment to a speedy. marriage of Maria Theresa and 
Don Carlos failed to elicit anything more than prevaricating 
answers. The Austrians argued that the Archduchesses were too 
1. A description of Stanhope's passage through the City on 
April 15th. St. James' Evening Post 5 Ap. (os) 1729. 
2. George left London on May 17th (os). 
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tender. for matrimony and that Don Carlos must wait. 
1 It is 
probable that Charles VI had no intention of making Carlos his 
son-in-law, and the favour with which Francis of Lorraine was 
treated at Vienna suggests that he was seen already as the 
likely husband of Maria Theresa. In the. short term it is 
probable that other factors also played a role in postponing 
the Austrian decision. Waldegrave suggested that the Austrians 
had decided to postpone all decisions until they saw whether 
Spain intended to honour her. prbmise to pay Austria the arrears 
of her subsidy out of the proceeds of the treasure fleet. The 
acute fiscal crisis then affecting Austria lends substance to 
Waldegrave's suggestion, for without her subsidy Austria was 
unable to pay the subsidies she had promised to various Princes 
of the Empire. 
2 
Enraged at the Austrian refusal, Elisabeth Farnese determined 
to discover whether France and Britain were willing to support 
her interests. At the end of March the Spanish minister La Paz 
wrote to Fleury offering to reopen negotiations on the basis of 
the introduction of Spanish garrisons into those Italian duchies 
whose succession Carlos claimed. 
3 Neither the Austro-Spanish 
1. Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 15 Mar. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, 
f. 128; Waldegrave to Townshend, 23 Feb. 1729, PRO. 80/64 
f. 114; Waldegrave to Poyntz, 26 Feb. 1729, Chewton; De BUy 
to Manteuffel, 29 Mar. 1729, Dresden, 3105,2, f. 111-2; 
Solaro di Breglio to Victor Amadeus II, 23 Feb., 3 tsar., 
4 May 1729, AST. LM. Aut. 59; King, pp. 72-4,77-85; Goslinga, 
pp. 325-8,331-3. 
2. Waldegrave to Townshend, 15,29 Jan., 23,. 26 Feb. 1729, PRO. 
80/64 ---f. 28,47,109,122; Waldegrave to Poyntz, 
26 Mar. 1729, Chewton. The Austrians were aware of the 
danger that Spain might approach France, Sinzendorf to 
. 
Fonseca, 8 Jan. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13, f. 13. 
3. La Paz to Fleury, 29 Mar. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 419-21; Wilson, 
p. 206; Baudril'lart, III, 500-1; Goslinga, pp. 338-9. 
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tension nor the Spanish approaches to France remained secret 
for long, but optimism within the camp of the Hanover alliance 
was tempered by several factors. Firstly, as the British 
Plenipotentiaries. noted, Spain seemed to expect support over 
the Spanish garrisons without being willing. -to promise anything 
more than a renewal of negotiations at the Congress. 
l The 
British were determined that their position in Gibraltar and 
Minorca should be secured and Spanish depredations halted, whilst 
the French were very concerned at the projected indulto upon the 
cargo of the treasure fleet. 
2 Secondly, the Hanover allies were 
worried about Elisabeth Farnese's real intentions for Carlos. 
Fleury feared Elisabeth's 'vastes projects, 
3 
and wondered how 
it would be possible to get Austrian consent to the introduction 
of Spanish garrisons. 
4 Thirdly, the unpredictability of the 
Queen of Spain in particular and of Spanish policy in general made 
Spain seem an. undesirable ally. 
5 Fears -were expressed that Spain 
would dupe the Hanover allies and use her negotiations with them 
to scare Austria into accepting her demands. 
6 
0 
1. Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 25 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 409" 
The same situation had been noted the previous autumn, Stanhope 
and Horatio Walpole to Keene, 4 Oct. 1728, BL. Add. 32758 f. 233. 
2. Le Coq to Augustus II, 4 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 143; 
Goslinga, p. 347. 
3. Fleury to Brancas, 14 Ap. 1729, Baudrillart, III, 505. 
4. Fleury to Brancas, 20 Ap. 1729, Baudrillart, III, 506. 
5. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 Max (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 
f. 179; Le Coq to Augustus II, 4 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 2733 f. 143. 
6. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 May (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 
, 
f. 179; De Buy to Manteuffel, 12 May 1729, Dresden, 3105 f. 120. 
ý 
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These factors encouraged a cautious- response to the initial 
Spanish approach. 
l This caution was particularly marked in the 
a 
British case, for the early months of 1729 had seen rumours of 
Anglo-Spanish military conflict, rumours which had persisted into 
the late spring and had attracted much diplomatic attention. The 
British government was concerned at Spanish military moves, 
worried by her naval preparations and anxious about the possibility 
of a new Spanish attack on Gibraltar. Keene was -ordered to report 
on Spanish military moves. ' Admiral Cavendish reported concern 
over Gibraltar whilst Chesterfield informed Townshend of a report 
that a siege was intended. The arming of the Spanish navy was 
followed by foreign diplomats, and by the British press. In late 
April the Daily Post Boy noted that Spain had twenty-one men of 
war in its Spanish ports. On May 5th the representative of the 
French Ministry of the Marine in Spain, D'Aubenton reported that 
eleven ships of the line were arming at Cadiz. 
2 
The natural British response was naval armaments, and. the 
-- British decided to send a squadron 
to protect Gibraltar. Zamboni 
noted that the British were concerned about the Spanish preparations 
........ .................. 
1. Fleury to La Paz, 14 Ap. 1729, PRO. 78/190 f. 422-3; Chesterfield 
to Townshend, 6 May, Vandermeer to Van Hoey, 28 Ap. 1729, PRO. 
84/304 f. 73., 103-4; Baudrillart, III, 418,503-6; Goslinga, 
p. 339; Wilson, p. 206. 
2. Newcastle to Keene, 1 Ap. (os), Keene to Newcastle, 12 May 
1729, PRO. 94/100; Poyntz to Delafaye, 6 Feb. 1729, PRO. 78/190 
f. 139; Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 29 May (os) 1729, 
PRO. 78/193 f. 204; Tyrawly to Newcastle, 5,16 Jan., 25 Feb., 
25 Mzr., 8 May 1729, PRO. 88/35 f. 127,131,139,143,145.159; 
Chesterfield to Townshend, 29 Ap. 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 59; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 1 Mar. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 365 f. 156; 
Cavendish to Burchett, 25 May 1729, PRO. 42419 f. 346; 
D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 5 May 1729, AN. AM. B 296; Lady Irwin 
to the Earl of Carlisle, 22 Feb. (os) 1729, Carlisle, p. 57; 
Daily Post_Boy 29 Ap. (os) 1729; London Eveninr Post 10 May 
os 1729; Fog's. Weekly Journal 10 May (os) 1729; Marini, p. 128. 
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and unsure what they were intended for, Ton a destine l'armement 
naval de 1'Espagne pour tant d'endroits, savoir hour l'Amerique, 
pour Gibraltar, ou Port Mahon, pour Livourne, et pour la 
Sardaigne'. l Given the scope of possible Spanish action, major 
British preparations were clearly felt to be necessary. During 
the late spring a sizeable fleet was prepared. On May 17th 
Tilson informed Waldegrave that the fleet would be ready for 
'any action that may be render'd necessary'. 
2 These British 
preparations alarmed Spain3 and worried Britain's allies. The 
Saxon representative in Spain, De BUy, informed Count Manteuffel 
that the Spanish decision to send more troops to the Indies was 
taken in response to fears that the British would attack their 
possessions there. 
4 Britain's allies feared that the despatch 
of a large British fleet to Spanish waters would increase tension 
and might lead to war. 
5 
Fortunately for the negotiations between Spain and the Hanover 
allies, the representatives of Britain and France in Spain were 
not alarmists. Keene, D'Aubenton, and William Cayley, the British 
Consul at Cadiz, took great care to report both the intended 
Spanish preparations and their limited success. On May 15th 
Cayley commented on the movement of the Spanish warships from the 
1. Zamboni to the Marquis de Fleury, 24 May, 22 July 1729, Bodl. 
Rawl. 120 f. 67,73. 
2. Tilson to WYaldegrave, 6 May (os) 1729, Chewton; D'Aix to 
victor Amadeus II, 16 May 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Marini. p. 129. 
3. D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 24 Mar. 1729, AN-. AM. B7 296; 
Plenipotentiaries to Newcastle, 25. Ap. 1729. PRO. 78/190 f. 
408; Cayley to Newcastle, 17 May 1729, PRO. 94/219; Keene to 
Townshend, 23 June 1729, PRO. 94/100. 
4. De BUy to Manteuffel, 21 Ap. 1729, Dresden, 3105,2 f. 215. 
5. Chauvelin to Chammorel, 7 Ap. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. Sup. 8 f. 106. 
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inner harbour at Cadiz into the Bay, 'It can hardly be with any 
other design than to make a noise and show of readiness, in which 
they are far from really being'. 
1 
It is likely, though there is no confirmatory proof, that 
these reports damped the pressure within Britain for naval action 
against Spain. The British fleet was still ordered to assemble 
off Spithead and to prepare for an expedition to Spanish waters, 
but, alongside these preparations, the British showed a willing- 
ness to negotiate with Spain. The failure to secure a rapprochement 
with Austria left Britain little choice but to follow the French 
lead in replying to the Spanish approach. On May 9th instructions 
drafted jointly by the British and French ministers were sent to 
the French ambassador in Spain, Brancas, and to Keene, to assure 
the Spanish government that in return for an immediate Spanish 
acceptance of the provisional treaty, France and Britain would 
" attempt to gain the agreement of Austria and of the Grand-Duke of 
Tuscany to the speedy introduction of the Spanish garrisons. 
2 
France yielded to British pressure and agreed to threaten Spain 
with war should she reject the Anglo-French approach. 
3 
Fleury, however, had not only no intention of fighting Spain, 
but also did not wish to run the risk of Austria refusing to 
accept any settlement of the Italian problem devised by the 
Hanover allies and Spain. 
4 The introduction of Spanish garrisons 
Cayley to Newcastle, 19 Ap., _21 June, 9 Aug., PRO. 94/219; Cayley to Keene, 15 May 1729, PRO. 94/215; Keene to Newcastle, 
9 June 1729, pýRO. 94/100; D'Aubenton to""Maurepas, 26,31 May 
1729, AN. AM. B 296. Tyrawly was more concerned about the 
Spanish preparations, Tyrawly to. Newcastle, 25 Mar. 1729, 
PRO. 88/35 f. 143 
2. Baudrillart, III, 512-4; Goslinga, p. 340. 
3. Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 5 May (os) 1729, Pro. 
78/193 f. 180-1; Poyntz to Delafaye, 9 May 1729, PRO. 78/191 
f. 42. 
4. Goslinga, p. 340. 
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had not been specified in the Quadruple Alliance, and Fleury 
feared that Austria would reject the idea, seeing it as a threat 
to Austrian hegemony in Italy. He therefore suggested that 
neutral, rather than Spanish, garrisons should be specified; 
during the summer various expedients involving British, Papal, 
Sardinian and Swiss troops were advanced. 
I Elisabeth Farnese 
was totally opposed to any such arrangement2 and in late May 
she threatened to return to the Austrian alliance. 
3 The Austrian 
ambassador Count Kdnigsegg declared that Austria would accept 
Spanish garrisons, and he worked hard to restore the Austro-Spanish 
alliance. 
4 By June 23rd De BUy could report that the Hanover 
allies had lost the chance of a Spanish alliance due to Fleury's 
5 
opposition to the Spanish garrisons. 
1. D'Arvillars to Victor Amadeus II, 26 May 1729., AST. LM. SDagna. 
61; De BUy to Manteuffel, 9 June 1729, Dresden, 3105,2-'f. 131; 
Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 5 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 28; 
Marini, p. 131. 
2. D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 5 June 1729, AN. AM. B7 297; Holzendorf 
to Delafaye, 10 June 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 139; Keene to 
Townshend, 2 Aug.. 1729, PRO. 94/100; Villars, p. 175. 
3. Keene to Townshend, 26 May 1729, PRO. 94/100. 
4. Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 5 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 20; 
Keene to Townshend, 10 July 1729, PRO. 94/100; Marini, p. 132. 
5. De BUy to Marquis de Fleury, 23 June 1729, Dresden, 3105,2 
f. 133-9. The British government feared that the Austrians 
would offer new and better proposals to Spain, Newcastle to 
the Plenipotentiaries, 12 June (os) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 282-3; 
Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 5 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 28. 
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'By all the conversations I have had with 
Mor. Patino I am more and more persuaded that it 
will be impossible to content the Queen of Spain 
without the introduction of Spanish troops into 
Tuscany and Parma and that upon this condition 
Spain will not barely resume the course of the 
negotiations at Soissons as laid down in the 
Marq. de la Paz's letter of the 29th March to 
the Cardinal but will finish and conclude all 
matters depending between the two courts by a 
formal and decisive treaty!. 
l 
Whereas the French response to the prospect of a Spanish alliance 
was hesitant and affected by the animosity between Fleury and 
Elisabeth Farnese, the British were more positive in their response 
to the Spanish demands, though it was they, not the French, who 
were preparing for military action against Spain. A major reason 
for this was the willingness of the Spaniards to drop the issues 
of Gibraltar and Minorca, provided they secured their goal of the 
Spanish garrisons. The British seemed to be more favourable to 
the prospect of Spanish garrisons than the French, though they 
too would have preferred neutral garrisons. De BUy reported on 
June 16th, 
1. Keene to Newcastle, (quote), 19 May, to Townshend, 26"1. Say 1729, 
PRO. 94/100; Newcastle to Queen Caroline, 3 June (os) 1729, 
PRO. 36/12 f. 19; D'Arvillars to Victor Amadeus II, 2 Ap. 1729, 
AST. LM. Spagna., 61. 
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'Telles sont les vicicitudes des choses 
humaines, les Anglois, qui etoient il ya quatre 
mois 1'horreur de leurs Mmtes Catholiques se trouvent 
aujourdhuy ceux, surqui elles fondent leurs esperances 
et ä qui elles font un pont d'or, ils ont beau jeu, s'ils 
en savent profiter, mais s'ils echapent cette occasion, 
nous verront immanquablement resservez, plus que jamais'. 
l 
The issue of the Spanish garrisons might seem to be a rather 
petty one, but in fact it was of the greatest importance both at 
the time and subsequently. They were seen not so much as a minor 
infraction of the Quadruple Alliance, but as a possible means by 
which Spain might destroy the equilibrium in Italy and launch 
herself on a career of Italian conquest. 
2 The Hanover allies 
were intensely suspicious of the intentions of Elisabeth Farnese. 
They were warned by their representatives in Spain that she 
intended to use the Spanish garrisons to further aims of her own 
totally incompatible with the Quadruple Alliance. Keene informed 
Newcastle that, 
'the Queen's great view is the securing D. Carlos's 
succession and next to that to have her revenge upon the 
Emp. for having so long amused her, both which points 
she thinks Will be gained by the introduction of Spanish 
garrisons into Italy'. 
3 
1. De BUy to Manteuffel, 16,30 June 1729, Dresden, 3105,2 f. 134-5, 
144. 
2. Waldegrave to Poyntz, 12 Feb. 1729, Chewton; Instructions for 
Seckendorf, 30 June 1729, PRO. 78/193, f. 272. Brancas and 
Keene urged the Spaniards, 'that at least in the publick treaty 
some regard should be had to cover our resolutions to introduce 
Spanish troops that it might not appear that we went directly 
contrary to the express words of the Quadruple Allyance', 
Keene to Townshend, 2 Aug. 1729, PRO. 94/100. 
3. Keene to Newcastle, 12 May 1729, PRO. 94/100; Chauvelin to 
Brancas, 5 July 1729, Baudrillart, III, 526 n. 1; London 
Evening Post 19 Aug. (os) 1729. 
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However, a refusal to accept Spanish garrisons would have led 
to a failure of the negotiations with Spain. 
1 Spain, already 
fooled by one ally (Austria) suspected neutral garrisons as 
an attempt to trick Don Carlos out of the succession to Tuscany 
and Parma. By insisting on the Spanish garrisons, Spain intended 
to serve two purposes; to secure Carlos' succession, and, by 
holding the Tuscan ports of Leghorn and Portoferrario, to retain 
the ability to move large numbers of troops into Italy. This 
tested the views of the Hanover allies on the major issues of 
the European balance of power. The talk of the previous four 
years of reordering the territorial order in Italy and driving 
the Austrians out of all or part of the peninsula suddenly ceased 
to be speculation. 
2 Though some argued that territorial changes 
in Italy were of no importance to the European balance of power, 
this was not a generally 
view, 
and it was commonly believed that 
regional balances, whether in Italy, the Empire, or the Baltic, 
were an integral part of the general European balance of power. 
By aiding the introduction of Spanish troops into Italy, the 
Hanover allies, however circumscribed their intentions were, 
could be accused of helping to destroy the regional balance of 
power, and, indeed, this accusation was to be made over the 
next few years. 
3 
1. Chauvelin wrote, 'Nous sommes bien dans le principe oü Md. 
.. Townshend vows a'paru estre que l'enjagement de faire entrer 
des troupes Espagnoles en Toscane, meme malgrg 1'Empereur, 
est Bien moins ä redouter que la continuation de 1'union 
entre 1'Esp. et la cour de Vienne', Chauvelin to Chavigny, 
21 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f.. 134. 
2. Chesterfield to Townshend, 28 June 1729, PRO. 84/304, f. 192. 
3. Bathurst claimed in the Lords debate on the Treaty of Seville, 
that the change might cause 'a dangerous and expensive war' 
and 'destroy the balance of power in Europe', 27 Jan. (os) 1730, 
Cobbett, VIII, 773,775-6. Sandys made a similar accusation in- 
the Commons' debate on the Removal of Sir Robert Walpole, 13 Feb. 
(os) 1741, I. G. Doolittle, 'A First-hand Account of the Commons 
Debate on the Removal of Sir Robert Walpole', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, LIII, (1980), p. 19. Armstrong, p. 258. 
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NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WITTELSBACHS 
F: 
Challenging the Austrian hegemony in Italy by supporting 
Spanish interests was not the only policy possibly incompatible with 
long term British aims being pursued by the British government in 
the summer of 1729. Just as the British risked committing themselves 
to a troublesome and unpredictable Italian policy,. so their 
negotiations with the Witteisbachs entailed the risk of a similar 
commitment in the Empire. Although these negotiations have received 
very little scholarly attention, they are of considerable importance 
and throw much light on British intentions toward Prussia and 
Austria in the second half of 1729. The only scholarly work devoted, 
at least in part, to the negotiations is a_sbort but important work 
by Dureng. Dureng's book suffers from being based exclusively upon 
the French archives, and from adopting too credulous an attitude 
to his principal source, -the despatches of Anne Theodore Chevignard 
de Chavigny, the French envoy to the Imperial Diet 
1. 
Chavigny. was 
sent to Hanover in the summer of 1729, in order to persuade George II 
to accept an alliance with the Wittelsbachs on the latter's terms. 
An attempt to supplement Chavigny's despatches encounters several 
major problems. Firstly, there is surprisingly little material 
extant that can throw light upon the attitudes of George and 
Tmwnshend to the negotiations, or upon the talks held at Hanover 
that summer. As D'Aix pointed out, there were few foreign envoys 
1 Dureng, pp. 85-6 
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in Hanover that year1. Only four men participated in the talks 
at Hanover: George, Townshend, Chavigny, and the Wittelsbach 
representative, Count Plettenberg, the principal minister of 
2 Clemens-August the Elector of Cologne. Chavigny's despatches 
are unreliable. George left no record of his role and Townshend's 
record is restricted to-his correspondence with Newcastle and with 
the British Plenipotentiaries in Paris. In this correspondence 
he gave a less than full account-of his meetings with Chavigny 
and Plettenberg. 
Fortunately, Plettenberg's papers have survived and are 
accessible. The large deposit of his papers held in Münster 
contain his correspondence with most of the prominent Wittelsbach 
ministers, such as the Bavarian Count Toerring, with the Elector 
of Bavaria, with the Bavarian representative at Paris, Count Albert, 
the Prince of Grimbergen, with Chavigny and with Townshend. 
Unfortunately he did not keep a diary or rather none has survived, 
and he preferred to entrust confidential matters to verbal 
communication. Thus, he left very little material about his 
1 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 16 June 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
2 There are several- articles by Braubach that deal with Plettenberg: 
'Ferdinand von Pletterberg, ein Westfalischer Politiker und 
Diplomat des 18. Jahrhundert. s', Westfalen, hefte f. Geschichte, 
kunst und Volkskunde, 22, (1937)-,. -U5-175; 'Vom Wesen und treben 
es Kolnischen Ministers-Plettenberg', Annalen des hist. Vereins 
f. den Niederrhein 134, (1939), 131-6; 'Ferdinand von Plettenberg, 
- es a, ische Lebensbilder, 9, (1962), 34-51. 
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conferences with George and Townshend. The ease of movement between 
Hanover and the courts of the Electors of Cologne, Mainz and the 
Palatinate, at Bonn, Mainz and Mannheim respectively, meant that 
Plettenberg was able to report in person on his conferences at Hanover 
to the Electors. 
Aside from the problem of discovering what actually happened 
at Hanover, it is difficult to ascertain what the Wittelsbach 
intentions actually were. The major source for Wittelsbach intentions 
is the correspondence of Plettenberg, but it is a source that has 
to be handled with care as it tends to stress the interests of the 
Elector of Cologne rather than those of his relatives. 
To coerce Austria into abandoning her provocative policies and 
to block her schemes for areas such as Mecklenburg and East-Friesland 
at the Imperial Diet, it was necessary to secure the alliance of a 
number of German Princes. A long-term policy of weakening Austria 
and gravely restricting her authority and power required the assistance 
of the Wittelsbach Electors'. They wielded great potential power, 
controlling several votes in the Electoral College, the College that 
1 There is an excellent recent study of the financial aspects of 
Wittelsbach diplomacy, PC Hartmann, Geld als Instrument 
europaischer Machtpplitik. Studien zu den finanziellen und 
olitiachen Beziehungen der Wittels acher Territorien Kurbayern, 
ur az und Kur on mit Frankreich und dem Kaiser von 1715 bis 
1740 (Munich, This study does not, however, consider nglo- 
WWittelsbach relations', and Hartmann does not appear to have been 
aware of the work of Dureng, not to have used the Plettenberg 
papers. I would like to thank Dr Hartmann for discussing the 
subject with me. Schmidt's Karl Philipp provides a very brief 
coverage, based solely upon the archives in Vienna and Munich. 
On 16 April 1728 the Electors of Bavaria, Trier, Cologne and the 
Palatinate signed a treaty stipulating common action in support 
of their various pretensions, Dureng, pp. 77-8. There is a copy of 
the treaty in PRO. 103/110. 
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elected Emperors1. In addition, when the bishoprics held by members 
of the family were taken into account, they controlled most of the 
not 
area of Catholic Germany that was ruled by the Austrians 
2. 
As such, 
they were an obvious ally for France, and, in particular, for those 
French ministers who wished to see a fundamental reordering of the 
European situation. For Chauvelin, Chavigny and Belle-Isle the best 
way to accomplish such an aim was to have a Wittelsbach elected as the 
next Emperor, and to woo the Wittelsbachs from their commitments to 
the Austrians. 
In 1727-1728 the British had displayed less interest than the 
French in seeking the alliance of the Wittelsbachs3. After St. Saphorli 
left Munich in December 1725 no British envoy visited the city until 
Onslow Burrish's mission in 1746, though Isaac Leheup received 
credentials as British representative in 1726, and Sir Thomas Robinson 
in 1745. Leheup was also accredited to the courts of Cologne, Mainz 
and Mannheim, though he did not present his credentials. In the late 
1720s there were no British representatives at any of the Wittelsbach 
courts and diplomatic relations between them and the Electorate of 
Hanover were similarly bad. George II, in 1727 and 1728, preferred 
1 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 13 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32756 
f. 272; Dureng, p. 78. 
2 15% of Imperial territory was ruled by the Wittelsbachs. Hartmann 
gives a map of Wittelsbach territories in 1724, including the 
ecclesiastical principalities, Hartmann, Geld x. 79. 
0 
The British government was aware of the potential importance of an 
alliance with the Wittelsbachs, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 
13 June (os) 1728, BL. Add. 32756 f. 272; Townshend to Horatio Walpole 
3 June (os) 1728, Bradfer Lawrence; Newcastle to the Plenipotent- 
iaries, 15 July (os) 1728, PRO. 80/326. Townshend distrusted the 
Wittelsbachs, and was opposed to granting them subsidies, Townshend 
to Horatio Walpole, 22 Aug. (os), Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 
26 Aug. 1728, BL. Add. 32757 f. 475,523. 
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to leave the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs to the French, and 
l 
tgtomcentrate od his attempts to create a Protestant German league. 
It is possible that George's view of the Wittelebachs was 
affected by their response to his father's approach in 1725, as a 
member of the Alliance of Hanover, for-an alliance. The Elector of 
Bavaria, Max-Emmanuel, had demanded that he receive peacetime 
subsidies and a guarantee of the Bavarian claims to the Austrian 
succession. These demands, and the treaty signed on September 1st 
1726 between Charles VI and Charles-Albert, the new Elector of 
Bavaria, ended Britain's interest in a Wittelsbach alliance2. 
Interest was reawakened in late 1728 and the issue brought to 
the fore by French pressure. In 1727-1728 France had had considerable 
success in severing the ties between the Wittelsbachs and Austria3, 
but for a variety of reasons Prance wanted Britain to participate in 
her new agreements with the Wittelsbachs. The cost of subsidising 
the Wittelsbachs was a major reason and. the French believed that 
George II both. could and should bear his share of the subsidies. 
4 
However, important though they doubtless were, it was not the 
subsidies that were the major issue at stake. By seeing the 
negotiations between George and the Wittelsbachs in 1729 as a matter 
1 Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 29 Aug. (os) 1727, PRO. 78/187 f. 20-1. 
2 Recueil. Baviere Palatinat, Deux 
9 p. 167; A. sen e ner, un 
Hartmann, Geld pp. 112-120. 
to edited by A. Leben (Paris, 
und Wien 1725-26 (Munich, 1906) 
3 Agreements between France and Bavaria, and France and the Palatinate 
were signed on 12 Nov. 1727 and 15 Feb. 1729 respectively, Naumann, 
i3sterreich, En land und das Reich pp. 136-7; Hartmann, Geld pp. 127-140 
238-9; Schmidt Karl Phll pp. 184-7; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 
11 Oct, '1728, PRO. 78/189 28; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and 
Stanhope, 6 Nov. (Os) 1728, BL. Add. 32759 f. 116; Sinzendorf to 
Fonseca, 14 Dec. 1728, Vienna, Fonseca, 12 f. 125. 
4 Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 26 Aug. 1728, BL. Add. 327§7 f. 475. 
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of money, and be drawing attention to this issue in the quarrel 
between Townshend and Walpole, historians have misunderstood the 
essential issues at stake. The alliance between Britain and the 
Wittelsbachs was intended to last many years, and the latter sought 
a commitment for the long-term payment of subsidies. As such, the 
negotiations were of great. significance for long-term British, and 
indeed Hanoverian, diplomatic strategy. An alliance with the Wittels- 
bachs would have committed Britain to a long-term anti-Austrian 
policy and would have made support for Wittelsbach pretensions a 
central feature of British policy. Because of the Witteisbach demands 
that Britain should guarantee the Sulzbach claim to the Jiilich-Berg 
inheritance', it would also commit Britain to an anti-Prussian policy 
and serve to drive Prussia and Austria further together2. The 
consequences of these commitments were clear. The traditional 
Hanoverian interest in a league of Protestant German Princes and in 
close dynastic ties between Hanover and Prussia would be replaced 
by a non-confessional league tied to Wittelsbach interests3. 
George II's policy of creating a position of strength, from which 
1 Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Newcastle, 20 July 1728, BL. Add. 
32757 f. 126; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 12 Sept. 1728 
PRO. 78/188 f. 275; Townshend to Platen de Linn, Palatine Minister 
in London, 14 May (ds) 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 292; Papers relating to 
the succession of Berg and Jülich, 1729-32, PRO. 103/112. 
2 Townshend to Finch, 15 Aug. (os)1727, PRO. 84/294 f. 84-5; Horatio 
Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 12 Sept. 1728, PRO. 78/188 f. 275; 
Townshend to Newcastle, 13 Ap. (os)1729, PRO. 43/77. Frederick 
William was concerned about the possibility of the Witteisbachs 
gaining allies, Frederick William to Chambrier, 18 June 1729, 
AE. CP. Prusse 88. The Palatine court argued that a Prussian 
acquisition of Jülich-Berg would threaten Hanover, 'Contre-Remarques 
Palatines avec Remarques faites par Mylord Townshend ... sur le Traits d'amitig', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
3 As Elector of Hanover George was involved in disputes with the 
Electors of Cologne and the Palatinate. He had been unenthusiastic 
about the Elector of Cologne's election as Bishop of Osnabrück, 
and he was in dispute with this prelate over the municipal rights 
of Hildesheim, Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 12 Sept. (os) 
1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 398-9. 
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the Emperor could be coerced or cajoled into being a good ruler, 
would be replaced by a commitment to confront the Austrians and 
support those determined to destroy their power. It would open the 
way to a territorial recasting of the Empire. Despite the noted 
anti-Austrian attitudes of Townshend and George, both angered by 
Austrian intransigence in European matters and obstinacy over 
Hanoverian interests, neither sought the destruction of Austrian 
power. The negotiations over the Wittelsbach alliance exposed an 
-important ambivalence in the Anglo-French alliance, that towards 
Austria. George II and those British ministers who were hawks in 
Anglo-Austrian relations - Townshend and Chesterfield - were essentiall: 
short-term hawks1. Their French couhterpartp, particularly Chauvelin, 
were long-term hawks, and though the British knew that Fleury was 
not interested in war with Austria, and was on good diplomatic terms 
with the Austrians, they both suspected his real views and feared 
that his death would cause French policy to become more strident, 
if not violent2. The negotiations of the summer of 1729 with the 
Wittelsbachs were therefore of major importance. They brought into 
prominence a major difference of opinion between Britain and France 
over diplomatic policy. The British had had a poor view of the 
negotiations between France and the Wittelsbacha. In November 1728 
Horatio Walpole and Stanhope informed Newcastle that the French 
government was neglecting to keep them informed of the negotiations. 
1 Townshend to Chesterfield, 14 June 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 153. Horn 
referred to Townshend's 'bellicose anti-Hapsburg policy', Horn, 
Great Britain and Europe pp. 51,121. I have benefited greatly from 
discussions w th Derek Mckay and Peter Barber c3ncerning this issue. 
2 Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 6 Tuly 1729, Höfler, I, 32. ' 
The Dutch minister Fag6l 'was persuaded in case the Emperor should 
die, France would again lay its hands upon the Austrian Netherlands', 
Chesterfield to Townshend, 28 June 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 190. 
Robinson referred to 'Chauvelin's predilectiofl for the $otee of 
Bavaria', Robinson to Harrington, 19 Aug, 1730, L A40,0139 ß. 1Q0; 
Dureng, pp. 80-82. 
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They also attacked the incompetence of Chauvelin, 'who, instead of 
making a solid and good plan of union with the four Electors for the 
publick tranquility of Europe, has given the Guaranty of France to 
the Palatine family for the succession of Bergh and Juliers, for an 
exchange of a neutrality only on the Elector Palatine's side, and for 
some concessions for the benefit of France in Alsace ...... '1 
In the winter of. 1728-1729 the French altered their policy and 
decided to involve Britain more actively 
British Plenipotentiaries were told that 
Prussian policy, whether it involved see] 
or attempting to block Prussian moves in 
on British support for the French German 
British support of the Sulzbach claim in 
in the negotiations. The 
French support for Britain's 
king Anglo-Prussian marriages 
Mecklenburg, was dependent 
strategy, and, in particular 
t Jülich-Berg. This was not 
favourably received by the British, but a combination of concern over 
Mecklenburg, the failure to improve Anglo-Prussian relations, and, 
no doubt, the abortive Anglo-Austrian reconciliation led Britain to 
adopt a more receptive attitude. George did not send any envoys to 
the Wittelsbach courts, possibly because they did not want to provoke 
Austria by such a step, but he agreed to receive Plettenberg at 
Hanover. This contrasted with his refusal to see Count Seckendorf, 
the Austrian envoy at the Court of Berlin and the confidant of 
Frederick William I. George's decision to refer the negotiations 
1 Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 30 Nov. 1728, BL. Add. 
32759, f. 251-3. 
2 Newcastle proposed that British support for the Witteisbach over 
Mich-Berg should be linked to Wittelsbach support over Mecklenburg, 
Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Stanhope, 30 Sept. (os) 1728, 
PRO. 78/189 f. 419. When, in the autumn of 1728, George was sent the 
project of a treaty between the Alliance of Hanover and the four 
Electors he expressed general approval, but requested a more 
moderate wording of the article concerned with Jülich-Berg, 
Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 12 Sept. (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 
f. 397. 
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to Hanover was interesting as talks between the French government, 
the British Plenipotentiaries and the Wittelsbach envoys were already 
in progress in Paris. In May 1729 a project for ,a 
treaty had been 
presented to the British and the French by Count Albert. The 
projected treaty called for subsidies and a guarantee of the Sulzbach 
claim to Jülich-Berg. By referring the talks to Hanover, George 
t 
indicated his great interest in the matter, and his determination 
to gain personal control of the negotiations2. 
Plettenberg reached Hanover on July 14th. He had an audience 
with George on the 15th and several lengthy conferences with 
Townshend over the following week. The substance of their convers- 
ations is a matter for dispute, and in particular it is unclear 
exactly what Plettenberg demanded and how far George and Townshend 
indicated a willingness to meet his demands. The position is confused 
by the fact that in the autumn, when the negotiations had run into 
difficulties, Townshend accused Plettenberg of a lack of consistency 
1 Albert to Plettenberg, 11,19,26 May 1729, Münster, NB. 331 f. 104, 
120-124,130; 'Draft of the Electoral Treaty', PRO. 103/110; 
'Formulaire d'un art. touchant Bergh et Juliers - as given by 
Albert', in British Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 1 June 1729, 
PRO. 103/112. The Elector of Cologne requested subsidies, assistance 
for Witteisbach claims to episcopal vacancies and a satisfactory 
settlement of the. Hildesheim issue. The treaty was projected for 
14 years. Bavaria and Cologne expected compensation for the 
arrears in their subsidies from Austria. Bavaria sought 400,000 
ecus of German money p. a. and a British guarantee of the payment 
by Spain of one million piastres owed under treaties signed by 
Charles II of Spain. In George's view the projected treaty entailed 
excessive fiscal demands and inadequate support over Mecklenburg, 
Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 June 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 216-7. 
2 In late July Townshend informed the Plenipotentiaries that George 
had 'referred the farther transaction of this matter to your Excys', 
Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 22 July, Tilson to Horatio, 
Walpole, 5 Aug. 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 284,292-3. However the next 
stage of the negotiations was handled by Townshend and Chavigny, 
and Albert claimed that they had been referred to Hanover, because 
Horatio Walpole lacked the necessary insructions, Albert to 
Plettenberg, 9 Aug. 1729, Munster, Nß. 33 f. 174. 
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in the demands he had presented on the behalf of the Wittelsbach 
Electors1. 
Opinions differed as to the success of the talks in July. An 
optimistic note was struck by Charles-Albert and by Chavigny. 
Charles-Albert replied to a report by Plettenberg by stating that 
the negotiation was nearly complete and that Britain had only to 
change her policy a little in order to satisfy the Wittelsbachs2. 
Chavigny, whose arrival in 
the roads that suruner, pre 
to the idea of an alliance 
he informed Chauvelin that 
Electors, 'pour l'apologie 
four days later he wrote, 
Hanover was delayed by the poor state of 
seated Townshen d as being totally committed 
with the Wittelsbachs. On August 18th, 
Townshend sought the alliance with the 
et la justification de sa conduite', and 
'Md. Townshend consiAre aujourd'hui cette union 
comme l'Kpoque la plus glorieuse de son ministure .... 
Md. Townshend qui vent plaire ä son maitre et qui veut 
peut 4tre se faire valoir plus qu'il n'a fait jusqu'icy 
par la relation de ses Etats d'Alemagne avec les affaires 
gen6rales, ne veut pas perdre cette occasion de signaler 
son ze1e et sa prevoyance pour la seuretL< de 1'Electorat 
de Hanovre. '4 
1 Townshend wrote that he and Plettenberg had declared 'that nothing 
that had passed between us, should be looked upon as binding or 
conclusive on either side', Townehend to the Plenipotentiaries, 
22 July 1723, PRO. 78/193 f. 284. 
2 Charles Albert to Plettenberg, 26 July 1729, Munster, NB. 164 f. 37. 
Boissieux reported that Plettenberg was very pleased with the 
manner in which he had been received at Hanover, and with George's 
willingness to settle various points at issue between the Elector of 
Cologne and the Electoral government of Hanover, Boissieux to 
Chauvelin, 25 July 1729, AE. CP. Cologne, 70 f. 144. 
3 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 1 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 
f. 101. D'Aix had commented on the absence of a French representative 
at Hanover, and Schleinitz had argued that Chavigny's presence was 
necessary, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 30 June, 7 July 1729, AST. LM. 
Ing. 35; Schleinitz to Fleury ,1 July 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
4 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 18,22 Aug. 1739, AE. P. Allemagne, 375 f. 151,159. 
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Those who struck a less optimistic note seem to have been nearer to the 
truth. On July 21st Plettenberg sent Charles-Albert and Count Albert 
copies of Townshend's comments upon the Wittelsbach alliance project. 
He informed Count Albert that the British thought that France should 
pay the entire subsidy demanded by Bavaria'. Townshend also pressed 
for the inclusion of the Elector of Mainz, the Wittelsbach Franz Ludwig, 
Duke of Neuburg, in the alliance, and declared that Britain was not 
prepared to accept an alliance for fourteen years, but was determined 
to fix a limit of two years. Plettenberg was suspicious of the British 
views on the Jülich-Berg inheritance2. Count Toerring, the Bavarian 
foreign minister, commented, 
'Je juge par les remarques de Mylord, que nous sommes 
encore loin de notre compte avec le Roy d'Angleterre, et 
qu'il voudroit avoir l'Electeur de Baviere a trop bon marche. ' 
Toerring argued. that it was unlikely that France would be 
willing to pay all the Bavarian subsidy and that Britain should not 
only agree to pay half the subsidy, but be keen to do so in order to 
have greater influence upon Bavarian conduct. He also stated that the 
British demand for Wittelsbach assistance over the Mecklenburg question 
1 George had made it clear to Schleinitz on 26 June that he would not 
accept the Bavarian financial demands, Schleinitz to Fleury ,1 July 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
2 'Projet d'un Traits avec les Electeurs' with marginal comments by 
Townshend and Plettepberg, PRO. 103/110; Plettenberg to Albert, 21 July 
172 , Minster, NB. 
33` f. 171-2. George was reported to be in favour 
of an alliance with the Electors, but dissatisfied with their proposals, 
Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 June, Tilson to Horatio Walpole, 
5 Aug. 1729, PRO. 43/9,78/193 f. 292-3. Fleury proposed a conference 
by which George, as King and Elector, would undertake to make no 
engagements over Jülich-Berg incompatible with a Sultzbach succession. 
George and Townshend approved of this compromise, Schleinitz to Fleury 
1 July, Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 3 Aug. 1729, PR0.. 103/110. It was 
rejected by the Elector Palatine who demanded an explicit commitment 
to the Sultzbach succession, Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 24 July, 
'Contre Remarques Palatines... ', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
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was likely to meet with opposition, particularly from Mainz-1 
Albert pressed Chauvelin about Wittelsbach anxiety over the British 
attitude to the Jülich-Berg question. He was assured that France 
wanted Britain to give a guarantee for the succession similar to the 
French one and that Chavigny would be ordered to lend the Wittelsbachs 
all possible assistance on the matter. Both Chauvelin and Albert were 
dissatisfied with the British position. Chauvelin argued that the 
British demand for an inclusion of Mecklenburg within the terms of 
the provisions for mutual defence was unacceptable2, and that the 
only thing George could expect was an agreement to defend Hanover if 
it were attacked as part of a dispute Involving Mecklenburg. The 
French and Albert agreed that the British demand for the inclusion 
of Gibraltar and Minorca was also inadmissible. Albert also informed 
the French that from the Wittelsbach point of view, 'que c'etoit mime 
les insulter que de leur proposer de les louer pour deux ans comme 
on feroit un carosse de Eiacre pour deux ans'. 
3 
The difficulties Plettenberg encountered were soon to be faced 
by Chavigny. He took over the task of persuading George and Townshend 
to accept the Wittelsbach case whilst Plettenberg set off on a tour 
1 Toerring to Plettenberg, 30 July 1729, Munster, NA. 148 f. 186. 
George was very concerned about Mecklenburg, Townshend to the 
Plenipotentiaries, 11,23, June 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 216-7; Toerring 
to Plettenberg, 18 June 1729, Munster, NA. 148 f. 169; Townshend to 
Chesterfield, 21,28 June 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 163-4,181; Schleinitz 
to Fleury , 27 July 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 96; Promemoria, Bavarian views on British project concerning Mecklenburg 
given to Plettenberg at Hanover, 5 Aug. 1729, PRO. 100/15. 
2 The British sought the same agreement as part of the projected treaty 
with Spain, King, p. 107. 
3 Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 24 July 1729, PRO. 103/110; 'Contre 
Remarques Palatines... ', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO. 10? /110; Albert to 
Plettenberg, 9,16 Aug. 1729, Münster, NB. 33 f. 173-4,176,182-4; 
Schleinitz, memorandum about the negotiations, no date, PRO. 103/110; 
'Reponse de S. A. S. E. de Baviere sur les Remarques faites . Hannover 
par Mylord Townshend, et Monsr. le Comte de Plettenberg, sur le 
projet du traite a faire avec les quatre Electeurs', PRO. 103/110. 
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of the Wittelsbach courts designed to counter Austrian intrigues at 
Mannheim and to discover how much of the British case would be 
accepted by the Electors1. On August 12th Chavigny reported that 
Townshend was firm on the subsidies and the Jülich-Berg guarantee. 
2 
Chavigny argued that Britain should concede on the Jülich-Berg issue 
in return for help over Mecklenburg, but Townshend replied that the 
Dutch would never accept the Sulzbach succession, a somewhat misleading 
argument, for Chavigny realised that the British were more concerned 
with the Prussian than the Dutch response. Townshend argued that it 
was impossible to pay any new subsidies because Parliament would 
reject any such obligations, and, according to Chavigny, he claimdd 
that 
'la seule proposition exciters contre le ministere des 
criailleries dont 1'effet ne peut qu'alterer notre, union 
avec l'Angleterre'. 
3 
Chavigny replied by stating that the. response in Britain would 
depend upon the manner in which the issue was presented to Parliament. 
The exchange between the two men is interesting, in that it 
illustrates that Chavigny, despite his trip to London in 1723, still, 
at least publicly, subscribed to the manipulative interpretation of 
Parliament so condemned by Townshend. Townshend, however, was, or 
at least claimed to be, very concerned about the Btitish response. 
He and George were certainly ready to send the Wittelsbach project 
for a treaty, presented by Plettenberg, to London, in order to elicit 
the views of the 'Lords of the Council' on the matter4. These 'Lords' 
1 Toerring to-Plettenberg, 27 July, 6 Aug, 1729, Minister, NA. 148 
f. 182,190. 
2 Chauvelin referred to the Julich-Berg issue as 'la difficult' la 
plus importante', Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 3 Aug. 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
3 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 12 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 
f. 121-5; Villars, 24 Aug. 1729, p. 191. 
4'Townshend to Newcastle, 22 July 1729, P80.43178. 
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constituted a form of cabinet appointed by George II to advise the 
Regent, Queen Caroline, during his absence in Hanover. The only 
records of their deliberations that survive are to be found in 
Lord King's Notes, and the reports of their proceedings sent to 
Hanover. Lord King was a member of the group, but unfortunately 
he did not attend many of the sessions. He makes it clear that he 
was frequently ignored by Sir Robert Walpole, and preferred the 
seclusion of his seat at Ockham to the strains of Whitehall, strains 
that did not do his gout any good 
l. Unfortunately neither the Notes 
nor the reports preserved in State Papers Regencies specify the 
views of individual ministers. 
On August 22nd the 'Lords of the Council' met at Sir Robert 
Walpole's house in Chelsea to discuss the Wittelsbach project. 
Present were Lord King, Walpole, Newcastle, the, Lord. Privy Seal, 
(Lord Trevor), the Lord Chamberlain (the Duke of Grafton), and 
the first Lord of the Admiralty (Viscount Torrington). 
2 They argued 
that though an alliance would be useful, as it would increase the 
number of troops within the Empire at the disposal of the Hanover 
alliance, the terms proposed by the Wittelsbachs were unacceptable. 
They objected to the provisions concerning the succession to 
Jülich-Berg as being too anti-Prussian. They-were opposed to the 
projected time-span of the treaty, and approved of Townshead's 
suggestion that it should only last for two years. They argued 
1 King, p1107. 
2 Care was taken to prevent ministers, not iä the inner circle, 
from gaining information about government policy, King, 16 M Ay (os) 
1729, p. 86. Though King did not name any ministers it is probable 
that Newcastle was referring to Carteret and Wilmington. 
249 
that the preamble of the projected treaty, confining it simply to 
'the good of the Empire', and the provisions that specified that the 
Wittelsbachs were under no obligations if conflict arose over Gibraltar 
or the Ostend Company, were unacceptable and might cause political 
difficulties in Britain. It was however the Seventh article of the 
projected treaty that they most disapproved of. By this article 
George undertook not to give any guaranty to any power whatsoever 
not included in the projected alliance, without the consent of all 
the contracting powers. As the Lords in London pointed out this 
referred principally to the guaranty of the Pragmatic sanctionl. 
The reasons advanced in the deliberations of the Lords sent to 
Townshend on August 23rd are of great interest as they indicate the 
long-term views of the group of ministers left in London, or, at 
least of the most powerful of them. They argued that such an 
undertaking, 
'would be an unnecessary tying up H. M. 's hands from doing 
a thing, which perhaps hereafter upon a change of circumstances, 
H. M. may think adviseable, if the Emperor should ever make 
such proposals as H. M. might think advantageous for himself 
and hLs people, and safe and honourable for his allies. 
Their Lordps. have the greatest dependence upon the present 
good disposition of the court of France; But as considering 
the particular circumstances of that court, the same confidence 
1 In 1727, Horatio Walpole in his 'Considerations qui peuvent servir 
ä donner quelque id6e des mesures prealables que les Allies 
devroient concerter entre eux pour regler leur conduite au Congres' 
had proposed an article in a Treaty by which the German princes 
allied with the Alliance of Hanover '... qu'aucune des dites parties 
ne feroit aucun Traits ou marche de quelque nature qu'il pat etre 
(par report au cas de la mort de l'Empr. sans issue mile) a moans 
que ce ne fut de concert et conjointement avec tous les autres... ', 
PRO. 84/294 f. 133. 
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may not always be preserved, their Lordships have ever lookt 
upon it as the wisdom of H. M. 's councils, that hitherto nothing 
has been done that should make ye friendship of that Crown 
absolutely necessary, or a reconciliation with the Emperor 
impracticable. '1 
This statement is probably the best summary of British policy 
in the summer of 1729. It indicates the fears held about future 
developments in French policy. Persistent reports over the previous 
two years that Fleury would fall, or die, to be replaced by ministers 
less interested in pacific measures or the British alliance, had helped 
to sap confidence in the Anglo-French alliance. Instead of being 
seen as a stable feature in European diplomacy and an essential 
aspect of British foreign policy, a view that had been strongly 
advanced following the formation of the Alliance of Hanover, it was 
increasingly seen as a temporary measure, an expedient necessary for 
the pursuit of better Anglo-Austrian and Anglo-Spanish relations. 
The difficulty was to determine how the Emperor was to be per- 
suaded to offer advantageous proposals. Attempts over the previous 
two years to negotiate with the Austrians whether alone or in con- 
junction with other powers, as at Soissons, had failed. The logical 
conclusion of this failure, that an attempt should be made to coerce 
the Austrians, by diplomatic isolation and the threat of violence 
2 
was in the summer of 1729 forcing the British ministry to crystallize 
their views and assumptions about foreign policy, and adopt specific 
1 Account of Council Meeting, 11 Aug. (os) 1729, PRO. 43/80; King, _ pp. 122-5. 
2 Townshend to Chesterfield, 14 June 1729, PRO: c. 84/304 f. 153. Kinaky 
blamed the failure to negotiate an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation 
on the rigidity of the Austrian negotiating position, Kinsky to 
Ferdinand Albrecht, 2 Sept. 1729, Wolfenbiittel, 1 Alt, 22, Nr. 590 
f. 2. Horatio Walpole and Stanhope referred to 'the usual haughtiness 
of the Imperial Court', Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Townshend 
4 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 10. 
251 
policies by agreeing to treaties that involved major commitments 
both in the short and the long terml. In a sense, the summer of 
1729 was the first major opportunity for fresh thinking since the 
Alliance of Hanover in the autumn of 1725, since it saw the need for 
the discussion of two treaties that represented novel alignments. 
In the intervening years the treaties negotiated by Britain had 
largely been the consequence of the Alliance of Hanover and had 
mostly been with powers considerably weaker than Britain. The 
negotiations had usually been about the amount of money Britain 
was prepared to pay to secure the alliance of other powers. In the 
case of the negotiations of 1729 with Spain and with the French- 
supported Wittelsbachs, money was not the major issue. 
The report of the 'Lords of the Council' showed that the vague 
talk of the need for an Anglo-Austrian reconciliation that had been 
expressed in public by various government figures over the previous 
years represented not only a nostalgic feeling for the triumphs of 
the Grand Alliance in the 1700's2, but also a considered response 
to the long-term European situation. The relationship between the 
approach made to Austria in the early spring of 1729 and the views 
expressed by the Lords of the Council in August is unclear since 
it is not known how many of the Lords were aware of the approach and 
of its failure. What is clear is that the British ministry was 
1 Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 20 Sept. 1729, Wolfenbtittel, 1 Alt, 22, 
Nr. 590 f. 2. Horatio Walpole and Stanhope expressed their fear that 
Britain might 'be pushed and engaged by Spain ...... into new and extravagant projects for troubling the tranquillity of Europe, 
contrary to former Treatys, or to carry things any farther, than what. 
is necessary to secure the succession of Don Carlos by the 
Introduction of Garrisons... ', Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to 
Townshend, 4 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 9. 
2 On these feelings see S Baxter, 'The Myth of the Grand Alliance in 
the Eighteenth Century', in S Baxter and P Sellin, Anglo-Dutch Cross 
Currents in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Los Angeles, 1976) pp . 42 -59 . 
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seriously interested in a reconciliation. It will therefore be 
necessary to consider why Austrian approaches made in the summer 
of 1729 failed. 
While Plettenberg, Chavigny, Townshend and George II were 
holding talks in Hanover, a dispute was in progress between the 
Lords of the Council and Townshend over Anglo-Spanish negotiations. 
The Lords of the Council, worried that Spain intended to dupe 
Britain and concerned at the prospect of having nothing definite 
to present to the next session of Parliament, argued that Spain 
should be persuaded to settle by the presentation of an ultimatum 
supported by the threat. of naval action from the fleet assembled at 
Spithead. A blockade of Spain and the Spanish West Indies was 
suggested, and an attack on Porto Rico Droposedl. Townshend 
believed that this course of action was too hasty. He felt that 
Spain would produce a satisfactory answer to th9 British approaches 
and argued that any British action would meet with French and Dutch 
disapproval. He therefore blocked the plan by persuading the Dutch 
to add a squadron to the fleet assembling under Wager. As he had 
predicted, the difficulties of ensuring cooperation between the 
British fleet and the Dutch naval command helped to delay plans 
for an expedition. Townshend also made it clear to the Lords*of 
the Council that he regarded their policy as precipitant2. The 
Lords agreed to defer their plan until mid-July, and Newcastle in- 
formed Townshend that if, by then, no satisfactory Spanish answer 
had been received naval squadrons would be sent to Gibraltar and 
1 Newcastle to Townshend, 13 June (os), Delafaye to Tilson, 3 June 
1729, PRO. 43/77. 
2 Townshend to Chesterfield, 1 July 1729, BL. Add. 48982, f. 160; 
King, 17 June (os) 1729, pp. 90-i. 
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the West Indiesl 
These steps by Town spend did not mean that opinion at Hanover 
was opposed to the possibility of coercing Spain. On June 1st 
Townshend ordered the Plenipotentiaries to press Fleury to set a 
date, preferably in July, for initiating operations against Spain 
if she had not, by then, returned a suitable answer. Similar 
instructions were sent a month later2. However, though Townshend 
was prepared to consider the possibility of action against Spain, 
he believed that the time was not ripe, and that negotiations had 
to be attempted first. He therefore did his best to thwart the 
Lords of the Council. Accompanying his instructions to the 
Plenipotentiaries an Jurylist was a. pr. ivatte letter to. Hor. sfto 
Walpole, 
'You will see that the orders your. colleagues receive by 
this messenger take their rise from England. I am glad 
that orders fall into wise hands, who if they can do no good 
with them, will however not let them do harm. I am persuaded 
for my own part that we shall finish with Spain, and therefore 
cannot help fearing that our friends are too hasty'. 
3 
It is not clear whether this flagrant incitement to disobey 
orders was made with George's knowledge. Indeed, the extent to 
which Townshend's opposition to the plans for naval action stemmed 
from royal views is a mystery. However, it can be suggested that 
opinion in Hanover was affected by French pressure. The French 
1 Newcastle to Townshend, 13 June (os) 1729, BL. Add. 9161, f. 80-1. 
2 Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 1 June, 1 July, 1729, PRO. 43/9 
BL. Add, 48982, f. 164; Horatio TValpole and Stanhope to Townshend, 
4 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 6. 
3 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 1 July, Townshend to Chesterfield, 
1 July 1729, BL. Add. 48982 f. 166,160. 
m 
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were very concerned about the matter. They feared that it would 
hinder negotiations, and, indeed, Keene informed Townshend that 
the Spaniards were very angry about the naval preparations 
Chavigny was ordered to press George II against the despatch of the 
fleet and to make him realise that it would probably lead to the 
revitalization of the Austro-Spanish alliance and an Austrian attack 
upon uanover. Chauvelin attacked 'l'extreme vivacite du ministere 
Anglais' and believed that pressure on George was the best method 
to thwart it2. 
Whether George and Townshend opposed naval action because of 
fear of French reaction is unclear, although it should be noted that 
this factor had been important in preventing such action over the 
previous two years. It is likely that Townshend's claim that the 
negotiations with Spain looked too promising to risk was an important 
factor. Equally important was the relation between the negotiations 
with Spain and those being conducted at Hanover. As the Wolfenbüttel 
minister Schleinitz, then at Hanover, pointed out, the progress of 
the negotiations in Spain was of great importance in determining 
the response at Hanover to the Wittelsbach propositions3. Should 
Spain reject the Anglo-French proposals and return to an Austrian 
alliance, then an alliance with the Wittelsbachs would be necessary 
to offset an increase in Austrian strength and to bind France clearly 
to a British alliance in opposition to Austrian interests. There 
would be little chance of Austria responding favourably to British 
approaches if she were sure of Spain. If the Spaniards accepted the 
3 Keene to Townshend, 23 June 1729, PRO. 94/100. 
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 26 June, 7,21 July 1729, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8, 
f. 117,118,119; 'Memoire pour servir d'instruction au S. de Chavigny 
allant a Hannover', 26 June, Chauvelin to Chavigny, 3,24 July, 
21 Aug., Chavigny to Chauvelin, 18 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick- 
Hanover, 47 (. 48,61,83,134,148; Dureng, p. 83. 
3 Schleinitz to Fleury , 19 July 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 85. It was also of the greatest importance for An 1-Prussian 
relations, Du Bourgay to Townshend, 18 June 1729, PRO. Q90/24. 
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Anglo-French proposals then there would be less need for the Wittelsbac} 
and their alliance could be secured on easier terms 
l. 
The coordination of these two sets of negotiations required 
too much intelligence to be easy. Whereas the previous summer 
negotiations had been centralised at Soissons and Paris, in 1729 
the distances between the peripatetic courts of Philip V and George II 
were large, so considerable skill was required in coordinating the 
varied British negotiations. The Spanish determination to hold 
their negotiations in Spain and not at Paris, and George's decision 
that his negotiations with the Wittelsbachs should be held at Hanover, 
not Paris, meant that the British Plenipotentiaries enjoyed less 
influence than in the previous year. Virtually no important foreign 
envoys spent the summer in London, where anyway there were no accred- 
ited representatives of Spain or of the Wittelsbachs2. 
It may seem to be a rather questionable exercise to assess the skill 
displayed by various ministers in relating the two sets of negotiations 
particularly when there are no personal memoranda on which to base 
the conclusions. However, it could be suggested that some of the 
clashes over policy within the British ministry stemmed not only 
from differences of opinion over policy but also from varying abilities 
to integrate the diffuse negotiations. Walpole, Newcastle and the 
other 'Lords of the Council' appear to have viewed Anglo-Spanish 
1 Townshend to George II, 1 Oct. (os) 1729, PP. O. 103/110. 
2 Newcastle to Townshend, 24 June (os) 1729, Pß0.43/78. Horatio 
Walpole complained that he was not being informed, either speedily 
or fully, of the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs, Horatio Walpole 
to Delafaye, 29 July, Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, 
PRO. 78/192 f. 137,178; Chauvelin to Schleinitz, 7 Aug. 1729, 
PRO. 103/110. Townshend told Chavigny that George was more concerned 
than his father 'de parottre tout voir, et tout determiner par 
luymeme', Chavigny to Chauvelin, 12 Aug. 1729, AR. CP. Brunswick- 
Hanover, 47 f. 112. 
ýr 
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relations in isolation and not to have related them to German 
matters'. They do not seem to have grasped as well as George, 
Townshend and Chesterfield that Spanish policy was not determined 
by fear of British naval action, that securing the active cooperation 
of France was essential if Spain were to be persuaded to adopt a 
favourable policy and that French help over Anglo-Spanish disputes 
was linked to British support for French policy in the Empire. 
France viewed both sets of negotiations as parts of an anti-Austrian 
policy but the 'Lords of the Council' were both disinclined to 
adopt the French analysis and unable to produce a satisfactory 
alternative. Had Spain rejected an ultimatum then the policy of 
naval action would have been a failure because it would have produced 
the risk. of British isolation. Spain would probably have returned 
to her Austrian policy2, possibly with French connivance, and 
Austrian pressure upon Hanover would have forced the British to seek 
French help, and therefore to submit to French direction of Britain's 
Spanish policy. There are no signs that this was grasped in London, 
despite the knowledge that Austro-Spanish negotiations were continuing 
3 in Spain. 
1 Chauvelin criticised the British Plenipotentiaries for the same 
fault, Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick- 
Hanover, 47 f. 134. 
2 Chesterfield to Townshend, 7 July 1729, PRO. 84/304. f. 209. 
3 Chavigny wrote of Townshend, '... personne en Angleterre nest plus 
convaincu que luy de la relation necessaire des affaires de la 
couronne d'Angleterre avec celles d'Allemagne', Chavigny to 
Sickingen, 23 Jan. 1730, Münster, NB. 286 f. 80. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMER-AUTUMN OF 1729 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA, WAR-PANIC WITH PRUSSIA, 
SETTLEMENT WITH SPAIN. 
'L_'Empereur a voulu me susciter des embarras et des affaires, 
j'auray tort ou tard ma revanche'. 
George II to Chavigny, 4 Sept. 17291. 
A further element in the diplomatic situation in the summer of 
1729 was the continuing contact between Britain and Austria. Given 
the increasing commitments being envisaged that summer as cart of the 
strategy to coerce Austria, (support for Spain in Italy and for the 
Wittelsbachs in the Empire), given the opposition of the British 
ministers to war with Austria; and given the obvious difficulties that 
faced the coercive strategy, (dependence upon the quixotic Elizabeth 
Farnese, Hanoverian vulnerability to Austrian and Prussian pressure, 
and the likelihood of successful Austrian resistance in Italy), it was 
not surprising that talks with Austria were considered. After the 
abortive British initiative in the early spring neither Britain nor 
Austria made any approaches in the late spring. The British were more 
concerned to exploit Austro-Spanish differences and they may have been 
affected by French disquiet at the Anglo-Austrian contacts earlier in 
the year. Adopting a charitable interpretation, it could be suggested 
that the Austrians were waiting until they could discover Spanish 
intentions2. A less charitable view would suggest that in the late 
1 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 
f. 220. 
2 Horatio Walpole to Trwnshend PRO. 78/192 f. 7. Uncert- 4 July 1729 F , , 
ainty over the degree to which Spain, once it had broken with Austria, 
` 
would take anti-Austrian steps was an important factor, Instructions 
for Fonseca, 14 May 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f. 236. 
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spring the Austrian government, and in particular its foreign policy, 
was affected by the lethargy that seems to have crept over it so 
often during the reign of Charles VI1. This indolent and Prevaricating 
2 
monarch preferred hunting to the difficulties of decision making. 
Eugene was also disinclined to commit himself to unpredictable courses 
of action, whilst Sinzendorf had suffered for his forwardness at 
Soissons. The unwillingness to take decisions at Vienna complicated 
a foreign-policy already handicapped by the disorganized nature of 
the Austrian diplomatic corps. Both Eugene and Sinzendorf maintained 
extensive private correspondences with Austrian envoys. Sinzendorf 
had close links with Fonseca, one of the Austrian Plenipotentiaries 
at Paris, whilst Eugene had similar links with, among others, 
Seckendorf, Kinsky and Wratislaw the Austrian envoy in Russia. 
Braubach has drawn attention to the range of Eugene's system and to 
the way in which he used it to follow a private diplomacy of his own, 
often in opposition to that of the Chancery under Sinzendorf. The 
effect of this confusion was that most Austrian envoys received 
contradictory instructions, and were uncertain about what to do. 
Seckendorf's claim that most Austrian envoys, himself naturally 
excepted, were unaware of the true intentions of the Austrian 
government, was partially true, though it begged the question whether 
1 Waldegrave to Townshend, 1 Jan. 1729, PRO. 80/64 f. 5; Horatio Walpole] 
and Stanhope to Townshend, 4 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 7; Poyntz to 
Waldegrave, 19 Jan. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 24. 'Icy 1'on vit daps 
une tranquilitS sans pareille, on ne met non plus an peine de ce 
qu'il se passe en Europe que si cela ne nous regardoit ny en blanc 
ny en noir... ', Visconti to Zamboni, 3 July 1729. Visconti was 
writing from Vienna. Bodl. Rawl. 129 f. 163-4. 
2I have benefited from discussions on this point with Leopold. `Auer, 
Peter Barber and Derek McKay. 
2 59 
there were any concerted views at Vienna'. 
In late May 1729 the Austrians approached the British asking 
for talks. Sinzendorf, 'quite out of patience with Kinsky', approached 
Waldegrave, and suggested that he meet George II at Hanover and convey 
Austrian proposals for talkst. Kinsky approached Newcastle and 
intimated that Austria was ready to come to terms with Britain. 
Newcastle stated that Austria would have to sign the Provisional 
treaty as a condition of any peace. Kinsky was against such a condttt= 
and told Newcastle that the treaty was bad for both Britain and 
Austria. He claimed, correctly, that the treaty would not settle the 
dispute over Gibraltar, and 'hinted to me that perhaps the Emperor 
might be disposed to go further lengths with us against Spain, in 
support of our pretensions, than possibly France would do'. Newcastle 
replied that Britain was perfectly satisfied with French conduct. 
Since France was known to be opposed to Britain's proposals for action 
against Spain this untruthful reply hardly suggested a British 
willingness to reply to Austrian approaches. 
On May 30th Minsky had a long conference with Sir Robert Walpole. 
They met in secret, in the house of the Duke of Grafton, who acted as 
an interpreter in order to prevent any misunderstandings. Kinsky was 
1 M. Braubach, Die Geheimedi lomatie des Prinzen Eugen von Savo en 
(Cologne, 1962); u er, Das Kaiserliche esan tsc a tswesen im 
Jahrhundert nach dem Westfa sc en Frieden " 1643-1740 (Bonn, ) 
pp. - 222-6; Pretsch, Man eu e Colman to Newcastle, 10 July 
1725, PRO. 98/25; Sinzendor to Fonseca, 31 May 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 
13 f. 263; Waldegrave to Townshend, PRO. 80/65 f. 211. D'Aix wrote that 
xinsky 'parott creature du Prince Eugene', D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II 
15 Nov. 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. The bad relations of Kinsky and Seckendorf were notorious, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 7 July 1729, 
AST. LM. Ing. 35; Kinsky to Eugene, no date, late August 1729, Vienna, 
Kinsky, Kart. 3(a). 
2 Waldegrave to Tilson, 18 June 1729, Chewton. 
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more detailed in his approach to Walpole than he had been with 
Newcastle, Kinsky argued that nothing was so desirable, or so much, 
in the interests of both Austria and Britain, as a 'return to 
the old system of politicks in Europe', and a renewal of the 
alliance between the two powers. He blamed the fate of the 
approaches earlier in the year upon the British arguing that 
their stance had been both too general and too harsh, and stated 
that the Emperor would never sign the provisional treaty in its 
present form. Kinsky said that his efforts to persuade Vienna 
of the good dispositions of Britain for a reconciliation had 
been hindered by the conduct of certain British envoys, but that 
he had eventually received full powers for negotiations from 
the Emperor. Kinsky stated that the Emperor would never comply 
with the unreasonable demands of Spain over the Spanish garrisons 
and the marriages of the archduchesses, and that these demands 
had freed the Emperor to do what he could not previously have 
done with honour. He argued that the provisional treaty was 
not only unsatisfactory for the Emperor but also insufficient 
to secure British interests in Gibraltar and Minorca. 
Walpole asked Kinsky to reconcile his protestations of 
good Imperial dispositions with the behaviour of the Emperor 
over Hanoverian interests. Kinsky attempted to differentiate 
between British and Hanoverian interests, but he suggested that 
a general reconciliation would produce a settlement of the 
Mecklenburg question that would be agreeableto Hanoverian 
interests. Kinsky told Walpole, as indeed he told the Queen, 
that he had powers to sign the provisional treaty. 
Walpole's response was apparently unfavourable. He avoided 
'saying anything more than what was absolutely necessary'. He 
told Kinsky that his request that Britain should make no 
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diplomatic moves until Austria had made proposals to George II 
at Hanover was unreasonable1. He urged Kinsky to travel to 
Hanover at once and there make his proposals to George and 
Townshend, but he refused to adopt an encouraging note. Aside 
from the official report upon the conference it is unclear 
what Walpole's reactions were. Three days after the conference 
between Walpole and Kinsky, a conference of which Newcastle was 
fully informed, Newcastle wrote to Stanhope of his preference 
for an alliance with the Emperor to one with Spain. He did 
not advance as his reason, a belief in the Importance of Anglo- 
Austrian relations as of essential importance to the European 
System, but claimed both that the consequences of a breach 
with Spain were less serious than one with the Emperor, and 
that a peace with the latter could probably be done 'att a 
cheaper rate' than one with the former2. Although he did not 
expand on his argument it is probable that he was referring 
to the dangers of committing Britain to Spain's Italian policy. 
The negotiation with the Wittelsbachs does not appear to have 
been an issue before the summer. It may have been this negoti- 
ation that Newcastle complained of the secrecy of on April 26th, 
and there are few rumours or reports about it before July3. 
Newcastle, certainly, and Sir Robert Walpole, possibly, 
were advocates of an Austrian alliance by the late spring. It 
may then be asked why they did not succeed in their views, given 
that it is generally held that the two ministers succeeded in 
defeating Towäshend and his policies the following winter. 
Several reasons can be advanced to explain the situation; some 
1 Newcastle to Townshend, 20 May (os) 1729, PRO. 43/77. Newcastle 
to Stanhope, 22 May (os) 1729, Coxe II, 641. 
2 Newcastle to Stanhope, 22 May, 12 June (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 641-2 
f. 44. 
3 Newcastle to Stanhope, 15 Ap. (os) 1729, Ccxe, II, 642. 
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refer to the role of Newcastle and Sir Robert Walpole in the 
formation of foreign policy, and some to the prospects for 
Ariglo-Austrian reconciliation. Both Plumb and Browning have 
attributed too much influence to the two men. It would have 
been unthinkable for them to have detained Kinsky in London and 
sought to negotiate with Vienna through him'. The King, jealous 
of his prerogatives and vitally concerned by relations with 
Austria, would never have accepted the situation. Equally there 
were limits to the amount of pressure that the ministers in 
London could bring to bear upon Hanover. They made clear their 
disinclination to commit Britain to long-term support for the 
Wittelsbachs, but this was a view also held in Hanover. Given 
George's anger at Austrian opposition to Hanoverian interests 
and his suspicion that Austria was stirring up Prussia, it 
would have been foolish to press persistently the Austrian cause, 
and there are no signs that it was pressed during the summer2. 
Furthermore, such a course of action would have endangered 
Newcastle's Secretaryship and threatened Walpole's position. 
It was probably for these reasons that comments from London 
tended to refer to peripheral aspects of British foreign policy, 
such as the cost of subsidies. The few comments that were made 
upon the desirability of particular alliances tended to be in 
response to demands from Hanover for the opinion of the London 
1 Browning, p. 56; Plumb, p. 198. 
2 The Austrians argued that Hanoverian demands threatened the 
Imperial constitution and the judicial position of the Emperor. 
'Quoique nous souhaitions et desirions sincerement de retablir 
l'ancienne intelligence avec ce Roy, nous ne voulons pas pour 
y parvenir employer des moyens derogatoires a notre grandeur.. ', 
Instructions for Seckendorf, 30 June 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 280. 
263 
ministers, as when Townshend communicated the Wittelsbach 
project for a treaty. George would never have accepted dictat- 
ion over his foreign policy, but he did realise the need to seek 
consent and advice over the financial aspects of foreign policy. 
It was therefore through-their opposition to extensive subsidy 
commitments that the ministers in London were able to attempt 
to influence general policy. Discussions in State Papers 
Regencies of general diplomatic strategy are rare. 
Particular problems faced any attempt to improve Anglo- 
Austrian relations in the summer of 1729. As Newcastle pointed 
out, Kinsky 'seems to drive at a separate treaty with us'1. 
This raised the problem of the relationship between such an 
alliance and the already existing Anglo-French alliance, with 
its prospect of expansion to include Spain. Newcastle may have 
preferred settling with Austria to settling with Spain, but, 
like the members of the Opposition who advocated the same 
policy, he failed to make clear what was to be done with Anglo- 
French relations, or to face up to the fact that French help 
was likely to be needed in order to restrain Spain in the 
Mediterranean; for however willing Austria might be to approach 
Britain, she could not be supposed to be willing to satisfy those 
very Spanish demands that had recently caused her to break her 
Spanish ties. In addition, there was the danger that Austria 
might use any British response to discredit Britain with her 
allies. 
Aside from the. possibility of separate negotiations with 
Austria there was also the option of linking the negotiations 
with Spain with talks with Austria2. There were several 
1 Newcastle to Townshend, 20 May (os)1729, PRO. 43/77. 
2 Fleury was reported as being 'determined not to agree with 
Spain separately from the Emperor', Chesterfield. to Townshend, 1j 6 May 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 73. 
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problems with this solution. It would have reintroduced the 
questionable element of French arbitration. The course of 
negotiations at Paris over Anglo-Wittelsbach relations, with 
France pressing Britain to accept the Wittelsbach position, 
suggested that negotiations in Soissons or Paris would not 
serve British interests. They would also be unpopular in 
Britain. More dangerous was the probability that a fusion of 
the negotiations would both delay matters, and, thus, increase 
the possibility that Austria would regain the alliance of Spain 
or the Wittelsbachs 
1. 
Stanhope and Horatio Walpole informed 
Townshend of their concern that Austria might seek to enter 
the negotiations, and to spin them out over the Parmesan and 
Tuscan successions 
2. 
Thus, despite disquiet over the negotiations with Spain 
and the Wittelsbachs, there was little pressure from London for 
a settlement with Austria or for the inclusicn of Austria in the 
negotiations. There was more interest among the British 
Plenipotentiaries, Stanhope, in particular, making favourable 
comments to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries 
3, 
but the British 
received no instructions for negotiations with the Austrians 
4 
1 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 
47 f. 254; Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 2 Dec. (os)1729, Pß0.78/192`; 
f. 551. Kinsky was instructed to argue that the way was open 
for an Austro-Spanish reconciliation, Charles VI to Kinsky, 
26 June 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f. 369. 
2 Stanhope and Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 4 July 1729, BL. Add.; 
32761 f. 268-9; Horatio Walpole to Tilson, 4 July, Plenipotent- 
iaries to Townshend, 4 Aug., Delafaye to Horatio Walpole, 
2 Dec. (os) 1729, PRO. 78/192, f. 21,175,551. 
3 Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 22 Aug. 1729, Höfler, I, 10,. 
4 Fonseca had been ordered to sound the British and Dutch Pleni- 
potentiaries about a possible guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction,, 
Instructions for Fonseca, 14 A4ay 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f. 241. 
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The issue of talks with Austria was left to George and Townshend 
and their control of the matter was unchallenged during the 
summer. 
The Austrians made further direct approaches for talks 
with George through Seckendorf and through Kinsky. Kinsky's 
reports had given the Austrians room to hope that George was 
willing for a reconciliation, and Seckendorf sought to handle 
the negotiation. However his projected mission to Hanover was 
blocked by two developments: firstly George refused to notify 
his arrival in the Empire to the Emperor, which Charles VI 
chose to regard as a slight; secondly, Seckendorf, who had asked 
the Emperor to appoint him to carry the compliments that were 
the traditional response to this notification, found that George 
made it clear that he did not wish to see him. Both Townshend 
l 
and Hattorf denied Seckendorf's statement that letters had 
been sent to him inviting him to Hanover2. The British decision 
was taken by George and related, not to any disinclination to 
listen to Austrian proposals, but to a deep suspicion that 
Seckendorf, despite his professed interest in improving 
Anglo-Prussian relations, was actually seeking to keep the 
1 Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 15 July 1729, PRO. 78/193 
f. 265-6; Eugene to Kinsky, 16 July 1729, Vienna, OK. 94(b) `i 
f. 37; Gansinot to Plettenberg, 19 July 1729, Minster, NB. 259 
f. 181; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 21 July 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Seckendorf to Diemar, 30 July 1729, Marburg, 195; Marini, 
pp. 132-3. 
2 Schleinitz to ---, 12 July 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 
f. 78. 
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two powers apart'. It is very possible that George and the 
British exaggerated Seckendorf's influence in Berlin and 
minimised Frederick William's antipathy; 'to George II. A major 
reason for this was their understandable wish to persuade them- 
selves that if only Frederick William ceased hearing anti- 
British reports he would at once settle with George on George's 
terms. Such a view was foolish, but the reports from Berlin 
which stressed Seckendorf's malevolent role make it. understand- 
able. 
The refusal to permit a visit to Hanover did not end 
Seckendorf's hopes. He attempted to establU. sh a correspondence 
with George through Diemar, and he suggested that Townshend 
and Diemar could meet him in Hamburg. Seckendorf urged Diemar 
to tell George of his good intentions and to communicate his 
letters to George. Diemar, unwilling to take such a step with- 
out the authority of his court and probably disinclined to 
associate Seckendorf with Anglo-Hessian relations, declined 
to do so, and George persisted in his refusal to receive 
Seckendorf. 2 
Kinsky, rebuffed at London, set off for Hanover, but on 
the way he chose to spend several days at the Hague. This led 
Townshend and Chesterfield to surmise that his delay was in 
order to give the Austrians time to ascertain the success of 
their efforts to regain Spain and they concluded that the 
1 Kinsky to Eugene, 27 July 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b); Du Bourgay 
to Townshend, 11 Sept. 1729, PRO. 90/25. Townshend was 
suspicious of the 'extraordinary intimacy... and very close 
and extensive engagements between the Emperor and the Kings 
of Prussia and Poland', Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 
15 July 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 265. 
2 Seckendorf to Diemar, 30 July, 9 Aug. 1729, Marburg, 195. 
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Austrians were not sincere when they talked of reconciliation 
Townshend had informed Newcastle that the King was very 
satisfied with the manner in which Newcastle and Walpole had 
spoken to Kinsky2. Kinsky, when he arrived at Hanover, received 
as negative a reply as he had got in London, though it does 
not seem that he made a particularly strong approach. On 
June 21st he had a long conversation with Townshend. Kinsky 
stated that the Austrian government doubted that Britain was 
at all interested in the resumption of good relations, and he 
drew attention to Townshend's personal commitment to anti-Austrian 
policies. The two men quarrelled over the fate of Tuscany and 
Parma, and Kinsky claimed that the Emperor was not bound to 
stand by the terms of the Quadruple Alliance unless they were 
confirmed by the Treaty of Vienna, a statement Townshend con- 
tradicted. Townshend complained that Kinsky was very hesitant 
in explaining himself and far from forthcoming, but this was 
not surprising, given Townshend's refusal to consider any 
extension to the Anglo-Austrian talks earlier in the year, and 
his insistence that Britain would take no steps without the 
concurrence of France and the Netherlands, and that she was 
1 Townahend to Newcastle, 14 June 1729, PRO. 43/9; Chesterfield 
to Townshend, 28 June 1729, PRO: 84/304 f. 191. Kinsky did 
not leave The Hague until June 13th. In discussions with 
Chesterfield, 'he insisted strongly upon the affairs of 
Ostend and Mecklenburg, and declared the emperor could never 
give up those two points', Chesterfield to Townshend, 14 June 
1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 155. Kinsky reached Hanover on June 18th 
and saw Townshend on the 19th. 
2 Townshend to Newcastle, 10 June 1729, PRO. 43/77. 
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entirely satisfied with French conduct1. Given the British 
unwillingness to tie their hands by agreeing not to negotiate 
without the concurrence of the Wittelsbachs and given the 
conduct of Britain earlier in the year, Townshend's statement 
must have seemed rather harsh. It reflected the determination 
of George and Townshend not to endanger the negotiations with 
Spain by holding talks with Austria. Thus, it naturally 
2 
complemented their opposition to the despatch of a fleet to 
Spanish waters. 
The flexibility of the Austrian negotiating position 
increased as the summer progressed. On June 26th Charles VI 
sent Kinsky plenipotentiary powers for a negotiation, ordering 
him to press the British on a guarantee of the Pragmatic 
Sanction. Charles urged compliance with the system of the 
Quadruple Alliance; claimed that as Austria had guaranteed the 
Hanoverian succession so Britain should guarantee the Pragmatic 
Senction, and declared that Maria Theresa would not be married 
in such a way as to threaten the balance of power3. Two months 
1 Townshend to Newcastle, 21 June 1729, PRO. 43/77; Townshend 
to Kinsky, 9,10 Aug., 20 Sept. 1729, PRO. 100/11; Kinsky to 
Eugene, 5 Sept. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b); Chavigny to Chauvelin, 
12 Aug., 4 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 130-1, 
203; Horatio Walpole and Stanhope to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, 
PRO. 78/192 f. 458. Kinsky suggested that the negotiation of 
Hanoverian demands, the so-called 'Electoral Points', should 
be handled after British demands had been discussed, Townshend 
to the Plenipotentiaries, 23 June 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 252. 
Chesterfield suggested that the Austrians hoped to use 
Seckendorf's mission to sow discord among the allies, 
Chesterfield to Townshend, 12 July 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 219. 
2 Plenipotentiaries to Keene, 19 Aug. 1729, BL. Add. 32762 f. 221. 
3 Charles VI to Kinsky, 26 June 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 
f. 368-70. 
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later Eugene informed Kinsky that the sole Austrian demand was 
the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. He argued that it 
was essential for the balance of power, and suggested that 
Britain and the United Provinces were concerned in the balance, 
at least, if not more, than other powerst. 
Thi(3 change in the Austrian attitude, a change doubtless 
produced by the growing tension in Austro-Spanish relations, 
led to fresh approaches by the Austrian representatives in 
Hanover and Paris. In September WValdegrave, who had been 
ordered to perform the duties of the Secretary of State in the 
gap between the departure from Hanover of Townshend and of George, 
recorded a conversation with Kinsky. Kinsky outlined a settle- 
ment of Anglo-Austrian differences that included a suppression 
of the Ostend Company, an Austrian signature of the Provisional 
Treaty negotiated by Fleury and Sinzendorf, Austrian concessions 
over Mecklenburg, Bremen and Verden, British support for the 
terms of the Quadruple Alliance, and a British guarantee of 
the Pragmatic Sanction, 'but the guarantee not to extend to any 
P. of the house of Spain or to any other P. who by his other 
dominions might endanger the Libertys of Europe'2. 
The Austrian Plenipotentiaries were more active in August 
than they had been during the preceding months. On July 2nd 
Horatio Walpole complained that Stephen Kinsky, 
'has not opened his mouth since his arrival to any purpose 
but that of eating and drinking. We are feasting him plenti- 
fully each in his turn, and when he seeks to take you aside, 
1 Eugene to Kinsky, 25 Sept. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 44-5. 
2 Undated note in Waldegrave's 'Journal of his Embassy in 
France', Chewton. 
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and affects to talk in confidence, it is a routine discourse 
that. we have heard often; general professions; secrecy as to 
what he shall say; enquiry about our having made any new 
engagements, ancient friendship and ye old system; and at-last 
ends; when he has received no more than generall answers, to 
his general questions; with insisting upon a limited commerce 
[for the Ostend Company]. Never any court acted so unaccount- 
able a part .... I flatter myselfe we shall end with Spain 
without ye Imperiall court, and then I think we shall have 
nothing to fear from it'1. 
More concrete Austtian proposals were advanced in August. 
Stephen Kinsky informed the French ministry and the British 
Plenipotentiaries that Charles VI would never accept any alter- 
ation to the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, and would fight 
rather than accept Spanish garrisons. He told the British 
Plenipotentiaries that the issue of the Ostend Company would 
be settled to British satisfaction if George II, as King, would 
agree to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction under the condition 
that the guarantee would only be binding if George II approved 
of Maria Teresa's spouse2. 
The Plenipotentiaries assured Stephen Kinsky of British 
good intentions towards Austria, but informed Townshend that 
they thought. Stephen Kinsky's purpose was 'to interrupt or 
I 
slacken our present transaction with Spain, and to create 
jealousies between His Majesty and France3. The British and 
1 Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 2 July 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 2-3. 
2 Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 174-5. 
3 Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 3 Aug. 1729, H8fler, 
I, 90; Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO. 78/192 
f. 175. 
\' 
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the Dutch Plenipotentiaries made clear their support for the 
Pragmatic Sanction and their belief that it was vital for the 
balance of power, but they informed the Austrians that they 
had no instructions on the subject, and that the Austrians 
should address themselves directly to George II and the Dutch 
government. On August 1st Stanhope told Stephen Kinsky that 
'sa cour' held the same views that had been expressed the 
previous winter in discussions with Philip Kinsky, 
'mais comme it n'avoit presentement 11 dessus ny ordres, 
ny instructions il ne pouvoit pas sly avancer'1. 
The crisis over relations with Prussia intervened at the 
end of August, with the British accusing the Austrians of 
stirring up Prussia, accusations Austria denied2. By then-, 
however, the negotiations with Spain were sufficiently advanced 
to lead Britain to rebuff Austria,. a situation Eugene had 
foreseen3. Whilst Britain needed French help to obtain a 
Spanish guarantee of British commercial and territorial claims, 
it was understandable that Townshend should rebuff Kinsky, and 
1 Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 3,22,24 Aug., 
26 Sept. 1729, Hbfler, I, 88-90,105,110,227. Keene reported 
that the Spanish ministry was keeping a close watch on Stephen 
Kinsky's negotiations, Keene to Plenipotentiaries, 25 Aug. 
1729, BL. Add. 32762 f. 253-4. 
2 Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 5 Aug. 1729, Vienna, Fonseca, 13 f. 324; 
Townshend to Chesterfield, 2 Sept. 1729, PRO. 84/305 f. 93; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 4 Sept. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 22 Aug., 1,26 Sept., 
Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 8 Oct. 1729, 
Höfler, I, 102,200,247,250-2; Horatio.. Walpole and Stanhope 
to Keene, 17 Sept. 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 463. Stephen Kinsky 
had spoken of 'letting the Russians, Prussians and Poles 
loose upon the Empire', Poyntz to Delafaye, 7,12 Aug. 1729, 
PRO. 78/192 f. 200,215. 
_ 
3 Eugene to Kinsky, 24 Aug. 1729, Vienna, CýK. 94 (6) f. 42. 
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claim that Britain would do nothing without her allies. 
Negotiations with Spain had progressed more slowly than 
the British had hoped. This led to renewed pressure in August 
for the presentation of an ultimatum to Spain, and Newcastle 
instructed the British Plenipotentiaries to have the project 
of a treaty with Spain, agreed with France and the United 
Provinces, delivered to Spain as an ultimatum 
l. Such a method 
was unnecessary as Spain had already rejected the approaches 
made by the Austrian-envoy in Spain. K8nigsegg had suggested 
that Austria would accept*Spanish garrisons in Tuscany and 
Parma2. However., he failed to receive sufficient support from 
Vienna, where Eugene and Sinzendorf disagreed over the extent 
to which Austria should make concessions to Spain3, and the 
Spaniards rejected his promises as too vague. 
4 
On June 14th new instructions had been sent to Keene and 
Brancas, ordering them to agree to the Spanish garrisons if 
1 Newcastle to the British Plenipotentiaries, Horatio Walpole, 
Stanhope and Poyntz, 29 Aug. (os) 1729, PRO. 43/80; King, 
pp. 88-9; Goslinga, pp. 344,348. 
2 Keene to Townshend, 10 July 1729, PRO. 94/100; British Pleni- 
potentiaries to Newcastle, 21 Aug. 1729, BL. Add. 32762 f. 209. 
The Austrian Plenipotentiaries suggested that Austria would 
declare the marriage of Don Carlos and an Archduchess, and 
make Carlos.. King of Naples, Horatio Walpole to Delafaye , 11 Aug., Poyntz to Tilson, 12 Aug. 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 210,215. 
3 Bussy to Chauvelin, 27 July, 17 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Aut. 163; 
Newcastle to Stanhope, 17 July (os) 1729, Coxe, II, 651; 
Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 4 Aug. 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 175; 
Keene to Townshend, 1 Sept. 1729, BL. Add. 32762 f. 315. 
4 De Buy to Marquis de Fleury, 30 June, 14 July 1729, Dresden, 
3105,2, f. 145,148; Frederick William'-I to Chambrier, 20 Aug. 
1729, AE. CP. Prusse, 88. 
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Spain insisted on the issue'. This satisfied Elisabeth Farnese, 
but negotiations were delayed as a result of the idiosyncratic 
7 
nature of the Spanish government 2. Writing to Townshend on 
July 28th, Keene commented, 'Your Lordship must be justly 
surprised and impatient of these delays .... I cannot attribute 
to any other cause than to its 
[Spaints) 
natural and invincible 
slowness ... to their catholick Majesties unaccountable conduct 
with regard to their two ministers ..... '3. 
Attempts to persuade Spain to accept neutral garrisons 
failed,, and they only served to increase Spanish suspicion of 
France and Britain. The British believed that the Spaniards 
were deliberately delaying the negotiations in order to benefit 
from British difficulties with Austria and Prussiad. Once 
Britain was fully and openly committed-against these powers, 
it was possible that she would have to offer Spain better terms. 
The British, suspicious that Spain would reserve difficulties 
to the last moment in the negotiations and hope to profit, 
thereby, from the government's need to settle matters before 
s the beginning of the parliamentary session, also feared that 
1 Townshend to the Plenipotentiaries, 11 June 1729, PRO. 43/9; 
'Instruction particuliere et secrete pour Dior. Keene et 
Mr de Brancas', enclosed in Plenipotentiaries to Keene, 14 June 
1729, BL. Add. 32761 f. 162-8; King, p. 89; Baudrillart, III, 
520-1; Goslinga, p. 347; Conn, pp. 106-7. 
2 D'Aubenton to D4aurepas, 27 Oct. 1729, AN. AM. B7 299. 
3 Keene to Townshend, 28 July 1729, PRO. 94/100; Tilson to 
Waldegrave, 23 June 1729, Chewton. 
4 Keene to Townshend, 22 Sept., Keene to the Plenipotentiaries, 
5 Oct., Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Newcastle, 12 Oct. 1729, 
BL. Add. 32763 f. 214,289,313. 
5 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 11 Aug., 18 Sept. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, . 17 Sept. 
1729, PRO. 78/192 
f. 441-3; Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Keene, 3 Oct., Keene 
to Townshend', 5 Oct., Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 18 Oct., 
Keene to Newcastle, 20 Oct. 1729, BL. Add. 32763 f. 265,281-2, 
370,429. 
274 
Spain would commit Britain to an aggressive warlike policy in 
Italy l. It was, therefore, decided to send Stanhope to Spain. 
It was believed that his diplomatic skills,, combined with the 
high regard that the Spanish court held him in, would enable 
him to finish the negotiations and sign a treaty.. It was also 
felt that the despatch of such a high-ranking diplomat would 
convince Spain that Britain was in earnest. Furthermore, the 
decision to supersede Keene, a decision resented by the latter, 
possibly owed something to a fear that Keene would yield to 
2 
pressure as he had done with Rottembourg in 1727. 
Setting out from Paris on September 21st, Stanhope moved 
at great speed, despite the bad roads, made worse by heavy 
rains, and the difficulty in-securing enough mules for his 
3 
baggage in north Spain. On October 5th he reached Pamplona, 
on the 12th Madrid, and on the 25th, in the late morning, 
Seville. That evening he was received by Philip V and 
4 Elisabeth Farnese and treated 'extremely graciously'. 
D'Aubenton, who was both suspicious and 'jealous of Stanhope, 
had predicted major difficulties for him unless he brought 
5 
new concessions. De Büy shared these views, and, in common 
1 Keene to Townshend ,5 Oct., Keene to Newcastle, 13 Oct. 1729, BL. Add. 32763 f. 281,353. 
2 Horatio Walpole to Keene, 18 Oct. 1729, BL. Add. 32763 f. 385; 
D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 20 Oct. 1729, "AN. AM. B7299; George Lyttelton to Sir Thomas Lyttelton, -- Sept. 1729, Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Century I, 19. Stanhope's 
mission was closely linked to s desire for a peerage. 
3 Doctor Lidderdale to Horatio Walpole, 26 Sept., Stanhope to 
Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 30 Sept., Stanhope to Newcastle, 
5,14, -Oct., Stanhope to Keene, 12 Oct. 1729, BL. Add. 32763 
f. 275,324,277,360,336. 
4 Stanhope and, Keene to Newcastle, 27 Oct. 1729, BL. Add. 32763 
f. 446. 
5 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 20 Oct. 1729, AN. AM. B7299; Chauvelin 
to Chammorel, 3 Nov, 1729, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 148. 
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with D'Aubenton reported that neither Philip nor his Wife 
approved of Stanhope, 
'c'ent une chose generallement connue icy que Mr. 
de Stanhope nest point aime du Roy et beaucoup moans 
de la Reyne'1. 
Both were to be proved wrong. On November 3rd De Büy 
0 
reported that the Spanish rulers were very content with Stanhope. 
Stanhope succeeded in settling matters, and at 7 p. m. on 
November 9th the Treaty of Seville was signed, a treaty which 
in the words of De By 'donne un terrible echec ä la puissance 
de la maison d'Aut riche'Z. 
The treaty settled outstanding differences between 
Britain, France and Spain, and committed the two former powers 
to the support of Spanish pretensions in Italy. The treaty 
stipulated that Spanish garrisons should be introduced into 
Leghorn, Porto Ferrajo, Parma and Piacenza. Four months were 
to be devoted to securing the oonsent of the Emperor and the 
Grand Duke of Tuscany to this stipulation. If they refused 
consent, force was to be used, and the garrisons were to be 
introduced not later than May 9th, six months after the signature 
of the treaty3. - 
The British had been'less successful thaw the Spaniards 
in achieving their goals. Despite efforts to obtain an explicit 
confirmation of their rights to Gibraltär and to trading 
privileges in the Spanish Empire, the Spaniards proved unwilling 
1 De Buy to Manteuffel, 6 Oct. 1729, Dresden, 3105,2 f. 174-5. 
2 Königsegg to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 8 Nov, 1729, Vienna, 
Frankreich, Varia, 12 f. 60-1; - De Buy to Manteuffel, 10 Nov. 1720, Dresden, 3105,2 f. 187; Baudrillart, III, 540-2. 
.3 Treaty of Seville, PRO. 108/490. 
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to make any such declarationl. The British attempted'to gain 
French support for their efforts, arguing that if they failed, 
Parliament would reject the settlement. The French proved 
unwilling to support the British demand, and disagreement over 
this point played a part in increasing Anglo-French tension 
on the autumn of 17292. Major differences of opinion over 
negotiations both with Spain and the Witteisbachs helped to 
increase suspicion, and to ensure that discussions over the 
response to the Austrian demand for the guarantee of the 
Pragmatic Sanction, and over the best method to ensure Austrian 
compliance over the Spanish garrisons, took place within an 
alliance made unstable by distrust3. 
The Treaty of Seville stipulated that any articles of 
the Treaty of Vienna which conflicted with. articles in treaties 
signed prior to 1725 were to be revoked. British and French' 
commercial privileges were to be restored to the pre-1727 
situation. Although the Prince Frederick was to be immediately 
restored, outstanding claims relating to the activities of 
illicit British merchants and to the depredations of Spanish 
guarda-ccctas were to be referred to a specially created 
commission. This was also ordered to consider the Spanish 
claim for the restitution of the Spanish ships taken by Byng 
1 Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Newcastle, 13 Aug. 1729, PRO. 
78/192 f. 222; Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 
4 Sept. 1729, Höfler, I, 206. 
2 Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug., 4,19 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. 
Brunswick-Hanover, 47 (. 135,210,254; Chauvelin to Brancas, 
24 Aug. 1729, AE. Mem. et Doe., France, 499; Keene to 
Townshend, 1 Sept., Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Stanhope, 
27 Sept. 1729, BL. Add. 32762 f. 316,32763 f. 231-2; Chauvelin 
to Chammorel, 3 Nov. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 148; King, p. 109. 
3 Chavigny, however, assured Fleury of George II's confidence 
in Fleury's intentions, Chavigny to Fleury, 12 Oct. 1729, 
AE. CP. Allemagne, 375 f. 185. 
I 
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after the battle of Cape Passaro. These terms, combined with 
the failure to mention Gibraltar specifically, were not as 
good as the British ministry had hoped, and they were indeed 
to lead to press and parliamentary criticism in Britain. 
There was a widespread suspicion that the government was 
failing to protect British interests, and it was thanks to 
this suspicion that credence was given to reports which 
suggested that, by a secret clause in the treaty, the ministry 
was engaged to restore Gibraltar and Minorca within six years 
and to bring this restoration before Parliament within three 
years 
l. It was partly due to this already strong disquiet 
over ministerial intentions that the opposition was able to 
make so much headway in February 1730 with claims that the 
government had failed to prevent the improvement of the 
harbour and fortifications of Dunkirk. This atmosphere of 
distrust obliged the ministry to move sharply over the issue. 
2 
1 Ferdinand Albrecht was sent a copy of the supposed article 
by both Kinsky and Seckendorf, Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
25 Feb., Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 13 Mar., Seckendorf 
to Ferdinand Albrecht, 4 Mar, 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, 
Nr. 590 f. 32-3,35, Nr. 585 (d) f. 70-1. 
2 Stephen Kinsky claimed that there was a secret article in 
the Treaty for restoring Sicily and Naples to Spain, Poyntz 
to Delafaye, 24 Nov. 1729, PRO. 78/192 f. 537. 
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'We are on the verge of war in the middle of our 
negotiations for peace, and upon a matter that has 
no connection with the differences we are trying to 
settle. '1 
The diplomatic situation was made more urgent in the late 
summer of 1729 by the threat of a Prussian invasion of Hanover. 
When George II had arrived in Hanover Anglo-Prussian relations had 
been far from cordial, but there had been no talk of war 
2. The 
Anglo-Prussian marriage talks had failed because of what the British 
3 
saw as a negative Prussian attitude, but the British still hoped 
for an improvement in relations. Their refusal to guarantee the 
Sulzbach succession to Jülich-Berg was seen in this light, and there 
were rumours of a projected meeting between George and Frederick 
4 William I No such meeting took place, and George seems to have 
made no attempt to arrange one. He dismissed proposals that 
Seckendorf should visit Hanover, and Seckendorf's proposals for a 
confidential correspondence with George, through the Hessian envoy 
5 Diemar, were rejected by Diemar. George appears to have thought 
1 George Lyttelton to Sir Thomas Lyttelton, - Aug. 1729, M Wyndham, Chronicles of the Eighteenth Centur : Founded on the Correspondence 
of Sir Thomas Lyttelton and his Family vols. -, ---I-9'24) I, 19. 
2 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 23 June 1729, A. ST. LM. Ing. 35. 
3 Chesterfield to Townshend, 17 May 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 95. 
4 Wackerbarth to Augustus II, 2 July 1729, Dresden, 3331,2, f. 2-3; 
London Evening Post 13 May (os) 1729; Seckendorf to Ferdinand 
Albrecht, 24 May 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585 (b) f. 93. 
.m 
5 Sühm to Augustus II, 5 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f. 139-40; 
Schleinitz to Fleury , 8,12 July 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 74,78. Sauveterre suspected that Seckendorf's object was to reopen 
Anglo-Prussian marriage talks, Sauveterre to Chauvelin, 21 June 1729, 
AE. CP. Prusse, 89. The British acquired a copy of Seckendorf's 
instructions, Townshend sending them to the Plenipotentiaries on 
15 July, Instructions for Seckendorf, 30 June 1729, PRO. 78/193 f. 268-83. 
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that any approach to Prussia was pointless until Prussia could be 
persuaded that she was not powerful enough to defy Britain. This 
would happen when successful negotiations with Spain and the 
Wittelsbachs had weakened Austria and Prussia, and, until then, it 
was best to wait for Prussia to make approaches, as it was necessary 
to convince Britain's allies that George did not intend to neglect 
' 
their interests that were threatened by Frederick William. For 
these reasons George did not use the opportunities for personal 
diplomacy, presented by his trip to Hanover, to launch any initiatives 
for a Protestant German league, as was to be suggested on his 1735 
and 1736 trips. 
The responsibility for the Anglo-Prussian crisis of 1729 rests 
with both monarchs2. Frederiek William's determination to increase 
the size of his army had produced vigorous recruiting policies that 
infringed the rights of his neighbours most of whom he had upset 
by the summer of 1729. George retaliated in July by arresting various 
Prussian soldiers then in Hanover3. According to 
unreasonable, as the soldiers had valid passports 
public way, and because George refused to see the 
Kannengieser sent by Frederick William to discuss 
Charles argued that for Hanover to arrest Prussia: 
Charles VI this was 
and were on the 
Prussian minister 
the matter. 
a soldiers as a 
reprisal for Prussian recruiting methods was against the constitutions 
of the Empire which forbade reprisals. George argued that the 
4 
1 The Dutch and French were opposed to Prussian schemes for Jülich- 
Berg, the Swedes suspicious of Prussian views on Swedish Pomerania. 
2 Schleinitz to [Fleury],, 8 July 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 74 
3 Sühm to Augustus II, 5 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI-f. 142; 
Schleinitz to Fleury , 12 July 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 78; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 21 July 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Marini, pp. 131-3. 
4 Charles VI to Fonseca and Stephen Kinsky, 31 Aug., 10 Sept. 1729, 
Höfler, I, 144-6,211; Marini, p. 136. 
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Prussian methods were a breach of the peace of the Lower Saxon 
circle. The somewhat petty dispute, no different in character from 
several that had occurred between Prussia and other powers over the 
preceding decade, was made more serious by a Prussian military 
mobilization in mid-July. George appears to have neglected to 
consider the possibility that Prussia would react violently. On 
July 12th Sühm, the Saxon envoy in Berlin, noted, 
'on affecte plus de tranquilitg, qu'on ne se repand 
pas en menaces, et qu'il paroit qu'on a le coeur ulcer( 
et rempli d'un desir de vengeance, dont I'execution 
dependroit de peu de chose, 'et ne manque de la moindre 
incitation' . 
He reported that Frederick William had ordered the encampment on 
the Elbe near the frontier of Hanover of fifty two battalions by 
mid August. Sühm commented that Prussia had made warlike preparations 
before, but that hitherto they had been done openly. He believed 
that the secret nature of the current preparations indicated that 
Frederick William intended to attack, though he stated his conviction 
that Seckendorf would prevent this. However when Seckendorf told 
Frederick William that he could expect no Austrian help if he was 
the aggressor, the latter replied that he only wanted an absence of 
Austrian opposition, and that Prussia was ready to attack alone 
l. 
Despite Prussian suggestions of a joint commission, to settle 
the troubles, George continued to arrest Prussian soldiers, and 
Frederick William continued to assemble his troops, though George 
2 
made no similar moves. The Prince of Anhalt, one of the leading 
1 Sühm to Augustus II, 12 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f. 146; Guy 
Dickens to Du Bourgay, 19 July 1729, PRO. 90/24. 
2 Sübm to Augustus, 19 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f. 157. 
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Prussian generals, was sent to reconnoitre the valley of the Elbe 
down which the Prussians hoped to advance, cutting off Mecklenburg 
from Hanover'. On July 19th Guy Dickens, Du Bourgay's secretary, 
reported from Berlin that Frederick William was eager for action, 
'the King of Prussia waits with impatience for an opportunity to 
do some action, which, to use his own expressions, may make some 
affronting stroke on the side of Hanover'. 
2 
The Hanoverian response to the Prussian suggestion of a 
mediating commission was too general to please the Prussians3, but 
opinions differed as to Prussian intentions. Prussian war prepar- 
ations continued4. On the 6th-August Du Bourgay informed Townshend 
that the constant tergiversations of Frederick William made it 
difficult to form any firm conclusions but that 'the general opinion 
is that he will not undertake anything'. Du Bcurgay dismissed the 
suggestions, made to him by the Prussian minister Knyphausen, that 
Prussia was really in earnest, and that Seckendorf was secretly 
encouraging this policy. Three days later Suhm argued that the 
fact that both powers were still negotiating their dispute suggested 
that there would be no conflict. Sutton, then at Brunswick, noted 
Prussian preparations at Magdeburg, and Halberstadt, but stated 
that no Prussian troops had yet left their quarters 
5 
The response at Hanover had been muted in July and early August, 
but by mid August the continued Prussian preparations led to a change 
1 Sühm to Augustus, 23 July 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f. 163. 
2 Dickens to Du Bourgay, 19 July 1729, PRO. 90/24. 
3 Sühm to Augustus, 26 July, 2 Aug. 1729, Dresden, 3378, VI f. 172,174. 
4 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 9 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/24; Sühm to Augustus, 
26 July, 9 Aug. 1729, Dresden, VI f. 166,181. 
5 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 6 Aug., Sutton to Townbhend, 12 Aug. 1729, 
PRO. 90/24,81/123; Villars, July 1729, p. 183; Marini, p. 135; D'Aix 
to Victor Amadeus, 28 Aug, 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
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in tone. The tritish pressed their allies to urge Prussia to desist 
from violent measures, and to prepare to support their represent- 
ations by force. The French were asked to press the Prussians and 
to encourage other powers to do likewise. The French secretary in 
Berlin, Sauveterre, declared to the Prussian government that France 
would support George II if he was attacked'. The French ministry 
gave the 3ritish Plenipotentiaries assurances to this effect, and 
pressed Denmark to assure Britain of her support2. On August 23rd 
the situation suddenly became more serious. Townshend received 
reports from Du Bourgay stating that Prussia had decided to attack3. 
Requests for assistance were despatched the same day to Britain's 
allies. Copies of these reports were sent by express to Cassel with 
a call for military assistance. Sutton was ordered to travel to 
Copenhagen, and persuade Denmark to hold ten or twelve thousand troops 
ready to march to assist George either in repelling a Prussian 
invasion of Hanover, or the movement of Prussian troops into 
Mecklenburg. Townshend also ordered Chesterfield and the British 
Plenipotentiaries to secure Dutch and French support4. 
On the 25th Townshend sent Newcastle copies of the recent 
despatches from Du Bourgay and commented on the envoy's statement 
1 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 20,23 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/24; Declaration by 
Sauveterre, 22 Aug. 1729, Höfler, I, 146; Marini, p. 136; Chauvelin 
to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47, f. 139. 
2 Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 21 Aug. 1729, BL. Add. 32762 f. 226; 
Chavigny to Plelo, French envoy in Denmark, PRO. 100/5. 
3 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 21,22 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/24; Chavigny to 
Chauvelin, 23 Aug. 1728, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 162-5. 
The previous day Frederick William had written to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
'Je me prepare ä la guerre et tout sera pret pour la marche vers 
le 17 de septembre', Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 532 f. 32. 
4 Townshend to Sutton, 23 Aug., to Titley, 23 Aug., to Du Bourgay, 
25 Aug. 1729, PRO. 81/123,75/53 f. 35,90/24; Diemar to William of 
Hesse-Cassel, 23 Aug. 1729, Marburg, 195. 
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that Frederick William intended to attack, 
... 'these advices are confirmed 
from all hands, 
so that there is not the least room to doubt of 
these being his Prussian Mty. 's present intentions 
... the King of Prussia's temper and character is 
such that we shall not be justified either before 
God or man if we do not take all necessary 
precautions'. 
Townshend informed Newcastle that if war broke out George 
would order a sizeable section of the British army to Hanover, and 
he conveyed George's orders that 'the Lords of the Council' should 
send an account of the state of the regiments in England, and an 
estimate of how long it would take for these regiments to be 
prepared for shipping to Germany1. 
Frederick William hoped that George's allies would desert him. 
He ordered Chambrier, his envoy in Paris, to press France not to 
intervene, and he sounded his own allies, Russia, Austria and Saxony 
about the possibilities of assistance2. Frederick William was 
swiftly disabused. None of his allies was willing to send troops, 
whilst George's allies produced a generally good response. The 
Government of Hesse-Cassel received the British request on August 25th 
1 Townshend to Newcastle, 25 Aug. 1729, PRO. 43/80; Marini, p. 136; 
King, p. 108. 
2 Frederick William to Chambrier, 20 Aug., 3 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. 
Prusse, 88; Du Bourgay to Townshend, 20,27 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/124; 
Woodward to Townshend, 8 Sept. 1729, PRO. 88/35; Pretsch, Manteuffel 
pp. 56-7. Prussia exerted diplomatic pressure on Hesse-Cassa , Chetwynd to Tilson, 9 Sept. 1729, PRO. 81/123. The Austrians pressed 
France not to intervene, arguing that the conflict was an internal 
affair of the Empire, Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 
31 Aug., Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 1,4 Sept, 1729, 
Höfler, I, 145-6,201,206. 
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and at once ordered all their regiments to 
first warningl. The Dutch readily promise 
States General voted 8,000 troops to go to 
The French promised aid, as did the Danes3 
be ready to march at the 
3 assistance, and the 
the aid of Hanover2 
The Elector of Cologne 
refused to give the Prussians permission to move troops across his 
Westphalian possessions4. 
The British were delighted by the response of their allies 
and attributed to it the Prussian decision not to invade Hanover5. 
George was particularly grateful for the Hessian assistance. On 
September 6th Townshend informed Newcastle, 
'I am by the King's express command to acquaint your 
Grace that H. M. thinks himself in a very particular manner 
obliged to the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel upon this occasion, 
1 William of Hesse-Cassel to Diemar, 27 Aug. 1729, Marburg, 195; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 28 Aug. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Caillaud 
to Tilson, 29 Aug. 1729, PRO. 81/123. The Swedish government was 
also willing to help, Poyntz to Tilson, 12 Sept. 1729, PRO. 78/192 
f. 426. 
2 Chesterfield to Townshend, 2,9 Sept. 1729, PRO. 84/305; D'Aix to 
Victor Amadeus, 4 Sept. 1729, AST. LM. tng. 35; Marini, p. 136. 
3 Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 31 Aug., to Tilson, 9 Sept,, 
Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 2,3,12 Sept. 1729, PRO. 78/192 
f. 279,343,283-4,291,349; Sutton to Townshend, 30 Aug. 1729, 
PRO. 81/123; Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 1 Sept. 1729, 
Höfler, I, 201; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sent. 1729, AE. CP. 
Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 209; Titley to Townshend, 13 Sept. 1729, 
PRO. 75/53; Woodward to Townshend, 21 Sept. 1729, PRO. 88/35; 
Chauvelin to Chammorel, 3 Oct. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 131-2. 
4 Boisseaux to Chauvelin, 2 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Cologne, 70 f. 178. 
5 Newcastle to Plenipotentiaries, 19 Aug. (os) 1729, BL. Add. 32762 
f. 276; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 11 Sept, 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 366 f. 264; 
Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 
f. 264; Worms newsletter, 23 Sept. 1729, AG. A1 2655 No. 196. 
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who by his great fidelity and readiness in executing his 
engagements, has extreamly contributed to the happy turn 
which this affair seems now to. have taken; his Prussian 
Majesty's present peacable desposition being, in the King's 
opinion in great measure owing to the early motion of the 
Hessian troops, and to the apprehensions of a strong diversion 
on that side in favour of H. I! 4. ' 
The reiterated reference to George's personal view would not 
have been lost on Newcastle whose conclusion, advanced on 
September 9th, was a good deal less specific, 
'The king's Allies have, with so much justice, vigour 
and resolution, exerted in the support of His Maty., 
which must have undeceived those, who vainly imagined 
that H. M. )vould not. have had their assistance upon 
this occasion'. 
2 
It is probable that the swift response of George's allies 
was the decisive factor in persuading Frederick William not to 
attack. As Townshend pointed out, the Prussian dominions were 
far-flung and many of them were vulnerable to attack3. In particular, 
Frederick William's Rhenish territories of Cleves and Mark, and 
his Westphalian lands of Minden, Lingen and Tecklenburg, as well 
1 Townshend to Newcastle, 6 Sept. 1729, PRO. 43/80; Townshend to 
Sutton, 11 Sept. 1729, PRO. 81/123; Plenipotentiaries to Townshend, 
3 Sept., Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 12 Sept., 1729, PTO. 78/192 
f. 291,424. Chavigny claimed that Townshend wished to show that 
George II could count on French help in all circumstances, and that 
it was a good opportunity for the French ministry to ingratiate 
itself with George and the British nation, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 
4 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 207-8. 
2 Newcastle to Twnshend, 29 Aug. (os) 1729, PRO. 43/80; Newcastle to 
Chesterfield, 2 Sept. (os) 1729, PRO. 84/580 f. 321; Newcastle to 
Poyntz, 22 Jan. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 144. 
3 
Townshend to Du Bourgay, 25 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/25. 
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as the Prussian possession of Upper Guelderland were all vulnerable 
to French and Dutch attack. 
' Indeed Chesterfield, who seems to have 
welcomed the opportunity to humiliate Prussia, suggested that Cleves 
might be offered to the Dutch. 
Whatever the reason, Prussia changed her tone in the last week 
of August. Though she continued her military preparations, and 
Du Bourgay indeed urged George to maintain his, 
2 Prussia indicated 
a willingness to negotiate. Frederick William suggested an 
arbitration of Prusso-Hanoverian differences, and on September 6th 
Du Bourgay and the Prussian ministers Borck and Knyphausen signed 
a convention in Berlin, by which both powers agreed to submit their 
differences to the arbitration of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and Saxe- 
Gotha;. the powers chosen by Britain and Prussia respectively. They 
agreed that the arbitrators should hold a Congress at Brunswick 
and'that until a settlement had been reached the men seized by 
both sides were to be detained by the arbitrating powers. The 
convention arrived at Hanover on the 8th and was immediately 
ratified by George. 
3 
The consequences of the Anglo-Prussian war scare are difficult 
to elicit and its relationship to British diplomatic thinking and 
foreign policy in 1729 has therefore received little study. nuazza, 
suggesting that Austria was responsible for the crisis, argued that 
it failed to delay the negotiations in Spain. Dunthorne argued that 
the crisis made the defence of Hanover an important priority, and 
therefore persuaded Britain to adopt a more conciliatory attitude 
1 George II pressed for the French and Dutch to threaten Cleves, 
Chavigny to Chauvelin, 23 Aug., 4 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick- 
Hanover, 47 f. 164,203. -$ 
2 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 30 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/25. 
3 Townshend to Horatio Walpole, 4 Sept. 1729, BL. Add. 9139 f. 39; 
Townshend to Sutton, 6,9 Sept. 1729, PRO 81/123. 
287 
towards Spain1. Dunthorne is certainly correct in suggesting that 
the crisis highlighted the vulnerability of the Electorate of Hanover. 
Writing to Sutton on September 2nd Townshend stated, 
'You are very well acquainted with the exposed situation 
and extent of his Majesty's frontiers, and that, as he has 
no fortifications to defend it, if he be not supported by 
a condiderable body of his allies, there will be great 
danger from the first impression'. 2 
This may well have been realised by Townshend, by George II 
and Sutton with their military training, and by visitors to the 
Electorate, but it is questionable how far they were aware of the 
acute nature of the situation prior to the 1729 war-scare. Prussian 
boasts that they could conquer the Electorate in less than four weeks 
were far from foolish3. Whatever the views held by George and 
Townshend there seems to have been little awareness in Britain of 
the vulnerable nature of the Electorate, and the war-scare must 
have come as a nasty surprise. Though preparations had been made in 
early 1727 for the movement of British troops to'the United Provinces, 
the prospect of British troops fighting for the defence of Hanover 
as a result of local disputes was very different from the situation 
in 1727, when an attack on Hanover could have been presented as part 
of an attack upon the Hanover alliance, an alliance formed to protect 
British interests. 
The Prussians argued that the British people would be unwilling 
to support a war fought for the benefit of Hanover. Sasstroff, the 
Prussian resident in Cassel, stated that Parliament would never 
1 Quazza, p. 129; Dunthorne, p. 183. 
2 Townshend to Sutton, 2 Sept. 1729, PRO. 81/123; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 
12 Aug., Chauvelin to Chavigny, 21 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick- 
Hanover, 47 f. 120,134. 
3 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 27 Aug. 1729, PRO. 90/25. 
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support George II in any war he might undertake 
for the defence of 
Hanover, and he claimed 'that the Hessian troops being voted 
for by 
Parliament, were not to act in any cause that did not regard 
Great 
Britain in particular'1. George Woodward, the British resident at 
the Court of Augustus II, reported that Manteuffel 
had told him that 
he doubted whether George would enjoy the support of the 
English 
ministers2. There was no doubt that there was 
little enthusiasm within 
Britain for a war with Prussia3. Stock prices fell on the news of 
the crisis. What is unclear is how far the crisis affected 
the 4 
views of the 'Lords of the Council'. 
In their correspondence with 
Hanover they made clear their willingness to support George, and 
there is no reason to doubt that had Prussia attacked, British troops 
would have been sent to the defence of the Electorate. Such a move 
however would have been costly and unpopular5. It could be suggested 
that the prospect of an unpopular war made the ministers in London, 
and in particular Walpole and Newcastle, less happy with the direction 
of British foreign policy. The anti-Austrian policy, represented by 
the negotiations with Spain and with the Wittelsbachs, did not make 
a conflict over Hanover less likely, and it was possible that next 
1 Caillaud to Tilson, 5 Sept. 1729, PRO. 81/123. In attempting to 
persuade George to accept arbitration Chavigny argued that, should 
he refuse, the Opposition would claim that Britain had no obligation 
to defend Hanover, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. 
Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 206. 
2 Woodward to Townshend, 29 Aug. 1729, PRO. 88/35. 
3 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 366, f. 264; 
Zambont to Manteuffel, 2 Sept. 1729, Bodl. Rawl. 120, f. 76-7. 
4 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 5,15 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 366, f. 248-9,264. 
5 Delafaye to Tilson, 22 July (os) 1729, PRO. 43/79. Townshend seems 
to have been concerned about the amount of backing he could expect 
from London, Townshend to Newcastle, 25 Aug. 1729, PRO. 43/80. 
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time Prussia would be supported by her allies. The vulnerability 
of Hanover in a cause that had no obvious bearing upon British 
interests had not been an issue for many years. When it became one 
in the summer of 1729 it posed major problems for British foreign 
policy and for the position of the government in Parliament. For 
these reasons it is not surprising that the relations between Hanover 
and Austria, Prussia and the gittelsbachs became of greater concern 
to the British ministers in the autumn of 1729, and that they were 
increasingly less willing to leave British policy in the Empire under 
the control of George and Townshend. 
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'At proven t things are at a Htand, and in all likelyhood 
there will not be much to doe untill we hear the sucess of 
1 Mr Stanhope's journey'. 
The lengthy negotiations with Spain led to most other 
issues being placed in abeyance. Austrian approaches to the 
Plenipotentiaries at Paris, requesting negotiations over a 
guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, were met with delaying 
tactics2. It was agreed to defer the answer to Austria until 
the success of Stanhope's mission was known 
3. This decision 
was taken, despite the wish of Slingelandt to combine the 
negotiations with Austria with those with Spain. The British 
were against any such combination4. They believed that the 
state of negotiations with Spain depended heavily on the 
state of relations between Austria and the Hanover allies, 
and that Spanish pliancy depended on Spanish fears of an 
0 
1 Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 3 Oct. 1729, Chewton. 
2 Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Newcastle, 5 Oct, 1729, 
BL. Add. 32763 f. 267; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 17 Oct., 1729, 
AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
3 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 26 Oct., 9 Nov. 1729, BL. Add. 
32763 f. 441,502. 
4 Kinsky claimed that Townshend wished to finish both sets 
of negotiations at once, but he advanced no evidence for 
this assertion, Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729, 
Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590 f. 9. 
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that Townshend was misleading Chavigny, and that he had less, 
trust in him than the latter believed1. As with the WolfenbUttel 
minister Schleinitz, and the Swedish diplomat Gedda, it is 
clear that the British were capable of taking foreign diplomats 
they distrusted into their apparent confidence and using them 
for negotiations2. 
On September 28th Chavigny sent Townshend the project 
for a treaty with the Witteisbachs3. Townshend's response 
4 
was hostile. On October 18th he despatched angry letters 
to Plettenberg and Chavigny. Plettenberg was informed that 
the project for a treaty sent by Chavigny included points 
that Townshend had told Plettenberg George II would not accept. 
Townshend noted the reports that Plettenberg was to visit 
London to further the negotiations and he urged him to do 
so. Such a development would remove French participation 
on the negotiations. The letter to_ Chavigny was lengthy, 
angry and suspicious. Townshend proclaimed his commitment 
to an alliance with the Wittelsbachs, but he rejected the 
project sent by Chavigny. 
'Le traittee en question est un ouvrage favori, que 
nous avons tous deux entierement a coeur;. nous avons tous 
deux les memes sentiments de vouloir affermir par toutes 
sortes de moyens cette union si hetrreuse et si respectable 
entre la grande Bretagne et la France. Nous souhaitons 
1 Townshend to Plettenberg, 12 Dec. 1729-, Aunster, 5474 f. 42. 
2 Townshend to George II, no date, PRO. 103/110; Tilson to 
Poyntz, 20 Oct. (os) 1729, Bradfer Lawrence. 
3 Chavigny to Townshend, 28 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 133-4, 
PR0.103/110;. secret article concerning Jülich-Berg guarantee, 
enclosed in Chavigny. to Townshend, 28 Sept. 1729, PRO. 103/112. 
4 Townshend to George II, 1 Oct. (os) 1729, PRO. 103/110. .e 
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egalement de wettre de justes bornes ä L'authorite Imple, 
et d'etablir par la le bönheur de L'Empire, aussi bien que 
la tranquilit( de toute L'Europe; et je seray 1'inconsolable 
si nous ne pouvons pas reussir ä perfectionner ce traite, 
qui dost nous asseurer ces grands et glorieux avantages'. 
However much he might claim to regard the projected 
Wittelsbach treaty as a touchstone of the Anglo-French alliance, 
Townshend was not prepared to accept the project sent by 
Chavigny. He claimed that it included points that even 
Plettenberg had not insisted upon when they had met at Hanover. 
He drew attention to the demand for a guarantee of the 
Wittelsbach inheritance of Jülich-Berk, dissented from the 
project's provisions with regard to Mecklenburg and noted. 
that George was amazed to see himself. charged with half the 
Bavarian subsidy 'contre ce que j'ay declare aussi souvent 
en son nom'. He replied to. the suggestion that George should 
give a secret assurance to pay peacetime subsidies to Cologne, 
with a comment that revealed sensitivity to public pressure, 
il n'y a nut exemple que le Parlement ait donna 
des subsides en. tems de paix, et que toute asseurance 
secrete par ecrit au contraire ne fera autre chose 
qu'aigrIr les esprits icy, et. de brouiller le Roy 
avec son peuple'. 
The project had proposed that the-reciprocal defensive 
guarantee should explicitly exclude Wittelsbach commitments 
in the event of hostilities that might. arise over Gibraltar 
or the Ostend Company. Townshend rejected this as dishonour- 
able and politically dangerous. Having dismissed virtually 
the entire project, he urged Chavigny to have it altered1. 
1 Townshend to Chavigny, 7 Oct. (os)1729, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 142-7; 
PRO. 103/110; Townshend to George 11,17 Oct. (os)1729, PRO. 103/110; 
Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (os)1729, PRO. 100/9; 
Chavigny to Chauvelin, 
20 Dec. 1729, AE. CP. Allemagne, 375 f. 288. 
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The Wittelsbachs judged Townshend's reply inadequate. 
The Elector of Bavaria wrote a memorandum on the subject. 
He was willing to accept George's views on Mecklenburg, and, 
in view of the approaching peace with Spain, to include 
Gibraltar in the provisions of the Treaty, but he made it 
clear that he supported the Palatine demands over the 
Jülich-Berg succession and that he expected Britain to pay 
subsidies to Bavaria. The Elector's stated-reasons for 
demanding that'"Britain should pay peacetime subsidies to 
Cologne are an interesting indication both Of the discrepancies 
between British and European views of the parliamentary system, 
and of the differing time-scales of diplomatic planning. 
Whilst most of the British ministers were concerted with a 
time scale that lasted simply to the end of the nest parliament- 
ary session, the Elector of Bavaria was concerned about the 
diplomatic situation after the next peace, 
'n'etant pas naturel d'exiger de S. A. E. quelle se 
maintienne ä ses propres frais et depenses pendant un 
temps ei considerable, dane l'etat qui. convient pour 
se garantir du mal qu-'. on voudroit luy faire en haine 
de cette alliance. S. M. B. trouvera done bien lea moyens 
de payer des sommes ai modiques sans 'tre obligee d'en 
rendre compte ä son Parlement, mail quand eile devroit 
passer par le suivant lee constitutions du Royaume, 
il ya dane le Parlement d'Angleterre des gene trop 
habils et trop affectiones ä lour Roy pour regreter. 
la petite depense qu'il s'agit de faire pour asseurer 
a B. M. l'alliance d'un maison aussy considerable dans 
l'Empire que cello de Bavibre unie aver la 
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PalatineI . 
The Elector told his foreign minister, Count Toerring, 
that, far from being accommDdating, George's attitude was 
distancing any chance of a settlement, and he instructed him 
to convey to Chavigny the Elector's anger at the French 
failure to alter the British attitude2. The Bavarians were 
firm on their financial demands, and the Elector Palatine 
on the Jülich-Berg guarantee. 
3 
Far from being a simple quarrel about money, the negoti- 
attons were closely related to the issue of British diplomatic 
strategy in the Empire. Suggestions had been made that Britain 
should use the talks at Brunswick as a springboard for an 
Anglo-Prussian alliance, an alliance that would isolate 
Austria, facilitate negotiations with Russia, reduce dependance 
upon France and the Wittelsbachs, lessen tension over 
Mecklenburg and solve some of the marital problems of George's 
4 
children. The need to avoid committing themselves over 
II 
1 'Remarques de S. A. E. de Baviere sur la lettre ecrite par 
Mylord Towsent a Mr de Chavigni', reinster, 5474 f. 29-32. 
The French were certain that Parliament would provide the 
necessary funds, Chauvelin to Chammorel, 29 Jan. 1730, 
AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 154. Charles VI was deeply suspicious 
of Bavarian plans over the Austrian succession, Charles VI 
to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 16 Nov. 1729, H6fler, I, 338. 
2 Toerring to Plettenberg, 2 Nov. 1729, Miinster, NA. 148 f. 211. 
3 Toerring to Plettenberg, 11 Nov. 1729, Münster, NA. 148 f. 214-6; 
Schmidt, Karl Philipp p. 196. Chavigny supported the stance 
of the Elector of Bavaria, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 10 Nov. 1729, 
AE. CP. Allemagne, 375 f. 216. 
4 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 4 Nov. 1729, Coxe, II, 659-665; 
Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 30 Mar. (os) 1730, 
BL. Add. 32766 f. 332; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
1,8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbuttel, 1 Alt. 22, Nr. 585 (c) f. 57,59. 
296 
Jülich-Berg was therefore clear'. Toerring noted that it 
was over this issue that the British and Wittelsbach points 
of view were furthest apart2. The Cologne minister Bellanger 
was aware of this. After his conferences with Chesterfield 
at the, Hague he informed Plettenberg that George wished to 
do nothing over Jülich-Berg that would upset Prussia. The 
following day he wrote to Chavigny of 
-'"une negotiation que l'on crest sur le tapis 
ä 
Berlin entre le Roy d'Angleterre et le Roy de Prusse. 
Si cette negotiation avoit lieu, or quelle reussit, 
l'alliance avec la maison Bre....... ne seroit plus d'une 
grande consideration pour'le Roy d'Angieterre'3. 
Chavigny was informed that there was a danger that the 
Anglo-Prussian dettlement would be effected before the treaty 
with the Wittelsbachs could be signed. On October 21st 
Bellanger had received (from Chesterfield) Townshend's reply 
to Chavigny's project. Ue had been most surprised by 
Townshend's failure to propose any expedient for adjusting 
1 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 28 Aug. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Towashend to George II, 17 Oct. (os) 1729, and George's 
undated reply, PRO. 103/110; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 10 Nov. 
1729, AE. CP. Allemagne, 375 f. 208. 
2 Toerring to Plettenberg, 11 Nov. 1729, Münster, NA. 148 f. 214. 
Chavigny claimed that a British guarantee of the Sulzbach 
inheritance would 
., 
b 'un sujet Presque perpetuel de separation 
de veues et d'inter2ets' for Britain and Prussia, Chavigny 
to Chauvelin, 18 Aug. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 150. 
3 Bellanger to Plettenberg, 28 Oct. 1729 Münster, VE. 133 f. 18; 
Bellanger to Chavigny, 29 Oct. 1729, llýüaster, VE. 133 f. 10-14, 
AE. CP.. Cologne, 70 f. 271-7; Bellanger to Chavigny, 5 Dec. 
1729, AE. CP. Oologne,. 70 f. 321; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 10 Nov. 
20 Dec. 1729, AE. CP. Allemagne 375 f. 208,288-9. Kinsky'was 
aware that the British ministry was opposed to new engage- 
ments with the Wittelsbachs, Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
20 Sept. 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590 f, 2. 
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the points at dispute1. British obstinacy was unhelpful, 
but so too was the difficulty in securing agreement among 
the Wittelsbachs. Bellanger suspected that the Palatine court 
was seeking to delay or block the negotiations2. This court 
was notoriously unpredictable. and unreliable, riven by faction 
and open to bribery. Plettenberg's tour of the Wittelsbach 
courts in the summer had revealed major differences of opinion 
between them and these were still an important factor in the 
autumn3. Bavaria and Cologne were principally concerned 
with subsidies, the Palatinate with Jülich-Berg. Thus, 
Toerring was willing to accept a compromise over the latter4 
Angry at the British reply, the Witteisbachs urged France to 
press Britain to alter her p6licy. They displayed little 
interest in altering their demands. They hoped that the 
British would change their attitude, as a result of French 
pressure, and the return to Britain of Chesterfield, regarded 
as sympathetic to the Wittelsbache5. 
The French put pressure on the British to accept the 
Witteisbach claims, Broglie pressed the government in London, 
1`Bellanger to Chavigny, 29 Oct. 1729, Münster, VE. 133 f. 10. 
Townshend had proposed that only a 'civil, dilatory .... answer in general' be sent, Townshend to George II, 1 Oct. 
(os) 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
2 Bellanger to Plettenberg, 28 Oct. 1729, Münster, VE. 133 
f. 21. Townshend was suspicious of Austrian approaches to 
the Elector Palatine, Bellanger to Gansinot, 5 July 1729, 
PRO. 84/304 f. 225. 
3 Toerring to Plettenberg, 18 May, 20 July 1729, Münster, 
NA. 148 f. 163,176. 
4 Toerring to Plettenberg 11 Nov. 1729, Münster, NA. 148 
f. 214-215. 
5 Bellanger to Chavigny, 29 Oct. 1729, AE. CP. Cologne, 70 f. 277. 
The Wittelsbachs counted on a British change of mind, Albert 
to Plettenberg 24 Jan. 1730, Münster, NB. 331 f. 7. 
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whilst the British envoys in Paris were repeatedly urged to 
yield. Townshend assured Plettenberg that he was still 
' 
determined to secure the treaty2, but he rejected the French 
expedient of a secret guarantee of the Cologne claim to 
3 
peacetime subsidies. Townshend refused to yield over 
subsidies to Bavaria and peacetime subsidies to Cologne, and 
he continued to press for George's demands over Mecklenburg, 
Jülich-Berg and the inclusion of Gibraltar and the Ostend 
Company in the reciprocal provisions of the treaty. British 
4 
obstinacy had some effect. By January the Eavarians had 
dropped their demands for a peacetime subsidy, though no 
agreement had been reached over the Cologne peacetime subsidy5. 
Rejecting the latter in December, Townshend could nevertheless 
inform Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 
1 Maffei to Victor Amadeus, 4 Dec. 1729, AST. LM. Francia, 164; 
Villars, 4 Dec. 1729, p. 200; rlarini, pp. 138,141; Poyntz to 
Newcastle, 11 Jan. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 4-5,7-9; Albert to 
Plettenberg, 23 Oct., 28 Dec. 1729, Münster, NB. 33 f. 221,3 
229; Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (os) 1729, PRO. 100/5; 
D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 28 Nov. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; 
Townshend to Plettenberg, 12 Dec. (os) 1729, Münster, 5474 
f. 42; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 29 Jan. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 
f. 154-5; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 9 Feb., Broglie to Chauvelin, 
23 Feb. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369 f. 174,210-213; Minutes 61 proceed- 
ings at Conference of Newcast'e, Townshend and Broglie, 
10 Feb. (os) 1730, PRO. 36/17 f. 97-8. 
2 Townshend to Plettenberg 11 Nov. (os), 12 Dec. 1729, Münster, 
5474 f. 33-4,42. 
3 Townshend to Broglie, 3 Nov. (os) 1729, PRO. 100/5; 'Account 
of the Difference between the several projects of the Treaty 
with the Four Electors', PRO. 103/110. 
4 Townshend to Chavighy, 11 Nov. (os) 1729, Munster, 5474 f. 34-6; 
Poyntz to Newcastle, 11 Jan., 10 Feb. 1730, Newcastle to 
Poyntz, 6 Feb. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 4,206,269-70. 
5 Toerring to Plettenberg, 13 Jan. 1730, Monster, NA. 148 f. 232. 
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'..... the Treaty with the Electors is in a manner 
adjusted, in every particular except the subsidies. 
The lengths H. M. has gone in this affair, particularly 
in the point relating to Berg and Juliers, in compliance 
with the court of France, will he hopes, convince the 
cardinal, that H. H. has nothing more at heart than the 
preservation of the present system, and the continuance 
of that perfect union, which has hitherto subsisted 
between the two crowns, so much to their mutual advantage 
and glory'1. 
The British yielded to French pressure to give the 
Elector Palatine a secret guarantee of the Wittelsbach claims 
to the Jülich-Berg inheritance. The French were informed 
of George's determination to finish the Electoral Treaty2. 
Despite these hopeful signs major differences still 
existed, and neither among the British ministry nor amongst 
the Wittelsbach Electors was there a whole-hearted commitment 
to the treaty that matched the French determination to secure 
its signature3. A significant deterioration in Anglo-Wittelsbach 
1 Townshend to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 11 Dec. (os)1729, 
BL. Add. 48982 ß. 205. 
I 
2 'Pro : of letter to C Broglie - turned as a ý pro mem: r', no date, 'Hem: delivered to C Broglie', 8 Dec. (os)1729, PRO. 100/5; [Tilson ] to Poyntz, 20 Jan. (os)1730, BL. Add. 48982 f. 218; on 
12 February (os) 1730 Newcastle sent a project for the Treaty 
to Paris, Negotiations then languished till June. 
3 Townshend to George 11,17 Oct. (os)1729, PRO. 103/110; Horatio 
Walpole to Poyntz, 4 Nov. 1729, Coxe, II, 659-663. The Elector 
of Mainz displayed little support for the projected treaty, 
whilst George was angered by the conduct. of Mainz and Cologne 
at the Imperial Diet, D'Aix to Victor Amadeus, 24 Oct. 1729, 
AST. LM. Ing. 35; Albert to Plettenberg, 24 Jan. 1730, bünster, NB. 331 
f. 7. Newcastle wrote, 'His Maty. thinks it by no means advisable 
that this Treaty should be concluded till we can see further 
what turn the publick affairs are like to take', Newcastle to 
Poyntz, 12 Feb. (os)1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 325. 
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relations was caused by a major quarrel over the municipal 
rights of the town of Hildesheim. The Elector of Cologne, 
as Bishop mf Hildesheim, sought to limit these rights, rights 
guaranteed by the Elector of Hanover. Conflict was only 
narrowly averted and the Erench blamed the ministers in 
Hanover for endangering the new alliance. Chavigny attempted 
to defuse tension, by assuring Plettenberg that the ministers 
in Hanover had acted without royal authority1. However, the 
Wittelsbachs were livid at the Hanoverian conduct, which 
threatened the authority of the Elector of Cologne in all 
his Westphalian bishoprics, and which evoked memories of the 
struggles earlier in the decade over the municipal and religious 
liberties between the Wittelsbachs and the protestant German 
powers. Toerring informed Plettenberg that the Elector of 
Bavaria was scandalized at Hanoverian conduct. His anger 
was shared by Fleury and the French ministry2. 
Far more significant in delaying matters, than the dispute 
over Hildesheim, was the struggle for, control within the 
British ministry. This struggle persisted until the resignation 
of Townshend in May 1730. It is a struggle that has received 
singularly little scholarly attention. The absence of a 
biography of Townshend is particularly serious for this period, 
1 Poyntz to Newcastle, 11 Jan. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 8; Chauvelin 
to Chavigny, 22 Feb., 7 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Allemagne, 376 
f. 77,114; Baron Stain to Chavigny, 20 Feb. 1730, AE. CP. ' 
Brunswick-Hanover, 48 . 13; Naumann, 
Osterreich, England 
und das Reich p. 164. hauvelin regarded the Elector o 
Cologne's anger over Hildesheim as very important, Poyntz 
and Harrington to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 343. 
2 Chavigny to Plettenberg 26 Dec. 1729, Minster, NB. 286 f. 62; 
Toerring to Plettenberg, 24 Dec. 1729, Munster, NA. 148 f. 225; 
Albert to Plettenberg, 31 May, 3 July 1730, Monster, NB. 33$ 
f. 11,22; Chavigny to Townshend, 28 Sept. 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
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as is the restricted or prohibited access to the papers of 
Townshend, Horatio Walpole and Stephen Poyntz now held in 
Raynham, Wolterton and Althorp. Given the restricted nature 
of the archival sources available it is not surprising that 
scholarly comment on Townshend's fall has been brief, and, 
at times, superficial. Browning argued that it was Townshend's 
loss of control over foreign policy to Walpole and Newcastle, 
that made his fall inevitable, 'If he could no longer command 
foreign policy, it seemed but a matter of time until he either 
left or was asked to leave the government''. Speck also saw 
foreign affairs as decisive. He stated that Walpole 'negotiated 
the Treaty of Seville .... behind Townshend's back .... this 
independent initiative in foreign policy brought to a head 
a growing antagonism between the two ministers ..... After 
some months waiting for events to justify him, Townshend 
Z 
resigned'. Langford's analysis was similar, 
'Once Walpole began to formulate his own line in 
foreign policy, there could be only one conclusion, and 
that a direct clash ... Townshend was committed to a 
strategy ..... based on the assumption that the Emperor 
was the greatest menace to the peace of Europe and to 
the interests of Britain. Walpole, under the pressure 
of his domestic difficulties, could only see that Spain.... 
posed an equal threat .... Walpole's chief concern was.... 
peace and retrenchment. There could be no compromise ..... 
Townshend, in no position to challenge Walpole's 
1 Browning, p. 57. 
2 Speck, p. 232. The claim that Walpole negotiated the Treaty 
of Seville behind Townshend's back is unfounded. 
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predominance at court and in the commons ..... '1. 
The general consensus, therefore, is to link Townshend's 
fall to a major difference of opinion over foreign policy, 
and to regard it as the inevitable consequence of his 
disagreement with Walpole. Walpole is not seen as having 
been in danger, and George's role is discounted2. Such an 
analysis underestimates the severity of the crisis and ignores 
its longevity. Government policy, particularly its foreign 
policy, -was seriously affected by the clash between the two 
ministers, a clash made more serious by its coincidence with 
the commencement of the. parliamentary session. Had Walpole 
been as strong as is believed he would have removed Townshend 
before May 1730. Once the attempts of George and Caroline 
to reconcile the two men had failed at the end of 1729, there 
was no reason for Walpole to keep Townshend in the ministry, 
unless either he feared his opposition in the House of Lords, 
a possibility that casts doubt on Walpole's control of the 
peers, or he was unable to persuade George to dismiss him, a 
possibility that casts doubt on Walpole's influence with his 
royal master. 
The parliamentary session of 1730 witnessed a determined 
effort by the opposition to use foreign policy issues to 
ensure the removal of Walpole. This coindided with a con- 
tinued lack of control by Walpole over the ministry. 
Wilmington, Dorset and Dodington were unreliable, and the 
government lost the support of Townshend, "Carteret and 
Winchelsea. George's support for Walpole was unclear; it 
1 Langford, The Eighteenth Centur pp. 99-100; Coxe, I, 332-9; 
Williams, p. 201; Owen, Eighteenth Century p. 43. 
2 Jones, Britain and the World pp. 191-2; Dickinson, Walpole 
pp. 125, -. 
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was widely believed, in diplomatic circles in late 1729, 
that George preferred Townshend's policies to those of 
Walpole. If this is correct then the crisis of 1729-1730 
is of greater importance than historians have perhaps 
recognised. 1730 could be seen as a foretaste of 1742 and 
1744, when George was forced to part with Walpole and 
Carteret respectively, against his better judgement. 
A lengthy examination of the available archives does 
not permit any definite conclusions. It does, however, 
suggest that the situation was more complex than has been 
realised hitherto, and that differences of opinion over 
diplomatic issues were crucial to the quarrel between 
Walpole and Townshend. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
MINISTERIAL CRISIS 
'I1 paroit aussy depuis son retour en Angleterre, qu'il 
a laisse tous ses interäts d'Allemagne en deja de la mer, 
n'agissant en Angleterre, que suivant les principes et les 
interrts de la nation Angloise'. 
Count Toerring of George II1. 
The views of George II in the winter of 1729-30 are 
unclear. There are only a few hints as to his opinions, and 
most of them are not completely reliable. In particular, 
George's views with regard to relations with Austria, France, 
Prussia and the Wittelsbachs are unclear. In addition, there 
is little evidence about his relations with Walpole, Townshend, 
and the principal, actual or potential competitors for the 
Secretaryships of State, Chesterfield, Methuen, Stanhope 
and Horatio Walpole2. The major source for George's views 
is the despatches of foreign diplomats in London. The King's 
attitudes were only rarely alluded to in the correspondence 
1 Toerring to Plettenberg, 13 Jan. 1730, Münster, NA. 148 f. 232. 
Chavigny complained, 'Je ne reconnois point Mylord Townshend 
non plus que vous depuis qu'il a repasse la mer', Chavigny to 
Plettenberg, 16 Feb. 1730, Monster, NB. 286 f-90- 
2 Scarborough and Henry Pelham were also mentioned, Farle 's 
Bristol News pi er 11 Oct. (os)1729, Lady Mary Howard to the 
Earl of arise, 27 Dec. (os)1729, Carlisle, p. 62. Reichenbach 
reported that the principal contenders were Chesterfield, 
Harrington and Horatio Walpole, Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 
24 Mar. 1730, PRO. 90/27. 
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of the leading British ministers. 
The surviving evidence suggests that George was interested 
in an alliance with the Witteisbachs, but only upon his own 
terms. He did not wish to pay large subsidies1, had little 
interest in supporting the Wittel®bach claim to the Jülich- 
Berg succession, and demanded that the Wittalsbachs support 
him over Mecklenburg2. George's attitude towards Austria 
was not one of simple hostility. Rather, like Townshend, 
he was deeply suspicious of Austria, but hoped to persuade 
or force the Austrians'. into good relations3. On November 11th, 
before the news of the Treaty of Seville had reached Tondon, 
but when it already seemed likely that Stanhope would succeed 
in his negotiations, Townshend informed Waldegrave of his 
views on Anglo-Austrian relations, 
'however the Maritime Powers may be engaged in" 
interest to prevent any division of the Austrian 
territories, this is by no means a proper time to 
propose a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction '. 
He argued that much would depend on Maria Theresa's 
marriage, and stated that it was best for Charles VI, 
'to put an end to-the present disturbances an soon an 
possible, and by so doing put the Maritime Powers in a 
condition to renew their ancient friendship with him'.. 
4 
1 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 20 Dec. 1729, AE. CP. Allemagne, 375 
f. 287. 
2 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 20 Decl. 1729, AE. CP. Allemagne, 375. 
f. 286-7,289-90. 
3 Chesterfield to Townshend, 7 July 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 212. 
Poyntz shared this view of the need to coerce Austria,, 
Poyntz to Delafaye, 8 Ap. 173 PRO. 78/194 f. 77. 
4 Townshend to Waldegrave, 31 Ot. (os), to Chesterfield, j 
10 Oct. 1729, PRO. 80/65 f. 216-8,84/305. 
1 
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This was hardly the language of the anti-Austrian hawk, 
seen by many historians. It seems that George shared 
Townshend's views1. As soon as Austria was prepared to 
cooperate in the Empire with Hanover, and in Europe with 
Britain, then an alliance couldlibe negotiated. There were 
two problems with this approach}. Firstly, it left the future 
of the French alliance in doubt. Bro , lie noted on 
January 2nd 
1730, 'Le Roy d'Angleterre a de conserver nostre alliance 
pour soutenir ses etats en Allemagne'2. However, if Angl 
Austridn or Anglo-Prussian relations improved then this 
situation would not pertain, and, whatever the British ministry 
might need France for, George II would need her for nothing. 
It was only partly due to Hanoverian territorial interests 
in Bremen, Verden and Mecklenburg that George wanted an j 
Austrian, and/or Prussian alliance. The principal spur for 
him came from the more general need for Hanoverian security. 
Thus, far from George being defeated on Maröh 16 1731, when 
the Second Treaty of Vienna was signed and Hanoverian territ- 
orial demands she. ved, albeit temporarily, the treaty was a 
triumph for George because it brought Hanover security. 
Broglie was sceptical about the degree of commitment against 
Austria shown by both Townshend and George. On December ist 
he reported that Townshend wanted to maintain an Austrian 
presence in Italy, and to diminish, not destroy, Austrian 
1 There is, however, no evidence supporting the claim advanced 
in the Amsterdam Gazette that George had written two letters 
to Charles promising never to execute-the Treaty of 
Seville by force, Poyntz to Keene, 14 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 
32765 f. 250. 
2 Broglie to Chauvelin, 2 Jan. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369 f. 10. 
In the first two months of 1730 the British pressed the 
French to threaten Prussia with military action in the 
event of a Prussian attack upon Hanover, Newcastle to 
Poyntz, 22 Jan (os), Poyntz to Keene, 9 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 
32765 f. 143-4,162. 
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authority in the peninsula. 
1 
Aside from French support, the second major problem with 
Townshend and George's Austrian policy was that Walpole was 
impatient with the progress of British foreign policy. It was not 
that Walpole disagreed substantially with Townshend's Austrian 
policy. Browning's claim that 'Walpole and Newcastle, by 
repudiating Townshend's anti-Habsburg policy, were preparing for 
the day when the artificial situation that induced Britain and 
France to be allies had dissolved, ' is inaccurate. Townshend's 
2 
policy was not 'anti-Habsburg', and his insistence that a guarantee 
of the Pragmatic Sanction was dependant upon an Austrian commitment 
over Maria Theresa's husband, was to be maintained, after his 
resignation, in the negotiations for the Second Treaty of Vienna. 
Walpole's concern was rather with the cost; in time and money, 
produced by Townshend's Policy. He'wanted; a swift settlement of 
European problems, an end to heavy British' military expenditure and 
extensive subsidy obligations, and reduction in taxation. The 
political cost of the French alliane, in terms of providing ready 
issues for the parliamentary opposition wag also a factor, and! in 
1730, disputes with the French over Dunkir and St. Lucia madelthis 
problem more serious. 
3 
Whether Walpole, in the autumn of 1729, already sought to 
4 discard the French alliance is unclear. It is more likely th t the 
acute parliamentary crisis over Dunkirk in February 1730 and tie 
l Broglie to Chauvelin, 1 Dec. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 367 f. 176-6. ` 
2 Browning, p. 56. 
3 Dunthorne, p. 202. 
4 Dureng argued that the Walpoles had already determined upon 
reconciliation with Austria, Dureng, p. 90. ' 
{ 
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Iy I, 
return of the pro-Austrian William Stanhope to Britain in the 
summer of 1730, led Walpole to this conclusion, and that he had not 
already decided to abandon France at the time of his quarrel withI 
Townshend. At that time it is probable that Walpole had already 
determined to seek to lessen British dependence upon France. This 
was a wish shared by George and Townshend, Chesterfield and Stanhope. 
ýh 
Thus, both Walpole and Townshend had a similar long-term diplomatic 
strategy: a rapprochement with Austria, the guarantee of the 
Pragmatic Sanction, upon terms, and a lessened dependence upon 
France. Such a situation would permit Walpole to retrench, and 
leave Townshend and George in a glorious diplomatic position. 
In diplomatic circles there was little doubt of George's support for 
Townshend, and hostility to Walpole's attempt to supplant him.. 
y clo honno part quo is Roy d'Angleterre, 
n'aime ny n'estime dann le fond le Chev. 
Robert Walpole'. 2 
There was less agreement as to the cause of the dispute between 
the two Ministers, though most blamed it on differences over the ' 
Witteisbach negotiations, and, in particular over the subsidies. It 
was generally held that Townshend was in favour of the latter and 
Walpole against. 
3 A more specific explanation was advanced in 
1 George II to Townshend, no date, Coxe, If, 536-7. 
2 Broglie to Chauvelin, 28 Nov. (quote), 15 Dec. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 367 
f. 170-1,212; Chavigny to Chauvelin, 19 Sept. 1729, AE. CP. 
Brunswick-Hanover, 47 f. 256; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 5,19,26 
Dec. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; LTilson%to Poyntz, 20 Jan. (OS) 1730, 
BL. Add. 48982 f. 218. 
3 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 4 Nov. 1729, Coxe, II, 659-601 D'Aix to 
Victor Amadeus II, 17 Oct. 1729, AST. LM. Ing. 35; Vignola to the 
Doge of Venice, 28 Oct. 1729, ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 203. Townshend kept 
his correspondence with Chavigny a secret from his colleagues, 
Townshend to George II, 1 Oct, (OS) 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
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February 1730, by Plettenberg and Chavigny. On February 5th 
Plettenberg informed Chavigny that the cause of the dispute was a 
project, concerted between Townshend and the Wolfenbdttel minister 
Schleinitz, by which the Elector Palatine was to be offered the 
payment of all the money owed him by Britain if he agreed to desist 
from demanding George II's guarantee for the Jalich-Berg succession. 
Townshend stated that the money could be found by George II, but 
that Walpole had to be kept in ignorance of the project. According 
to Plettenberg, Schleinitz informed Fleury by a letter of part of 
the scheme, and Fleury received it when with Horatio Walpole whom 
he showed it tq. The latter immediately informed his brother, by 
courier, and, though Townshend said that he knew nothing of the 
scheme and claimed that the project was Schleinitz's, a breach was 
caused. 
1 
Eleven days later Chavigny confirmed, in part, Plettenberg's 
account. He claimed that the Palatine debt was 'une obligation 
publique avoUee et reconnüe de tout* la nation, representee par 1e 
Parlement', and that this had authorised Townshend to promise his 
help in repaying it. He informed P}ettenberg, 
'J'ay sjeu de Mylord Townshendýluy mete ce qui a donne 
lieu a la jalousie que Messieurs Walpole oIt consue contre luyý. 
2 
1 Plettenberg to Chavigny, 5 Feb. 1730, AE. CP. Cologne, 71 f. 44-5= 
Horatio Walpole to Townshend, 4 Aug., to! Walpole, 4 Aug. 172, 
2 PRO. 78/192, f. 180-2,184-5. Chavigny to Plettenberg, 16 Feb. 1730, Münster, NB. 286 f. 90+1, 
AE. CP. Allemagne, 376 f. 88-9. A similar account was sent by D'Aix, 
Marini, pp. 137-8. The Elector Palatine, Karl Philipp, had made it 
clear to the British that support over Mecklenburg was dependent 
upon the payment of the debt, and British support over the JBlich- 
Berg succession, Karl Philipp to Gansinot, 30 June 1729, PRO. 84/304 
f. 223. The debt arose from the expenses of Palatine troops who had 
fought in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish succession under 
terms of a subsidy agreement with Britain and the United Provinces. 
The Elector Palatine had pressed hard for the payment of the debt, 
memorandum about arrears demanded by Elector Palatine, enclosed witt 
Schmidman, Palatine resident in London, to -, 6 Feb. 1728, 
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Coxe included in his biography of Sir Robert Walpole an 
explanation that also attributed the rift to actions and policies 
commenced by Townshend, a contrast to the view of Townshend as 
dispirited, enfeebled by illness, and largely passive in the face 
of Walpole's growth in authority and power. Coxe claimed that 
Townshend was resolved to form 'a new administration', and sought 
to replace Newcastle by Chesterfield. Coxe's account is not very 
sympathetic to Townshend: 'He became more obsequious to the King's 
German prejudices,. paid his court with unceasing assiduity, and 
appeared to have gained so much influence, that he thought himself 
capable of obtaining'the appointment of Chesterfield '. 
l 
According to Coxe, the Queen, never a supporter of Chesterfield, 
whom she thought a client of Lady Suffolk's, helped Walpole to 
block Chesterfield's appointment, and Townshend's second choice, 
2 
Methuen, failed also, though Coxe does not explain the latter failure. 
Coxe's account attributes much to the influence of the Queen, and 
there was general agreement among the'diplomats in London that 
Caroline actively backed Walpole against Tow"nshend. 
3 
How important 
4 this support was is less clear. However successful Walpole and 
2 (cont. from note 2 on previous page) Townshend to S chmidman, 17 May 1728, PRO. 100/15; Platen de Linn, Palatine Minister in London, 
memoranda to George II, 6 Ap. 1730,30 Jan. 1731, PRO. 106/16. 
Townshend complained that the Elector Palatine was unwilling to discuss the terms of an alliance with the Wittelsbachs unless his financial demands over the Spanish debt were met, Townshend to 
Baron de Beveren, 18 Aug. 1729, PRO. 103/110. 
1 Coxe, It 335; B. Kemp, Sir Robert Walpole (1976) p. 51; Ossorio to 
Victor Amadeus II, 3 Ap. 17 0, AST. LM. Ing. 37. 
2 It was widely reported that Chesterfield was to be appointed 
secretary, Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 28 Oct. 1729, ASV. LM. Ing. 
98 f. 203; O'Rourke to James III, 5 Nov. 1729, RA. 131/165. 
3 Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbtlttel, 1 Alt 22, 
Nr. 590 f. 9. 
4 Foreign diplomats were certain of Caroline's great influence in 
this period, Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 29. 
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Caroline might have been 
Walpole failed to remove 
be the case that Walpole 
Lord Presidency of the C 
the Duke of Devonshire. 
to this issue, 
in preventing the appointment of Chesterfield 
Townshend at the end of 1729. It seems to 
attempted to transfer Townshend to the 
Duncil, a post made vacant by the death of 
Zamboni attributed the ministerial rivalry 
'La brouillerie ... entre Walpole et Townshend, j'ay 
ete 
assure de fort bonne part 
a cause tout cela, d'auta 
tems ä procurer la charge 
ayant immediatement apres 
que la mort du Duc de Devonshire ... 
it que Walpole, qui vise depuis long. 
de secretaire d'Etat ä son frere ... 
la mort du dit seigneur conseille et 
presse Mylord Townshend de vouloir s'accommoder de 1'employ de 
President du Conseil pour faire place ä son frere, Mylord ... 
rejette cela avec. la derniere fermete. '1 
Peter Wentworth clearly had a different source for two days 
later he noted that Townshend was to have the Presidency added to 
his Secretaryship. 2 It. would be easy to multiply these various 
reports, but such a process is not very helpful. All the single- 
causal explanations of the rift and dubious, and it is probably more 
helpful to note that the divisions over. policy seem to have been 
linked to differences over the composition of the Ministry and 
1 Zamboni to Manteuffel and the Marquis de Fleury, 4 Oct. 1729, Bodl. 
Rawl. 120 f. 79; D'Aix to Victor Amadeus It, 17 Oct. 1729, AST. LM. 
Ing. 35; Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 24 Oct., Kinsky to Ferdinand 
Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbdttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590 f. 6,9; 
Broglie to Chauvelin, 28 Nov. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 367 f. 170; Zamboni 
to the Duke of Modena, 13 Jan. 1730, AS. Modena, LM. Ing. 19; 
Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 13 Jan. 1730, ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 237. 
Robinson wrote to Horatio Walpole of the possibility of his 'coming 
to the chief direction of foreign affairs', Robinson to Horatio 
Walpole, 7 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 913.9 f. 48. 
2 Peter Wentworth 
, 
to his brother the Earl of Strafford, 25 Sept. (OS) 
1729, BL. Add. 22227 f. 92. 
ý. 
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quarrels over place. The relationship between the disputes over 
policy and those over place is an obscure one. Comments such as 
Hervey's, 'they say the conclusion. of this treaty has not secured 
Don Carlos's succession in Tuscany more effectually than it has 
defeated the hopes of Ld. Chesterfield in the cockpit, ' are unclear. 
' 
Whether ministers supporting the same policy naturally coalesced and 
sought posts for each other, or whether the quest for office took 
precedence, is difficult to, ascertain. Given the fact that 
negotiations with the Wittelsbachs only became a divisive issue in 
the early autumn of 1729, whilst Townshend had been actively 
sponsoring Chesterfield, 
2 
and Newcastle, Stanhope, from before this 
period, it is clear that, however much these negotiations provided an 
occasion for conflict, they were not the original cause of division. 
It could be suggested that a conflict fuelled by ambition for office 
required an issue of policy in order to give credibility to the 
dispute, but it is hardly likely that Walpole would have chosen the 
Wittelsbach negotiations out of preference. The personal interest 
of the King, and Townshend's knowledge of, and willingness to support, 
Hanoverian interests, made it a dangerous issue. Townshend was 
heavily criticised by the other ministers for his pro-Hanoverian 
stance. In January 1730 Horatio Walpole informed Poyntz of 
Townshend's 'endeavours to make all measures electorall, preferrable 
to all other considerations, which is entirely agreeable to the 
King's sentiments'. 
3 
Of all the ministers Townshend was the most sensitive to 
Hanoverian interests, and this shared concern of king and minister is 
1 Hervey to Stephen Fox, 18 Nov. (OS) 1729, West Suffolk CRO. 941/474 
p. 94. 
2 Townshend to Chesterfield, 22 (OS), 25 Ap. 1729, PRO. 84/304 f. 61,65. 
3 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 21 Jan. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 667. 
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more in evidence in the winter of 1729-1730, than the few signs'of 
personal disagreements between the two. 
Aside from the Wittelsbach negotiations-another diplomatic 
issue developed that winter that attracted George's personal interest 
and was directly related to Hanoverian interest: an-alliance with 
Prussia. The progress of the Congress held at Brunswick, to settle 
Anglo-Prussian differences, was, despite hopes to the contrary, 
slow. 
l British suspicions of Prussia continued, and, indeed, at the ' 
beginning of 1730, the British pressed Sweden to increase their 
garrisons in Swedish Pomerania. Anglo-Swedish subsidy talks were 
seen, by the British ministry, as a basis for securing Swedish forces 
against Prussia, in the event of war. 
2 The Electorate of Hanover 
remained on a war-footing, to-the anger of Frederick William. 
3 The 
British were very-concerned by the improvement'of Prusso-Saxon 
relations over the winter, and feared that the journey which took 
Frederick William to Dresden in February-had produced a secret 
treaty. On January 31s. t Townshend informed Edward Finch that he had 
been instructed by George to instruct him 'that he has received 
secret advices concerning the warlike preparations of the King of 
1 Du Bourgay to Townshend, 20 Sept. 1729, PRO. 90/2'5; Tilson to 
Waldegrave, 21 Oct. (OS), 4Nov. 1729, Chewton; Seckendorf to 
Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Dec.., Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 23 Dec. 
1729, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585 (c) f. 89,590 f. 16-17; 
Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 16 Jan. 173Q, Vienna, Kinsky, Kart. 
2(b); Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 6,20 Jan. 1730, ASV. LM. Ing. 98 
f. 235,243; Townshend to Baron Stain, 21 Nov. 1729, PRO. 100/15; 
Townshend to Diemar, 27 Jan. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 105; Post man 
5 Feb. (OS) 1730; Daily Post Boy 7 Feb. (QS) 1730. 
2 Townshend to Edward Finch, 3 Feb. (OS) 1730, PRO. 95/54 f. 27-9; 
Poyntz to Newcastle, 10 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 204-5. 
3 Frederick William to Ferdinand Albrecht, 24 Feb. 1730, Wolfenbdttel, 
1 Alt 22, Nr. 532 f. 64; London Journal 31 Jan. (OS) 1730; Post Man 
and Historical Account 7 Feb. (OS) 1730; Daily Post Boy 9 Feb. (OS) 
1730; Du Bourgay to Townshend, 21 Mar. 1730, PRO. 90/26. 
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Prussia, and his dangerous designs of disturbing the peace of that 
part of Germany. These advices have been confirmed from several 
quarters, and we also learn from Holland, that the Kinq of Prussia 
reinforces his garrisons on those frontiers and appears inclinable 
to do all the mischief he is able, as soon as he can-have a proper 
occasion. His scheme seems to be, if the Emperor does not agree 
with the allys of the Treaty of Seville, to begin hostilitys by 
attacking the King's German Dominions. '1 
2 
There was no doubt of Townshend and George's fears of Prussia. 
Equally, Frederick William made no secret of his anger with George 
and his ministers, particularly his Hanoverian ministers, and he 
blamed George for the slow progress at Brunswick. 
3 Caroline and 
Walpole hoped to end these disputes and to secure a marital union 
between the houses of Hanover and Prussia. It was probably this 
that accounted for their marked opposition to Wittelsbach 
pretensions. The repeated entreaties of. Sophia Dorothea, the 
Queen of Prussia, had finally born fruit, even if they had had more 
effect upon her sister-in-law, Caroline, than her brother, 
1 Townshend to Edward Finch, 20 Jan. (OS) 1730, PRO. 95/54, f. 5; 
Newcastle to Poyntz, 21,22 Jan. (OS) 1730,. BL. Add. 32765, f. 105-6, 
143-4; Titley to Townshend, 21 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 32766, f. 67; 
Du Bourgay to Townshend, 3, '17,21 Jan. 1730, - PRO.. 90/26. It was 
believed that Frederick William intended to attack Hanover and 
Swedish Pomerania, Sauveterre to Chauvelin, 7 Feb. 1730, AE. CP. 
Prusse 90, f. 73, Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 4 Mar, 1730, 
Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585(d), f. 80; ' Poyntz to Delafaye, 8 
Feb. 1730, PRO. 78/194, f. 39; Titley to Tilson, 25 Feb. 1730, PRO. 
75/54, f. 114; Townshend to Diemar, 27 Jan. (OS), to Baron Stain, 
27 Jan., to Dehn, 20 Feb. 1730, PRO. 100/16; Villars, 8 Jan., 1 Feb. 
1731, pp. 205,210; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 31 Jan. 1730, 
Marburg, 199. 
2 George II' to Townshend, no date, Coxe II 538; Diemar to Landgrave 
Karl, 7 Feb. 1730, Marburg, 198. - 3 Ferdinand Albrecht to Kinsky, 16 Jan. 1730, Seckendorf to Ferdinand 
Albrecht, 30 Jan. 1730, Frederick William I to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
10 Feb. 1730, Wolfenbdttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590, f. 26-7, Nr. 585 (d), 
f. 38-9, Nr. 532, f. 61. 
_ 
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George. l Caroline resumed her efforts to secure a marital alliance. 
Lodge, who referred to Caroline as 'an ardent patroness of the 
scheme', nevertheless saw Walpole as its prime exponent, although, ;J 
he produced no evidence for his view. 
'His first expedient for the preservation of peace was a 
2 
supreme effort to detach Prussia from the Austrian alliance. ' 
There is not much evidence to support this assertion, though 
Reichenbach, the Prussian agent, informed Grumbkow on April 7th, 
'Le Chev. Walpole a dit a un de ses amis qu'on devroit 
detacher Le Roy de Prusse de. l'Empr. coute qu'il coute, ... 
le meme Chev. Walpole qui est 'a present le favori unique de 
la Reine a conseilles au Roy d'Angleterre de ceder dans 
l'affaire de Bronswic, ayant allegue pour raison qu'on pourroit 
obtenir des avantages plus grandes d'un autre cote et qu'on 
pourroit absolument obliger par La Mr L'Empr. de faire la 
paix. Le Chev. Walpol 
näussi d'accord ävec La Reine d'Ang. - 
'3 par rapport aux marriages 
There is no doubt of George's lack of enthusiasm for a new 
approach to Prussia. His correspondence with Townshend about the 
A 
projected mission of a British diplomat to Berlin to propose a III 
marital alliance, reveals distrust of Prussia and dislike of the 
mission. He believed, correctly, that the mission would fail, and 
he feared that it would irritate France and Spain. George was also 
1 Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729,30 Jan. 1730, 
Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585, (c) f. 59, (d), f. 38; Copy of the 
paper laid before the Cabinet Council by the Reverend Mr Villa; 
being sent over from the Queen of Prussia to His Majesty to 
represent the State of affairs at the court of Berlin', no date, 
2 Hull, DDHO 3/10; Dureng, p. 88. Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia p. 21. On Walpole 's keen support 
for the approach to Berlin, Chammorel to Chauvelin, 15 June 1730, 
AE. CP. Ang. 370, f. 127; Horn, Great Britain and Europe p. 147. 
3 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 7 Ap. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. Pulteney 
argued in favour of a Prussian alliance, Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 
14 Mar. 1730, PRO. 90/27. - 
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worried that his honour would be insulted by Frederick William. He j1 
realised that the mission was incompatible with the negotiations 
with the Wittelsbachs, 
l 
and he made it clear to Townshend that he 
2 
regarded the latter as 'of much more consequence'. 
Given this attitude it might be suggested that the eventual 
despatch of Sir Charles Hotham to Berlin was as much proof of 
George's inability to control the situation, as the failure of the 
Wittelsbach negotiations, the fall of Townshend, and the defeat of 
the aspirations of Chesterfield, a diplomat who had received much 
praise from both George and Townshend since he began his mission at 
the Hague. 
3 If such an interpretation is adopted then Walpole can 
be seen to have defeated both Townshend and George in 1730. However, 
this was not the case. The selection of Hotham for the mission seems 
an interesting indication of George's power. Hotham. was a Gentleman 
of the Bedchamber to George II, and a serving army officer. 
4 
Grumbkow referred to him as a 'creature' of George II, and noted the 
description of him as 'un fort aimable home , bon vivant, officier 
1 George was correct in this view. The Prussians demanded British 
support over the Jülich-Berg inheritance as one of the conditions 
for any Anglo-Prussian marriage, Hotham to Townshend, 13 May, 
Frederick William to Reichenbach, 13 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. George 
told Chavigny that Frederick William was contemptible and could not 
be trusted, Chavigny to Chauvelin, 4Sept. 1729, AE. CP. Brunswick- 
Hanover, 47 f. 221. The Palatine court argued that the increase of 
Prussian territorial power was a threat to Hanoverian interests, 
'Contre-Remarques Palatines ... ', 8 Aug. 1729, PRO. 103/110. 2 George to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George, 8 
Feb. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 534-5. Townshend argued that once the 
treaty with the Wittelsbachs was concluded the issue of the Spanish 
garrisons could be brought before the Imperial Diet, ZTilson/ to 
Poyntz, 20 Jan(OS )1730, BL. Add. 48982 f. 222-3. 
3Gansinot to Plettenberg, 13 Sept. 1729, Münster, NB. 259 f. 209; 
Broglie to Chauvelin, 15 Dec. 1729, AE. CP. Ang. 367 f. 214- 
4 A. W. Stirling, The Story of the Hothams and their Family Papers 
1066-1771 (2 vols. 1918), 1,142-8; Sedgwick, II, 152; Broglie to 
Chauvelin, 13 Mar. 1730,. AE. CP. Ang. 369 f. 302. 
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et chasseur et on la choisi pour 1'humeur du Roy ... ' Reichenbach `i 
had a low opinion of him, and commented on his lack of experience. 
l 
Whatever his merits as a diplomat the crucial factor about Hotham, 
who was also Chesterfield's brother-in-law, was that the King could 
rely upon him. Du Bourgay the British Envoy Extraordinary, at 
-Berlin had, in 1727, been severely reprimanded for exceeding orders, 
and it is clear that, in 1730, George no longer trusted him. 
2 it 
is possible that the reason for this distrust was Du Bourgay's close 
contacts with the Queen of Prussia and the ministers linked to her. 
George wanted his children married, but he had no intention of 
yielding to Prussian political demands. The element of personal 
hostility between the rulers of Britain and Prussia was already 
significant. 
In this context, the selection of Hotham, and the orders he 
received, suggest that it was George and Townshend who were in 
control of the negotiations with Prussia. This is a contrast to 
Reichenbach's report, 
'que La Reine d'Angl. et le Chev. Walpole diront en 
congediant Mylord Townshend qu'on l'avoit sacrifie pour 
rendre justice a S. M. Pr.. parcequ'il avoit ete la cause de 
toutes les Brouilleries, ce qu'on dira pour faire un grand 
compliment au Roy de Prusse'. 
3 
In fact, Hotham was ordered to insist on the double marriage 
of Frederick Prince of Wales and Wilhemina, the Prussian Crown 
Princess, and of Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia and Anne, the 
Princess Royal of Britain. This was despite the fact that it was 
Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 25 Mar., Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 4 Ap. 
1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
2 George to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George of 
8 Feb. (OS) 1730, Coxe, II, 534. 
3 
Reichenbach to Grumbkow,. 31 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
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known that Frederick William was keen on the former marriage, 
1 but 
opposed to the latter, as he believed that it would serve to increase 
the ties between the Crown Prince and his Hanoverian uncle. 
Seckendorf was correct in claiming that even the single marriage 
R.: 
project was full of difficulties, as Frederick William would not 
hear any talk of conditions. 
2 When Hotham reached Berlin he found 
that Frederick William was determined on the single marriage. 
3 
Despite Hotham's reports, and the knowledge that Frederick William 
had already declared the marriage of the Prince of Wales and 
Wilhemina, George and Townshend remained firm. On April 27th 
Townshend sent Hotham fresh instructions, 
'The King continues firm in the resolution of having the 
double marriage, as most expedient, and most proper and desirable 
on both sides. And from this he will never depart, or be brought 
by any means to consent to make the one, either without, or at any 
distance of time from the other'. 
In reply to the Prussian suggestion that, if there was to be a 
marriage between Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia, or Anne, one of 
them should be created stadtholder of Hanover, and the Electorate 
placed under their authority, Townshend noted that George was 
willing for Anne to be stadtholder on condition that Anne and 
Frederick should first come to England ' and make-such stay there as 
H. M. shall judge convenient'. Finally, George expected Frederick 
William to settle the Mecklenburg issue on George's terms. 
4 
1 Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, &92. 
2 Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 25 Nov., 28 Nov. 1729,8 Ap. 1730, 
i Wolfenbdttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585(c) f. 75-6, (d) f. 7, (e) f. 6-7. 
Seckendorf feared that Hotham would propose the single marriage, but 
on April 4th Frederick William assured Seckendorf that he would not 
hear any talk of conditions, Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
4 Ap. 1730, Wolfenbattel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585 (d) f. 82,85. 
3 Hotham to Townshend, 4 Ap. 1730, PRO. 90/106; Hotham to Poyntz, no 
date, Hull, DDHO 3/2. 
4 Townshend to Hotham, 16 Ap. (OS) 1730, PRO. 90/27. 
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These instructions were hardly calculated to produce good 
relations. Frederick William could not be expected to yield on 
Mecklenburg, nor on. the departure of his heir for an unspecified 
term to England. Townshend's ability to send these instructions 
indicates thht he was still in control of at least the important 
negotiations with Prussia a month before his resignation, and that 
George still trusted him to draw up these crucial instructions. 
1 
Whatever the significance of his failure to enlist support for the 
Palatine arrears and the other Wittelsbach demands, Townshend had 
clearly not been crushed in the disputes with Walpole in late 1729. 
Since at least October 1729 Townshend had been threatening to 
2 
resign. On March 3rd 1730 his son Thomas-'Townshend wrote to his 
father's old friend Stephen Poyntz informing him of his father's 
intention to resign. 
3 However, despite the talk of resignation, 
Townshend continued very active. Horatio Walpole doubted his 
intentions; and noted that despite Townshend's declaration that he 
would acquiesce in the views of others and 'barely give his opinion', 
he was in fact 'as active and eager in business as ever I knew him'. 
4 
Six weeks later, Horatio still doubted Townshend's intention of 
resigning, and Newcastle shared his scepticism. 
5 Townshend's 
continued activity with foreign diplomats aroused disquiet, and it 
is clear that he criticised his rivals for failing to support 
1 In August 1730, Newcastle told Degenfeld, the new Prussian enkoy to 
Britain, that he had strongly disapproved of Hotham's conduct in 
Prussia, Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 15 Aug. 1730, PRO. 107/2. 
2 Poyntz to Townshend, 11 Oct. (OS)1729, Poyntz to Thomas Townshend, 
26 Nov. (OS)1729,26 Mar. 1730, Newcastle to Harrington, 16 Mar, (OS) 
1730, Coxe, II, 659,666,674-5,676. 
Poyntz to Thomas Townshend, 26 Mar. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 674. 
4 
Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 21 Jan. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 666-7, Hervey, 
It 118. 
5 Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave 13 Mar. (OS), Newcastle to Harrington, 
24 Mar. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 673,679; Diemar to William of Hesse- 
Cassel, 5 May 1730, Marburg, 199; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24 Mar. 
1730, PRO. 90/27. 
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Hanoverian interests, 
'His Lordship has represented us, as giving up Hanover quite, 
and has worked much upon the king upon that head; and also, that we 
had neglected pushing the plan of operations ... I must begg you 
would do all you can about the German points, Mecklenburgh etc.... 
Lett us have some brisk resolution about the plan of operations, and 
some strong assurances about Hanover, and we shall be able to defy 
him, and all he can do. ' 
t 
A 
i 
'Hanover is Lord Townshend's great merit, and we have been all 
represented as wanting zeal'. 
'We have here great hopes of the king of Prussia ...... 
'You may imagine somebody will not be sorry that things should 
miscarry hereafter'. 1 
It is clear from the instructions sent to Hotham that Townshend 
was indeed very concerned with Hanoverian interests, and that he and 
George were able to control the mission, -and, in the event, so 
direct Hotham that it failed. It is also clear that the ministerial 
dispute, far from being centred on the Wittelsbach issue and the 
late months of 1729, was still of great importance in the early 
spring of 1730. It was not until the beginning of may that Townshend 
signified his determination to resign at the end of the session. 
2 
Coxe attributed this to the success of Walpole and the Queen in 
overturning Townshend's strategy that before any proposals of 
accommodation should be presented to the Emperor, a plan of hostile 
operations should be concerted between the Seville allies. Townshend 
1 Newcastle to Harrington, 24 Mar. (OS), 23 Ap., 16 Mar. 1730, Coxe, 
II1 678-9,689,676. 
2 Townshend to Waldegrave, 21 Ap. (OS), Newcastle to Harrington 23 Ap. 
(OS), Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap. (OS)1730, 
Coxe, II, 686,689,691; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 4 May 1730, AE. CP. 
Ang. 370 f. 15; Diemar to Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 5 May 1730, 
Marburg, 199. 
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believed that the news of such a plan would cause Prussia and Austria 
to submit, and George agreed. Townshend also argued that if it was 
decided to delay the formulation of the plan until after the ; 
negotiations with the Austrians had commenced, 
'I very much fear that considering the temper and disposition 
of the Cardinal, as well as of the Dutch, no plan 
be formed; and in that case any declaration to be 
will rather be insulted than agreed to. And your 
next year at the meeting of the parliament under 
difficulties you at present. labour, not only with 
but likewise in regard to the affairs in general, 
of operations will 
made at Vienna, 
Majesty will be 
the same 
regard to Prussia, 
and one may easily 
foresee the evils that must attend such a' situation 
Townshend was to be proved correct. The Seville allies, their 
disputes notorious, failed to persuade the Austrians to accept the 
Spanish garrisons, and the attempt to concert a plan of operations 
to_coerce Austria collapsed in confusion and recrimination. Why 
George allowed himself to be persuaded into accepting the policy of 
delaying the formulation of the plan is unclear. Though Reichenbach 
claimed that Townshend was fed up with George's brutal manners, 
2 it 
was widely accepted that Townshend was still George's favoured 
3 
minister. Reichenbach reported on March 28th that George did not 
want Townshend to go, 
1 
Townshend to George, no date, George to Townshend, no date, 
Newcastle to Harrington, 24 Mar. (OS), Newcastle to Harrington and 
Poyntz, 24 Mar. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 540-1, 
. 
541,678,680,684, I, 337; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 18 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. f. 58; Chauvelin to 
Broglie, 9 May 1730, BL. Egerton Mss. 3134 f. 276; LTilson/to Poyntz, 
20 Jan. (OS)173013L. Add. 48982 f. 218-223, Poyntz agreed that a plan of 
operations should be formulated speedily, Poyntz to Newcastle, 
1 Feb. 1729, BL. Add. 32765 f. 132. On the plan, see p. 229. 
2 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
3 
Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 5 May 1730, Marburg, 199. 
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'mais comme le Chev. Walpole lui doit procurer l'argent il 
sera oblige de carresser plus Walpole que Townshend. '1 
Townshend resigned; George did not dismiss him. 
2 He appears to 
have finally decided to resign because of his frustration at the 
3 
constant opposition of Walpole to his plans, rather than because of 
his anger over any particular issue. Reichenbach noted that Walpole 
'ý 
ý. 
ý,, 
ý', 4 '' 
aý 
'veut que tout soit fait uniquement selon sa volonte et Md Townshend 
ne voulant se laisser traiter en petit garcon' ... Horatio Walpole 
4 
also suggested that Townshend's stance was due to his general feeling 
5 
of frustration rather than to anger-over a specific issue. It is 
also probable that the ill-health Townshend told Chammorel about was 
I 
indeed a factor: 'que sa sante toujours chancelante depuis sa grande 
maladie ne luy permettoi plus de soutenir les fatigues du Ministere. '6 
As in 1733, when Walpole was unable to persuade George to 
dismiss Harrington and Scarborough, so in 1730, Walpole had to wait 
for Townshend to resign. 
7 
He had clearly succeeded in making life 
difficult for Townshend, and, by May 1730, Townshend was refusing to 
do anything that involved cooperation with Walpole. 
8 The differences 
in 
1 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 28 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
2 Hervey, I, 118. 
3 
Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24,28 Mar., 9 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; 
Kinsky to Charles VI, Vienna, EK, Kart. 67; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 
7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 32. 
4 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 19 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
5 Horatio Walpole to Poyntz, 21 Jan(OS)1730, Coxe, II, 667. 
6 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 32. The 
conversation took place that day. On Townshend's ill-health, Dehn 
to the Duke of Wolfenbüttel, 4 June 1729, Wolfenbüttel, 2 Alt 3631 
f. 25; Townshend to Du Bourgay, 21 Oct. 1729, PRO. 90/25. 
7 Claims that Walpole 'sacked' Townshend are inaccurate, Mckay, 
Eugene p. 221. 
8 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 19 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Hervey, I, 118. 
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between the two men certainly involved foreign policy issues,, but by 
the spring of 1730 these had become expressions of a struggle for 
power and control. Walpole succeeded in thwarting Townshend over the 
plan of operations and the negotiations with the Wittelsbachs, though 
Townshend and George had their way over Hotham's mission. 
Exasperated and unwell, Townshend resigned even though he still 
enjoyed the confidence of the king. The crisis was not a defeat for 
George, however. Though he failed to make Chesterfield Secretary of 
State, George's protege William Stanhope, recently ennobled for his 
success at Seville, as Lord Harrington, replaced Townshend. Zamboni 
stated that Walpole and the Queen had attempted to gain the post for 
Horatio Walpole, but had been thwarted by George. 
l Newcastle, 
Harrington and the Walpoles were forced to consider Hanoverian !.; 
interests and to press the French to support Hanover. 
2 George could 
not have hoped that the ailing Townshend would continue Secretary 
for many more years. He succeeded in gaining a pliant successor 
whose tenure of the Northern Secretaryship was marked by very few 
disagreements with the king. 
3 Indeed, Harrington was a more 
r, t dependable Secretary than Townshend had been. It is unclear how far 
Horatio Walpole sought to become Secretary, but he was too independent' 
for George, and it. is. possible that the king would have found 
Chesterfield a difficult subordinate for the same reason. If anything, 
the replacement of Townshend by Harrington, however difficult for 
George, helped to increase his power in the direction of British 
foreign policy. 
. 
........ ..... .......... ...... 
1 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 7 Ap. 1730, Bodi. Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 
8 Nov. 1729, Wolfenbüttel 1 Alt. 22, Nr. 590 f. 9; Ossorio to Victor 
Amadeus II, 3 Ap. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. Horatio Walpole denied that he 
was interested in the post, Egmont, 5 Mar. (OS)1730, I, 77, Poyntz to 
2 Thomas Townshend, 26 Nov. 1729, Coxe, II, 666. 
Newcastle to Harrington, 24 Mar. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 678; Maffei to 
3 Victor Amadeus II, 30 Jan. 1730, AST. LM. Francia, 165. Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 30. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE SESSION OF 1730 
'Vous pouvez compter Mgr. que son eloignement des affaires 
ne causera aucun changement da. ns les principes qu'on a suivis 
jusqu'a present: 
Chammorel on the impending resignation of Townshend. 
1 
0 
The prolonged crisis within the ministry in the winter of 1729- 
1730 and the following Spring, coincided with an unstable inter- 
national situation and a troublesome parliamentary session. The 
Treaty of Seville had stipulated an approach to Austria, in order to 
obtain Austrian agreement to the admission of the Spanish garrisons. 
Opinion in London was divided over whether the Austrians would 
accept the proposal. The government argued that the choice of 
Spanish garrisons, instead of the Swiss ones stipulated in previous 
treaties, was a minor variation, 
2 
and encouraged an optimistic 
attitude to the possibility of Austrian agreement. 
3. Others were less 
sure, and noted reports of Austrian military moves, and, in 
of the beginning's particular, of an Austrian build-up in Italy. 
1 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 33. 
2 Townshend to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 2 Dec. (OS)1729, BL. Add. 
48982 f. 194. 
3 Delafaye to Clutterbuck, 27 Dec. (OS)1729, PRO. 63/391 f. 287. 
4 Maffei to Victor Amadeus II, 16,23 Jan., 20 Feb. 1730, AST. LM. 
Francia 165; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 11 Jan., 26 Ap. 1730, Vienna, 
Fonseca, 14 f. 6, '83; Frederick William I to Chambrier, 11,21 Mar. 
1730, AE. CP. Prusse 91 f. 17,19; Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 6 Mar. 
1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Marini, p. 142. 
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Partly as a result of Austrian diplomatic approaches in the autumn, 
l 
the Dutch, particularly the Pensionary Slingelandt, were greatly 
in favour of associating the approach to Austria for an 
implementation of the Seville treaty, with the offer of a guarantee 
of the Pragmatic Sanction. 
2 The French were opposed to the idea. 
3 
Both powers pressed Britain for her view, and it. is interesting to 
note that the supposedly 'anti-Habsburg' Townshend was not unwilling 
to support the Pragmatic. He argued that it was not the time to 
offer the Austrians the guarantee, as it would Upset Spain and 
Sardinia, but that the Emperor ought to be informed that a settlement 
of the points at issue would lead to a negotiation of the guarantee. 
4 
Townshend did not wish to anger the Dutch and delay their accession 
to the Treaty of Seville, but it is clear, in December 1729, that 
Townshend was being consistent with the Austrian policy he had 
advocated over the previous three years, namely that, once Austria 
indicated its readiness to satisfy the demands of other powers, 
including Hanover, Britain should commit herself to the-long-term 
stability of Austria. It was a policy that. was to be encapsulated 
in treaty form, by the Walpole ministry, in the Second Treaty of 
Vienna of March 16th 1731, and this indicates the continuity of 
policy between Townshend and Walpole. 
1 DeBrais to Augustus II, 10 Clct. 1729, Dresden, 2735,1, f. 213; 
Goslinga, pp. 365-6; Huisman, pp. 451-2. 
2 Tilson to Waldegrave, 12 Dec. (OS)1729, Chewton; Maffei to Victor 
Amadeus II, 2 Jan, 1730, AST. LM. Francia, 165; Goslinga, pp. 353, 
368-71,379-85; Villars, 20 Nov. 1729, p. 199. 
3 Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 25 June 1728, BL. Add. 32756 f. 293-4; 
Wilson, pp. 104-7,216-7; Mckay, Eugene p. 218. 
4 Townshend to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 2 Dec. (OS)1729, BL. Add. 
48982 f. 193-5; Townshend to Broglie, 4 Dec. (OS)1729, PRO. 100/5. 
With regard to the Pragmatic, George was 'of opinion not to declare 
my intention about this matter, as long as it will be possible', 
George to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George of 
15 Dec. (NS? )1729, BL. Add. 38507 f. 250. 
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The Austrians had no intention of complying with the 
6 
introduction of the Spanish garrisons. On December 28th the Emperor 
informed his representatives in Paris that he would not accept the 
garrisons, 
1 
and this decision was swiftly conveyed to the Seville 
allies. 
2 The allies continued, until the summer, to harbour the 
hope that the Austrians would change their mind, if the terms 
offered were slightly improved, or if they were frightened by the 
allies' preparations. Negotiations with the Austrians continued, but, 
largely under pressure from the British and the Spaniards, an attempt 
was made to devise a plan for operations against Austria. Conferences 
were held at Fontainebleau and several different schemes were 
proposed. 
3 The major issue discussed was whether operations in Italy 
should be matched by operations_ncrth of the Alps. The French were 
very interested in. an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, a scheme 
opposed by the British and the Dutch. 4 The latter powers were 
concerned about the security of Hanover and the Netherlands, and 
wanted the deployment of a French army specifically designed for their 
protection. 
5 The Dutch wanted to confine offensive operations to 
, 4M 
1 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 28 Dec. 1729, Höfler, I, 
438; Eugene to Kinsky, 25 Jan. 1730, Vienna, GK. 94(b) f. 53; Mckay, 
Eugene pp. 219-20. 
2 Holzendorf to Tilson, 3 Jan. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. l; ''Copy of the Paper which Ct. Kinsky read to Ld. Townshend, as the Empr. 's answer 
to the communication made to his Imperial Majesty of the Treaty of 
Seville', 4 Feb. (OS)1730, PRO. 100/11; Wi}son, p. 215; Albert to 
Plettenberg, 24 Jan. 1730, Münster, NB. 33 
, 
f. 6; Daily Post Boy 4 Feb. 
(OS)1729. 
3 Baudrillart, IV, 25-60; Villars, 12,13,20 Ap., 11,15,16 May 1730, 
4 
pp. 226-9,232-3,237-9,240,240-1. 
Poyntz to Keene, 6 Mar., Harrington and Pöyntz to Newcastle, 25. -Mar. 
1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 59-60,206; Maffei to Victor Amadeus II, 6 Mar. 
1730, AST, LM. Francia, 165; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 10 July 
1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; Viscount Percival's Newsletter, 14 Mar. (OS)1730 
BL. Add. 27981 f. 65. Sinzendorf had. predicted that this would divide 
the alliance, Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 4 Feb. 1727, Vienna, Fonseca, 
14, f. 32-3; Daily Post Boy 8 June(OS)1730. 
5 'Draft to Mr Poyntz relating to the Advices from Berlin as it was 
sent to Your-Majesty yesterday morning', 21 Jan(OS)1730, BL. Add. 32765 
f. 125-6; Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL. Add. 
32766 f. 341. 
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Italy. The British tended to concur with this view. 
1 
There was less disagreement over operations in Italy. It was 
generally agreed that, if the Tuscan ports were closed to the 
Spaniards, Sicily should be invaded, whilst the French should seek 
to gain Sardinian support and should invade the Milanese. However, 
there was a dispute over the timing of the intended invasion of 
Sicily, and over the French demand that no offensive moves should 
be undertaken until agreement had been reached on war aims and on 
the extent and nature'of the territorial changes that should be 
sought in the war. This was referred to as a treaty of equilibrium, 
and it had indeed been specified in the event of war, in the Treaty 
of Seville'. This angered both the British government and the 
Spaniards, who saw it as an indication of French unwillingness to 
fight. 2 'Patino turned upon the old topicks against the Cardinal, 
who demanded a plan for the operations of a war before he was 
I Ii 
resolved to undertake one. '3 Furthermore, the Spaniards, anxious to 
regain their former Italian possessions now held by Austria, did not 
wish to see their potential gains confined by treaty. Rather than 
wanting the simple introduction of their garrisons, the Spanish 
government, and, in particular Elisabeth Farnese, wanted a war that 
would provide opportunities for Italian'conquests. 
4 
These delays, and suspicion of the views of her allies, worried 
the British ministry. Aware of Spanish impetuosity, they were 
1 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 366-7 
Frederick William I to Chambrier, 4 Ap. 1730, AE. CP. Prusse 91 f. 25; 
Reichenbach to Frederick William I, 25 Ap. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/6. 
2 Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 2 Aug. 1730, Coxe, III, ll; 'Short Abstract 
of what has past about ye Treaty of Equilibre', anon, memorandum 
drawn up in summer of 1730, PR0.103/113_; Keene to Poyntz and 
Harrington, 16 Mar. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 347. 
3 
Keene to Poyntz, and Harrington, 24 Mar. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 349 
4 
Harrington and Poyntz to Keene, 1 Ap., to Newcastle, 27 Ap. 1730, 
BL. Add. 32766. f. 354,32767 f. 2; De By to Manteuffel, 1,22 Dec. 1729, 
Dresden, 3105,2, f. 193,200; Chesterfield to Harrington, 25 Aug, 
1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 204. 
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particularly concerned with the delays caused by the French 
insistence on the need to concert a treaty of 'equilibrium. They 
-feared that it would cause Spain to doubt the commitment of her 
allies to the introduction of Spanish garrisons, and that this might 
lead Spain to renounce the Treaty of Seville and resume negotiations 
. with Austria. There was no 
doubt that such a course of action 
l 
would be disastrous for the British government, both diplomatically, 
and for internal political reasons. Diplomatically, it would 
increase Austrian power, thereby make Prussia less likely to settle 
with Britain, and the Wittelsbachs less willing to offend Austria, 
and thus force Britain into greater dependence upon France. In 
Britain the ministry had proclaimed the commercial clauses of the 
Treaty of Seville as a great triumph. If Spain renounced them, and 
the ministry had nothing to show for the preceding years of 
diplomatic effort, military expenditure and higher taxation, then 
the opposition would be handed a brilliant basis for press attack 
and parliamentary criticism. 
Thus, by the time of Townshend's resignation, on may 26th, there 
was already disquiet about French intentions. On April 12th 
Harrington and Poyntz complained to Newcastle that the French were 
blaming the British for the delays in concerting plans, and were 
2 
seeking to embitter Anglo-Spanish relations. On May 4th Newcastle 
confessed his concern about the possibility of an Austro-Spanish 
reconciliation. The embittered nature of the Paris conferences, 
3 
of 
1 Poyntz to Keene, 19 Jan., Poyntz to Newcaetle, 19 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 
32765 f. 13,279. 
2 Poyntz to Newcastle, 10,14,19 Feb., Harrington to Newcastle, 12 Ap., 
Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 7 May(OS)1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 20 
242,277,32766 f. 365,32767 f. 129; Keene to Poyntz and Harrington, 
16 Mar. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 346. 
3 Poyntz to Newcastle, 11 Jan., Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 
23 Ap. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 4-5,32767 f. 34. 
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the suspicion that the French did not want the Anglo-Prussian 
initiative to succeed, 
' the anger at continued French sponsorship 
of the Wittelsbach claims2 and the growing irritation with the 
conduct of Broglie, 
3 helped to create a situation of great strain 
in the Anglo-French alliance. 
The difficulties created for the Anglo-French alliance, by 
diplomatic disagreements, were matched by the strains placed upon 
it as a result of the parliamentary session of 1730. One of the 
factors encouraging the Austrians in their opposition to accepting 
the terms of the Seville allies, was their conviction that the 
British ministry would be defeated in the session. 
4 Assurances to 
this effect were also given to the Prussians, both by the Austrians, 
and by their Resident in London, Reichenbach, who was closely in 
touch with opposition politicians, such as the Earl of Strafford. 
5 
Waldegrave noted the Austrian conviction that the British ministry 
6 
would fall, and the ministry was intensely suspicious of links- 
1 Paper sent to Lord Chesterfield, 10 Feb. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 9139 f. 51. - 2 Poyntz to Newcastle, 14 Feb., Newcastle to Waldegrave, Horatio 
Walpole and Poyntz, 24 Aug. (OS) 173Q,, BL. Add. 32765 f. 242,32769 f. 191. 3 Newcastle to Poyntz, 12 Feb. (OS), to Plenipotentiaries, 28 Aug, (OS) 
1730, BL. -Add. 32765 f. 323-4,32769 f. 256. 5 Holzendorf to Tilson, 20 Jan. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 13. 
Chetwynd to Townshend, 9 Sept. 1729, PRO. 81/123; Du Bourgay to 
Townshend, 25 Oct., Townshend to Du Bourgay, 31 Oct. (OS)1729, PRO. 
90/25; Sauveterre to Chauvelin, 7 Feb. 1730', AE. CP. Prusse 90 f7.73; 
Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 3 Mar., Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 17 Mar. 
6 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. Waldegrave to Tilson, 15 Mar., 12,26 Ap. 1730, Chewton, 22 Ap. 1730, 
PRO. 80/67 f. 90; Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 24 Mar. 1730, iChewton; 
Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, -_ Ap. (OS)1730, PRO. 78/195 f. 126. 
Kinsky assured Eugene that the ministry was sure of a parliamentary 
majority, Kinsky to Eugene, 23 Dec. 1729, Vienna, GK. 94(b). 
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between the British opposition and the envoys of Austria and Prussia. 
Tilson suggested that bribery had played its part in the activities 
of the opposition, 'now the Emperor borrowing money here looked as 
if some at least was to stay among us and then it was not to be 
wondered that the language agt. the House of Bourbon, and in favour 
of that of-Austria, and that all measures agt. the Emperor were 
condemned by the discontented'. 
The governmental tendency to castigate opposition as treasonable, ' 
and to blame the difficulties of their diplomatic position upon the 
activities of the parliamentary opposition, must be treated with 
caution. Nevertheless, the excellent resources öf the government's 
interception system, by producing decyphered interceptions of the 
correspondence between Reichenbach and Grumbkow, gave the ministry's 
fears a basis of truth. Reichenbach sought information from Berlin 
about the Hotham mission, information which he claimed the opposition 
had asked him for, and he conveyed to Berlin supposed opposition 
advice to reject Hotham's terms, and thus gain concessions. 
1 
It was unnecessary to believe that the opposition was 
manipulated by foreign envoys, in order to realise that the 
relationship between foreign policy and parliamentary developments 
was a close one. Horatio Walpole referred to 'the relation which 
the affairs here in Parliament must have with those abroad. '2 The 
course of the session revealed the truth of this assertion, and also 
produced disquieting evidence of the fragility of the ministerial 
position, particularly over foreign affairs. 
1 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 14,18 Ap. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
2 Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 13 Mar. (OS)1730, Chewtön; Horatio 
Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 2 Mar. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 668-9. 
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A troublesome session had been anticipated by ministerial and 
opposition figures, and by foreign envoys. Delafaye had predicted 
that there would be trouble over Dunkirk, St. Lucia and Gibraltar, 
points at issue between Britain and her allies, whilst Horatio 
Walpole and Lord Hervey expected that the major conflict. in parliament 
would be over the governmental wish to continue the subsidies for 
the Hessians. ' Horatio claimed that the opposition had planned to 
attack the ministry 'for their. indolence and neglect in suffering so 
patiently the insults of the Spaniards' upon British trade, but that 
the Treaty of Seville had forced them to change their tactics. 
There is no evidence for this assertion, though it seems probable. 
2 
The session began, on January 24th, with a royal speech setting 
out the benefits of the Treaty of Seville3; and a debate in the 
4 Commons on the address. The ministry claimed to be well satisfied 
with the debates, and British envoys were instructed to convey an 
optimistic view. 
5 Britain's allies were certainly impressed by the 
ministerial success. 
6 
However, though there had been no division in 
'a 
Delafaye to Waldegrave, 7 Jan. (OS)1730, Chewton; Horatio Walpole to 
Poyntz, 21 Jan. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 667; Hervey to Henry Fox, 24,29 
Jan. (OS)1730, Ilchester, pp. 45,46. Zamboni to Manteuffel, 20 Jan. 
1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120, f. 93; Kinsky to Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Nov. 1729, 
Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 590, f. 9; Zamboni to -, 3 Feb. 1730, 
Dresden, 637, vol. 2, f. 35; Diemar to; William of Hesse-Cassel, 27 Jan 
1730, Marburg, 199. 
2 
Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 12 Mar. (OS)1730, Chewton; Kinnoull 
to Delafaye, 14 Dec. 1729, PRO. 97/25, Vignola noted that the Treaty 
of Seville plunged the opposition into confusion, Vignola to the 
Doge of Venice, 9 Dec. 1729, ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 223. 
3 HCJ. XXI, 392; HLJ. XXIII, 450; Hervey, I, 111. 
4 
Egmont, I, 3-6; Hervey, I, 112-4; Carlisle-, p. 64; Knatchbull, 
pp. 97-8; Kinsky to Charles VI, 27 Jan. 1730, Vienna, EK. Kart. 67; 
McMains, The Parliamentary opposition to Sir Robert Walpole iü 
(unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Indiana State University, 1970) pp. 163-5. 
5 Townshend to Du Bourgay, 13 Jan. (OS)1730, PRO. 90/26; Townshend to 
Edward Finch, 13 Jan. (OS)1730, PRO. 95/54 f. 3; Newcastle to Poyntz, 
13 Jan. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 5-6. 
6 Holzendorf to Tilson, 31 Jan. 1730, PRO. 84/301 f. 19; Zamboni to 
Manteuffel, 27 Jan. 1730, Dresden, 637,2 f. 21; D'Aubenton to ? '! ti Maurepas, 16 Feb. 1730, AN. AM. B7301. 
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the Lords, the opposition motion in the Commons to amend the address 
was defeated by 262 votes against 169, a government majority of 93. 
This compared with a majority the previous year of 162. Furthermore, 
the opposition vote was the highest recorded so far in the 1727 
parliament, and was 36 votes greater than the previous best of 
March 17th 1729, when the ministerial majority had been 119. 
Horatio Walpole saw this a success for the opposition Whigs' plan 
to create a workable alliance with the Tories. 
... 'the discontented Whigs had concerted a perfect coalition 
with the Torys of all degrees, and it had agreed to act heartily 
and vigorously in the same opposition, and that for the purpose a 
summons should be made of all the Torys to be present without 
suffering any excuse, and this was pursued with soe much zeal, that 
I believe there has been in town this year above 110 Torys, which 
is within a very few of the whole number elected. '1 
On February 6th, in the Commons, Lord Morpeth moved that the 
king be addressed to communicate to the House any engagements he had 
entered into for the payment of subsidies to foreign troops, or for 
the hire of foreign troops, which he had not laid before the House. 
The motion made little impact and the government maintained its 
2 
majority of 93. Next day, Townshend spoke in favour of the 
ministry, when the Lords came to consider the Treaty of Seville. 
The opposition moved three motions, asserting that the Treaty of 
Seville violated the clauses of the Quadruple Alliance and 
threatened to involve the nation in a dangerous and expensive war, 
did not extinguish Spanish claims to Gibraltar, and provided for 
insufficient reparation for mercantile losses. The ministry defeated 
1 Sedgwick, I, 68; Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 13 Mar. (OS)1730, 
Chewton. 
2 Egmont, I, 10; Carlisle, p. 65; Knatchbull, pp. 100,143-5; HCJ. XXI, 421. 
The opposition motion was defeated by 200 votes against 107. 
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the motions with votes of 86-31,85-31 and 79-30.1 
The following day, February 8th, the Commons debated the 
estimates for the land forces for 1730, and, thanks partly to 
indiscreet expressions by the Jacobite M. P. Shippen, the debate 
2 
was shorter than expected and the government majority rose to 122. 
Given this situation it is not surprising that ministerial optimism 
was maintained, and that both Newcastle and Chauvelin were confident 
3 
of the government's ability. to retain control of the Commons. 
This optimism also reflected the ministerial success in carrying 
the Hessian subsidies. On February. 9th, the majority in the commons 
fell to 68, and on the 15th, the day of the debate over the 
Hessians, to 79, but, despite these figures, the ministry could feel 
satisfied that they had carried the issue they had most feared 
trouble over. 
5 They were to be surprised by the storm that was to 
arise over the French restoration of Dunkirk. 
6 Since 1725 the 
facilities at the port of Dunkirk had been restored, despite 
1 
mont I 1l; HLJ X Eg ,, XIII, 462-4; Cobbett, VIII, 773-4; Kinsky to 
Charles VI, 18 Feb. 1730, Vienna, EK. Kart. 67; Newcastle to Poyntz, 
30 Jan. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 32765, f. 169; Newsletters for Lord Percival, 
27,29 Jan. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 27981, f. 25-6,27; Vignola to the 
government of Venice, 10 Feb. 1730, ASV. LM. Ing. 98, f. 249. 
2 Egmont, I, ll-12; Knatchbull, pp. 101-2,145-6. The opposition motion 
was defeated by 243 votes against 121. 
3 Newcastle to Poyntz, 30 Jan. (OS)1730, BL. Add. Mss. 32765, f. 169; 
Dayrolles to Tilson, 21 Feb. 1730 (referring to Tilson to Dayrolles, 
6 Feb. (OS)1730), PRO. 84/310, f. 43; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 16 Feb. 
1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8. f. 158; Villars, 15. Feb. 1730, p. 212. 
4 The debate was on an opposition address to seek a further reduction 
of the army by the end of this, or before the beginning of the 
next session, Egmont, I, 12-13; Carlisle, p. 66; Knatchbull, p. 102. 
The address was rejected by 201 votes against 133. 
5 Egmont, I, 24-31; Hervey, I, 114-115; Knätchbull, pp. 102-3,147-151; 
Winnington to Henry Fox, 3 Feb. (OS)1730, Ilchester, p. 47; Diemar to 
Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 17 Feb. 1730, Marburg, 199; Plumb, 
p. 207; Hill, Parliamentary Parties p. 200. 
6 Egmont, I, 44; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 27 Feb. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; 
Plumb, p. 208; Newcastle to Poyntz, 5 Feb. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 32765 
f. 263. 
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specific prohibitions in the treaties of Utrecht of 1713, and of 
the Hague of 1717. The British government had been well aware of 
this restoration, and had complained to the French in 1727,1728 
and 1729.1 The issue had been exploited by the opposition press 
over the previous three years, and it was widely known that the 
2 harbour at Dunkirk was capable of receiving fairly large ships. 
The existence of a regular trade between Dunkirk and London was no 
secret. The ministry were aware that Dunkirk might be used as an 
issue by the opposition in the session of 1730,3 though they appear 
to have taken no precautions to ensure that they could deflect 
criticism easily. 
4 On the evening of January 18th the Lords of the 
Admiralty met to consider the progress of the works at Dunkirk, and 
they noted that they were contrary to treaty. 
5 Given this 
governmental concern, and the knowledge that the opposition was 
keen to criticise the Anglo-French alliance, it is surprising that 
no precautions were taken. It might be suggested that the poor 
French response to previous approaches and the wish to win French 
cooperation over the negotiations with the Prussians and the 
Wittelsbachs led to a decision not to press France on the issue. 
On February 21st, the House of Commons formed itself into a 
Committee of the whole house to consider a motion of Sir William 
1 
Townshend to Finch, 15 Aug. (OS)1727, PRO. 84/294 f. 83; Newcastle to 
Horatio Walpole, 14 May(OS)1728, PRO. 78/1$9 f. 196,198. 
2 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, - July(OS)1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 281, 
draft; Daily Post Boy 21 Nov. (OS)1729. 
3 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 7 Jan. (OS)1730, Cliewton. 
4 
Horatio Walpole reported that the French government had respected 
the provisions of the treaty, and that improvements to the port 
were due to tidal action and to unauthorised work by the local 
population, Horatio Walpole to Delafaye, 14 Dec. 1729, PRO. 78/192 
f. 564. 
5 Wager to Delafaye, 8 Jan. (OS)1730, PRO. 42/20 f. 2. 
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Wyndham's for an examination of the state of the nation. 
1 After a 
lengthy attack upon the policies and practices of the ministry, 
Wyndham advanced, as a proof of the government's failure to protect 
national interests, the restoration of the harbour of Dunkirk. The 
ministerial speakers lost control of the house and were unable to 
prevent the hearing of evidence about the restoration. On the 
following day it was-resolved to address the King for the laying 
before the House of all correspondence about Dunkirk. In order to 
give time for this to be prepared, the debate on the state of the 
nation was adjourned for a fortnight. 
2 
The seriousness of the situation was clear. The opposition had 
found an issue that captured the concern of many M. P. s over the 
French alliance. The historical concern over the use of Dunkirk as 
a privateering base made the issue a concrete and readily grasped 
example of the more general opposition criticisms of the ministry. 
Broglie noted that 'La chambre en general a paru approuver les 
raisons du parti oppose ... Percival referred to it as 'so popular 
and national a point', and Charles Howard noted that most M. P. s 
believed that France was restoring the harbour. 
3 Support for the 
ministry certainly diminished in late February. On the 23rd the 
ministerial M. P. Anthony Duncomb complained that 'he saw the members 
fall every day from the Court, and ... at last there would be a 
1 It was the first committee on the state of the Nation since the 
Hanoverian succession. 
2 Zamboni to the Duke of Modena, Archivio di Stato di Modena, tM. Ing. 
19; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 22, Feb. 1730,1Broglie to Chauvelin, 
. 27 Feb. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369, f. 207,237. Hervey, I, 116-7; Egmont, I, 34-8; Knatchbull, pp. 104-6; Dickinson, Bolingbroke, pp. 225-8; Hill, 
Parliamentary Parties, pp. 200-1; McMains, Parliamentary Opposition, 
pp. 192-213; P. Mantoux, Notes sur les Comptes rendus dess6ances du 
Parlement anglais (Paris, 1906), pp. 51-2. 
3 Broglie to Chauvelin, 22 Feb. 1730, Mantoux, Comptes rendus, p. 52; 
Egmont, I, 39; Carlisle p. 67; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 
24 Feb. 1730, Marburg, 199. 
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majority against it'. 
1 An air of anticipation hung over Westminster. 
Opposition leaders scented the prospect of office, and foreign 
envoys speculated on the fall of the ministry. As Hervey noted on 
the 28th, 'People's expectations are mightily raised by the affair 
of Dunkirk'*2 
The previous day, Sandys had proposed in the commons that a 
bill be brought"in tö 'render the laws more effectual by disabling 
people that had pensions from the crown or offices in trust for them 
to be Members of the House of Commons'. The ministerial speakers 
'were violently against it', but they lost the division by 134 to 
144, an opposition majority of ten. 'Percival attributed the defeat 
to Whig defections, noted that 'above sixty persons who were used to 
vote with the court deserted Sir Robert on this occasion, some by 
voting for the motion, others by leaving the House'. He claimed 
that Walpole 'it is probable may date his fall from this day'. 
3 
Kinsky was sufficiently impressed to send a courier to Vienna with 
  
"m 
the news of the defeat, and, in Austria, expectations were raised of 
the fall of the Walpole ministry. 
4 Holzendorf noted that the 
Imperialists at the Hague 'lay such a stress upon it as if the court 
had lost all their interest in the House'. Zamboni suggested that 
the government would be unable to win a majority in the Commons when 
1 Egmont, I, 40; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 2 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369, 
f. 271; Plumb, p. 212. 
2 Hervey to Henry Fox, 17 Feb. (OS)1730, Ilchester, p. 48. Daily Post 
Boy 12 Feb. (OS)1730. 
3. Egmont, I, 50; Knatchbull, p. 106; Diemar to the king of Sweden, 
31 Mar. 1730, Marburg, 201; Hill, Parliamentary Parties, p. 201; 
George II to Townshend, no date, in reply to Townshend to George II, 
19 Feb. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 536. 
4 Tilson to Waldegrave, 24 Mar'. (OS)1730, Horatio Walpole to 
Waldegrave, 24 Mar, (OS)1730, Chewton; Woodward to Tilson, 19 Ap. 1730, 
PRO. 88/36. 
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the debate on the state of the nation was resumed. 
' aj 
The ministry was therefore threatened not only with a loss of 
control in the Commons, but also with a collapse of European 
confidence in its ability to control Parliament. 
2 It was not 
surprising that the French were pressed hard over Dunkirk. Poyntz 
and Armstrong, the British military representative at Paris, who 
was an expert on the Dunkirk issue, were instructed to secure the 
demolition of the works. Armstrong was informed by Newcastle that, 
could he but execute these orders, nothing would 'more contribute to 
damage the efforts of those who oppose his Majesty's measures and 
have chiefly in view to discredit our alliance with France'. 
Horatio Walpole sought Fleury's personal intervention. 
3 
The British diplomatic pressure succeeded. Fleury gave an 
official assurance that the works at Dunkirk had been performed 
without the authorisation of Louis XV. Louis XV ordered their 
demolition and copies of this order were sent to Britain. On 
4 
March 10th the Commons resumed their deliberations on Dunkirk. 
Wyndham produced fresh evidence of the French works at Dunkirk, but, 
fýt 1 Holzendorf to Tilson, 7 Mar. 1730, PRO. 84/307, f. 47; Zamboni. to 
Manteuffel, 3 Mar. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120, ' f. 98; Ossorio to Victor 
Amadeus, 20 Mar. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; Diemar. to William of Hesse- 
Cassel, 24 Feb. 1730, Marburg, England, 199. 
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 12 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8. 
3 Newcastle to Poyntz and Armstrong, 12 Feb. (OS)1730, Newcastle to 
Armstrong, 12 Feb. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 32765,, f. 361-2,366-7. Horatio 
Walpole to Fleury, 23 Feb. 1730, Saint-Leger, Flandre Maritime, p. 321; 
Percival newsletter, 21 Feb. (OS)1730, BL. Add. 27981 f. 47; St. James 
Evening Post 5,7 Mar. (OS), Evening Post 5,7 Mar., Whitehall Evening 
Post 5,7 Mar., London Evening Post 5,7 Mar., Flying Post 5 Mar., 
Oedipus: or the Postman Remounted 5 Mar., Weekly Medley and 
Literary Journal 7 Mar., British Journal 7 Mar., Applebee s 
Original Weekly Journal 7 Mar. 1730. 
4 Armstrong to Newcastle, 27 Feb. 1730, The 'Order from the King of 
France', 27 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 32766, f. 3-4,7; Chauvelin to Broglie, 
2 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369, f. 229-30; Villars, 29 Mar. 1730, p. 224; 
Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 14 Mar. 1730, PRO. 90/27. 
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after a lengthy debate, the ministerial proposal for an address to 
thank the king for his care of the national interest over the 
Dunkirk issue and'to 'declare satisfaction in the firm union and 
mutual fidelity, which so happily subsist, and are so strictly 
preserved, between the two crowns',. was carried by 270 to. 149, a 
majority of 121.1 The government was delighted, and proclaimed it 
as a proof that Parliament was really behind ministerial policy. 
The French assurances were printed in the newspapers, and British 
envoys were instructed to cite the debate as a demonstration of 
parliamentary support for the Anglo-French alliance. 
2 
'Since the Dunkirk affair has been quash'd, we have had calmer 
doings in the House, and I hope we shall have no more very 
troublesome struggles'. 
3 
The period of The-Dunkirk debates was the 
high-point of parliamentary tension in the session of 1730. After 
the government's victory, -the opposition 
lost much of their energy. 
. 
On the 21st, when the examination of the state of the nation was con- 
tinuecj, a desultory debate on the Anglo-French dispute over the 
possession of St. Lucia ended with a government majority of 112. 
4 
1 Egmont, I, 71-5; Knatchbull, pp. 109-10; Carlisle, pp. 68-9; 
Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 14 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; Broglie to 
Chauvelin, 13 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369, f. 303-4; Ossorio to Victor 
Amadeus, 13 Mar. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. 
2 Töwnshend to Du Bourgay, '3 Mar. (OS), PRO. 90/26; Horatio Walpole to 
Harrington and Poyntz, 2 Mar. (OS)1730, Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave 
13 Mar. (OS)1730, Coxe, II, 669,673; Newcastle to Harrington and 
Poyntz, 2 Mar. (OS)1730, Newcastle to Harrington, 2 Mar. (OS)1730, 
BL. Add. 32.766 f. 123,127; Newcastle to Keene, 5 Mar. (OS)1730, PRO 
. 
94/105; Townshend'to Edward Finch, 3 Mar. (OS)1730, PRO. 95/54, f. 51; 
Diemar to Prince William of Hesse-Cassel, 3 Mar. 1730, Marburg, 199. 
The pro-British faction at Berlin were delighted by the Dunkirk 
victory, Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 25 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
3 Tilson to Waldegrave, 6 Mar. (OS)1730, Chewton; Chammorel to 
Chauvelin, 23 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369, f. 329. 
4 Egmont, I, 778; Knatchbull, pp. 112-3; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 24 Mar. 
1730, Hu11, DDHO 3/3; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 23 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 
369, f. 329; Tilson to Waldegrave, 13 Mar. (OS)1730, Chewton; Diemar 
to William of Hesse-Cassel, 21 Mar. 1730, Marburg, 199. 
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The dispute was a longstanding one, that arose from conflicting 
claims to the island. The interest of the British government in it 
-was not particularly strong, especially since the British rights 
had been granted to the Duke of Montagu. The Duke had angered the 
ministry by his conduct, and the government had made it clear to 
' 
, the French that they were not greatly concerned by this 
issue, a 
view shared by Parliament. St. Lucia lacked the historical 
importance of Dunkirk, and in no way approximated to the latter as 
an issue capable of arousing anger and concern. Furthermore, the 
position, in international' agreements, of St. Lucia, was obscure and 
contested. 
The opposition failure over St. Lucia led to the end of the 
Committee of the State of the Nation, and to the departure of many 
opposition M. P. s from London. 
2 
Parliament became more-quiescent. 
On March 28th Tilson could write, 'we are somewhat in a state of 
indolence, no furious attacks, nor any vigorous defence at present', 
and on May 2nd, Horatio Walpole claimed that the 'skirmishes that 
have happened since the day of Dunkirk, have served only to expose 
the weakness of the opponents'. 
3 
Many of these 'skirmishes' involved 
foreign affairs. On March 28th the Loan Bill, a measure designed to 
prevent loans to foreign powers without royal licence, was passed by 
the commons, after only a short debate, with the government receiving 
more than twice the opposition votes in a division on the opposition 
amendment. 
4 On the-30th the government enjoyed a substantial 
1 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 22 Feb. , 16 Mar. 1710, AE. CP. Ang. 369 f. 208,311. 2 Egmont, I, 78. 
3 Tilson to Waldegrave, 17,20 Mar. (OS)1730, Chewton; Horatio Walpole 
to Waldegrave, 21 Ap., 1 May(OS)1730, Chewton; Carlisle, p. 70. 
4 Egmont, I, 81-2; Knatchbull, pp. 113-4. -The opposition motion was 
defeated by 176 votes against 76; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 
4 Ap. 1730, Marburg, 199. 
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majority in a Lords debate on the Pension Bill, a measure rejected 
on April lst. 
1 
On May 2nd Norris moved in the Commons for an 
address to the king to lay before the House the secret and separate 
articles of the Treaty of Seville, but the ministry defeated his 
motion by 197-78 votes. Horatio Walpole concluded, 'it plainly 
appeared by the debate and by the complexion of the house that they 
will support H. M. in fulfilling his engagements for the execution of 
the Treaty of Seville'. Though Parliament was not prorogued until 
May 26th, Norris ' motion was the last major conflict that session 
involving foreign affairs,. and after the debate was' over Horatio 
Walpole wrote 'This session of Parliament is in a manner come to a 
conclusion'. 
2 
l 
I 
I. 'il 
0 0 
1 Egmont, I, 82-4; Carlisle, p. 70; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 3 Ap. 1730, 
AST. LM. Ing. 37; Newsletter, 21 Mar. (OS11730, BL. Add. 27981 f. 71-2. 
2 
Egmont, I, 95-6; Carlisle, p. 71; Horatio Walpole to Waldegrave, 21 Ap. 
(OS)1730, Chewton. 
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The Reconstitution of the Ministry 
'.., the endeavouring at least to fix the tranquillity of 
Europe on lasting foundations ... could not be too dearly 
purchased ... ' I 
Poyntz. March 1730.1 
'I1 suffit que le Ministere paroisse porte pour 1'alliance 
de la France pour que les ennemis de la cour d'Angleterre se 
livrent aux principes contraires ... ' 
Chauvelin. February 1730.2 
In the session of 1730 the ministry found itself forced to 
defend the Anglo-French alliance against strong attacks. The 
parliamentary opposition based its assault upon the ministerial 
foreign policy on a strong attack on this alliance, and a demand for 
the revival of the Anglo-Austrian alliance of the first decade of 
the century. 
3 In adopting this plan the opposition chose to discard 
the parliamentary strategy that had been largely followed the 
previous session, the attack upon the 'Hanoverian' bias of British 
foreign policy, and its consequences such as the Hessian subsidies. 
The French alliance had been attacked in previous sessions of the 
v 
1 Poyntz to Newcastle, 10 Mar. 1730, B4. Add. 32766 f. 133. 
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 26 Feb. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8, f. 159. 
3 Egmont, i, 52; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 14,24 Mar. 1730, PRO. 90/27. 
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Parliament, but never with the ferocity that marked the attacks of 
1730, whilst, in the latter year, the attacks upon Hanover were not 
pressed so hard. - This was despite the fact that the war-panic of the 
previous summer had threatened to drag Britain into a war with 
Prussia as a result of Hanoverian quarrels, and that the decision to 
continue subsidies to the Hessians in 1730 contrasted badly with 
ministerial assurances of a forthcoming peace. 
However, in concentrating on the French alliance, the opposition 
chose well. The attacks struck a popular chord, appealing to the 
persistent francophobia of large sections of the British political 
nation. 
' Furthermore, the opposition arguments that the balance of 
power in Europe and British interests would be endangered by a war 
with Austria, reflected disagreements within the ministry over the 
French alliance. Percival recorded in his journal a story of Lord 
Lovel arriving in London at the start of the session, and telling 
Chesterfield that he. did not know how to vote. When the Earl replied `' 
'with the Court', Lovel retorted, 'the Court. is so divided that I 
don't know which way it leans'. 
2 On March 31st Zamboni reported that, 
's'etant forme ici de ma certaine sciene un gros parti de plusieurs 
puissans seigneurs et autres (qui d'ailleurs ne sont ni mecontens, 
ne Jacobites, mais zeles pour le bien de la Patrie) les quels en cas 
qu'on vint a se resoudre de faire la guerre conjointement avec la 
France contre1'Empereur, ont determine de parler clair au Roy, et 
aux ministr"es, et d'en empecher l'execution'. 
3 
Two weeks earlier Chauvelin had argued that the Austrians were 
fomenting opposition in Britain, 
1. Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 20 Mar. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; D. B. Horn, 
Great Britain and Europe pp. 34-5. 
2 
Egmont, I, 10. 
3 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 31 Mar. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 103. Zamboni 
suggested that if the ministry did not abandon its anti-Austrian 
policies it would lose its parliamentary majority, Zamboni to Manteuffel, 24 Feb. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 97. 
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'11 n'est que trop vrai que 1'Empereur y fomente un parti, 
que ne cherche qu' a jetter de la defiance contre la France 
personnellement, l'example de ce qui a ete dit et fait a 
l'occasion de Dunkerque, en est une si grande preuve ... '1 
Chauvelin's view, that the Austrians were behind the opposition, 
cannot be established, but Zamboni's suggestion of a powerful pro- 
Austrian lobby within the ministerial camp appears more convincing. 
It is very possible that this group was the same as that recorded by 
Percival on February 16th. That day Percival dined at Dodington's 
and noted, 
'I found by Mr. Dodington's free way of talking that I have not 
been in the wrong in thinking a long time past that the speaker is 
forming a party in the House of reasonable Tories and discontented 
Whigs, to rise upon the ruins of Sir Robert Walpole'. 
2 
By the'speaker' Percival meant, not the current speaker Onslow, but 
his predecessor, Wilmington. 
3 On April 28th Percival referred to 
Wilmington as 'the head of the party which opposes Sir Robert 
Walpole', and Dodington, that evening, inforjned Percival that he was 
in favour of an Austrian alliance. The composition of Wilmington's 
4 
party is a mystery, although it is probable that it included 
Dodington and Dorset, and may have comprised former members of the 
1 Chauvelin to Brancas, 14 Mar. 1730, AE. Mem. et Doc. Espagne 158f. 114. 
On 18 Mar. (OS)1730 the Daily Post Boy carried the following 
advertisement, 'This Day is published - Dedicated to his Grace the 
Duke of Bedford - "Remarks on the Proceedings of the French Court, 
from Charles VIII, to the latter part of the reign of Lewis XIV. 
Shewing what little regard has been had to. the Faith of Treaties; 
the Ties of Blood, Marriages, Friendship and Oaths etc...... Proper 
to be compared with the present Times, and to be perused by all 
True Englishmen; by which they may judge how far the French are to 
be depended on by their Allies, either in Time of Peace or War'. 
2 
Egmont, I, 31. 
3 Sedgwick, I, 95. 
4 
Egmont, I, 94,93-4. 
_ 
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court of George II, as Prince of Wales, such as Scarborough. 
' 
Zamboni's reports were sometimes inaccurate, and he was no 
friend of the ministry, which had indeed sought his recall. 
2 
Percival made mistakes, and Dodington was unreliable. The reports 
are of considerable importance, however, because in the government 
reshuffle at the end of the session Wilmington was given an important 
post, that of Lord Privy Seal. Horatio Walpole stated that this was 
'done by a perfect. union and concert with those already employed'. 
3 
It was even suggested that Wilmington was considered as Townshend's 
replacement, 
4 though there is little evidence for this assertion. 
The struggles within the ministry were very important. However, it 
is very difficult to establish much more than the eventual disposal 
of offices. May 1730 witnessed major alterations in the ministry. 
The vacant Lord Presidency was conferred on Lord Trevor, 
5 Harrington 
succeeded Townshend, and Wilmington, created an Earl, succeeded 
Trevor, as Lord Privy Seal. Newcastle's brother, Henry Pelham, 
replaced Wilmington, as Paymaster-General of the Forces, and was in 
turn replaced, by Sir William Strickland, as: Secretary at War. 
1 Broglie reported that Wilmington was the head of a very strong 
group, that included Chesterfield and Scarborough, committed to 
removing Walpole. Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370, 
f. 28-9. The French ministry feared that if Walpole fell he might 
be replaced by a pro-Austrian government, Chauvelin to Broglie, 
13 July 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370, f. 184. 
2 Townshend to Woodward, 27 Feb. (OS)1730, PR0.88/36. 
3 Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap. (OS)1730, Coxe, II,. 
693. Newcastle assured the Lord Primate of Ireland, Archbishop 
Boulter, that Dorset and Wilmington were acting with the ministry 
'in the most perfect concert and union imaginable', 20 June(OS)1730, 
PRO. 63/392, f. 142. Broglie reported that Walpole, determined to 
prevent the entry of Wilmington into the ministry, had informed 
George II of links between him and Pulteney, Broglie to Chauvelin, 
7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370, f. 28-9. The continued prominence of 
Wilmington, Dorset and nodington, throws doubt upon TAill's claim 
that the ministry 'was now almost wholly composed of Walpole's 
nominees', Hill, Parliamentary Parties p. 201. 
4 
Broglie to Chauvelin, 7 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370, 'f. 28. 
5 
Trevor's death, on 30 June 1730, led to Wilmington being appointed 
\"Lord President, and Devonshire Lord Privy Seal. 
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Dorset succeeded Carteret as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Carteret 
refused Dorset's place of Lord Steward, which was given to 
Chesterfield, and-Carteret's political ally, Lord Finch, the new 
Earl of Winchelsea, declined Methuen's former place, of the 
Treasurership of the Household. 
1 
Reichenbach suggested that Walpole 
2 
did not wish to give Carteret a place of importance, but in fact 
household posts-in the early Georgian period could be not only 
extremely remunerative but also very influential, and Horatio Walpole 
was made Cofferer of the Household in May 1730. Hervey suggested that 
Carteret declined the offered post as a result of Winchelsea's 
influence. 3 Whatever the reason his decision had the important effect 
of removing from the court a major rival. of Walpole's. 
These changes were matched by new diplomatic postings. 
Harrington, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz were recalled from France, the 
last, a potential Secretary of State, to become Governor of the Duke 
of Cumberland. Neither Walpole nor Poyntz returned to Britain until 
September 1730, and, therefore, both of them were absent during the 
period when the decision was taken to resume negotiations with 
Austria. Britain's new representative in Paris was James Waldegrave, 
who had been created Earl Waldegrave the previous year. 
4 Leaving 
1 
Williams, Carteret and Newcastle, p. 80; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 
29 May 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. The appointment of Chesterfield to the 
Paris Embassy had been discussed, Harrington to Keene, 30 Jan. (OS) 
1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 232-3. Viscount Percival's newsletter noted 
the report that Carteret would succeed Trevor, 20 June(OS)1730, 
BL. Add. 27981 f. 152. 
2 Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 19 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3. 
3 Hervey, I, 120. 
4 Browning is inaccurate in his suggestion about the reason for 
Waldegrave's transfer and he is wrong to state that Keene replaced 
Stanhope. In fact, Waldegrave was very popular at Vienna and 
Stanhope's posting to Seville had been intended to be temporary 
only, Browning, p. 58. Townshend appears to have helped Waldegrave to 
obtain the Paris Embassy, Townshend to Waldegrave, 1 May(OS)1730, 
BL. Add. 48982, f. 228. Newcastle had never been enthusiastic about 
(cont. on next page) 
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Vienna on June 7th, he arrived in Paris on the 21st, and received 
his instructions as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary the 
following month. He was replaced at Vienna by Thomas Robinson, who 
had been Secretary of the Embassy at Paris and was a protege of the 
Walpole family, and, in particular of Horatio Walpole, and his 
brother-in-law, Isaac Leheup. 1 Robinson, who arrived in Vienna on 
June 17th, symbolised the new role in the Northern Department of 
Walpole family influence. 
Whatever their effect on Sir Robert Walpole's political position, 
the governmental changes led to the. promotion of less anti-Austrian 
opinions. The resignation of Townshend, the departure of his protege 
Poyntz from Paris, and the decision not to create Chesterfield 
Secretary of State, represented major blows for those who wanted 
Britain actively to confront Austria. The French had been in no 
doubt of Townshend's willingness to use. force in order to make 
Austria reasonable. 
2 Equally the changes represented a victory for 
those who advocated milder methods with Austria. Newcastle had not 
been sent to replace Carteret in Ireland, as'many had anticipated. 
The Austrians regarded Harrington as one of the more pro-Austrian of 
the British ministers. Robinson was disillusioned with the French 
alliance, and was to be accused, throughout the 1730s, of being pro- 
Austrian. 
  
4 (cont. from previous page) Waldegrave, draft memoir by Waldegrave, 
no date, Chewton. Waldegrave suspected that Newcastle was pushing' his cousin, Thomas Pelham, for the post, Newcastle to Waldegrave, 
22 June(OS)1730, Chewton. Pelham had served as secretary of the 
embassy to the Congress of Soissons from 1728. He returned to Paris 
from a visit to London on 24 May 1730, and he apparently took charge 
of affairs, 15-21 June 1730. Horatio Walpole supported Waldegrave's 
appointment to Paris, Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 23 July 1730, 
Coxe, III, 8. 
1 Robinson to Waldegrave, 28 June 1730, Chewton; Robinson to Leheup, 
4 Feb., to Horatio Walpole, 7 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 9139 f. 43-6,48. 
2 
Newcastle complained to Chammorel about his preference for 
Townshend, Chauvelin to Chammorel, 12 June 1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8, 
f. 168. 
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The exact importance of these governmental changes is difficult 
to ascertain. 
l 
In particular, their influence upon the decision to 
resume negotiations with Austria is obscure. The timing of the 
approach,, soon after the return of Harrington to England, 
2 
could 
suggest that it was Harrington, a minister who had enjoyed close 
links with George II in recent years, who was instrumental in 
persuading George and the ministry to resume negotiations, a decision 
strongly opposed by Horatio Walpole. 
3 Harrington Is role in the 
foreign policy of the 1730's is largely unknown, and too often the 
dismissive and witty phrases of Hervey are remembered. Harrington 
was doubtless indolent, but he also'possessed ability and diplomatic 
skill, and his role in the negotiation of the Second Treaty of 
Vienna was an important one. 
The session of 1730 closed with a-considerably rearranged 
ministerial team. The government had survived a serious onslaught 
in parliament. French readiness to meet British demands over Dunkirk 
had played a major role in enabling the ministry to face the onslaught 
However, the opposition claim that the nation would not accept 
endlessly an uncertain diplomatic situation, and a dangerous and 
expensive alliance system had come close to fruition. Throughout 
the summer and autumn of 1730 ministers surveyed anxiously issues, 
such as Dunkirk or the recruitment in Ireland for the French army,, 
_ 
4 
I Zamboni claimed that they would have no impact on policy, Zamboni to 
. 
Manteuffel, 2 June 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120, f. 118. 
2 Harrington returned to London on the morning of 24 June'1730. 
3 
Horatio Walpole to Walpole, 16 Aug. 1730, Coxe, III, 15-18,20. 
4 
Broglie to Chauvelin, 24 Aug. 1730, PRO. 107/2; King, pp. 115-8; 
Newcastle to the Plenipotentiaries, 28 Aug(OS)1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 255-( 
Zamboni to the Duke of Modena, 22 Dec. 1730, Archivio di Stato di 
Modena, LM. Ing. 19. 
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that might produce trouble in the forthcoming session. It was normal, 
particularly in the early winter, to exercise such fears, but, in 
1730, the level of anxiety, though unmeasurable, was certainly higher 
than in preceding years. 
1 A strong conviction grew in ministerial 
circles, a conviction that stemmed from opposition arguments2 and 
drew sustenance from the events of the preceeding session. It was 
a conviction, not of the correctness of an Anglo-Austrian alliance, 
but rather of the need to escape from the situation of diplomatic 
uncertainty Britain was in. In the circumstances of 1730 this 
produced'pressure, first, for an alliance with Prussia, and, after 
this had failed, for one with Austria. No tide of pro-Austrian 
sentiment swept ministerial circles in the summer of 1730. There 
was little sympathy for the Austrian case over the Spanish garrisons, 
and suspicion of Austrian chicanery and diplomatic dishonesty 
persisted. 
3 Instead the pressure for a new departure in British 
foreign policy, pressure that came from a variety of sources, led to 
a decision to attempt a reconciliation with Austria. It was a 
decision taken with few illusions. Ministers were aware of the 
difficulties that faced such a reconciliation. However, as Chammorel 
noted, 'un point sur lequel tout le monde convient c'est un grand 
desir de la paix'. 
4 
1 Zamboni to Manteuffel, 2 June 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 118. 
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 22 June 1730, AE. CP. Ang, sup. 8 f. 169. 
3 
Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz to Robinson, 16 July 1730, 
BL. Add. 23780 f. 72; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 17 Aug. (OS)1730, 
BL. Add. 32769 f. 143. 
4 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 14 Aug. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 294. 
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The Diplomatic Situation in summer 1730 
'Mr. Keen should be explicit, not only in our readiness but 
even our desires not to pass this summer in inaction'. 
June 1730. Sir Robert Walpole. 
Whatever the importance of the alterations in the ministry, 
, 
developments in the diplomatic situation made imperative a recon- 
sideration of British foreign policy. Two. developments were of 
particular importance. The first was the collapse of Britain's 
'Northern strategy', her hopes of profiting from developments in 
Prussia and Russia. The failure of Hotham's mission marked the 
effective end of this approach, and it was replaced by fears that 
Prussia and Russia would profit from the revival of difficulties in 
Mecklenburg to attack Hanover. This in turn led to a consideration 
of the degree to which Britain could now rely on her allies for 
assistance. The second major. development was the degeneration of the 
Alliance of Seville into a feuding and distrustful group of powers 
pursuing independent policies. Possibly. "this"had been predictable, 
and was inevitable, once the alliance had failed to intimidate 
Austria into compliance with its demands. Tension between Britain 
and her allies was not new, but the increased hostility of the. 
summer of 1730 marked the effective end of the Anglo-French alliance, 
and placed major strains on relations between Britain and Spain. 
1 Walpole to Newcastle, 24 June(OS)1730, PRO. 36/19 f. 79. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
SPRING 1730: 
THE COLLAPSE OF BRITAIN'S NORTHERN STRATEGY 
'His Majesty has had intelligence that the Russians were 
making preparations to march a body of men to attack His 
Majesty's German Dominions and that they had sounded the 
King of Poland about granting them passage through his 
country, and that it was suspected that the King of Prussia 
was privy to this enterprize'. 
1 
In Britain, in the spring of 1730 there had been considerable 
expectation of a major alteration in the diplomatic situation in 
northern Europe. Great hopes had been raised about the Hotham mission, 
and it had been widely anticipated that a new period in Anglo-Prussian 
relations would be ushered in, with marital links between the ruling 
houses, a visit by Frederick William I to England, and Anglo-Prussian 
cooperation in European diplomacy. It had been felt that such a 
realignment would affect Saxony and Austria 
2 
At the same time developments in Russia suggested other major 
changes. The surprising death from smallpox of the young Peter II, 
the grand-son of Peter I, led to the accession of Peter I's niece, 
Anne, the widowed Duchess of Courland. The greater aristocracy 
succeeded in making Anne's accession conditional upon her accepting 
a new constitution that drastically limited regal powers, and 
1 Harrington to Woodward, 30 June (os) 1730, PRO. 88/37. 
2 Paper sent to Ld. Chesterfield, 10 Feb. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 9139 
f. 51. 
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suggested, to various foreign commentators, the Swedish, Polish or 
British constitution'. It was widely believed that Russia would 
revert to her pre-Petrine state, and that the circumscribed power 
of the new monarch would be. too weak to prevent internal disorders 
and the reversion of Russia to what western-Europeans unfairly 
described as barbarism2. 
In the specific field of foreign affairs it was believed that 
the developments in Russia would harm their ally, the Austrians. In 
particular, the Russian treaty obligation to send 30,000 men to the 
defence of Austria, if attacked, seemed in danger, and the role of 
the Austro-Russian treaty in keeping Prussia in alliance with Austria 
was threatened by the apparent collapse of Russian power. It was 
also believed that the change in Russia would open the way to an 
easing of relations between Russia and the powers of the Treaty of 
Seville, particularly Britain. Percival noted in his diary, 'it is 
not improbable but that the apprehension of civil disturbances will 
induce the court of Muscovy to cultivate the friendship of all the 
Princes of Europe capable of hurting the present election, and 
particularly of Great Britain, and if so the late Czar's death, who 
was nephew of the present Emperor of Germany, will have a great 
influence over him to accede to the Peace of Seville'. 
3 
Dayrolle 
suggested that the pro-Austrian British opposition would be upset by 
1 Poyntz to Newcastle, 24 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 32765, f. 376; Zamboni 
to Manteuffel, 24 Feb. 1730, Bodl., Rawl., 120, f. 97; Stainville 
to Duke Francis of Lorraine, 24 Feb. 1730, Nancy, 86, No. 63; 
Chavigny to Bussy, French charge d'affaires at Vienna, 28 Feb. 1730, 
AE. CP. Aut. sup. 10, f. 15; Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 28 Mar. 1730, 
Hull, DDHO 3/3; Titley to Townshend, 4 Mar. 1730, PRO. 75/54, f. 124. 
2 Wych to Townshend, 14 Mar. 1730, PRO. 82/47, f. 59. 
3 Egmont, I, 49. 
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the death of the Czarl. It was believed that the changes in Russia 
would cause Prussia to be more cautious in making anti-Hanoverian 
2 
moves 
These hopes were to be shattered. Firstly, there was far less 
disorder than had been anticipated. The Duke of Liria, the Spanish 
ambassador in Russia, informed Prince Eugene, from Moscow, of the 
death of Peter II, and added, 'tout est dune tranquilite admirable, 
chose qui n'a pas laisse que de nous surprendre, car dann cette 
catastrophe, nous nous attendions a quelque grande revolution'. 
3 
Secondly, as a result of a military coup, Anne was able to capture 
her opponents and reject the new constitution. Thirdly, the new 
Russian ministry lost no time in promising Austria the 30,000 men, 
and Anne pledged herself to the Austrian alliance4. On March 24th 
the Emperor sent his representatives in Paris a memorandum which 
included the claim 'Les nouvelles qu'on reVoit de Moscou, ne svauroient 
5 Otre plus favourables aux interests de sa Majeste.... I . 
These developments upset British hopes, though the British 
government continued to claim that the new Russian government was 
less stable than it seemed, and that it would therefore be unable 
and unwilling to send troops to the aid of Austria. However, British 
1 Dayrolle to Tilson, 21 Feb. 1730, PRO. 84/310, f. 43. 
2 Titley to Townshend, 21 Feb. 1730, PRO. 75/54, f. 100. 
3 Liria to Eugene, 2 Feb. 1730, Vienna, GK. 97 (b), f. 133; Frederick 
William I to Chambrier, 25 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Prusse, 91 f. 22. 
4 Frederick William I to Chambrier, 11,25 Mar. 1730, AE. CP. Prusse, 91, 
f. 17,22; Grumbkow to Reichenbach, 7 May. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/3; 
Robinson to Harrington, 2 Aug. 1730, BL. Add. 9139 f. 86. 
5 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca, 24 Mar. 1730, Höfler, II, 124 
Daily Post Boy 28 Mar. (os) 1730. 
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hopes of Russia had been far less than those of Prussia. Little 
attempt had been made to establish an alliance, and no high-ranking 
British diplomat had been either sent or selected for Russia. On 
May 27th the Consul-General., Thomas Ward, had been promoted to 
Minister Resident, and a new Consul-General, Claudius Rondeau, 
appointed. Both men had been in Russia for some time, and each had 
claimed that the possibility of an Anglo-Russian alliance existed. 
They had sought instructions from London. On May 22nd Rondeau 
informed Tilson that 'The goodness Count Osterman has had for me, 
makes me hope I shall be able, when I receive new instructions to 
settle a perfect good correspondence with this court'1 However, no 
instructions were sent from London in 1730 until early June. On 
June 9th Newcastle informed Ward that it was time to put aside the 
disputes dating from Peter I's reign, 'as many changes have hapned 
since both in Muscovy and England and as those disputes were wholly 
personal it is to be hoped they are forgotten on all sides'. Ward 
was congratulated on his approach to Count Osterman, but Newcastle 
made it clear that Britain expected reciprocity to be the basis of 
any relationship. 
'You did very right in shewing him the real instances His 
Majesty had given of the sincerity of his intentions to live in 
perfect amity with Russia, and it is very reasonable that His Majesty 
should find some proofs of a mutual good disposition on their side' 
2. 
. 
The lack of instructions earlier in the year, and the guarded 
tones of those that eventually arrived made it clear that, whilst the 
ministry in London was actively interested in securing an alliance 
with Prussia, as indeed it was also, in 1730, with Saxony-Poland, 
1 Rondeau to Tilson, 11 May (os) 1730, PRO. 91/11, f. 109. Osterman 
was the Russian foreign minister. 
2 Newcastle to Ward, 29 May (os) 1730, PRO. 91/11 f. 101. 
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there was considerable caution about Anglo-Russian negotiations. 
There were several reasons for this hesitation. The apparently 
unstable nature of Russian factional politics, and the desire not to 
offend Sweden and Denmark, allies whose interests were incompatible 
with Russia, were important. The confused nature of Russian politics 
' 
following the death of Peter II led to a revival in Sweden of schemes 
for a reconquest of the Baltic provinces surrendered, only nine years 
earlier, at the Treaty of Nystad. The ministry of Peter II had 
displayed little interest in supporting the anti-Danish interests 
of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and indeed, during the reign of 
Peter II, when the Russian capital returned to Moscow and 'German' 
influences were muted, Russian expansionism had not been a European 
problem, and relations with Russia were not a high priority in British 
foreign policy. The possibility that the new reign of Anne would 
see a revival in Russian expansionism could not'but remind the 
British government of their treaty obligations to Denmark and Sweden. 
There were probably other reasons that helped to account for 
the lack of a British diplomatic approach to Russia. Newcastle's 
mention of the importance of a good Russian disposition is significant. 
George II believed that any moves toward good relations had to be 
the product of efforts by both powers. It is also possible that the 
British ministry felt that, if they succeeded in winning Prussia, 
Austria would yield over the Spanish garrisons and Russia would be 
forced to avoid diplomatic isolation by settling her differences on 
the terms of Britain and her allies. Rather than compromising over 
the rights of the Dukes of Mecklenburg and Holstein-Gottorp, the 
1 Responding to Swedish fears of Anglo-Russian negotiations, Newcastle 
had, in June 1728, given the assurance that 'no negociation of this 
sort will be entered into by His Majesty without previously 
communicating it to the King of Sweden and Count Horn, and having 
their concurrence and approbation', Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 
20 June (os) 1728, PRO. 78/189 f. 260. 
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British ministry could hope that, by holding out, the Russians would 
yield. In the absence of material that could cast light on thinking 
within the British ministry about relations with Russia, the role 
of Townshend, never noted for his sympathies with Russian interests, 
is open to speculation. The decision to promote Ward, appoint 
Rondeau and despatch instructions, coincided with Townshend's 
resignation. Possibly Townshend, well-informed of Swedish views 
and seeking to persuade the Swedes to follow an anti-Prussian policy 
and increase their forces in Swedish Pomerania, simply preferred to 
avoid antagonising Sweden. 
The reaffirmation of the Austro-Russian alliance after the 
consolidation of Anne's power would not have been a terribly serious 
blow to British foreign policy had it not been followed by the failure 
of Hotham's mission. The relationship between developments in 
Russia and Prussia is obscure. Frederick William I certainly revealed, 
throughout his reign, a well-developed consciousness of Russian 
strength, and the idea of using Prussian fears of Russia to hold 
Frederick William in check was recognised in the diplomatic plans 
of the period. However, in the spring and early summer of 1730, 
comtemporaries did not ascribe the failure of Hotham's mission to 
Russian developments', and there is no reason to doubt their views. 
1 Holzendorf feared that Russian developments would influence 
Frederick William I, Holzendorf to Tilson, 4 Ap. 1730, PRO. 84/307, 
f. 67. 
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Arriving in Berlin in early April 
IHotham found Frederick William 
more interested in the single than the double-marriage scheme. 
2 
This was a serious blow, though the possibility of a compromise 
involving two marriages and the establishment of Crown Prince 
Frederick in Hanover was investigated. It is not clear that 
George. II envisaged the succession of Frederick of Prussia and 
his intended wife Anne to both Prussia and Hanover and the 
eventual union of these two territories but the possibility of 
such a development was certainly more tempting for Prussia than 
their more usual schemes of a Hohenzollern ruling Courland 
and of dynastic links with the house of Brunswick-Bevern. 
On April 12th Hotham reported to Townshend that his 
negotiations were complicated by Frederick William's inconstancy 
and 'excessive jealousy'. At the end of a drunken feast, an 
intoxicated King of Prussia had declared the marriage of his 
eldest daughter and the Prince of Wales, but eventual sobriety 
led the King to renege on this declaration. Hotham noted that 
a compromise, albeit a difficult one, was possible in the case 
of Crown Prince Frederick, 'It is very plain he will sell his 
son, but not give him'. 
3 
1 Hotham's first audience with Frederick William took place at 
Charlottenburg on 4 April. 
2 Hotham to Townshend, 4 Ap. 1730, PRO. 90/106; Hotham to Poyntz, 
no date, Hull, DDHO 3/2; Holzendorf to Tilson, 14 Ap. 1730, 
PRO. 84/307, f. 75. 
3 Hotham to Townshend, 22 Mar. 1730, PRO-90/27; Hotham to 
Townshend, 12 Ap. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/10; Seckendorf to 
Ferdinand Albrecht, 8 Ap. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, 
Nr. 585(e), f. 5. 
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Good progress was made in the Brunswick Conferences and 
there was optimism in Britain about the chances of a reconciliation 
The press confidently predicted it3. Slingelandt urged the 
British to demand only the single marriage, in order to avoid 
antagonizing Frederick William4. On April 8th Frederick William 
wrote to his envoy in Paris, Chambrier, 
'Comme les differends survenu entre le Roi de la Grande 
Bretagne et moi soot heureusement terminez, il est a 'presumer 
que cela fera un changement considerable dans les mesures que 
l'on a voulu concerter ä Paris pour les operations militaires'. 
5 
Hotiiam was less optimistic, and he cannot be accused of 
misleading the British ministry about the difficulties facinc 
his mission. On April 18th he informed Townshend that he was 
finding it difficult to treat with Frederick William personally, 
and he noted 'how narrow a bottom our affairs are here'. 
6 A 
major problem confronting Hotham was the division between the 
Prussian ministers. Throughout the late 1720's the Prussian 
ministry had been badly divided, and the situation had not eased 
1 Alvensleben, Hanoverian minister, to Hotham, 30 Mar. 1730, 
Holzendorf to Hotham, 31 Mar. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/1; Ferdinand 
Albrecht to Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-WolfenbUttel, 31 Mar., 
4,16 Ap. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 531, f. 18,21,27-8; 
Frederick William I to Chambrier, 4 Ap. 1730, AE. CP. Prusse, 91, - f. 25; Tilson to Waldegrave, 10 Ap. (os) 1730, Chewton; Grumbkow 
to Reichenbach, 22 Ap. 1730 PRO. 90/28. 
2 Tilson to Hotham, 10 Mar. (os) 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/1; Newcastle 
to Keene, 2 Ap, (os) 1730, PRO. 94/105; Ossorio to Victor Amadeus 
20 Mar., 17 Ap. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; De Brais to Augustus, 
27 Mar. 1730, Dresden, 2735, Vol. 2, f. 71; Diemar=to William of 
Hesse-Cassel, 10,18 Apt 1730, Marburg, 199. 
3 Stanley's Newsletter 4,7 (os) Ap. 1730. 
4 Holzendorf to Hotham, 11 Ap. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/1. 
5 Frederick William I to Chambrier, 8 Ap. 1730, AE. CP. Prusse 91, 
f. 27. 
6 Hothan to Townshcnd, 18 Ap. 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
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by 1730. At the risk of some simplification, the ministry can 
be divided into two factions, one led by General Grumbkow, and 
the other by Knyphausen. Frederick-Ernst Knyphausen, a diplomat 
of some experience, was associated, albeit not always to the 
satisfaction of the British ministry, with the policy of a 
British alliance, and with the schemes for Anglo-Prussian 
marriages. He had lost influence with the death of his father- 
in-law, the Prussian minister Ilgen, in December 1728, and in 
1730 he relied heavily upon the British marriages, in order to 
restore his power. His principal rival Grumbkow was to be describe 
in 1732 by Chauvelin as 'un homme vif, pour ne pas dire f6roce, 
sans principes, assez oppose aux Anglois... '1. He was closely 
associated with pro-Austrian policies, and with the very active 
Austrian envoy in Berlin, Seckendorf. Complicating Hotham's 
mission was the fact that he had been ordered to attempt to 
secure the disgrace of Grumbkow and the recall of Reichenbach, 
whose correspondence with Grumbkow had been intercepted by the 
2 British . On April 19th Townshend sent Hotham the intercepted +;; I 
correspondence and ordered him to 'communicate them to Monsieur 
Knyphausen, and concert with him the use you are to make of them'3. 
However, by linking Hotham to Knyphausen, Townshend was complic- 
ating the mission to a fatal degree. Possibly the marriages, 
1 Chauvelin to Marquis de la Chetardie, French Minister at Berlin, 
4 Mar. 1732, Recueil Prusse edited by A. Waddington, Paris 1901>Iý, 
p. 344. 
2 Newcastle to George II, 4 Ap. (os) 1730, PRO. 36/18 f. 99. It 
had been argued that Prussian policy would not alter until 
Frederick William changed his ministers, Du Bourgay to 
Townshend, 30 Dec. 1727, PRO. 90/22; Fagel to Hop, 22 Sept. 1730, 
PRO. 107/2. 
3 Townshend to Hotham, 8 Ap. (os) 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/1; Dr. Villa, 
confidant of the Queen of Prussia, to Dickens, 3 Mar. (os) 1730, 
PRO. 90/27. 
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and their desired consequence, a Prussian breach with Austria, I' 
Ii 
could have only taken effect had Grumbkow been removed1. If 
so, the mission's chances of success were limited, as Frederick 
William did not wish to see his choice of ministers dictated by j,, 
foreign powers. Hotham sought to stir up the King against 
23 Grumbkow, but he had to inform Townshend of a lack of success 
On April 12th Hotham wrote, 
'I see no one instance of Cnyphausen's superiority or 
Grumkau's credit being lessen'd .... He 
[(nyphause n even told 
me himself that he stood alone, that the whole court was sold 
to the Empr. and I saw plainly, that he stands in that awe of 
the King, that he will never venture to lead his master into any- 
thing, which he does not see the King already disposed to: and 
it is most certain, that the few friends we have are timorous 
and indolent and our enemys enterprizing and active'. 
4 
Hotham's pessimism about his mission did not diminish 
5 
On May 6th he informed Townshend that Borck, the Prussian minister-J,;; 
then much in favour with Frederick William, 'follows Seckendorf's 
6 directions'. A week later, he reported that Frederick William, 
opposed to the idea of the Crown Prince leaving the country, had 
rejected the suggestions that the Stadtholderate of Hanover be 
conferred on Princess Anne, adding 'the proposal the King of 
Prussia has now rejected was sometime ago the thing in the world 
1 Hotham to Townshend, 13 May 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/10. 
2 Hotham to Townshend, 6 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
3 Hothain to Townshend, 13 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
4 Hotham to Townshend, 12 Ap., 27 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
5 Hotham to Woodward, 22 Ap. 1730, Hull, DDHO 3/2. 
6 Hotham to Townshend, 18 Ap., 6 (quote), 13 May, PRO. 90/28. 
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he was the most fond of? 
'. 
However, Frederick William was also willing to order the 
recall of Reichenbach, much to the latter's distress, and to 
tell Hotham that he wished for nothing more than to live well 
2 
with BritainHotham's conclusion was that the King was 
3 
unreliable. 
Another factor complicating Hotham's mission was Frederick 
William's concern about its consequences for the Austrian cause 
in the Empire. Seckendorf was adept at exploiting the King's 
fears that a war would harm the Empire, and by defeating Austria, 
overturn the balance of power. At dinner with Hotham in Potsdam 
on April 21st, Frederick William 'always returned to that; that 
suffering the French to attack Luxemburg or invade the Low 
Countries would in the end have very pernicious consequences, 
and that we ourselves should soon be sensible to it, and that 
he did not doubt but in a year or two, we should return to the 
old system, as he termed it, and 
4 join hands against France... ' 
Several days later he told Hotham that Luxemburg and the 
Austrian Netherlands were too near his own possessions for him I !i ' 
to permit an attack upon them in which he did not become involved:. } 
The relationship between Prussian fears, and British opposition, 
at the conferences at Fontainebleau, to war north of the Alps 
has not been brought out by those historians who have considered 
1 Hotham to Townshend, 13 May 1730, PRO. 90/28; Ossorio to Victor 
Amadeus, 24 Ap. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37. 
2 Hotham to Townshend, 9 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
3 Hotham to Townshend, 13,20 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
4 Hotham to Townshend, 22,26 Ap. 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
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the conferences', A major reason why the British devoted so 
much energy, in April and May 1730, to persuading their allies 
that operations against Austria should be confined to Italy, 
was their awareness of the danger of Prussian military assistance 
to Austria, either by virtue of treaty obligations, or because 
of Prussian obligations as a member of the Empire. Frederick 
William expressed particular concern about Luxemburg, whilst 
he allowed dotham to form the opinion that the Prussians would 
not send help to the Austrians, in the event of the war being 
confined to Italy. 
By early May Hotham's mission had clearly failed2. Whether 
it could have succeeded had George pressed for only the single 
marriage, as Slingelandt and the Wolfenbüttel minister Stain 
urged3, or if George had offered the Stadtholderate of Hanover 
to Crown Prince Frederick, as some of the British ministers had 
urged, is unclear4 It is probable that Frederick William's 
indecisiveness would have prevented him accepting any expedient 
until the European situation had been resolved by peace. The 
mission ended suddenly as a result. of Hotham's attempt to 
1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 19 Nov. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32770 f. 124. j 
ti 2 Ossorio to Victor Amadeus, 1 May 1730, AST. L. M. Ing, 37; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 4 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 16. 
3 Ferdinand Albrecht to Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 
2 May 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 531 f. 38. This solution 'Vi 
was feared by those who opposed an Anglo-Prussian reconciliation, ' 
Reichenbach to Grumbkow, 12 May 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
4 Horatio Walpole to Harrington and Poyntz, 23 Ap. (os) 1730, 
Coxe, II, 693. Frederick William sought this solution, and 
later in the year he blamed the failure of the marriage 
negotiations on the British refusal to accept the Prussian 
conditions, Frederick William to Chambrier, 30 Sent. 1730, 
AE. CP. Prusse, 91 f. 59. 
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discredit Grumbkow by a revelation of the contents of Reichenbach's' 
intercepted correspondence. Frederick William regarded the 
opening of his minister's letters as a personal insult, and he 
reacted violently when Rotharn pressed him on the matter on 
July 10th. Treating the King's violent anger as an affront to 
George II, in the person of his envoy, Hotham left Berlin without 
an audience of leave'. 
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1 Hotham to Harrington, 11 July 1730, PßO. 90/28; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 14 July 1730, Wolfenbtittel, 1 Alt 22, 
Nr. 585(e) f. 49; Gansirat to. Meerman, Bavarian envoy in Vienna, 
1 Aug. 1730, Munich, mien, 184; 'rsonsr. Bdreke's acct. of 
what passed with Sir Charles Hotham', no date, PRO. 90/106. 
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The failure of Hotham's mission was a serious blow to 
British foreign policy. The deterioration of British relations 
with Prussia and Russia led to a revival of fears that the two 
latter powers would initiate military action against Hanover. 
Earlier in 1730, when there had been fears of Prussian action 
against Hanover, Britain had turned to her allies, particularly 
France, for assistance, and had been greeted with promises of 
help'. In the summer of 1730 the situation was less promising, 
and the renewed perception of a threat to Hanover2 led to an 
awareness of the practical difficulties created by the distrust 
and disagreements that affected Anglo-French relations. Disagree-ä 
meat between Britain and France was particularly acute over the 
German policies of the two powers. The dispute over British 
subsidies to the Wittelsbachs had continued throughout the 
spring of 17303. Just as the British felt let-down over Dunkirk, 
so the French felt that British parsimony was destroying the 
sl 
1 Newcastle to Poyntz, 6 Feb. (os), Newcastle to Harrington and 
Poyntz, 30 Mar, (os)., Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 
5 Ap. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 267,32766 f. 331,320. 
2 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 
f. 341; London Evening Post 4,18 June (os) 1730; Toerring to 
Meerman, 17 June 1730, Munich, Wien, 182. On 3 May Townshend 
told Broglie that George II wanted France to hold a corps ready 
to assist Hanover in the event of an Austrian or Prussian 
attack, Broglie to Chauvelin, 4 May 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 13; 
Townshend to George II, 6 May (os) 1730, Coxe, II, 542. 
3 Villars, 8 Jan 1730, p. 205; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and 
Poyntz, 18 June (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32768 f. 23-5. 
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possibility of creating an effective anti-Austrian coalition 
within the Empire. The revival of the disputes over Hildesheim 
1 
angered the French. 
Without Prussia and without the Wittelsbachs the British 
position in the Empire was weak. The British had, in the spring, 
sought to benefit from the prospect of improved relations with 
Prussia by opening talks with the Saxons for an alliance. 
Woodward was ordered to press for good relations2, but on 
June 16th he had to report that the Saxon minister, Count Hoym, 
had informed him that the basis of any alliances would have to 
be British subsidies, and that it was the prospect of these that 
3 
would be most likely to lead Augustus II to consider a treaty. 
Suspicious of Prusso-Saxon links the British ministry was 
unwilling to offer a subsidy4. They were also sceptical of the 
value of any Saxon promises5. The well-known factionalism of 
the Saxon court made it appear particularly unstable6. "' 
1 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June, Newcastle to 
Harrington and Poyntz, 28 May (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32767 f. 239,354; 
Albert to Plettenberg, 31 May, 3 July 1730, Munster, NB. 33 
f. 11,22. 
2 Townshend to Woodward, 11 May (os) 1730, PRO 88/37, Townshend to, ' 
Hotham, 24 Ap. (os), Hüll, DDHO 3/1; Seckendorf to Ferdinand 
Albrecht, 14 July 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22,585(e) f. 46. 
3 Woodward to Newcastle, 16 June 1730, BL. Add. 32768, f. 33,35. 
4 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 18 June (os) 1730, 
BL. Add. 32768 f. 26; Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 13 June 
1730, Marburg, 199. 
5 Harrington to Woodward, 14 July (os) 1730, PRO. 88/37. Bussy, the, 'it 
French chargg d'affaires in Vienna, noted, 'Le Roy de Pologne 
ne veut prendre aucune engagement qui le mene trop loin', Bussy 
to Chauvelin, 26 July 1730, AE. CP. Aut. 166 f. 232. 
6 Harrington to Woodward, 14 July (os) 1730, PRO. 88/37. 
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The return of the exiled Duke, Charles Leopold, to 
Mecklenburg, aroused British fears that Russia, Austria and 
Prussia were seeking to create difficulties for Hanover. 
Robinson wrote of the possibility 'of drawing on an universal ýý. 
war from the least disturbance in lower Saxony'', and informed 
Newcastle of the danger that Russian troops would be sent to 
Mecklenburg2. Charles Leopold was the brother-in-law of the 
new Tsarina, and it was widely feared that she had been 
responsible for his return to Mecklenburg and was seeking to 
enlist support for him3. Opinions were divided as to the 
extent of Austrian support for Charles Leopold, and both 
Robinson and Du Bourgay argued that Austria did not want to see 
a war break out in northern Germany4. However, Chammorel reported 
that other British ministers believed that Austria was determined 
to persuade Russia to intervene in Mecklenburg either, 
11 Of 
1 Robinson to Harrington, 22 July 1730, BL. Add. 9139 f. 77; Ossorio r'. 
to Victor Amadeus II, 10 July, 14 Aug. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 37; 
Daily Post Boy 19 June (os) 1730. Hanoverian troops were still 
in Mecklenburg. 
2 Robinson to Newcastle, 5 July 1730, BL. Add. 9139 f. 66; Schleinitzl'1' 
to ---, 2 July 1730, AE. CP. Brunswick-Hanover, 48 f. 71. 
3 Rondeau to Newcastle, 13 July (os), Harrington to Rondeau, 
18 Aug. (os) 1730, PRO. 91/11 f. 142,146; Titley to Robinson, 
18 July 1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. 79; Dickens to Harrington, 5 Aug. 
1730, PRO. 90/29; Meerman to Gansinot, 19 Aug. 1730, Munich, 
Wien, 184; Vignola to the Doge of Venice, 30 June, 1 Sept. 1730, 
ASV. LM. Ing. 98 f. 323,348; St. James' Evening Post 20 June (os) 
1730; Evening Post 26 Mar. os 730. 
4 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 20 July 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 221; 
Robinson to Harrington, 22 July 1730, BL. Add. 9139 f. 77. 
Holzendorf feared that Austria would support Charles Leopold, 
Holzendorf to Tilson, 20,27 June 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 108,112. 
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'pour donner au Roy D'Angleterre la mortification de 
retirer ses troupes de ce pays la; ou Stil veut les y 
maintenir par la force, le mettre dans la necessite de 
continuer les subsides aux troupes de Hesse et de 
Wirtemberg, dont il supose que la demande sera tres mal 
recue a la prochaine seance du Parlement'. 
1 
Developments in Mecklenburg certainly aroused the concern 
and anger of George II. Broglie reported that the Queen and 
Walpole were cooperating to quieten George's anxiety2. The 
situation was made yet more serious by the continued deterioration 
of Anglo-Prussian relations. Frederick William had decided to 
replace Reichenbach by Count Degenfeld, and the British hoped 
that the arrival of the latter in Britain would provide an 
opportunity for a resumption of good relations. Borck and 
Harrington exchanged messages calling for such a resumption, and 
when Degenfeld arrived in London, Newcastle informed him that 
Hotham's folly was to blame for the failure of his mission, and 
that the marriage negotiations should be resumed by Degenfeld and ;,, 
the ministry in London3. On July 25th Tilson informed Robinson 
... '.. the King of Pr: seems concerned at his sudden flirt of 
passion.... we expect C. Degenfeldt here is all haste to set 
matters right... ' 
1 Chammorel to Broglie, 3,20 (quote) July 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 
f. 179-80,221; Holzendorf to Tilson, 27 June 1730, PRO. 84/307 
fill; Hotham to Harrington, 11 July 1730, PRO. 90/28. 
2 Broglie to Chauvelin, 2 July 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 167. Ossorio,,,. 
noted George's anger, Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II 10 July 1730, 
AST. LM. Ing. 37; Newcastle to Waldegrave, 19 Nov. (os) 1730, 
'Paper relating to the affair of Mecklenburg', BL. Add. 32770 
f. 131,133-4. 
3 Borck to Harrington, 15 July, Harrington to Borck, 17 July (os) 
1730, PRO. 90/106; Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 15 Aug. 1730, PRO. 107/2 
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Zamboni was assured that Frederick William had relented 
of his conduct to Hothaml. Degenfeld reached London in early 
August. Accordigg to Zamboni, who was well acquainted with 
Degenfeld, having known him before his mission to London, Hotham 
was sent to Degenfeld to ascertain whether he had been instructed 
to apologise for Frederick William's insult to George II, in 
the person of his minister. Degenfeld replied that he had not 
come to make excuses, and that it was rather the part of George 
to apologise for his minister's conduct. Zamboni added, 
'mais cela non obstant il ya apparence que tout finira 
biers, les deux cours (et celleci encore plus que lautre) 
etant port6es ä se reconcilier'. 
2 
He was to be proved wrong. Anglo-Prussian relations were 
not helped by George's refusal to give Reichenbach an audience 
of leave, and other 
Degenfeld's initial 
took place on Septet 
family. It was to 
4 
difficulties, created by George, delayed 
audience3. When Degenfeld's audience finally 
aber 21st he was treated badly by the royal 
be developments in Prussia, however, that 
proved Zamboni wrong. The attempted escape of the Crown. Prince, 
'ct 1 
Ti13on to Robinson, 14 July (os) 1730, BL. Add. 23780,, f. 102; 
Zamboni to Fleury and Manteuffel, 1 Aug. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 
f. 129; Dickens to Hotham 8 Aug. 1730, Hull, DDH') 3/1; Diemar 
to William of Hesse-Cassel, 8 Aug. 1730, Marburg, 199; Chammorel 
to Chauvelin, 14 Aug. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 295. 
" i. i. 2 Zamboni to Fleury and Manteuffel, 18 Aug. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 
f. 134; Delafaye to Waldegrave 17 Sept. 1730, Chewton. Newcastle l,? 
approached Degenfeld and proposed new negotiations over the 
double marriage, Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 15 Aug. 1730, PRO. 107/2 rI 
3 Diemar to William of Hesse-Cassel, 11,22 Aug., 29. Sent, 1730, 
Marburg, England, 199; Zamboni to Fleury, 25 Aug. 1730, Bodi. 
Rawl. 120 f. 135; Tilson to Robinson, 14 Sept. (os) 1730, 
BL. Add . 23780 f. 252. 
4 Zamboni to Fleury, 22 Sept. 1730, Bodl. Rawl. 120 f. 144. 
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and the disgracing of those who had opposed Grumbkow, destroyed 
the chances of a reconciliationl. Knyphausen was dismissed and 
banished from the Court on August 30th. On September 25th Borck 
declared to Guy Dickens that Frederick William would not consider 
any marriage, single or doublet. British anger at the treatment 
of the Crown Prince, and Prussian suspicion that George II was 
responsible for Frederick's attempt at escape, helped to embitter 
relations3. Plans to send Sutton to Berlin were cancelled4. 
Serious moves towards an Anglo-Prussian rapprochement were not 
to be made again until 1735, and the legacy of personal bitterness 
between the two monarchs was to wreck this attempt and the 
others made in the latter half of the 1730's. The failure to 
ensure good relations was to be a major handicap to British 
foreign policy in the 1730; s. 
1 Holzendorf to Chesterfield, 18 Aug. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 189; 
Dickens to Hotham 11 Sept. 1730, Hull,. DDHO 3/1; Dickens 
to Harrington, 19,26 Aug. 1730, PRO. 90/29. ;;! 
2 Robinson to Tilson, 7 Oct. 1730, PRO. 80/69; Diemar to William 
of Hesse-Cassel, 24 Oct. 1730, Marburg, 199; Seckendorf to 
Ferdinand Albrecht, 14 Nov. 1730, Wolfenbüttel, 1 Alt 22,585(e) 
f. 96. 
3 and 4 over page. 
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'Ar 
3 Frederick William to Degenfeld, 16 Sept. 1730, PRO. 107/2. 
The British knew of the plan to escape and had attempted to 
dissuade Frederick from it, Hotham to Newcastle, 16 June, 
Harrington to Dickens, 20 June, Harrington to Hotham, 20 June 
1730, PRO. 90/28; Seckendorf to Ferdinand Albrecht, 9 Sept. 1730, 
Wolfenbuttel, 1 Alt 22, Nr. 585(e) f. 67. 
4 Frederick William I to Ferdinand Albrecht, 14 Oct. 1730, 
W8lfenbuttel, 1 Aot 22, Nr. 532 f. 86; Degenfeld to Grumbkow, 
17 Oct. 1730, PRO. 107/2. 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
SUMMER 1730: 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SEVILLE ALLIANCE 
'Horace cannot be spur'd too much upon the affair of Dunkirk'. 
'Robert Walpole, July 1730'. 
1 
'Mr. Walpole shewed us this day a Private Letter from his 
brother Sr. Robt. in which Sr. Robt. seems very uneasy at 
the present situation of affairs in England, that we are 
in danger to break with France without being sure of the 
Empr. '. 
Waldegrave's Journal, September 2nd 17302. 
It is difficult to establish the nature or extent of the 
relationship between developments in Prussia, Russia and 
Mecklenburg on the one hand, and the British decision to pursue 
actively the option of an Austrian alliance, on the other. The 
British approach to Prussia had been intended as part of a 
diplomatic strategy aimed at restoring relations with Austria 
by isolating her and compelling her to sue for terms. Its 
failure, and the replacement of a reasonably satisfactory 
situation in northern Europe, by a threatening one, was paralleled 
by the failure of the conferences at Fountainebleau to produce 
much more than discord and distrust3. Townshend had apparently 
1 Walpole to Newcastle, 3 July (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32687 f. 376. 
2 Waldegrave Journal, 2 Sept. 1730, Chewton. 
3 Newcastle tp Wa1 e aye 91 oy t (os) 1@ BL, Eiaa, 
32770 f, 120; 
135. 
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been proved correct within a few months of his resignation. 
His belief that the only way to achieve the aims of the Treaty of 
Seville was its vigorous enforcement1 seemed vindicated by the 
discord at Fountainebleau. In April 1730 Chammorel had reported, 'r 
'on regarde icy 1'accomodement avec le Roy de Prusse comme 
1'ouvrage de M. le Chevalier Walpole. ' The failure of the 
Z 
Hotham mission, and the resumption of tension in northern Germany 1 
meant that, unless there were some major diplomatic changes 
before January, Walpole would be forced to ask for the 
continuation of the unpopular subsidies to foreign powers. 
3 
Parliamentary trouble could also be anticipated over Dunkirk. ' 
Louis XV's promise had been followed not by the demolition of 
the works at Dunkirk, but by prevarication on the part of the 
French, and anger on that of the British. Maurepas, the Naval 
minister, was opposed to the destruction of the works, and took 
steps to ensure that whatever demolition took place was slow and 
4 
partial. Within a month of the French promise to demolish the 
works, British complaints at the failure to honour the promise 
began. The French representatives in London were pressed by the 
British ministers5, and, in response to frequently reiterated 
orders6, the British representatives in Paris urged the French 
1 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 27 Ap. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369 f. 396. 
2 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 19 Ap. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 369 f. 381. 
3 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 10,20 Aug. (os) 1730, Chewton. 
4 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 3 June 1730, BL. Add. 32767 
f. 277. 
5 Newcastle to Harrington and Poyntz, 28 May (os) 1730, BL. Add. 
32767 f. 357; Chammorel to Chauvelin, 5,26 June, 31 July 1730, 
AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 108-9,155,277. 
6 Newcastle to Harrington, Poyntz and Horatio Walpole, 4 June (os), 
to Poyntz, Horatio Walpole and Waldegrave, 29 June (os) 1730, 
BL. Add. 32767 f. 367,32768, f. 185; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 27 Julyj 
(os), 10 Aug. 1730, Chewton. li,. ' 
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to fulfil their promise 
l. Fleury complained about the degree 
2 
of British pressure over Dunkirk. The British felt tricked 
by the French failure to honour reheated promises, and French 
questioning of their claims led to angry scenes. On August 23rd 
Waldegrave recorded in his journal a meeting which had taken 
place that morning between Fleury and Horatio Walpole, 
'His Eminence seemed still to doubt whether the works 
that were now insisted should be demolished had been really 
so in 1713. Mr. Walpole took fire at this, and with a good 
deal of agitation told the Card. he was abused, and that he 
would go away, and not take his leave of the Court, for he 
could not say in his complement which would be undoubtedly 
made public in England that he was pleased with the good 
harmony etc. which ought to subsist between the courts whilst 
,, i 
France was so little complaisant in an affair which was so 
clear. ' 
Sir Robert Walpole was clearly concerned about the danger 
of the issue being raised in Parliament, and this accounted 
for his instruction to his brother to present a memorial on the ýj 
subject3. Parliament would have to be convinced that the ministry 
had not been remiss over the issue. In the summer of 1730 the 
onDosition Dress drew attention to the continued activity at 
1 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 3 June 1730, BL. Add. 32767 
f. 277; Horatio Walpole to Fleury, 21 June 1730, AE. Mem. et 
Doc. France, 459 f. 208; Delafaye to Newcastle, 4 Aug. (os) 1730, ' 
PRO. 36/20 f. 6; Waldegrave Journal, 28 Aug., 1 Sept. 1730, Chewton! 
2 Waldegrave Journal, 12 Aug. 1730, Chewton. Horatio Walpole 
thought that the pressure was excessive, Horatio Walpole to 
Newcastle, 10 Sept. 1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 258. 
3 Waldegrave Journal, 1,2 Sept. 1730, Chewton; Delafaye to 
Waldegrave, 10,20 Aug., 11 Sept., 5 Oct. 1730, Chewton; 
Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, Poyntz and Waldegrave, 28 Aug, 
1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 2. 
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the port of Dunkirk, and to the French failure to begin the 
demolition of the illegal jettys, 
l 
The importance of the Dunkirk issue in embittering Anglo- 
French relations cannot be overestimated. Far from being a 
'little local difficulty', of no consequence dßr more general 
diplomatic developments, Dunkirk-served to produce frustration 
and anxiety among, the. British ministers. It represented the 
manner in which the Anglo-French alliance was no longer producing, 
any tangible benefits, but was instead threatening the parliament- 
ary position of the British ministry. 
2 
At the same times as conferences were being held at 
Fountainebleau in order to produce'an agreed allied strategy in 
the event of war with Austria, an attempt was made to settle 
by compromise the differences with Austria. The British and 
the French had re=jected the Austrian attempt to link negotiations 
for the admission of the Spanish garrisons to a guarantee of 
the Pragmatic Sanction. However, in order to keep the negotiations 
going, the Seville allies had informed Austria that they were 
ready to listen to further Austrian propösals. In addition, 
they decided to offer Austria a guarantee of the undivided 
1 London Evening Post 6 June (os), Daily Post Boy 8 June, 
Flying. Post or Post-Master 9 June, Fog's Weekly Journal 13 June, 
British Journal 13 June, 1730; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 21 Dec. (os; ' 
1730, Chewton. - 
2 Borck to Degenfeld, 26 Sept. 1730, PRO. 107/2; Delafaye to 
" Waldegrave, 11 Sept. (os), 15 Oct. 1730 Chewton; 
Delafaye to 
Newcastle., 8 Dec. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32770 f. 241. 
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ý 1, 
inheritance of the Emperor's Italian dominions in return for 
his consent to the admission of the Spanish garrisons. In late 
May Fleury proposed this solution to the Austrian representatives 
in the name of all the allies'. Charles VI rejected the ideal. 
The continuation of negotiations with the Austrians created 
tension between the Seville allies. Spain was opposed to talks3, 
and Britain suspicious of links between. France and Austria4. 
Furthermore, the disagreements at Fontainebleau became worse 
as the summer progressed5. The British suspected both that the 
French did not want war but were-seeking to shift the blame for 
inaction upon them6, and, that if the French did decide to fight, 
they would insist upon doing so in areas, such as the Austrian 
1 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 1730, BL. Add. 32767 
f. 320-7; Stephen Kinsky and Fonseca to Charles VI, 1 June 1730, 
Hbfler, II, 188-93; Wilson, p. 217; Huisman, Compagnie d'Ostende 
p. 472; Vaucher, Robert Walpole p. 33; G. Steuer, Englands 
8sterreich oliti in den Jahren 1730-35 (unpublished Phd. 
dissertation, Bonn, 1957pp. 25-6; 'Paper delivered to Count 
Kbnigseck by the Cardinal May 28 1730', PRO. 103/113. 
2 Thomas Pelham to Robinson, 9 July, Horätio Walpole, Waldegrave 
and Poyntz to Robinson, 19 July, 1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. 52,82; 
Steuer Englands österreichpolitik pp. 31-2; Villars, 2 July 1730, 
p. 258. Newcastle had hoped that the Austrians would be so 
impressed by the vigorous measures of the Alliance of Seville 
that they would yield, Diemar to Frederick I, King of Sweden, 
30 May 1730, Marburg, 201. 
3 Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 1730, BL. Add. 32767 
f. 237. 
4 Harrington to Newcastle, 12 Ap. 1730, BL. Add. 32766 f. 365. 
5 De Brais to Augustus II, 8 May 1730, Dresden, 2735,2 f. 88; 
Holzendorf to Tilson, 8 Aug. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 157. 
6 Newcastle to Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 27 July (os) 
1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 36-7; Waldegrave Journal, 23 Aug. 1730, 
Chewton. The French were aware that they were being blamed for 
delays by the British, D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 4 Aug. 1730, 
AN. AM. B 7 303. 
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Netherlands, where the British were opposed to French gains. 
The British ascribed 'the Austrian refusal to negotiate to their 
knowledge of. the divisions amongst the Seville allies 
l. These 
divisions were indeed no secret2. The Austrians were sure that 
there would be no hostilities in 1730; 
3 
and anticipated the 
collapse of the Seville alliance and the fall of the British 
government. The latter was also expected by the French4. 
The Austrians were correct in their belief that delay would 
cause some of the Seville allies to change their tone. On 
August 2nd the British-representatives in France reported that 
the Dutch government had ordered their representatives to propose 
'a negotiation with the Emperor about granting him a general 
guaranty of his dominions'. The Dutch suggested that the 
Spaniards should accept neutral garrisons. Fleury. rejected the 
idea, 'the Cardinal in a formal speech rejected what relates to 
the Guaranty of the Emperor's dominions on the foot of the 
Pragmatick Sanction, as what would bring. a scandal upon the 
Alliance of Seville, disoblige the Princes of Italy and the 
Empire and subject them to a 
. 
perpetual bondage to the Imperial 
Court. ''5 
1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 10 July (os) 
1730, BL. Add. 32768 f. 259. 
2 Waldegrave to Tilson, 10 Aug. 1730, PRO. 78/194 f. 206; Toerring 
to Meerman, 17 June 1730, Munich, Wien, 182; Daily Post Boy 
15 Jüne (os) 1730. 
,. 
3 Robinson to Newcastle, 5,21 June, 5 July 1730, BL. Add. 9139 f. 67, 
PRO. 80/68, BL. Add. 32768 f. 313. 
4 Walde grave Journal, 21 Aug. 1730, Chewton. The French regarded 
the British ministry as very weak, Horatio fa: lpole to Walpole, 
17 July 1730, Coxe, III, 6. 
5 Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 Aug. 1730, 
BL. Add. 32768 f. 349-51. 
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It was therefore clear that the French would oppose any 
guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. Yet for the British this 
' 
1 11 
was increasingly looking like the only solution to their diplomatic 
difficulties. When Charles VI had rejected the suggestion of a 
guarantee of the succession to his Italian dominions, the British 
representatives in Paris had written to Robinson, 'You will 
easily conclude that this negociation is at an end, and the allys 
must think of other means for bringing him to reason'. However, 
Z 
the resort to violence hinted at in this letter had been thwarted 
by disagreements among the allies3. The Austrian rejection of 
the proposed expedient led the British to press their allies for 
an immediate attack upon Sicily. The British hastened their 
military preparations for such an expedition. French insistence 
on the prior settlement of a treaty of equilibrium thwarted the 
British plan4. The British had wanted to see hostilities begin 
in 1730, and feared that without this Spain would attempt a fresh 
1 Chesterfield to Harriggton, 25 Aug. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 204. 
2 Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave and Poyntz to Robinson, 19 July 
1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. 82; Waldegrave Journal, 9 Aug. 1730, 
Chewton; Sinzendorf to Fonseca, 31 Aug. 1730, Vienna, Fonseca, 
14 f. 150. 
3 Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave and Poyntz, 27 July 
(os) 1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 35-8. 
4 Waldegrave Journal, 31 July 1730, Chewton; Thomas Pelham to 
Robinson, 5 Aug. 1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. -128-9. French policy 
angered Spain also, Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 
BL. Add. 32767 f. 239. 
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alliance with Austria1. The French argued that it was better 
to settle plans for a"general war in 1731, and that, before 
hostilities were commenced, efforts should be made to win the 
alliance of Sardinia and the Wittelsbachs2. Furthermore, the 
French arguod that the major Austrian military build-up in Italy 
made any maritime invasion unwise, and that operations in Italy 
required Sardinian assistance. A. M. Wilson suggested that the 
French were disinclined to force the issue, because their 
3 interests were not being harmed by the protraction of peace. 
This is probably correct, but it. should also be noted that there 
were reasonable military considerations leading France to reject 
the British scheme. The military effort demanded of the French 
was large, for they were expected not only to invade Italy but 
also to protect Hanover and the United Provinces from attack. 
The French view of the desired equilibrium was an ambitious 
one. On August 7th at a conference of British, French and Dutch 
representatives held at Compiegne Chauvelin 'explained himself 
more clearly... upon the Equilibre than ever I had heard him, his 
discourse tended to divest the Empr. of all the dominions he had 
in Italy... '4 The British were unwilling to accept such a plan, 
1 Walpole to Newcastle, 24 June (os) 1730, PRO. 36/19 f. 79; Toerring 
to Meerman, 18 July 1731, Munich, Wien, 182; Holzendorf to 
Tilson, 8 Aug. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 157; Daily Post Boy 8 Aug. 
(os) 1730, Austro-Spanish talks were reported, Colman to ii. 
Waldegrave, Poyntz and Horatio Walpole, 18 Aug. 1730, Chewton; 
Villars, 25 June, 3 Sept. 1730,25 Jan. 1731, pp. 253,271,295. 
The British ministry feared that the Spanish would not observe 
the commercial provisions of the Treaty of Seville, Newcastle 
to Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poymtz, 24 Aug. (os) 1730, 
BL. Add. 32769 f. 193-4. 
2 Waldegrave Journal, 20 Aug. 1730, Chewton; Thomas Pelham to 
Robinson, 24 Aug. 1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. 195. 
3 Wilson, pp. 221-1. 
4 Waldegrave Journal, 7 Aug. 1730, Chewton. 
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and Chauvelin complained that they would only accept a scheme 
that did not harm the Emperor1. On August 2nd the British 
representatives in Paris informed Keene that 'it never was His 
Majesty's intention to new model the possessions of Europe, and 
to make a new distribution of dominions and territorys for 
pleasing the Queen of Spain. '2 
The Anglo-French alliance had therefore become, by the 
summer of 1730, the basis of a possible recasting of the European 
system. British foreign policy was to be tied to the abasement 
of Austria, which was to become a matter of planning and action, 
rather than speculation3, Such a'situation had been advocated 
by various British ministers ever since the signature of the 
Treaty of Vienna, but its practical implementation had become, 
by the summer of 1730, an entirely different matter. The Anglo- 
French alliance was no longer a defensive screen to protect 
Hanover, Gibraltar and British commercial privileges. It now 
1 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 20 Aug. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 175; 
Ossorio to Victor Amadeus II, 24 July, 7-Aug. 1730, AST. LM. Ing. 
37. 
2 Horatio Walpole, Waldegrave 
BL. Add. 32770 f. 384. Eugene 
ance for the views of Elisa: 
overturning of the European 
1730, Vienna, Kinsky, Kart. 
and Poyntz to Keene, 2 Aug 1730, 
feared that a misplaced complais- 
beth Farnese would lead to the 
balance, Eugene to Kinsky, 17 June 
2(b). 
3 Lord Percival's Newsletter, 4 June (os) 1730, BL. Add. 22981 f. 137; 
Holzendorf to Chesterfield, 11 Aug., Chesterfield to Harrington, 
22,25,29 Aug., 1,5 Sept. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 160,197,205,84/308 
f. 1,5,14; Baudrillart, IV, 39; Hughes, p. 375. In January 1730 
Charles Albert of Bavaria told Chavigny that he wanted to 
succeed Charles VI as Emperor, Chavigny. to Chauvelin, 17 Jan 
1730, AE. CP. Allemagne, 376 f. 29. 
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entailed projected subsidies to Sardinia' and the Wittelsbachs, 
the possibility of a British guarantee of the Saxon succession 
in Pöland, and a war to drive the Austrians from Italy. The 
Anglo-French alliance that the British ministry decided to 
abandon in the late summer of 1730 was being directed by the 
French toward goals very different from those that ministerial 
speakers had-defended in Parliament for the previous five years. 
However difficult it had been to defend the alliance in those 
sessions, it would be even harder to confront the new session 
with demands for fresh subsidies. Horatio Walpole, aware 'of 
the clamour that may arise against our joyning with France to 
pull down the house of Austria', nevertheless urged, that in order 
to intimidate Austria, Parliament should be summoned to meet 
in November and asked to vote supplies sufficient to permit the 
raising of another ten thousand British troops2. 
It is not surprising that Sir Robert Walpole chose to ignore 
his brother's advice to maintain the Anglo-French alliance3 when 
it was accompanied by suggestions that would have been politically 
disastrous had they been attempted. It was frequently claimed 
that Sir Robert Walpole's role in the direction of British foreign 
policy was minimal, and that he took his ideas and his information 
1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, Horatio Walpole and Poyntz, 24 Aug. 
(os) 1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 191. Poyntz, noted that Victor Amadeus 
would require, as the price of an alliance, a 'reward... out of 
the Emperor's Dominions in the Milanese .... or Great subsidys. ' Poyntz to Holzendorf, 12 Feb. 1730, BL. Add. 32765 f. 258. 
2 Horatio Walpole to Robert Walpole, 16 Äüg. 1730, Coxe. III, 18-21. 
3 Wilson, pp. 222-3. Horatio's view of the state of the Anglo- 
French alliance could be regarded as naively optimistic, 
Horatio Walpole to Newcastle, 10 Sept. 1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 258. 
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from his brother l. On July 13th, Chammorel reported that Sir' 
Robert Walpole relied on his brother for foreign policy matters, 
and he noted 'Le Chevalier Walpole se mesloit tr'ýs peu des 
'Z affaires du dehors. Such an analysis was inaccurate. In the 
summer of 1730 Sir Robert Walpole read many of the-diplomatic 
dispatches and took an active role in the drafting of instructions 
3 to British envoys. It seems reasonable to suggest that his 
awareness of the potentially fatal domestic repercussions of the 
continuance of the Anglo- French alliance played a large part in 
the decision to explore the possibilities of an Anglo-Austrian 
reconciliation4, Equally, the views of Harrington must not be 
discounted. The Austrians were convinced that Harrington was 
the most pro-Austrian of the British ministers. On August 27th 
Charles VI informad his envoys in Paris that Harrington 's"'-est 
tourours montre plus equitable, que les deux freres Walpole, il 
pourroit chercher sous mains ä conclure un accommodement entre 
5 1'Empereur, et le Roy'.... Harrington's important role in the 
1 Ralph , Critical History of the Administration of Sir Robert Walpole p. 404. 
2 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 13 July 1730, AE. CP. Ang. 370 f. 215-6. 
3 Delafaye to Newcastle, 31 July (os) 1729, Walpole to Newcastle, 
24 June, Newcastle to George, 25 June 1730, PRO. 36/13 f. 171, 
36/19, f. 79-81,85; D. B. Horn, 'The Machinery for the Conduct of British Foreign Policy in the Eighteenth Century', Journal of the Society of Archivists III, (1967), 229-40, p. 234. 
4 Plumb, pp. 224-6; Dunthorne, p. 77; Hill, Parliamentary Parties, 
p. 202; R. Lodge, review of Vaucher, Robert Walpole, EHR 40, 
(1925), 438-41, p. 439. 
5 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, Fonseca and K5nigsegg, 27 Aug. 1730, 
H8fler, II, 260. Chauvelin shared this belief, Chauvelin to 
Chammorel, 27 Nov. 1730, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8, f. 179. Harrington and Poyntz had informed Fleury 'of the absolute necessity of putting 
an end to the present state of, uncertainty one way or other 
immediately, without which both England and Holland must think 
of new measures', Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 
1730, BL. Add. 32767 f. 237. 
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negotiation of the Second Treaty of Vienna suggests that he 
was also partly responsible for the decision to approach 
Austria. Though Browning claims that Newcastle played a significant!;! 
role in the conduct of British foreign policy in the summer of 
1730, the diplomatic papers of the period would seem to suggest 
that his role was largely confined to expressing increasing 
1r; 
i 
frustration with the French. He played little part in the 
negotiations with Austria 
l. ý 
It 
1 Browning, pp. 59-60. On Newcastle's doing 'as he was told', 
in this period, Horn, 'Machinery', pp. 233-4. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
THE NEGOTIATION OF THE SECOND TREATY OF VIENNA 
ýýý9 
'I continue in the opinion I have had a long while that 
nothing but fear of an impending danger will bring the 
Imperial court to reason'. 
Waldegrave to Newcastle, October 17301. 
On August 1st 1730 Kinsky reported to Charles VI that 
Harrington had hinted to him that the British were willing to 
sign a separate treaty with *.. Austria, 
'qu'on ne seroit pas eloigne en Angleterre ä'. accorder sans 
aucune restriction la guarantie de fordre de succession etabli 
dans la maison d'Autriche, en cas, qu'on voulut consentir.... a 
l'introduction des garnisons Espagnoles, et terminer a la satis- 
faction de la cour d'Hannovre 1'affaire de Mecklenbourg'2. 
The Austrian response to Harrington"s approach, and-to 
Robinson's proposed expedient of British garrisons in Tuscany 
and Parma, was cautious. Charles VI was not disposed to yield 
over Mecklenburg, fearing that it would upset Austria's allies, 
and he was worried that if Austria replied favourably to the 
British approach, the British would use the reply to discredit 
Austria with her'allies. In addition, wishing to avoid a 
1 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 17 Oct. 1730, *BL. Add. 9139 f. 106. 
2 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, Fonseca and Königsegg, 27 Aug. 
1730, Höfler, II, 258. As Secretary of State for the Northern 
Department Harrington was responsible for relations with 
Austria. 
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repetition of the dispute between Kinsky and Townshend in 1729, 
Charles wanted it to be made clear that the approach for a 
reconciliation had been initiated by Britain. He therefore 
ý°iý 
decided that it was best for Austria to make no reply to 
Harriggton's approach and to wait until better terms were offered 
l. 
However, the Austrians made it clear that they would welcome a 
British approach. Sinzendorf proposed. a separate Anglo-Austrian 
peace to Robinson, and Stephen Kinsky made the same suggestion 
to Waldegrave after dinner together on August 24th. 
2 
Possibly as a result of their experience the previous year 
the British decided not to base their negotiations for a separate 
treaty on Philip Kinsky3. Having gained Dutch agreement to a 
joint guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction4, Harrington instructed 
Robinson to begin negotiations, on the basis of the offer of such 
a guarantee in return for Imperial acceptance of the Spanish 
III 
garrisons, and an Imperial settlement_of the Ostend, Mecklenburg, `! - 
East Friesland and Bremen issues to the satisfaction of Britain 
and the United Provinces5. Negotiations' were begun, both at 
1 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, Fonseca and K8nigsegg, 27 Aug. 
1730, Höfler, II, 261,266-7; Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 
17 Aug. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32769 f. 143; Hughes, pp. 385-6. 
2 Robinson to Harrington, 15 July 1730, BL. Add. 32781; Waldegrave 
Journal, 24 Aug. 1730, Chewton; Eugene to Kinsky, 17 June 1730, 
Vienna, Kinsky, Kart. 2(b). 
3 Satzdorf to Augustus II, 30 Jan., 2 Feb. 1731, Dresden, 2676,1, 
f. 148,177. 
4 Chesterfield to Harrington, 29 Aug. 1730, PRO. 84/307 f. 1-2. 
5 Harripgton to Robinson, 14 Sept. (os) 1730, Coxe, III, 33-9; 
Naumann, Österreich England und das Reich pp. 167-9; Steuer, 
Englands sterreichpolitik pp. 42-6. 
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Vienna, and, between Chesterfield and the Austrian ambassador, 
count Sinzendorf, (the son-in-law of the Imperial Chancellor), 
at The Hague. The principal difficulty encountered was the 
Austrian refusal to entertain the idea of the Spanish garrisons 
a refusal encouraged by the Dutch willingness to envisage the 
compromise of garrisons comprised of Spanish and Swiss troops, 
in equal proportions2. On the evening of October 25th Robinson 
pressed Chancellor Sinzendorf to admit the garrisons, and informed 
him 'qu'it souhaitöit la promptitude pour asseurer toute chose 
avant 1'ouverture du Parlement'. ' He also stated that Britain, 
in regaining the Emperor's friendship, wished to do nothing to 
make Spain or France an enemy. Robinson claimed that Fleury 
would support anything that would produce peace3. The British 
frequently repeated the theme that an Anglo-Austrian alliance 
would be useless to Britain unless Spain was satisfied over the 
garrisons, because, without this, Anglo-Spanish relations would 
collapse, and Britain would be forced to defend Gibraltar and 
her commercial concessions4. Thus, on November 21st, Harrington 
informed Chesterfield that George II would 'insist upon the 
execution of the Treaty of Seville with respect to the introduction 
of the 6,000 Spaniards, as an hbsolute and indispensable condition 
of proceeding in this negociation'S. 
1 Robinson to Harrington, 28 Oct., 14,15 Nov. 1730, PRO. 80/69; 
Chesterfield to Robinson, 27 Oct. 1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. 306. 
2 Robinson to Tilson , 18 Nov., Chesterfield to Harrington, 22 Dec. 1730, PRO. 80/69,84/309 f. 154. - 
3 Draft account by Sinzendorf of the conference, 25 Oct. 1730, 
Vienna, England, Noten, 2. 
4 Robinson to Harrington, 18 Nov. 1730, PRO. 80/69. 
5 Harrington to Chesterfield, 10 Nov. (os) 1730, PRO. 84/309 f. 12. 
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The Austrian reply to the British proposals was judged 
unacceptable'. On December 15th Harrington informed Robinson 
that a prompt settlement was essential both for diplomatic and 
for domestic political reasons. George had to know what to tell 
Parliament. Harrington reiterated the link between the British 
guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction and the admission of the 
Spanish garrisons, 
'the King is absolutely resolved in all events to execute 
his engagements with Spain, in relation to the said garrisons, 
to which his own, and the nations honour, as also the interests 
of his subjects indispensably oblige him. The being enabled to 
compass that end without a war is what alone can induce the King 
to charge himself with the Guaranty of the Empr. 's succession'. 
Another issue that caused difficulties was George's demand 
that the 'Electoral points' should be satisfied. In December 
1730 Harrington wrote that it was the, 
v 
'.... highest dnjustice that those vexations and injuries 
done to H. M. 's Electoral rights, and interests purely on account 
of differences, and animosities unhappily arisen betwixt the 
Empr. and the crown of Great Britain, should not, upon the renewal 
of the ancient good understanding and friendship betwixt those 
two powers, be at the same time removed, and redrest'2. 
Charles VI's view was different. In August he had referred 
1 Harrington to Chesterfield, 4 Dec. (os) 1730, PRO. 84/309 f. 123; 
Chesterfield to Robinson, 12 Dec. 1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. 386. 
Informing Waldegrave of the Anglo-Austrian negotiations, 
Newcastle wrote 'I can'by no means promise that it will at last 
succeed', Newcastle to Waldegrave, 30 Nov. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 
32770 f. 139. 
2 Harrington to Robinson, 4 Dec. (os) 1730, PRO. 80/69; Delafaye 
to [Newcastle? ], 5 Dec. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32770 f. 213. 
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to George's wish to have the Mecklenburg issue settled 'ä sa 
1 fantaisie'. The Imperial answer to the British approach, con- 
veyed by a paper given to Robinson on November 17th, was un- 
yieding, as far as the Electoral points were concerned. Though 
the demanded investiture of Bremen and Verden would not 
seriously anger any of Austria's allies, Prussia was concerned 
in both the Mecklenburg and East Friesland disputes, and Russia 
interested in the former. The British ministry were prepared 
to compromise on the matter. On December 15th, when Robinson 
was sent the full powers to conclude a treaty, he was instructed 
to insist on the Electoral points. However, the following 
2 
day, Harrington sent him a letter written in his own hand, 
'coming from a private friend and not from a minister'. 
Robinson was ordered to obtain a declaration from Austria 
promising satisfaction of the Hanoverian demands, 
'but if the Court of Vienna should obstenately [sic) 
refuse to give such a declaration, you will not absolutely 
break the treaty upon that head, but send an account of every- 
thing with all speed to England, and if you find you are not 
likely to agree upon those points, I believe you would not do 
amiss, to dispose that court to send at the same time full 
powers and instructions to their minister here to conclude 
them if possible without any loss of time'3. 
1 Charles VI to Stephen Kinsky, Fonseca and Königsegg, 27 Aug. 
1730, Höfler, II, 261. 
2 Delafaye to (Newcastle? ] ,5 Dec. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32770 f. 212-3. 
3 Harrington to Robinson, 5 Dec. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 23780 f. 472. 
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Harrington's order reflected the realisation that the 
Austrians were not going to yield over both the Spanish 
garrisons and the Electoral points. It was essential to gain 
Austrian consent to the first, because otherwise Spain would 
be alienated,, but, none of Britain's allies, would be offended, 
if the Electoral points were not pressed. However, in December, 
Harrington did not dare to mention this in Robinson's instruct- 
ions. The situation had not changed by early February. When, 
on February 8th, Harrington sent Robinson a new project of a 
treaty, to be presented to the Emperor as. an ultimatum, there 
was no mention, in his official instructions, of the shelving 
of the Electoral points 
l. It was in a 'private and particular' 
letter that Harrington ordered Robinson to postpone the 
consideration of the Electoral points until after the treaty 
was signed2. 
It is unclear how far George II-was kept in ignorance of 
the decision to defer the negotiation of the Electoral points. 
It is possible that he was aware of Harrington's secret instruct- 
ions to Robinson, but did not wish, for reasons of honour or 
prudence, to countenance, them formally. Had George chosen to 
defy his ministers and insist upon the Electoral points he 
would have found himself in a very weak position. As 
Chesterfield, no supporter of the Electoral points, noted, if 
1 Harrington to Robinson, 28 Jan, (os) 1731, Coxe, III, 83-7. 
2 Harrington to Robinson, 28 Jan, (os), *'Tilson to Robinson, 
28 Jan, 1731, Coxe, III, 87,87-8. 
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the Austrians satisfied the British demands, 'then for reasons 
too obvious to mention, it will be impossible to break upon 
the Electoral points' 
1. If the negotiations were to be broken 
off upon these points it would provide the opposition with a 
marvellous opportunity to attack the government for its 
subservience to Hanoverian interests. The Craftsman, in its. 
issue of January 13th 1731, had revealed the secret of the 
Anglo-Austrian negotiations, and the Austrians, had the talks 
collapsed, would have been able to provide the opposition with 
material that would harm the government. 
This was a serious consideration, though it could be 
suggested that it may not have been decisive with George II. 
More important probably was the knowledge that Spain and France 
were considering or had actually begun negotiations with the 
Emperor2, British suspicions, already strong in the late 
3 
autumn had produced, by early 1731, a realisation that 
Britain was taking part in a race, with France and Spain, for 
an Austrian alliance. Were Austria to settle with either or 
both of the other powers then George would not obtain satis- 
faction for the Electoral points anyway. Furthermore, an 
Anglo-Austriin settlement that excluded these points would 
nevertheless assuage George's fear of an attack upon Hanover, 
and it can be suggested that, for George, this fear took 
1 Chesterfield to Robinson, 2 Feb. 1731, Coxe, III, 88. 
2 Maffei to Charles Emmanuel III, 25 Dec. 1730,30 Ap. 1731, 
AST. LM. Francia, 165,166; Villars, 17 Jan., 8,12 Feb. 10 Mar. 
1731, pp. 292,299,300,308; Newcastle to Waldegrave, 26 liar. 
(os) 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 113; Baudrillart, IV, 62-3,70-1; 
Wilson, pp. 227-8; Vaucher, Robert Walpole pp. 39-40. 
3 Holzendorf to Tilson, 24 Sept. 1730, PRO. 84/309 f. 27. 
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precedence over the more specific Hanoverian demandsl. 
The reasons which induced George to finally accept the 
postponement. of the Electoral points are unclear, but the 
importance of this postponement is not. As Thomas Pelham noted 
'the German affairs ... have been the-chief clog to this neg- 
ociation'Z. It is clear that the Austrians were concerned for 
more than Imperial authority. The Austrians had no wish to 
surrender their Russian and Prussian alliances for the sake 
of Hanoverian interests. Whilst the British ministry, however 
hopeful they might be of persuading Fleury to concur in the 
new diplomatic arrangements, realised that they were seriously 
jeopardising the Anglo-French alliance and taking what was in 
effect 'a leap in the dark, ' the Austrians were ready to take 
no such leap. They did not intend to abandon their allies, 
and, their alliance sought by Britain, France and Spain, they 
.a 
were in a far stronger diplomatic position, at the beginning 
of 1731, than the British. The British government was aware 
of this, and it accounted for the somewhat frenetic and anxious 
tone of the Harrington-Chesterfield-Robinson correspondence 
in the first ten weeks of 1731. Weeks slipped by, the Austrians 
did not yield to the British demands, the Austrian diplomatic 
position became stronger as the Seville alliance publicly 
disintegrated3 and the British ministers wondered whether they 
were following the correct policy. 
1 Watzdorf suggested that for domestic political reasons it 
was thought best to settle the Electoral points in a separate 
treaty, Watzdorf to Augustus II, 24 Ap. 1731, Dresden, 2676,1, 
f. 324. 
2 Thomas Pelham to Waldegrave, 23 Mar, (os) 1731, Chewton; 
Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, '12 Feb., 19 Mar. 1731, 
AST. LM. Ing. 38. George's concern over these matters is clear, 
Harrington to Newcastle, 11 Dec. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32770 f. 250. 
3 Delafaye to Newcastle, 13 Dec. (os) 1730, BL. Add. 32770 f. 258. 
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The negotiations were not confined to the Electoral points 
and 'the two great views of the Guaranty, and the Introduction'1. 
The Austrians suggested that George and the Czarina should 
reciprocally guarantee their dominions, and that George should 
undertake to obtain an equivalent for the Duke of, Holstein- 
Göttorp for the lands he had lost to Denmark2. George rejected 
both suggestions, and insisted that Anglo-Russian relations 
should be settled by the two powers in separate negotiations3 
By rejecting the Austrian proposals George showed his deter- 
mination to maintain his alliances with Sweden and Denmark. 
The failure to include Russia, Prussia and Holstein-G6ttorp 
in the Treaty of Vienna was to cause major problems. Russia 
and Austria abandoned effectively the Holstein-GÖttorp cause 
in the Treaty of Copenhagen of 1732. However, in 1731-33 a 
fatal ambivalence affected Austrian. policy in the Empire and 
Northern Europe. The conflicting diplomatic interests. -of, on 
the one hand Prussia and Russia, and, on the other, George II, 
proved very difficult to reconcile. Austria tended to support 
Prussia and Russia, and George II was angered and confused by 
actual or supposed Austrian support for the Prusso-Bevern 
marriages, the Prussian cause in Mecklenburg, the Prusso- 
Russian marriage project and the negotiations for the Treaty 
of Copenhagen, -negotiations which were kept a mystery to the 
British. Disputes over these issues helped to embitter Anglo- 
Austrian relations, and, in particular, to anger George II, 
so that by early 1733 the Anglo-Austrian-alliance was in a 
1 'Observations relating to the Counter Project sent from 
Vienna', endorsed 'sent to Ld.. Chesterfield and Mr. Robinson 
28 Jan. 1731', (hereafter, Observations), PRO. 84/311 f. 108,114. 
2 Chesterfield to Harrington, 19 Dec. 1730, HMC. Weston 
Underwood, p. 244. 
3 Observations, f. 118-120. 
391 
parlous condition. 
It is doubtful whether these difficulties could have been 
av61ded by widening the terms of the Treaty of Vienna to 
include Prussian and Russian interests. The postponing of the 
Electoral points meant that the negotiation of'differences 
with Prussia was put off1. The British refusal to undertake 
to guarantee Russian possessions was understandable given the 
strong fears that France would attempt to gain the alliance 
2 
of Sweden and Denmark. In addition, there was simply not 
enough. time to encompass these issues in the negotiations at 
Vienna. The initial requirements of secrecy demanded that as 
few powers as possible were informed of the negotiations, and 
the subsequent need for speed, and, in particular, the wish 
of the British ministry to inform Parliament of the Treaty, 
helped to ensure that the Vienna talks left many issues unsettled. 
The British ministry was determined to attach one important 
condition to their guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. They 
wished to include in the treaty a stipulation that the guarantee 
would depend upon the husbands selected for the Archduchesses, 
'His Majesty is willing still that hone of the Arch-Dutch- 
esses should be married to any Prince that might give any just 
grounds of jealousy as to the balance of power in 
1 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 15 June 1731, *Dresden, 2676, II f. 81. 
2 'You must avoid carefully any proposal of mutual guarantees', 
Harrington to Rondeau, 22 June (os) 1731, PRO. 91/12. By the 
spring of 1731 there was no doubt of French approaches to 
Denmark and Sweden, Harrington to Edward Finch, 5 Mar. (os) 
1731, BDI. Sweden p. 19. 
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The Emperor felt that it was dishonourable to have his 
daughter's marital choice restricted in a public treaty, and 
it was therefore decided that a secret article should be 
resorted to. This article released the Maritime Powers from 
their obligations to the Emperor in the event of a Bourbon or 
Prussian marriage for Maria Theresa. It is possible to suggest 
that George was responsible for this article. D'Aix had noted 
in 1728 that George had differed from Townshend in insisting 
2 
upon such a stipulation, and the ban on a Prussian marriage 
reflected the fear that Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia 
would be forced to convert to Catholicism in order to enable 
him to marry Maria Theresa. The secret article served another 
important function. By linking the British, guarantee to an 
-,. exclusion of a Bourbon marriage it restricted the possibility 
of the Austrians reviving an Austro-Spanish alliance based on 
the 1725 agreements. This possibility was not a strong one 
in 1731, but it could not be discounted.. In the event, Maria 
Theresa was married to Duke Francis III of Lorraine in 1736, 
and her sister married his brother Charles. These marriages 
had been strongly advocated by George II,, who had been much 
impressed by Francis on his visit to England in the autumn of 
17313. In the following years George urged the Austrians to 
declare that the marriage of Maria Theresa and Francis would 
1 Observations, f. 109; Harrington to Robinson, 14 Sept. (os) 
1730, Robinson to Harrington, 16 Jan. 1731, Coxe, III, 35, 
58-9. On 20 May, at a conference at Fontainbleau between 
British, French, Dutch and Austrian diplomats, Konigsegg 
'far from making any objection to the clause of the Emperor's 
not disposing of the Archdutchesses in such a manner as to 
endanger the Balance of Europe.... said it would be readily 
agreed to', Harrington and Poyntz to Newcastle, 2 June 1730, 
BL. Add. 32767 f. 231. 
2 D'Aix to Victor Amadeus II, 9 May 1728, AST. LM. Ing. 35. 
3 see following page. 
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take place. It is interesting to note, however, that, at 
the time of the War of Polish Succession, the Walpole ministry 
advocated an Austro-Spanish marriage as a way to settle diff- 
erences between the two powers. They were less concerned 
than George about the possibility of a future union of Spain 
and Austria. 
7 
1 
3 (from previous page) 
F Hennings, Und Sitzet zur Linkes Hand. Franz Stephan von 
Lothringen ( Vienna 1961) pp. -; Chavigny to Belle-Isle, V-June 7 i, A G. AI. 2676, No. 115. George had been a 
supporter of the Lorraine marriage before Francis' visit to 
Britain. 
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Negotiations were complicated by the sudden death on 
January 20th, -after a brief illness of two and a half days, 
of Antonio, the last Farnese Duke of Parma. He left a will 
announcing that his wife, Henrietta, was pregnant, and 
declaring her Regent for the unborn child. In the will he 
called upon the Pope, and the rulers-of Austria, France and 
Spain, to protect the Regency. The hopes of the Parmese 
government that the major powers would delay intervention until 
they saw the issue of the pregnancy were disillusioned. In 
the last week of January twelve battalions of Austrian infantry, 
accompanied by some cavalry invaded, and occupied, without 
resistance, the towns of Parma and Piacenza. The Duchess's 
l 
complaints were ignored by the Austrian commander, General 
Stampa. On January 31st Count Arconati Visconti wrote from 
Parma, 'Je m'imagine, que cete mort donnera le branle aux 
'2 affaires, et que nous aurons seurement ou paix ou guerre. 
1 Robinson to Waldegrave, 27 Jan. 1731, *Chewton; Waldegrave 
to Newcastle, 31 Jan. 1731, BL. Add. 32771 f. 191; 
M. Dall'Acqua, 'Dorothea Sophia 
von Pflaz-Neuburg', Zeitschrift fur Bayerische Landesgeschichte, 
44, (1981), pp. 302-1 , p. 313; Quazza, pp. - au ri 
lart, 
IV, 70-1. The Austrians wished to prevent the movement of 
Papal troops into the Duchies. 
2 Visconti to [Ballanger? ], 31 Jan, 1731, Münster, NB. 206; 
Gravenitz to Zamboni, 8 Feb. 1731, Bodl. Rawl. 127 ß. 103; 
Baudrillart, IV, 71. 
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It was widely suspected that the Austrians would seek to 
block Don Carlos' right to succeed in Parma. The news of 
the death of the Duke and of Stampa's invasion reached Seville 
on February 4th, and Patino promptly told Keene that he was 
' 
sure that the Austrians-would never accept Carlos in Parma. 
Degenfeld reported from London that the news from Parma 
worried the ministry considerably2. In order to remove the 
Austrians it was possible that Spain would turn to France3. 
Rottembourg informed the Spaniards that t, 4ey could not rely 
upon the British to get Carlos put into possession of'Parma4. 
The French and the Spaniards formally complained about the 
Austrian invasion 5. The British dithered, regretting the 
invasion and seeking to persuade the Spaniards that the 
Austrians would withdraw, and the Austrians that they must 
avoid provocative actions6. 
The invasion of Parma underlined the British need for a 
swift settlement with Austria. It was necessary to show the 
Spaniards that the Austrians were willing to accept the intro- 
duction of the troops, in order to prevent Spain heeding 
French suggestions of an anti-Austrian alliance?. Furthermore, 
rs 
_ýý 
1 Keene to Newcastle, 5 Feb. 1731, PRO. 94/107. 
2 Degenfeld to Frederick William I, 9 Feb. 1731, PRO. 107/3; 
Chesterfield to Harrington, 14 Feb., to Tilson, 16 Feb., to 
Robinson, 16 Feb. 1731, Coxe, III, 94PRO. 84/311 f. 169, BL. Add. 
23781 f. 206; Fog's Weekly Journal, 6 Feb. (os) 1731. 
3 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 9 Feb. 1731, AN. AM. B7 306.. 
4 Keene to Newcastle, 9,23 Feb. 1731, PRQ. 94/107. 
5 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 15 Feb., Newcastle to Waldegrave, 
11 Feb. (os) 1731, BL. Add. 32771 f. 324,347. 
6 Robinson to Waldegrave, 10 Feb. 1731, Chewton. 
.7 Holzendorf feared a French-backed Spanish invasion of Parma, 
Holzendorf to Tilson, 9 Feb. 1731, PRO. 84/311 f. 139. The 
Spaniards believed that Henrietta's pregnancy was imaginary, 
Keene to Waldegrave, 23 Feb. 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 24. 
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on January 23rd the Duke of Liria, a high-placed Spanish 
diplomat, (who was also Waldegrave's first cousin), reached 
Vienna, and on January 28th, Patino's brother, the Marquis 
of Castellar, the Spanish ambassador to France, solemnly 
announced Spain's repudiation of the Treaty of Seville'. 
The unpredictability of Spanish diplomacy, the danger of 
separate Spanish agreements with Austria2 or France, explained 
the British governments determination to push for Spanish 
garrisons rather than Electoral points' in the negotiations 
at Vienna. Castellar's declaration undermined the British 
ministry's claims to have secured British commerce, and, 
despite efforts to keep it a secret 
3, it was exploited by 
4 
the opposition in Britain . 
Fortunately for the British ministry the Austrians 
rejected the idea of a separate treaty with Spain. The 
Austrians were not interested in. a. Spanish marriage 
5. The 
Austrians, despite British pressure for speed, moved slowly 
towards settling the terms of a treaty. Chesterfield feared 
Austrian chicanery, but Robinson was accurate-, when he 
reported on March 9th, 'I have more reason to impute those 
difficulties to a habit in this court of turning everything 
to its advantage and to the satisfaction of its innate pride, 
than to apprehend from such artifices any insincerity in, the 
execution of what is now fixed'. 
6 
1 Castellar's Declaration, 28 Jan. 1731, PRO. 103/113; Baudrillart, =, ^ 
IV, f. 3-4. 
2 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 23 Feb. 1731, Dresden, 2676, I, ß. 201. 
3 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 16 Feb. 1731, Dresden, 2676, I, f. 198. 
4 Thomas Pelham to Waldegrave, 19 Feb. (os). 8 Mar. 1731, 
Chewton. 
5 Robinson to Harrington, 28 Mar. 1731, PRO. 80/73 f. 57; Robinson 
to Waldegrave, 25 June 1731, Chewton. il 
6 Robinson to Harrington, 9 Mar. 1731, PRO. 80/72 f. 53. { 
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A week later the treaty was signed. Britain, Austria 
and the United Provinces mutually guaranteed each others' 
territories, rights and immunities against attack. Britain 
and the United Provinces guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction 
with a secret proviso relating to a Bourbon or Prussian 
marriage for Maria Theresa. As security for Don Carlos' 
succession to Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany, 6,000 Spanish 
troops were to be immediately admitted. The Ostend Company 
was to be permanently suppressed, and the Emperor promised 
to satisfy the Dutch over East Friesland, as far as was 
consistent with Imperial justice. Two widely reported 
l 
secret clauses that were not in fact in the treaty were an 
agreement to compel France and Spain, by force if necessary, 
to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, and a British undertaking 
to pay Austria the equivalent of the subsidies owed her by 
Spain under the first Treaty of Vienna. 
In the following month, George and the Emperor. reached 
a compromise agreement on the 'Electoral points'. The 
Emperor refused to give way over Mecklenburg, but George was 
granted the investitures of Bremen and Verden2. The 
Mecklenburg issue continued to complicate relations with 
Austria over the next few years, but given the Austrian wish 
to maintain the Prussian alliance, a desire fortified in late 
1731 by suspicions of a French-backed alliance of Saxony and 
1 Copy of treaty, PRO. 103/113; 'Stipulations about ye Garrisons 
in Tuscany and Parma in the Quadruple Alliance, Treaty of 
Seville, Treaty of Vienna', anon, undated memorandum, PRO. 
103/113, The treaty was ratified by George on 9 April and 
by Charles VI on 21 April. 
_ 
2 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 8 Feb. 1731, Dresden, 2676, f. 7-11- 
Hughes, pp. $87-90; Naumann, Osterreich, England und das 
-Reich pp. 171-3. 
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Bavaria, it was unrealistic to hope that Austria would 
satisfy George over Mecklenburg. 
The treaty was proclaimed. in Britain as a triumph for 
British diplomacy. The Flying Post or Post Master printed a 
poem by Joshuan Nun praising the true patriot, Sir Robert 
Walpole, 
... 'the Great Patriot whose propitious care, 
Averts the Horrors of all wasting War, 
And bids our Isle with peaceful Pleasure crown'd 
Command the Wonder of the World around'. 
More prosaic ministerial writers asserted that Walpole had 
brought peace to Europe and secured British national interests1. 
Opposition claims that the government was guilty of inconsist- 
ency in now proclaiming the virtues of an alliance with a 
power, Austria, which had been treated as a threat for the 
previous six years, were dismissed. The Craftsman claimed 
that the government's new alliance had been negotiated as 
a result of the newspaper's call for an Austrian alliance, 
but it also asserted that the only proper alliance with 
Austria was an 'equal' one, not one that sacrificed British 
2 interests to those of Hanover. The ggvernment press denied 
that such a sacrifice had taken place. 
Whatever the importance for the future of the press 
debate about the Austrian alliance it in fact took second 
Newcastle referred to 'the honour and credit which our 
Royal Master has so justly acquired, by having singly given 
peace to all Europe', Newcastle to Waldegrave, 26 Mar. (os) 
1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 113-4. 
2 Craftsman, 24 Ap. (os) 1731. 
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place in the spring of 1731 to the government's attempts to 
counter opposition charges that their foolish diplomacy had 
only served to unite France and Spain. The opposition chose, 
thus, not to attack the new Austrian alliance, but rather 
to claim that incompetent diplomacy had served to create a 
Bourbon pact. The ministry claimed that Spain would accede 
to the new treatyI, and France accept it. The opposition 
challenged both these contestations. Castellar's declaration 
2 
and the new Spanish fortifications near Gibraltar provided 
grounds for public scepticism from January 1731. The events 
of the following six months were to provide more material 
for the opposition press, for far from being a triumphant 
diplomatic success the Second Treaty of Vienna threw Anglo- 
Spanish relations into total confusion, and produced in the 
summer of 1731 an Anglo-French war-scare that has been over- 
looked by historians. The Second Treaty of Vienna was to be 
a failure in the end, and in the short-term it produced a 
very difficult diplomatic situation for'the British government. 
However, in the circumstances of 1730-1 there had been no 
sensible alternative. 
1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 15 Mar. (os)*'1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 66; 
Chammorel to Chauvelin, 9 Ap. 1731, AE. CP. Ang. 373 f. 209. 
Broglie reported that the British government, despite public 
protestations to the contrary, was very fearful that Spain 
would not accede, Broglie to Chauvelin, 9 Ap. 1731, BL. Add. 
32772 f. 254. 
2 Broglie to Chauvelin, 9 Ap. 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 255. 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
SPRING-SUMMER 1731; 
SPANISH ACCESSION; ANGLO-FRENCH WAR-PANIC 
It 
..... 'our treaty with the Empr. It is I think as we can wish, 
and puts us above both our foreign and domestick ennemies, 
you cannot imagine what satisfaction it is. here, and is 
universally thought so good, that people will have it, we 
must have given more for it than we own. The Empr. has 
certainly done handsomely ... Spain must be pleased .... it 
is the general opinion that both the card. and the Garde de 
Sceaux will in their hearts be glad of it, however they may 
pretend the contrary'1. 
The British ministry failed to -appreciate how their new 
alliance would be received in Europe. They were inaccurate 
in their supposition that French anger would be but superficial 
and that the French would accommodate themselves to the new 
settlement2. British attempts to excuse their action to 
Fleury met with rebukes. Fleury had little time for the 
efforts of Horatio Walpole and Waldegrave to argue that the 
new treaty simply ensured the provisions of that of Seville. 
1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 1 Ap (os) 1731, Chewton. 
2 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 30 Nov. (os) 1730, Robinson to 
Waldegrave, 31 Mar, 1731, Chewton; Waldegrave to Newcastle, 
15 Feb., Waldegrave to Keene, 1 May 1731, BL. Add. 32771 
f. 316-8,32772 f. 334; Villars, 19 Ap. 1731, pp. 313-4. 
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Suspecting secret anti-French articles in the new treaty, 
the French attacked British duplicity. Chauvelin wrote to 
l 
Chammorel that 'les coups d'infidelite ne sont pas un crime 
Z 
aux yeux de la nation, dans laquelle wous vivez'. 
The French ministry had no intention of subscribing to 
any scheme.. that entailed the guaranteeing of the Pragmatic 
Sanction, and it made a determined effort to prevent Spain 
acceding to the new treaty, and to build up a party in the 
Empire and the Baltic pledged to resist the Pragmatic Sanction 
and Austrian power3. Within a few months British diplomats 
were complaining of French activities in Spain, the United 
Provinces, the Empire and Scandinavia. The British ministry 
responded to these complaints, and urged the Austrians to 
take all steps possible to defeat French projects. By the 
summer of 1731 the British realised that it would be totally 
impossible to reconcile the French to their new scheme. 
Suppositions based on Fleury's supposedly pacific dispositions 
were replaced by anxiety about French policy. 
Plumb wrote of the Spanish response, -'Elizabeth Farnese 
and her husband greeted this treaty with delight and joined 
it with surprisipg alacrity'. 
4 This statement is inaccurate, 
and historians have done less than justice to the difficulties 
that affected Anglo-Spanish relations in the first half of 
1731. The British ministry were to be proved wrong in their 
1 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 15 liar., Broglie to ChIxuvelin, 
9 Ap. 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 28,254; Keene to Newcastle, 
20 May 1731, PRO. 94/107. 
2 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 10 Ap. 1731, AE. CP. Ang. Sup. 8 f. 196. r 
3 Baudrillart, IV, 72-3,86-91. 
4 Plumb, p. 229. 
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view that Spain would accept the new treaty without hesitations. 
Sir Robert Walpole informed Parliament in February that 'there 
was nothing negotiated with the Emperor but with a comprehension 
of Spain's interest and to effectuate the admission of Don 
Carlos into Italy, according to the plan of the Seville 
Treaty'Z. 
However, as Chauvelin commented sardonically the following 
month, 'Les Walpoles vont beaucoup s'applaudir, meme avant 
qu'on sache quel parti prendra 1'Espl. '3... British attempts 
to gain'a speedy Spanish accession to the new treaty were 
defeated by the quixotic character of the Spanish government4. 
The personal views of Philip V were a major difficulty, as, 
in the spring of 1731 at any rate, he had no. wish to harm 
the interests of his native country, France. Furthermore, 
s 
the perpetually imminent succession crisis that so confused 
Spanish court politics in the 1720s and 1730s was of great 
importance in this period. The eccentric lifestyle of Philip V, 
and, in particular, his irregular hours and disinclination 
6 
to sleep, led to fears for his life?. Some envoys. such 
1 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 3 Ap., 15 May 1731, Dresden, 
2676,1 f. 300,318, 
.2f. 
21-2. 
2 Egmont, 23 Feb. (os) 1731, I, 146. 
3 Chauvelin to Chammorel, 26 Mar. 1731, AE. CP. Ang Slip. 8 f-195- 
4 Information from the Sicilian Abbes enclosed in Waldegrave 
to Newcastle, 29 Mar. 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 96. 
5 Keene to Newcastle, 11 May 1731, PRO. 94/107. 
6 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 13,20 Ap., 11,25 May, 1 June 1731, 
AN. AM. B7 307; Baudrillart, IV, 73-4,84-5. 
7 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 20 Ap. 1731, AN. AM. B7 307; D'Arvillars 
to Charles Emmanuel III, 6,20 July 1731, AST. LM. Spagna, 63. 
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as the Sardinian Marquis D'Arvillars took to cultivating his' 
eldest son, the Prince of Asturias, (the future Ferdinand VI), 
who was believed to have little interest in his stepmother's 
Italian aspirations, and whose accession, it was believed, 
would undo all the British effortsl. In this situation the 
diplomatic approaches of the British and French envoys, Keene 
and Rottembourg, were met with delay and prevarication. The 
French consul-general, D'Aubenton, reported on April 6th, 
'L'on continue icy a"ne vouloir prendre aucune sorte 
de party, ny faire de response sur les propositions que 
Pon ya faites'2. 
This refusal to accept their propositions was accompanied 
by two moves that disturbed the British, the continuation 
of the negotiations of the Duke of Liria, and the exacerbation 
of Anglo-Spanish relations by acts of hostility. Liria pressed 
the Austrians to sign an Austro-Spanish alliance that would 
exclude Britain, and demanded an archduchess for Don Carlos. yr 
3 
The Austrians rejected Liria's proposals, but, as the British 
ministry realised, the success of their attempts to have the 
commercial clauses of the Treaty of Seville renewed, depended 
on the success. of Liria's negotiations. On May-11th Keene 
informed Delafaye, 
'if they could come at Parma by the Emperor's means, 1 
without us, there is no doubt but they would refuse to renew 
our Treatys of commerce and particularly that of Assiento, 
which Patino looks upon as the ruin of the Indies'4. 
1 D'Arvillars to Charles Emmanuel III, 1 May, 15 June 1731, 
AST. LM. Spagna, 63. 
? D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 6 Ap. 1731, AN. AM. B7 307. 
" EI 3 Keene to Newcastle, 14 Aug. 1731, PRO. 94/108. 
4 Keene to Delafaye, 11 May 1731, PRO. 94/107. 
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Threatening Spanish moves near Gibraltar which had 
preceded the Second Treaty of Vienna did not cease with its 
signature. In December 1730 new Spanish emplacements near 
Gibraltar were constructed, and the Spaniards threatened to 
dominate part of the Bay of Gibraltar with their artilleryl. 
2 This development attracted much press comment in Britain. 
Fears were expressed that Gibraltar would be closely blockaded 
or attacked3. Pulteney contrasted the British wooing of Spain 
and the Spanish threat to. Gibraltar. On May 2nd Keene wrote 
4 
to Waldegrave, r 
'Mr Rottembourg tells me he hears from France that the 
affair of Gibraltar makes great noise in England, and that 
I am to have very strong orders to execute upon it which they 
imagine will finish our negotiations with Spain'5. 
The Commander of the Gibraltar, garrison was told to 
prepare against a possible Spanish-attack; the British factory 
in Cadiz was warned that war was a possibility6. Maritime 
7 insurance on ships trading with Spain rose considerably. 
1 Gastaldi to the Senate of Genoa, 8 Jan. 1731, AS. Genoa, 
LM. Ing. 11; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 30 Nov. (os), 21 Dec. 
1730, Chewton; Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 Jan. 1731, BL. 
Add. 32770 f. 281. 
2 EpgIs Weekly Journal 17 Ap. (os). Daily Courant 8 May, Daily 
Post Boy 24 May, London Evening Post June 1731. 
3 Dayrolle to Tilson', 29 May 1731, PRO. 84/317 f. 117; Ossorio 
to Charles Emmanuel III, 11 June 1731, AST. LM. Ing. 38. 
4 Pulteney to Colman, 12 June (os) 1731, G. Colman CeQ 
Posthumous Letters pp. 32-3. 
5 Keene to Waldegrave, 2 May 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 388. 
6 Keene to Newcastle, 2 May 1731, PRO. 94/107; Cayley to Newcastle, 
8 May 1731, PRO. 94/219. 
7 Wye's Letter, 22 May (os) 1731. 
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The British merchantmen-in the Bay of Cadiz left in May in 
order to avoid possible expropriation.. Alicante was similarly 
abandoned. A report circulated that the Spanish ministry 
2 
had ordered their governors in the West Indies to prevent 
all further trade with Britain3. The Daily Post Boy announced 
the. success of Rottembourg4, and reports circulated of the 
disgrace of Elizabeth Farnese and the rise to power of the 
5 Prince of the Asturias. Spain was reported as being opposed 
to the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and as demanding 
the return of Gibraltar6. Some commentators reported that 
the. major British naval preparations of this period were 
intended to cajole Spain into acceding to the new treaty or 
to protect British trade in the West Indies from Spanish 
attack7.. Waldegrave reported on June 12th that it was believed 
in Paris that the British had ordered the immediate return 
of the 'annual ship' of the South Sea Company, and had sent 
instructions to Admiral Stewart in the West Indies to prepare 
for action. The Sicilian priests, Waldegrave's informants 
on Spanish affairs, informed him that Castelar had reported 
1 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 11,18 May 1731, AN. AM. B7307; Watzdorf 
to Augustus II, 29 June 1731, Dresden, 267q, 2, f. 103; 
Evening Post 27 May (os) 1731. 
2 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 25. May. 17.31, AN. AM. B7307. 
3 D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 25 May 1731, AN. AM. B7307. Ail 
4 Daily Post Boy 26 May (os) 1731; Wattdorf to Augustus II, 
May 1731, Dresden, 2676,2, f. 51. 
5 Daily Post Boy 28,31 May (os) 1731. 
6 Daily Post Bob 1 June (os) 1731; Newcastle to Keene, 31 May 
os 1731, BL. Add. 32773 f. 27; Solaro di Breglio to Charles 
Emmanuel III, 26 May 1730, AST. LM. Aut. 61. 
7 Daily Post Boy 31 May (os) 1731_. 
\ 
406 
that the British fleet was being prepared in order to inter-. 
cept the galleons 
1. 
The British ministry were very anxdbus about Spanish 
intentions. Newcastle referred to the behaviour of the 
Spanish court as 'very extraordinary', and Robinson thought 
it 'very unaccountable'. Harrington noted, 'there is no forming 
anW sure judgement upon the future conduct of so capricious 
a court as that of Spain .... ', and he was to reiterate this 
theme on several occasions2. This view was shared by British 
3 diplomats. The prospect of a Bourbon alliance worried the 
ministry. Such a development would be harmful domestically, 
and dangerous diplomatically. On May 25th Harrington referred 
to 'France, who by such a union will be enabled to keep the 
affairs of Europe in a continual state ' of agitation and 
uncertainty, and perhaps bring on & 
, 
general war... '4 
The tense situation in international affairs was made 
appreciably worse by the simultaneous arming of the-British, 
French and Spanish fleets, and by a burst of reports about 
possible Jacobite action. The British ministry noted an 
upsurge of Jacobite activity, and received reports that 
James III had travelled secretly to France and met Louis XV 
1 
E;, 
1 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 12 June 1731, BL. Add. 32773 f. 12. 
2 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 7 May (os), Robinson to Harrington, 
4 Ap. 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 407,263; Harrington to Robinson, 
14 May (os), 18 June 1731, PRO. 80/74,80/75. 
3 Chesterfield to Tilson, 27 Mar, 1731, PRO. 84/312 f. 53; 
Thomas Pelham to Delafaye, 23 May 1731, PRO. 78/198 f. 23; 
Keene to Delafaye, 7 June 1731, PRO. 94/107. 
4 Harrington to Robinson, 14 May (os) 1731, PRO. 80/74. 
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and Fleury . Fears were expressed that France would support 
i3 
the Jacobites. British envoys were ordered to keep a close 
watch on Jacobite activities. On April 12th Newcastle wrote 
to Waldegrave, 'It is certain the Jacobites begin to conceive 
hopes of France, and thereupon the greatest attention imagin-' 
able should be given to that'2. Waldegrave was sceptical 
about the chances of French aid, but his scepticism had little 
effect upon Newcastle3. In fact, though James III did leave 
Rome, it was in order to visit Naples,, and on June 2nd 
Waldegrave was able to assure Newcastle that Fleury had 
refused a Jacobite request for James to be given permission 
to visit Frances. Concern about possible Bourbon support 
for the Jacobites helped to increase ministerial concern tl 
about European developments, and, in particular, about 
Bourbon naval preparations. 
Spanish preparations against Gibraltar and Spanish naval 
armaments were less of a military threat than French prepar- 
ations. The Spaniards were greatly hindered by a lack of ti 
sailors, and, despite Patino's attempts to improve the Spanish 4, 
ýt1 
ýü Chesterfield to --, 10 Ap., Colman to Waldegrave, 26 May 1731, Chewton; Chesterfield to Harrington, 10 Ap. 1731, 
PRO. 84/312 f. 83; Dayrolle to Tilson, 29 May 1731, PRO. 84/317 
f. 117. Newcastle complained of'Broglie 'having more than 
once said, talking of his own court, upon what has lately 
happened, uq 'on n'avoit u'a ouer le Pretendant', Newcastle 
to Waldegrave, 1 Ap. os 
1, 
Broglie to auvelin, 9 Ap. 
1731, BL. Add. 32272 f. 193,255. 
2 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 1 (quote), 15 Ap. (os) 1731, Chewton, 
BL. Add. 32772 f. 250. 
3 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 10,19 Ap. 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 181,233. 
ýs{ 4 Allen, British Consul in Naples, to Newcastle, 25 May 1731, 
PRO. 93/5 f. 154; DeBrais to Augustus II, 18 June 1731, 
Dresden, 2735,3 f. 175. rll 
5 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 2 June 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 486. 
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navy, it was still far from being a formidable force. Concern 
about French preparations had been expressed since April1. 
On May 5th Newcastle ordered Waldegrave to send spies to the 
French naval bases at Toulon, Brest, Port Louis and Rochefort 
to report on the condition of the French ships and arsenals 
and to ascertain whether the French were making any naval 
2 
preparations, Waldegrave's reply was far from alarmist. 
He reported the armament of a squadron of six or seven ships 
of the line at Toulon, and noted, 'this expedition is said 
to be chiefly intended for the instruction of the young seamen, 
and .... to awe the petty princes on the coast of Barbary'. 
Five weeks later Waldegrave, in denying the validity of 
reports of a French naval threat and of-the capacity of the 
Toulon Squadron to support the Jacobites, informed Newcastle 
that the squadron consisted of only five ships of the line 
and one frigate, and he noted of the reports, 'I am almost 
ashamed to write such idle stuff'3. 
Waldegrave was one of the very few diplomats not to be 
affected by the war hysteria of the summer of 1731, and his 
assurances were not believed. The British ministry was 
convinced that the French were arming a large fleet4. They 
were aware that their own armaments, intended to produce a 
squadron to escort the 6,000 Spanish troops to Leghorn, were 
viewed with concern in Spain and Frances. On May 24th 
1 Watzdorf. to Augustus II, 13 July 1731,, Dresden, '2676,2, f. 123. 
2 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 24 Ap. (os) 1731, BL. Add. 32772 ß. 500. 
3 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 16 May, 25,16 June 1731,. BL. Add 
32772 f. 395,168-9,147. 
4 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 29 May 1731, Dresden, 2676,2, f. 49. 
5 Watzdorf to Augustus II, 29 May 1731, Dresden, 2676,2, f. 49. 
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Newcastle inst iucted Waldegrave to assure the Prench. that the 
British squadron was only intended to aid the peaceful 
introduction of the Spanish garrisons1. These assurances 
failed to quell French anxiety. The French were suspicious 
of the size and intended destination of the British fleet, 
and, as WkIdegrave noted, believed 'the augmentation much 
greater than it is' 
2. 
Speculation. over the destination of the British fleet 
varied greatly. It was to intercept the Spanish galleons 
3 
seize a base in Cuba4, challenge the French possession of 
St Lucias, destroy the Spanish emplacements near Gibraltar, 
seize the Isle d'Origny6, prevent the junction of the French 
?g and Spanish navies, or destroy the harbour at Dunkirk. 
1 Newcastle to Waldegrave, 13 May (os) 1731, BL. Add. 32772 f. 463.4 
2 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 12,16 June 1731, BL. Add. 32773 f. 12, 
147; Chauvelin to Chammorel, 17 June 1731, AE. CP. Ang. sup. 8 f. 213; Marquis D'Asfeld, French general, to Dangervilliers, 
French Secretary of State for War, 6,8 July 1731, AG. A1.2676, 
Nos. 182,185. 
3 Waldegrave to Newcastle, 16 June. 1731, BL. Add. 32773 f. 147. 
4 Anonymous, undated memorandum filed in French military 
records of the period, AG. A . 2676, No. 217. 
5 Asfeld to Dangervilliers, 11 July 1731, AG. A1.2676, No. 190; 
Le Beau, French spy in London, to Se gent, French military 
commissioner in Dunkirk, 12 July 1731, AG. A . 2676, No. 193. 
6 Origny was an island 3 leagues off Cape La Hague from where 
it was feared Britain would be able to interfere with French 
coastal commerce, Chevalier de Caligny to --, 11 June 1731, AE. CP. Ang. 374 f. 36. 
7 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 4 June 17.31, AE. CP. Ang. 374 f. 27. 
8 D'Aubenton reported that the Spaniards feared an attack on F3 Spanish-America, D'Aubenton to Maurepas, 1 June 1731, 
AN. AM. B7307. 
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In this situation of fear and uncertainty, the news of 
a French military build-up along the Channel coast proved 
explosive. On June 18th, fearing a British attack upon 
Dunkirk, the French Secretary of State for War, Dangervilliers, 
ordered the Marquis D'Asfeld to ascertain the British intentions 
and take defensive precautions'. A substantial force of 
French troops was. ordered to march towards Dunkirk, Gravelines 
2 
and Furnes. These moves alarmed the British ministry. On 
July 10th Harripgton informed Robinson of these moves and 
ordered him to secure a promise of Austrian assistance in 
3 
the event of need. On the following day the Privy. Council 
met in Whitehall. Grafton, Devonshire, Godolphin, Wilmington, 
Scarborough, Bolton, Newcastle, Harrington, Sir Robert Walpole 
and Sir William Strickland, the Secretary at War, discussed 
'a design intended by France to make some attempt here'. 
They decided that an-invasion was-. -a--possibility and ordered 
that a squadron should be assembled in'the Downs4. Orders 
were sent to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to make prepar- 
ations for sending troops to Britain. Troops were moved from 
London to the Kent and Sussex coasts, and by the end of July 
1. Waldegrave to Delafaye, 16 July 1731, PRO.. 78/199 f. 203; 
DeBrais to Augustus II, 25 June 1731, Dresden, 2735,3 f. 203. 
Waldegrave blamed Dangervilliers for the crisis, and suggested 
that Chauvelin, Maurepas and Dangervilliers were imposing 
their views upon Fleury, Waldegrave to Delafaye, 30 July 
1731, PRO. 78/199 f. 213. 
2 Maffei to Charles Emmanuel III, 9 July 1731, AST. LM. 
Francia 166. 
3 Harrington to Robinson, 29 June (os) 1731, PRO. 80/75. The 
United Provinces were also asked, Harrington to Chesterfield, 
29 June (os) 1731, PRO. 84/313 f. 160. 
4 Minutes of the Privy Council, 30 June (os) 1731, PRO. 36/23 
. 
f. 184. 
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most of the army then in England had been deployed along or 
near those coasts 
l. 
The British preparations in turn upset the French and 
contributed to the exacerbation of the situation. Reports 
circulated that the British had landed troops near Dunkirk 
and bombarded the town. At the same time, it was widely 
2 
believed that the French were considering military action 
in the Empire. German newspapers claimed that the French 
intended to seize Luxembourg whilst the British press reported 
French military preparations near Metz and the hasty stocking 
of French magazines in French Flanders. Frederick William I 
feared that war would break out. 
3 
The war-panic was strongest in Dunkirk, the source of 
many inaccurate reports, and London. Ossorio noted that the 
French military moves 'allarme extraordinarement toute la 
nation'4. It also caused a fall in the stock market 
5. When 
they received reports that no troops had been embarked on 
the British fleet, the French realised that no attack upon 
1 Peter Wentworth to Strafford, 1 July (os) 17? 1, BL. Add. 22227 
f. 109; Le Beau to Sggent, 12 July 1731, AG. A . 2676, : ßo. 193; Gastaldi to the Senate of Genoa, 12 July, 1731, ASG. Lf.. Ing. 11; 
Zamboni to the Duke of Modena, 13 July 1731, ASM. LM. Ing. 19; 
Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 16 July 1731, AST. LM.. Ing. 38. 
2 Lascelles to Waldegrave, 4 July 1731, BL. Add. 32773 f. 351-2; 
Daily Post Boy 9 July (os) 1731. 
3 Chavigny to Chauvelin, 3 Ap. 1731, AE. CP. Allemagne, 379 f. 114-5; 
St James's Evening Post 29 May (os), 19 June, 29 July, 
WHitehall Evening Post 29 June, London Evening Post 6 July, 
Dally Post Soy 29 July 1731; Freier c William to Chambrier, 
28 July, 11 Aug. 1731, AE. CP': ý Prusse, '-91 f. 119,, 121. 
4 Ossorio to Charles Emmanuel III, 16 July 1731, AST. LM. Ing. 38. 
5 York Courant 6 July (os) 1731. 
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Dunkirk was envisaged'. The march of many of the troops ordered 
to Dunkirk was countermanded 
2, 
and the French assured the 
British that the reason for the concentration of troops near 
the coast was the need to find new areas of pasture for the 
cavalry3. The British did not withdraw their troops from 
the coast for some time4, but the countermanding of the march 
of most of the French regiments reassured the government. 
On August 17th the Ferrett sloop was sent to inspect the 
French ports from Dunkirk and Le Havre. Captain Smith reported 
on the 23rd that he had found only ordinary merchantmen in 
5 
the ports, and no signs of naval or military movements. 
The war panic had not prevented the desired Spanish accession 
to the new treaty. On July 22nd at Vienna the representatives 
s 
of Britain, Spain and the Emperor signed an agreement recognising 
1 Waldegrave to Delafaye, 6 July 1731, PRO. 78/199 f. 197. 
Z DeBrais to Augustus II, 9 July 1731, Dresden, 2735,111 f. 214. 
3 Zamboni to Lagnasco,. Saxon envoy in Vienna, 17 July 1731, 
Dresden, 637 f. 108; Delafaye to Waldegrave, 9 July (os) 1731; 
PRO. 78/199 f. 199.4 
Watzdorff to Augustus II, 20 July 1731, Dresden, 2676,11 f. 140. 
The Guards were recalled from Rochester at the end of August. 
5 Smith to Burchett, the Secretary of the Admiralty, 12 Aug. 
(os) 1731, PRO. 42/20 f. 498. 'i 
6 Rottembourg informed Patino that British fears of France 
would prevent the dispatch of a fleet to the Mediterranean, 
an allegation denied by Keene, Keene to Newcastle, 3 Aug, 
1731, PRO. 94/108. 
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Spain's acceptance of the provisions of the Second Treaty 
of Vienna. Three days later, at Florence, the Spanish and 
l 
Tuscan representatives signed a treaty which recognised 
Don Carlos as the heir to Tuscany. The new diplomatic align- 
2 
ment was symbolised by two journeys in the autumn. Francis 
of Lorraine arrived in England-in October, and, in a tour 
that took him to London, Newmarket, Euston and Houghton, made 
an excellent impression upon the British court and ministry'. 
Further south, Admiral Wager was very well received by 
Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese3, and then convoyed the Spanish 
troops to Leghorn. The Parma pregnancy having proved a sham, 
Don Barlos established his court in Parma. France appeared 
humiliated, isolated diplomatically and harmed internally 
by constitutional and religious disputes. 
The war-panic of the summer of 1731 may not, therefore, 
appear particularly important. Indeed, historians concerned 
to summarise the overwhelming mass of diplomatic developments 
in this period, can be forgiven for ignoring what might appear 
to have been an inconsequential event. Such a conclusion is 
inaccurate as the impact of the war-panic was probably of 
considerable importance for Anglo-French relations. It can be 
suggested that it played a role in worsening relations between 
the two powers, and helped to prevent the possibility of a 
British approach aimed at ascertaining the terms upon which 
France would agree to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction. 
tlig 
; ýý 
1 Copy of Treaty, PRO. 103/113; Pribram,, Osterreichische 
Staatsvertra e pp. 517-26; 'An account of what passed at Vienna 
relative to -the Introduction of the Spanish Garrisons etc. ', 
Mar. -Nov. 1731, PRO. 103/113; Baudrillart, IV, 103. 
2 
Baudrillart, IV, 103-4. ' 
3 Delafaye to Waldegrave, 23 Aug. (OS)1731, Chewton. Keene to 
Delafaye, 23 Aug. 1731, PRO. 94/108. 
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On July 30th Poyntz wrote to Waldegrave, 'The late alarm 
between us and France has astonished me above all the strange 
things I ever saw happen. I was in Norfolk when it first took 
rise, and had asserted to Ld. T. (who seemed to apprehend 
something of this kind) that during the Card. 's life, and our 
own inoffensive disposition at home, nothing of this kind could 
ever befall us; but upon coming back I found we have had secret 
intelligencers who - if I don't mistake had been infusing 
jealousys of us into the cardinal, and afterwards had been 
playing the same game here with regard to us'. 
1 
The identity or existence of these 'secret intelligencers' 
is unclear. Equally unclear are the views of the individual 
British ministers about the crisis. Chammorel claimed that, 
'c'est le Roy d'Angleterre qui a voulu absolument que l'on fist 
tous les mouvements', whilst Zamboni asserted that, 'Le Comte 
Kinsky, qui assiste ä la plupart des conferences de ces 
Ministres a principalement contribue que la cour d'Angleterre se 
determine ä prendre les mesures qu'elle. vient de prendre par 
raport a la marche des troupes, et 
ä faire equiper d'autres 
vaisseaux'. 
2 
It is impossible to ascertain the truth of these remarks. 
If George II and/or Kinsky were responsible for the British 
moves it is necessary to consider whether they did so as a 
result of fears that France would invade, or because they wished 
to see a deterioration in Anglo-French relations. Possibly 
George wished to convince Austria that Britain was a powerful 
ally capable of a strong military response to provocation. 
1 Poyntz to Waldegrave, 19 July(OS)1731, Chewton. 
2 Chammorel to Chauvelin, 19 July 1731, AE. CP. Ang. 374 f. 91; 
Zamboni to the marquis de Fleury, 13 July 1731. Bodl. Rawl. 120. 
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In 1731 the possibility of Britain using the Vienna Treaty as 
a stepping stone for a European peace, of Britain persuading France 
4{ 
to assent to the new arrangements, was lost. Possibly such an 
attempt would have failed, defeated by Chauvelin and by French 
unwillingness to accept a dictated settlement. 
1 However, without 
French consent no European peace settlement could be secure or 
long-lasting. Whilst France was isolated her diplomatic efforts, 
such as the attempt to gain the alliance of Sweden and Denmark or 
the attempt to prevent the Imperial Diet accepting the Pragmatic 
Sanction, could be defeated. As soon as France could gain allies, 
as in late 1733 when she formed alliances with Spain and Sardinia, 
she was to prove a major threat. 
The basis for any French accession to-the Anglo-Austrian 
agreement was assumed to be a guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. 
France was unwilling to provide such a guarantee but the eventual 
solution that was to be produced by the Third Treaty of Vienna, the 
acquisition of Lorraine, in return for the guarantee, had already 
been considered in the late 1720's and early 1730's. 
2 Should 
Maria Theresa marry Francis of Lorraine, the dynastic union of 
Lorraine and Austria would become 'a strong possibility. France 
could not be expected to accept this. Indeed, in June 1731, Count 
Toerring argued that an agreement over Lorraine was essential for, 
the peace of. Europe. 
3 
Unfortunately, the legacy of Anglo-French 
bitterness dating from the spring and summer of 1731,4 ensured that 
1Villars, 27 May 1731, p. 320. 
2 Boye, Un roi de Pologne p. 334. 
3 Toerring to Plettenberg, 21 June 1731, Mönster, NA. 148. 
4 
Delafaye had hoped that the war-panic would only prove to be 'ye 
falling out of lovers', and he urged a policy of 'Forget and 
Forgive', Delafaye to Waldegrave, 9 July(OS)1731, PRO. 78/199 f. 199. '. 
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whilst Britain had pressed Austria to satisfy Spain and accept the 
introduction of the Spanish garrisons, she was unwilling to press !i 
Austria to satisfy France by the cession of Lorraine. Possibly the 
411 
effort would have met with Austrian refusal, but the failure to 
make it was to have serious consequences. When the British 
ministry attempted to use its good offices to end the Polish 
. iEf 
Succession War, the absence of any substance underlying the 
assurances of regard exchanged by Horatio Walpole and Fleury was to 
defeat the attempt. France and Austria were to settle their 1i 
differences, including the Lorraine question,, and the French 
guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, without Britain, and the 
British were to be consigned to diplomatic isolation in the second 
r,. 
half of the 1730's. 
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Conclusion 
In British politics- the most important developments 
in the period 1727-1731 were the accession of George II, his 
decision to retain most. of his father's ministers, the 
development of a working relationship between king and ministers, 
and the fall of Townshend. Compared to these events the activ- 
ities of the Pulteney-Bolingbroke opposition, in both 
Parliament and the press appear of lesser importance. Foreign 
policy was of-great importance in these political developments. 
Issues of foreign policy provided much of the currency of 
political debate in the Council, in-Parliament and in the 
press. An examination of these issues can serve to elucidate 
some of the divisions within the ministry, but much still 
remains obscure. In particular, the exact impact of differ- 
ences over foreign policy upon the dispute between Sir Robert 
Walpole and Townshend is unclear. This study has cast light 
upon the relationship between foreign policy and domestic 
politics, but much has been left in darkness. The destruction 
of archival material and the attitudes of several manuscript 
owners are partly responsible for this$ but the nature of 
politics in this period is a more significant factor. Much 
material survives about party disputes and it is relatively 
easy to'undertake a study of parliamentary or press conflict. 
In these conflicts issues were publicly debated. This was 
not the case with divisions within the court or ministry, 
or between. the king and his ministers. These disputes were ! 
', I 
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conducted within a small group where everybody knew everybody 
else and where opportunities for meeting were frequent. 
Issues were debated face to face, and conversations took the 
place of memoranda. There was no institution that recorded 
the audiences ministers had with the king, and there is no 
equivalent for the British council of the records of the 
Austribn Privy Conference. In the latter case the views of 
the individual ministers were recorded separately. Distinguish- 
ing the views of George'II is not easy and it is no accident 
that historians have hitherto neglected George as the subject 
of a full-length*biography. Little of'his private correspond- 
ence has survived. In the official instructions to British 
diplomats, George's own ideas are invariably hopelessly 
intertwined with those of his ministers 
l. 
This study has indicated some areas in which the king's 
views can be reasonably asserted, but it has not proved 
possible to state definitively what George's attitudes and 
achievements were for more than a 
has proved possible to cast light 
of British foreign policy in this 
neglected. The discussions about 
Austrian reconciliation have been 
obscurity. An attempt has been m 
few issues. Equally, it 
on only some of the aspects 
period that were previously 
the possibility of an Anglo- 
rescued from an undeserved 
ade to indicate the import- 
ance of Hanoverian vulnerability in Anglo-French and Anglo- 
Austrian relations. The fragility of the Anglo-French alliance 
in the late 1720s has been stressed. However, much is still 
unclear about Anglo-Austrian relations in the late 1720s and 
it is still difficult to determine what led the British 
1 For comparable problems with the Emperor Joseph I, CW Ingr. ap, 
In Quest and Crisis. Emperor Joseph I and the Habsburg 
Monarchy (West Lafayette, Indiana, 1979) p. 3. 
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ministry to approach Austria in the late summer of 1730. The 
influence of Sir Robert Walpole upon British foreign policy 
in this period is nearly as difficult tb determine as that of 1 V 4 
the king. 
The value of this study therefore lies not so much in 
the answers it provides as in the questions it raises. It, 
can be seen that the usual view of British foreign policy 
in this period, of Britain firmly behind the Anglo-French 
alliance until the summer of 1730, 'is inaccurate. The 
customary view, that of Townshend's anti-Austrian policy 
being replaced by Walpole's pro-Austrian schemes, is not 
supported by the evidence. Rather this study suggests that 
policy was far more complex and confused, that ministers were 
less fixed in their opinions than has been appreciated, and 
that the distinct administrative machinery for the formulation 
and execution of foreign policy was of less significance than 
Ij 
the views and actions of individuals: George and his ministers. 
This. highlights the uncertainty over the fall of Townshend, 
and raises the question of George's influence. Both of these 
questions still require study if British foreign policy and 
British politics in this period are to be understood. 
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Epilogue 
The diplomatic development of the period up to the fall of Walpole in 1742 casts 
some light upon British foreign policy in the period 1727-1731. Despite much 
diplomatic effort Britain's attempt to use her good offices to end the War of 
the Polish Succession of 1733-35 failed. The terms of the treaty ending the war, 
that of Vienna, were not communicated to Britain. The new diplomatic configuration 
produced by this treaty, the Austro-French alliance that lasted until 1741, ignored 
British and Hanoverian interests. Austria and France attempted to settle many of 
the outstanding European problems, such as the Jülich-Berg dispute, without heeding 
British views. The British ministry retorted by considering alliances with Prussia 
and Russia. Discussions about the possibility of an Anglo-Prussian alliance having 
failed in 1735 and 1736, George II and the British ministry pinned their hopes upon 
Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia. They were to be swiftly disabused when he came 
to the 'throne but it is important to note that a conviction that his accession would 
produce an alliance led the British ministry to assume in the late 1730's that their 
diplomatic isolation would only be temporary. In late 1738 the British government 
launched a diplomatic initiative intended to produce an Anglo-Russian treaty. Though 
such a treaty was not signed until April 1741, this was due to Russian, rather than 
British, obstinacy. 
It is thus clear that far from welcoming diplomatic isolation and seeking to 
cut itself off from the problems of Europe, the Walpole ministry sought to replace 
the French alliance that had failed in 1730 by an Austrian alliance and, after this 
had run into major difficulties in 1732 and finally collapsed in 1733-4, by an attempt 
to win the support of Prussia and/or Russia. This suggests that it would be inaccurate 
to argue that British foreign policy became isolationist after Townshend fell. 
l 
Whatever the views of the principal ministers, British foreign policy was committed 
to involvement in continental developments, by royal interests, by concern for the 
1. This was suggested by Dunthorne, p. 237, and Lodge, review of Vaucher, 
Robert-Walpole, EHR, 40 (1925) P. 440. 
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security of Hanover, and by treaty obligations. Hanoverian security was to 
remain a major problem throughout the period of the Walpole ministry. It com- 
plicated Anglo-Prussian relations in the Mid-1730's and early 1740's just as it 
had embittered them in the late 1720's. The possibility of Prussia attacking 
Hanover affected George II's stance in the War of the Polish Succession. The 
threats by Prussia and France to attack Hanover in 1741 produced the Hanoverian 
neutrality that so harmed the Walpole ministry, both domestically and diplomati- 
cally, in its last months. Thus, the Hanoverian issue continued to remain a 
problem. However successful Walpole might have been in persuading George II, 
in the Spring of 1731, to shelve temporarily the 'Electoral points', he did not 
succeed in preventing similar points from complicating British foreign policy in 
the subsequent decade. This continuity puts into perspective the supposed changes 
produced in 1730 by the fall of Tcwnshend and the collapse of the Anglo-French 
alliance. The failure of the Hotham mission, combined with the continued importance 
of Hanoverian interests, condemned Anglo-Prussian relations to hostility throughout 
the 1730's, and this drastically limited the freedom of manoeuvre enjoyed by the 
British ministry in its foreign policy. Whilst the-fall of Townshend was followed 
by an attempt at a reconciliation with Austria, no such attempt was made in the 
case of Prussia. George II's views dominated Anglo-Prussian relations to their 
detriment. 
Walpole's ministry ended in war, the Anglo-Spanish conflict that began in 
1739, and the War of the Austrian Succession that began with Frederick the Great's 
invasion of Silesia at the end of 1740. The Anglo-Spanish war was in no way 
inevitable. The issues at stake were not new, and Anglo-Spanish negotiations 
succeeded in resolving most of them by the convention of'the Pardo signed in 
January 1739. The war that commenced that autumn was not 'necessary' in diploma- 
tic terms. Room for negotiation remained. War was brought about by the political 
weakness of the Walpole ministry. Had the ministry been united there would probably 
have been no war, but the ambivalent attitude of many leading ministers, such as 
Newcastle, weakened the ministry to a fatal degree. - It is interesting to contrast 
the events of 1739 with those of 1729. In 1729 the ministry had also been split 
over war with Spain, but the timing of the crisis had been different. Whereas in 
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1729 the issue was most serious in the summer, in 1739 it coincided-with the 
parliamentary session. In 1729 the opposition had planned to use the issue of 
Anglo-Spanish relations as the basis for their attack upon the ministry in the 
1730 parliamentary session. They had been pre-empted by the Treaty of Seville, 
whilst the ministers who had sought naval action against Spain were prevented from 
this by Townshend's skilful tactics. In both 1729-1730, and 1738-1739 British 
foreign policy was greatly affected by domestic political pressure. ' In the for- 
mer case the ministry responded to it by linking the satisfaction of British 
mercantile complaints to the introduction of the Spanish garrisicnsand by breaking 
with a French ministry whose policies were creating parliamentary difficulties in 
London. In the latter case the room for manoeuvre was smaller. Spanish acquie- 
scence in British commercial demands could not be-purchased by British support for 
Spanish claims in Italy. Such claims still existed in the late 1730's. Elizabeth 
Farnese wished to reverse the territorial settlement of the Third Treaty of Vienna 
and to establish her second son, Don Philip, in Parma. However, the Austro-French 
alliance made such aspirations hopeless, and they could not be pursued until the 
alliance disintegrated in the opening stages of the War of the Austrian Succession. 
It was this alliance, supported so ardently by Bartenstein and Fleury, that 'cir- 
cumscribed' Britain's diplomatic position in the period 173$-41, and it prevented 
a solution to Anglo-Spanish disputes by the methods utilised in 1729. 
Whether it would have been wise to win Spanish support by promising aid in 
Italy is a different question. At the end of 1735 the Spanish government sought 
unsuccessfully, to enlist British support against the third Treaty of Vienna. 
The British ministry was no longer interested in schemes designed to limit the 
size of the Austrian Empire. This might seem to be a change from the policies 
associated with Townshend, but this change should not be exaggerated. In 1741-3 
the British government helped to negotiate agreements by which Austria lost most 
of Silesia and much of the Milanese. Under the plans put forward by Horatio 
Walpole during the War of the Polish Succession, Austria would have lost Naples 
and Sicily. These agreements and plans were of course produced under the stimulus 
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of Austrian defeat, but many of the attitudes that had informed British foreign 
policy in 1727-31 can be seen in the later years of the Walpole ministry. The 
notion that Sardinia, rather than Austria, must be built up to resist Bourbon 
plans in Italy was not new. The interest in acquiring a Prussian alliance, whilst 
preventing Prussian expansion in Mecklenburg and Jtllich-Berg, was hardly novel. 
The British Commitment to the Austrian cause during the Wax of the Austrian 
Succession also followed on from the policies enunciated by George II and Townshend 
in the late 1720s. Then, whilst opposing the policies of Austria, they had never- 
theless made clear their determination to preserve the Habsburg inheritance as an 
essential counterweight to France. The negotiations with the Wittelsbachs in 
1729-1730 revealed a British ministry unwilling to contemplate major changes in 
the Empire, and Charles Albert was to find this attitude both in 1729-30 as 
Elector of Bavaria and in 1743 as the Emperor Charles VII. 
There was therefore no decisive break in British foreign policy when Townshend 
fell. To assume such a break would be to neglect the role of the king and to 
misunderstand the position and attitudes of Townshend. The exact role of George II 
in many of the issues facing British foreign policy in the first decade and half 
. of his reign 
is obscure. However, an examination of British foreign policy both 
before and after the changes associated with the fall of Townshend would suggest 
that his influence has been underestimated. A consideration of the King's actions 
would suggest that J. B. Owen's re-evaluation of the King, based upon his research 
on the 1740's can be corroborated by work in the early period of his reign. 
' 
Linked to the recent work of Gregg on queen Anne2and Hatton on George I this 
would suggest that the case for a reinterpretation of the role of the monarchy in 
early eighteenth-century Britain is a strong one. By concentrating their researches 
on Parliament and party, historians have neglected, to some extent, the focus of 
political life in aristocratic Britain - the court - and have overlooked the 
activities of the arbitrator of court and ministerial conflicts, the King. It is 
1. Owen, George II Reconsidered. 
2. E. Gregg, Queen Anne (1980) 
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interesting to note that whilst several scholars have written biographies of 
Sir Robert Walpole, there is no scholarly biography of. George II. Whilst such 
a situation pertains it will be impossible to arrive at a well-based understanding 
of British politics in the second quarter of the eighteenth-century. 
IA 
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List of Characters 
Env. envoy 
Ambass. ambassador 
Min. minister 
Ag. agent 
Con. consul 
Plen. plenipotentiary 
Ex. extraordinary 
Sec. secretary 
Ch. charge d'affaires/in charge of affairs 
rep. representative 
Res. resident 
d. died 
T h. married 
Albert Louis-Joseph, Count. Prince de Grimberghen 1742. 
Bavarian Min. in France, 1718-50, Palatine Ch. 
in France 1725-, Palatine Min. Plen. in France, 
1728-. 
Allen Edmund, British, Ch. 1728-9; Sec. 1729-34, in Sardinia. 
Andriani Ambrosio, Lorraine rep. in Spain. 
Anne 1709-59, eldest daughter of George II, married 
William IV of Orange, 1734. 
Anne 1.693-1740, Czarina of -Russia, 1730-40. 
Argyll John Campbell, 1678-1743, second Duke of; Duke of 
Greenwich in the British peerage. 
August Wilhelm 1662-1731, Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbttttel, 
1714-31, brother of Ludwig Rudolf. 
Augustus II 1670-1733, Elector of Saxony, 1694-1733, King 
of Poland, 1697-1704,1709-1733. 
Bathurst Allen, First. Earl, Tory peer. 
Bellanger Secretary of State of. the Elector of Cologne. 
Berkeley James, Third Earl of, ' First Lord of the Admiralty 
1717-27. 
ierkentin Christian August von. Danish Env. Ex. in Austria, 
1722-32. 
Berwick French Marshal, illegitimate son of James II of 
England, father of Liria, uncle of Waldegrave. 
! eueren Sebastian, Baron de, President of the Court of 
Justice of the Elector Palatine, mission to 
Hanover, 1729. 
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Bolingbroke Henry St. John, 1678-1751, First Viscount, 
Secretary of State under Queen Anne, attainted 
1715, returned to Britain, 1725; prominent 
figure-in the opposition to Walpole. 
ßorck Prussian Minister. 
Bournonville Joseph Michel, Duke of. Spanish Ambass. Fx. and 
Plen. in Austria, Jan. 1727-May 1728, Plen. to 
the Congress of Soissons, . 
1727-1731. 
Brancas Louis, Marquis de, French Ambass. Ex. in Spain, 
June 1728-Sept. 1730. 
Rruyninx Dutch Env. Ex. in Austria, 1700-38. 
Russy French Ch. in Austria, May 1728-Sept. 1733 
Casesar Charles, 1673-1741, MP. Hertfordshire 1727-34. 
High Tory, involved in Jacobite plots. 
Caroline 1683-1737, Wife of George II, Queen of England. 
Carteret 1690-1763, John, Lord, Secretary of State for 
the Southern Department, 1721-4, Lord Lieutenant 
of Ireland, 1724-30, opponent of Walpole. 
Castellar Spanish Ambass. Ex. and Min. Plen. in France, 
Oct. 1730-1733. 
Catherine I 1684-1727, Wife of Peter I, Czarina 1725-7. 
Cayley William, 'British Con. at Cadiz. 
Chambrier Prussian Hin. Pes. in France, 1721-51. 
Chammorel French Ch. in Britain. 1717-32. 
Charles VI 1685-1740, Emperor, 1711-40. 
Charles Albert Elector of Bavaria, 1726-45,, Emperor Charles VII 
Charles Emmanuel III King of Sardinia 1730-73. 
Charles Frederick Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, 1702-39, son-in-law 
of Peter I. 
Charles-Leopold Duke of Mecklenburg-Schweins 1713-28, son-in-law 
of Peter I. 
Chauvelin Germain-Louis de 1685-1762. French foreign 
minister 1727-37. 
Chavigny French Min. Plen. at the Imperial Diet, 1726-31, 
mission to Hanover, 1729. 
Chesterfield 1694-1773, Philip Stanhope, Earl of, British 
Ambass. Ex. and Plen. in United Provinces, 
1728-32. Lord Steward, 1730-3 
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Chetwynd William Junr. British, secretary to Richard 
Sutton at Wolfenbüttel and Brunswick 1729. 
Ch. at Brunswick after Sutton's departure, 
Aug. -Sept. 1729. 
Christine Louise Wife of Ludwig Rudolf of Brunswick-Wolfenbtittel. 
von Oettingen 
Clemens-August 1700-1761, brother of Charles-Albert of Bavaria, 
Elector - Archbishop of Cologne, 1723-61, 
Bishop of Hildesheim, Paderborn, Osnabrtick, Liege. 
Clutterbuck Thomas. MP. Liskeard 1722-34, Secretary to Lord 
Lieutenant of Ireland 1724-39. 
Colman Francis, British Res. at Florence, 1724-33, 
mission to. Parma, July-Sept. 1731. 
Compton Spencer, Hon. Lord Wilmington, 8 Jan. (os) 1728, 
LIP. Sussex, 1715-Jan. 1728; Speaker of the House 
of Commons, 1715-27; Treasurer to the Prince of 
Wales, 1715-27; Paymaster General, 1722-30; Lord 
Privy Seal, May-Dec. 1730; Lord President of 
the Council, 1730-42. 
Cramm August Adolf von, Brunswick-Bevern. Min. in 
Russia, 1727-31. 
D'Aix Sardinian Env. Ex. in Britain, 1726- Jan. 1730. 
Dangervilliers French Secretary of State for War. 
D'Arvilla Marquis, Sardinian Ambass. in Spain, Sept. 1728- 
1732. 
D'Asfeld Claude-Francois, Marquis, d', French general. 
D'Au bentön Jean Baptiste, 'charge des affaires concernant 
la marine, les colonies, le commerce et les 
privilegbs de la Nation francoise en Espagne', 
1728-31. 
Dayrolle James, British Res., in the United Provinces, 
1717-39. 
De3rais Saxon Ch. ' in France, Mar. 1729-1741. 
DeBrrosse Claude de, Saxon Env. Ex: in United Provinces, 
1721-50. 
De Büy Saxon correspondent in Spain, 1725-30. 
Degenfeld Prussian rep. in Britain, 1730-33. 
Dehn Friedrich Ludwig, Freiherr von, Brunswick- 
Wolfenbtfttel Env. Ex. in Austria, 1726- June 
1728, United Provinces, July - Dec. 1728. 
Dehn Konrad Detlef, Graf . von Brunswick-r"olfenbUttel Fnv. Ex. in Britain, autumn 1727- Mar. 1728, 
France, Ap. 1728, Hanover, June-July 1729. 
Delafaye Charles, Under Secretary of State in the Northern 
Department, 1717-24, in the Southern Dept. 1724-34. 
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Devonshire 
Dicken's 
Diemar 
Die scau 
William Cavendish, 1672-1729. Second Duke of, 
Lord President of the Council, 1725-29. 
Melchior Guy, Captain, secretary to Du Bourgay, 
British Sec. in Prussia, 1730-40. 
Ernst, General, Hesse-Cassel Env. Ex. in Britain, 
1725-35 
Baron von, Hanoverian Env. Ex. in Sweden, Dec. 
1727-Aug. 1730, British Ch. in Sweden, Dec. 
1727 - Dec. 1728. 
Dodington George Bubb. MP. Bridgewater 1722-54, Env. to 
Spain, 1715-17; Lord of Treasury, 1724-40. 
Dorset Lionel Cranfield Sackville, 1688-1765, First 
Duke of; Lord Steward, 1725-30; Lord Lieutenant 
of Ireland, 1730-7 
Du Bourgay Charles, Brigadier 1727, British Env. Ex. in 
Prussia, 1724-30. Left Berlin 2 June 1730. 
Esquiluz Spanish Ch. in Austria, May 1728 - Jan. 1731. 
Elisabeth Farnese 1692-1766, second wife of Philip V of Spain 
(m. 17$6). 
Elizabeth-Christine of Brunswick Volf enbt1ttel, 1691-1750, wife of 
Charles VI (m. 1708). 
Ernst August 1674-1728, brother of-George I, Prince-Bishop 
of Osnabrtick, 1715-28, Duke of York 1716-28. 
Essex Algernon .. Capel, Third Earl of, Gentleman of the Bedchamber to George Prince 
of Wales, 1719-27: Ranger of St. James's Park, 
1727-39; Ranger of Hyde Park, 1728-39. 
Eugene Prince, 1663-1736, prominent Austrian minister, 
Field ! Sarshal. 
Fabrice Friedrich Ernst von. 1683-1750, Hanoverian 
diplomat and courtier. 
Fagel Hendrik. Greffier of the States General. 
Ferdinand Albrecht 1686-1735, Duke of Brunswick-Bevern, son-in-law 
of Ludwig Rudolf, keen supporter of Austrian 
interests. 
Finch Daniel, Lord Finch, suc. father as 8th Earl of 
Winchelsea and 3rd Earl of Nottingham, 1 Jan. 
(os) 1730, Comptroller of the King's Household, 
1725-30. MP. Rutland, -1710 -1 Jan. (os) 1730. 
429 
Finch Edward, 11P. Cambridge University, 1727-68. 
British Min. Plen. in Poland, 1725-Nov. 1727, 
British Env. Ex. in Sweden. Dec. 1728-39. 
Finch William, MP. Cockermouth, Jan. 1727-1747. British 
Env. Ex. and Plen. in United Provinces, 1724- 
May 1728. ' 
Fiorelli Giacinto, Venetian Sec. in 3ritain, 1717-Aug. 1728., 1 
Flemming Jakob Heinrich, 1667-1728, Count, Field Marshall, 
Saxon Conference Minister, mission to Vienna, 
29M1ar .- 30 Ap. 1728. 
Fleury Andre` Hercule, 1653-1743, Cardinal, French first 
minister 1726-43. 
Fleury Joseph de Wicardel, Marquis de, Saxon Conference 
Minister. E '. 
Fonseca Hark, Baron de, Austrian Ch. in Paris, 1722- 
Dec. 1730. 
Forbes Duncan, HP. Inverness Burghs 1722-1737. Lord 
Advocate of Scotland, 1725-37.3'` 
Forbes John, elder brother of Duncan Forbes. MP- 
Fox Stephen, MP. Shaftesbury 1726-34, entered 
Parliament as Tory, and voted with Opposition 
on Hessians 1730. 
Frederick William I 1688-1740, King of Prussia, 1713-40. Nephbw- 
and son-in-law of George I. Cousin and brother- 
in-law of George II. 
Gansinot Jacob Anton, van. rep., in different capacities 
of the Wittelsbachs in the United Provinces, 
1716-41. 
Gastaldi -Giambattista, Genose Ch. in. Britain, 1728-55. 
Geffroy French, con.. at Hamburg. 
George II 1683-1760. 
Glenorchy John Campbell, Lord, British Env. Ex. in Denmark, 
"1720-31, MP. Saltash, 1727-41. 
Grafton Charles Fitzroy, 1683-1757, Second Duke of, 
Lord Chamberlain, 1724-57. 
Graham Sir John, Jacobite diplomat. 
Gran ville Bid6 de la, Intendant. of Flanders. 
Gravanitz Viktor Sigismund, Count, WV1rttemburg, Conference 
Minister, rep. in Britian, Oct. - Dec. 1727, 
Min. in France, Dec. 1727-1728. 
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Grimaldi Agostino, Genoese M. in. Res. in Spain, 1725-8. 
Grumbkow Prussian General and minister. 
Hanmer Sir Thomas, 1677-1746, MP. 1701-27. High Church 
Tory. 
Harrington William Stanhope's title after ennoblement in 
1730. 
Hattorf Johann Philipp von. 1682-1737, head of the 
Hanoverian Chancery in London. 
Hay Jacobite Secretary of State. 
Hedges John, British Env. Ex. in Sardinia, 1726-7, 
Treasurer to Prince of ? ". ales 1729-1737, MP. 
Bossiney 1727-34. 
Hervey John, 1696-1743, Lord, MP. Bury St. Edmunds 
1725-33. Moved Address at opening of George 
II's first Parliament. Vice-Chamberlain to 
the King, 1730-40. 
Holzendorf Charles, Secretary to Chesterfield in United 
Provinces. 
Hop. Hendrik,. Dutch Env. Ex. in Britain, 1723-61. ý'. 
Hotham Charles, Sir, Lieutenant Colonel, 1720-32, Groom 
of the Bedchamber to George II, 1727-38, MP. 
Beverley, Mar. 1729-38. Administration supporter. 
No special rank, creditive letters and instruction s, 
16 Par. 1730, at Berlin on a 'particular 
commission', 1 Ap. - 11 July 1730. 
Howard Charles, MP. Carlisle, 1727-61, Lt. Col. 1719, 
Lt. Governor of Carlisle, 1725-49; Administration 
supporter,, second son of third Earl of Carlisle. 
Howard Henry, Viscount Morpeth, MP. Morpeth 1715-38, 
active in opposition, first son of third Earl 
of Carlisle. 
Hoye Karl Heinrich, Count, Saxon Cabinet Minister. 
Jacquemin Baron de, Lorraine rep. in Vienna, 1723-34. 
James III James Edward Stuart, 1688-1766. 'the Pretender', 
'the Chevalier de St. Geo'rge', son of James II 
of England. 
Karl 1654-1730, Landgrave of Hesse-cassel, 1670-1730. 
Karl Philipp Elector Palatine, 1716-42. 
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Keene Benjamin, British Con. at Madrid 1724-6, Min. 
Plen. in Spain Oct. 1727-34. Strongly attached 
to the Walpole interest. 
King Peter, 1669-1734, Lord Chancellor, 1725-33. 
Kinsky Philip, Count, Austrian Env. Ex. in Britain, 
Aug. 1728-1736. 
Kinsky Stephen, Count, Austrian Ambass.. in France, 
June 1729-1732. 
Knatchbull Edward Sir, MP. Lostwithiel Feb. 1728- Ap. 3rd 
(os) 1730 (d). Ministerial supporter. 
Knyphausen Prussian minister. 
Kdnigsegg Joseph Lothar, Count, Austrian Ambassador in 
Spain, 1726 - Mar. 1730, Austrian Plenipotentiary 
to the Congress of Soissons, 1730. 
Lagnasco Rupert, Count, Saxon Cabinet Minister, Saxon 
rep. in Austria, July 1730-1732. 
La Paz Juan-Bautista, Marquis, Spanish Secretary of 
State for foreign affairs. 
Leathes Carteret, MP. Sudbury 1727-34, brother of Hill 
Mussenden. 
Le Beau French spy in London, 1731. 
Le Co Jacques, Saxon Env. Ex. in Britain, 1718-1728, 
Saxon rep. at Soissons, June 1728 - Ap. 1729. 
Leheup Isaac, British Env. to the Diet of Ratisbon, 
1726-7; British Env. to Sweden 1727, brother- 
in-law of Horatio Walpole. 
L'Hermitage Rene de Sä. uniers (1653-1729), Sieur de, Dutch 
agent and newswriter in London. 
Liria James Fitzjames Stuart, Duke of, Spanish Ambass. 
and Min. Plen. in Russia, arrived Sept. 1727, 
left Nov. 1730, Ambass. Ex. and Plen. in 
Austria, arrived Jan. 1731, left 1733. 
Louis XV 1710-1774, King of France, 1715-74. 
Ludwig Rudolf 1671-1735, Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, 
1731-1735, brother of August Wilhelm and father- 
in-law of Ferdinand Albrecht. 
Maffei Annibale, Conte, Sardinian Ambass. Ex. in France 
1723- Oct. 1731. 
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Magnan French Ch. in Russia 1726-33. 
P, 4anteuffel. Ernst Christoph, Freihierr von, Saxon Conference 
Minister, correspondent of Eugene and Seckendorf. 
Maria Theresa 1717-1780, eldest daughter of Charles VI. 
Maurepas Jean-Frederic Ph; 6lypeaux, Count of, Secretary 
of State for Marine 1723-49. 
Methuen Paul, Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department 1716-7. Treasurer of the Household 
1725-29. MP. Brackley 1715-47, leading ministe- 
rial spokesman. 
? Merman Franz Hannibal, Freiherr von, Bavarian Env. Ex. 
in Austria, 1730-6. 
Morville Count, French Secretary of State for foreign 
affairs until 1727. 
Newcastle Thomas Pelham-Holles, First Duke of, 1693-1768, 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department, 
-1724-1746. 
Norris John, Admiral, Sir, Commander Baltic Squadron 
1715-27. Lord of the Admiralty 1718-30. MP. 
Portsmouth 1722-34. 
Norris John, MP. Rye 
O'Rourke Owen, Viscoun- 
Orrery Charles Boyle 
with Jacobite 
Ossorio Giuseppe, Sd. 
1730. 
1727-30. Opposition supporter. 
t, Jacobite Ag. in Austria, 1727- 
1676-1731, Fourth Earl of, mory 
links. 
Env. Ex. in Britain, arrived Jan. 
Osterman 1686-1747, Russian Foreign Minister. 
Palm Karl Josef }von, Austrian Res. in Britain, 
expelled, early 1727. 
Patino Jose, 1666-1735. Spanish minister. 
Pelham Thomas, secretary of British embassy to Congress 
of Soissons, 1728-30, British Ch. in France, 
June 1730, sec. of British Embassy in France, 
1730-41, MP. Hastings, dependent of Newcastle's. 
Pentenriedter Johann Christoph, Freiherr von, 1678-1728, 
Austrian Plen. at Soissons,, 1728. 
Percival 1683-1748, John, Sir, Viscount Percival 1715, 
Earl of Egmont 1733-48. MP. Harwich 1727-34. 
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Peter II 17.15-30, Czar, 1727-30, grandson of Peter I. ' 
Philip V 1683-1746,. King of Spain 1700-46, uncle of 
Louis XV, Second grandson of Louis XIV. 
Plelo Louis, Count, French Ambass. in Denmark, 
Ap. 1729-1734. 
Plettenberg Ferdinand, Graf von. First Minister of Elector 
of Cologne, mission to Hanover, 1729. 
Plettenberg Friedrich Christian, Freiherr von, Cologne 
representative at the Imperial Diet, 1724-33. 
Poyntz Stephen, British Env. Ex. and Plen. in Sweden, 
1724-7, "British Ambass. Ex. in Sweden, 1727, 
Plen. at Soissons, 1727-30, returned to England, 
Sept. 1730, Governor of the Duke of Cumberland. 
Pulteney William, 1684-1764, MP. Hedon 1705-1734, Joint- 
founder of Craftsman 1726, leading opposition 
figure. 
Reichenbach Benjamin Friedrich von, Prussian Res. in 
Britain 1726-30. 
Rialp Marquis, 1663-1741. secretary of Charles VI's. 
Council of Spain, 
Richelieu Louis, Duc de, French Ambass. Ex. in Austria, 
1725-May 1728. 
Riva Giuseppe, Modenese Sec. in Britain, 1718- 
Mar. 1729, Res., Mar. -Ap. 1729. 
Robinson Thomas, Sec. of British Embassy in France, 
1724-June 2nd 1730, Min. Plen. in Austria, 1730- 
50. IMP. Thirsk, 1727-34. Close connection of 
Newcastle's from Westminster schooldays. 
Rochefort ``French rep. in Hamburg. 
Rondeau Claudius., British Consul-General in Russia, 
1730-1. 
Rottembourg Count, French, Env. Ex. and Min. Plen. in 
Prussia, 1714-1727, French En. Ex. in Spain, 
Oct. 1727-Ap. 1728, French Ambass. Ex. and Plen. 
in Spain, Jan. 1731-1734 
St. Saphorin Fran16is Louis de Pesmes, Seigneur de, Lieutenant- 
General. British rep. in Austria, 1718-27, 
without character as not a British subject. 
Sauveterre French rep. in Prussia. late 1720's, French Ch. 
in Prussia, Jan. 1730-1732. 
434 
Scarborough 1688-1740, Richard Lumley, Second Earl of, 
Favourite of George II. Master of the Horse, 
1727-34. 
Schaub Luke, Sir, protege of Carteret, British Ambass. 
in France 1721-4, special mission to Saxony- 
Poland, 1.730-1. 
Schleinitz Johann Christoph, Baron, Brunswick-Wolfenbtittel, 
Env. Ex. in France, 1728-30. Correspondent of 
Fleury. 
Seckendorf Friedrich Heinrich, Graf von, Austrian Min. 
Plen. in Prussia, 1726-May 1727, Mar. 1728-1734. 
Se ent French commissioner of war at Dunkirk. 
Shi pen" William, MP. Newton 1715-43, prominent Jacobite. 
Sinzendorf Philip Louis, Count, Austrian Court Chancellor, 
mission to Soissdns as first Austrian Plen. 1728. 
Sinzendorf Wenzel, Count, Austrian Ambass. in United 
Provinces, Sept. 1728-1734. 
Slingelandt Simon van, 1664-1736, Secretary to the Dutch 
Council of State. 
Solaro di Bregli Giuseppe Roberto, Marchese, Sardinian Min. in 
Austria, 1720-32. 
Stanhope Charles, 1673-1760, MP. Aldborough, 1722-34. 
Brother of William Stanhope. 
Stanhope William, 1690-1756, British Ambass. Ex. and 
Plen. in Spain, 1721-7,1729, MP. Derby 1727-30. 
Cr. Baron Harrington 6 Jan. 1730. Sec. of State 
1730-42. Vice Chamberlain of the Household 1727- 
30. Plenipotentiary at Soissons. } 
Stafford Thomas Wetntworth 1672=123R, 
.. 
3rd Earl. of, Tory. 
Strickland William, MP. Scarborough 1722-35. Major mini- 
sterial spokesman. Lord of Treasury, 1725-7. 
Treasurer to the Queen. 1727-30. Secretary at 
War 1730-5. 
Stihm 'Ulrich Friedrich von, Saxon Env. Ex. in Prussia, 
. 
1720-30. 
Sutton Richard Brigadier, British Env. Ex. in Hesse- 
Cassel, 1727-9,1730-1, Brun swich-Wo1fenbtittel, 1729, ' j'. 
1730-1; Special military mission to Denmark, 
Sept. 1729. Major General 1727; MP. Newark 1712-37. 
Tilson George, Under-Secretary of State at the Northern 
Department, 1708-38. 
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Titley Walter, British Ch. in Denmark, 1729-Nov. 1730, 
British Min. Res. in Denmark, 1730-9. 
Toerring Count, Bavarian foreign minister. 
Torrington George, Viscount, First Lord of Admiralty, 
1727-33. 
Townshend Charles, Second Viscount, 1674-1738, Secretary 
of State for the Northern Department, 1721-30. 
Townshend Thomas, MP. Cambridge University 1727-80. 
Trevor Thomas, Lord, Lord Privy Seal, 1726-30. 
Vandermeer Francis, Dutch Ambass. in Spain, 1723-43. 
Victor Amadeus II 1666-1732, King of Sardinia, abdicated Sept. 
3rd 1730,1675-1730. 
Vignola Girolamo, Venetian Res. in Britain, July 1728- 
Sept. 1731. 
Villars Claude Louis Hector (1653-1734), Ducde, French 
Field Marshal. 
Visconti Scaramuccia, Marchese di, Austrian rep. in 
Britain, first report Aug. 11 1727*, last report, 
Ap. 20 1728. 
Wackerbarth Joseph, Graf von, Saxon Min. Plen. in Austria, 
1728-30. 
Wager Charles, Admiral, Sir. MP. Portsmouth 1715-34. 
Lord of the Admiralty 1718-33. Commands fleet 
in Spanish waters, 1727. 
Waldegrave James, Lord (Earl 1729) British rep.. at Paris 
with no special rank, June 1727- Ap. 1728. In 
charge at Paris, Jan. -Mar. 1728, British'Ambass. 
Ex. and Plen. in Austria Ap. 1728-June 1730, in 
France, June 1730-1740. 
Wallenrodt Johann Christoph, Freiherr von, Prussian Env. 
Ex.. in Britain, 1719-1726, July 1727-d. Sept. 
4th 1727. 
Walpole . Iioratio, 1678-1757, MP. Great Yarmouth 1722-34. Secretary to the Treasury, 1721-30; *Cofferer 
of the Household, 1730-41. British Ambass. Ex. 
and Plen. in France, 1727-30. Plen. at Soissons. 
Walpole Robert, 1676-1745, MP. King's Lynn. 1713-42. 
First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, 1721-42. 
Ward Thomas, British Consul-General in Russia, 
1728-30, Min. Res. in Russia 1730-1. 
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Watzdorf Friedrich Karl, Graf von, Saxon Env. Ex. in 
Britain, 1730-2. 
Wentworth Peter, brother of Earl of Strafford, d. 1739 
Weston Edward, Under-Secretary of State at the 
Northern Department, 1729-46. 
, Rlestphalen Hans Georg, Danish Env. Ex. in Russia, 1718-20, 
1722-33. 
William of Hesse- 
Cassel Son of Karl of Hesse-Cassel, brother of 
Frederick I of Sweden, regent of Hesse-Cassel 
for Frederick, 1730-51, William VIII of Hesse- 
Cassel, 1751-60. 
William IV of Orange, 1711-51, married Anne, daughter of 
George 11,173-4. 
Wilmington Lord, Title taken by Spencer Compton, 8 Jan. 
(os) 1728. 
17urmbrand Johann Wilhelm.. Count, President of Aulic 
Council, 1728-40,45-50. 
Wych Cyril, British Env. Ex. in the Hansa towns, 
1725-41. 
Wyndham William Sir. MP. Somerset 1710-40. 'Head of 
those calling themselves Hanover Tories' `Hervey 
Yonge William, Sir, MP. Honiton, 1715-54. Lord of 
Treasury, 1724-7,1730-5, of Admiralty, 1728- 
30. One of principal ministerial spokesmen 
in Commons. 
Zamboni Giovanni Giacomo, Hesse-Darmstadt Ag. in 
Britain, 1723-52, Saxon Ag. 1726-51, Modenese 
Ag. 1729-36. 
437 
Bibliography: Manuscript Sources 
In the course of research for this thesis a large number of 
archives have been examined. Only those whose holdings relate to 
foreign policy have been listed; material of value solely for 
domestic developments has not been mentioned, for reasons of space, 
1. Foreign Holdings 
DARMSTADT Staatsarchiv 
El M, England, Frankreich, Osterreich. 
DRESDEN Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Geheimes Kabinett, 
Gesandschaften diplomatic reports. 
The following classes were of particular 
importance: - 
637 Zamboni's reports and correspondence, 
1728-1732. 
2674 Le Coq's correspondence with Marquis de 
Fleury, 1726-9. 
2676 Le Coq's and Watzdorf's reports from London. 
2733 Le Coq's negotiations in France, 1728-9. 
3105 De Buy's reports from Spain. 
3331 Wackerbarth's reports from Vienna. 
3378 SChm's reports from. Berlin. 
FLORENCE 
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HANOVER 
Archivio di Stato 
Lettere Ministri: Inghilterra, 45-47. 
Archivio di Stato 
Lettere Ministri: Inghilterra, 10-11. 
Francia, 44. 
Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Calenberg Brief Archiv 11 EI. 
LUCCA Archivio di Stato 
Documents 'al tempo. della Liberta', 
Instructioni, Relationi, 633. 
MARBURG Staatsarchiv 
Bestand 4: Politische Akten nach Philipp d. Gr., 
England-, Niederlande, Preussen, Schweden, 
Frankreich, Kur-Braunschweig. 
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MODENA Archivio di Stato 
Lettere Ministri: Inghilterra, 18-19. 
MUNICH Haupstaatsarchiv 
Bayr. Gesandtschaft. Kurbayerischer Politischer 
Schriftwechsel. Dresden, Wien, Paris, London. 
MUNSTER Staatsarchiv 
Dep. Nordkirchen. Papers of Count Plettenberg. 
NANCY Archives de Meurthe-et-Moselle 
Fondsale Vienne, series 3F. diplomatic reports. 
The following volumes were of particular use, 
139-140 (r4ports from Baron Jacquemin, Lorraine 
envoy in Vienna), 86 (reports from Stainville, 
envoy in Paris), 202 (reports from Andriani, 
resident in Madrid). 
OSNABRUCK Staatsarchiv 
Repertorium 100, Abschnitt 1, Newsletters to the 
Prince-Bishop. Volumes of particular interest 
are 291 and 299 (newsletters of 1727) 
i 
PARIS Archives Nationales- - 
a) Archives de la marine. 
1) B3 Service General, Correspondance 
2) B7 Pays Etrangeres 
b) Archive Prive - entree Fleury 
PARIS Bibliotheque de l'Arsenal 
Nouvelles Ecclesiastiques 
Archives de la Bastille: Gazetins 
Secrets de la Police 
PARIS Bibliothegue Nationale 
. a) Nouvelles Acquisitions Francaises 
349 Blondel. Remarques et anecdotes 
poliUiques. 
9399 Memoire sur la marine de Louis XV. 
9511 Reflexions sur le gouvernment de France, 
. par 
M: D'Aube ... 1731. 
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PARIS Quai d'Orsay. Archives du Ministere des 
Affaires Etrangeres 
1) Correspondance Politique. 
Allemagne 
Angleterre 
Autriche 
Baviere 
Brunswick-Hanover 
Cologne 
Espagne 
Hesse 
Hollande 
Prusse 
Turquie 
2) Memoires et Documents. 
Allemagne. 
Angleterre 
Espagne 
France 
Hollande 
PARIS Vincennes. Archives de la Guerre 
A1, Diplomatie. 
PARMA Archivio di Stato 
Carteggio Farnesiano. Lettere Ministri, 
Germania 12-13, Inghilterra, Francia. 
TURIN Archivio di Stato 
Lettere Ministri, Inghilterra, Francia, Autriche, 
Spagna, Olanda. 
VENICE Archivio di Stato 
Lettere Ministri, Inghilterra. 
VIENNA Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv 
a) Staatenabteilung. 
Frankreich: Varia 
England: Korrespondenz, Varia, Noten 
Interiora, Intercepte, 1-2 
b) Grosse Korrespondenz 
The following volumes were of particular 
interest, 49,60,76a, 85a, 86a, 95a, 102c. 
c) Nachlass Fonseca, 3,11,12,13,14,21. 
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VIENNA Palais Kinsky 
Correspondence and Papers of Count Philip Kinsky. 
WOLFENBUTTEL 'Staatsarchiv 
Diplomatic papers. 1 Alt. 3,6,19,22; 
2 Alt. 3162,3165,6542-7. 
The correspondence of Ferdinand Albrecht in 
1 Alt 22 was of particular interest. 
2. ' British Archives 
AYLESBURY' Buckinghamshire Record Office 
Trevor papers. 
BEDFORD Bedfordshire Record Office 
Lucas papers. 
BRISTOL City Reference Library 
Southwell papers. 
BURY ST. EDMUNDS West Suffolk Record. Office 
Grafton papers. 
Hervey papers. 
CAMBRIDGE Cambridgeshire Record Office 
Cotton papers. 
University Library 
Cholmondely Houghton papers. 
CHELMSFORD Essex Record Office 
Mildmay papers. 
CHEWTON MENDIP Chewton Hall 
Waldegrave papers. 
CHICHESTER West Sussex Record Office 
Goodwood papers. 
IPSWICH East Suffolk Record Office 
Leathes papers. 
LEICESTER Leicestershire Record Office 
Finch papers. 
LONDON Bank' of England 
Stock Ledger Books. 
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History of Parliament Trust 
Ryder transcripts. 
House 'of Lords Record Office 
Proxy Books. 
Public Record Office 
State papers. 
Domestic, Naval, Regencies, Scotland, Ireland, 1i 
Miscellaneous, Austria, Denmark, Dunkirk, 
Flanders, France, German States, Hamburg, 
Holland, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Prussia, 
Russia, Sardinia, Spain, Turkey, Tuscany, Drafts, 
Royal Letters, Treaties, Confidential, Foreign 
Entry Books, Foreign ministers in England, Treaty 
papers. 
British Library 
Loan 29: Portland Papers. 
Loan 57: Bathurst Papers. 
Egerton MSS: Bentinck papers. 
Stowe MSS: 98,158,180,186,256,308. 
Additional MSS: Coxe, -Strafford, Essex, 
Newcastle, Egmont, Holland House, Hardwicke, 
Townshend, Hatton-Finch,. Skinner, 
Mitchell, Keene, Blenheim, Bolingbroke, Tyrawly, 
Robinson, Norris, Wager, Carewe, Carteret, 
Wilmington, Pulteney, Dayrolles papers, 
Transcripts from the Dutch archives. 
Post Office Archives 
General Accounts. 
MAIDSTONE Kent Record Office 
Sackville papers. 
NEWCASTLE Northumberland Record Office 1i! 
Delaval papers. 
NORTHAMPTON Northamptonshire Record Office 
Isham, Finch-Hatton papers. 
NORWICH Norfolk Record Office 
Bradfer Lawrence, Ketton Cremer, Townshend papers. 
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OXFORD "Oxfordshire Record Office 
Dillon papers. 
Queens' College 
MSS. 450 - Proprietors' Ledger of the 
Grub Street Journal 
St. John's College 
Rawlinson papers. 
Bodleian Library 
Zamboni (Rawlinson letters), North, Carte, 
Dashwood papers. 
PETWORTH Petworth House 
Wyndham papers. 
SANDON Sandon Hall 
Harrowby papers. 
STAFFORD Staffordshire Record Office 
Dartmouth, Leveson-Gower papers. 
TROWBRIDGE Wiltshire Record Office 
Savernake papers. _ 
WINCHESTER Hampshire Record Office 
Mildmay papers. -, 
WINDSOR Windsor Castle, Royal Archives 
Stuart papers. 
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Pamphlets 
For reasons of space only a few titles can be mentioned. The 
extensive collections in the British Library and the Bodleian 
Library have been fully consulted. Several other holdings have 
been examined and useful pamphlets were discovered in the 
Public Record Office and the Library of Worcester College, 
Oxford. In tracing references I. was greatly assisted by the 
help of Dr. L. Bart-Smith of the. Eighteenth-Century Short 
Title Catalogue project. 
Anonymous pamphlets are listed alphabetically under the first 
word, not an article of each title. 
N. Amhurst, A letter to Caleb d'Anvers, Esq.,; occasioned by 
the Depredations committed by the Spaniards in the West 
Indies (1729) 
The Better Sequel Better'd in a Dialogue betwixt the oak and the 
Dunghill (1729) 
(Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount) The Case of Dunkirk 
Faithfully stated and Impartially considered (1730) 
(Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount) A Final Answer to the 
Remarks on the Craftsman's Vindication (1731) 
O. Burrish, Batavia Illustrata; or, a view of the Policy, and 
commerce, of the United Provinces: Particularly of Holland. 
With an Enquiry into the Alliances of the States-General, 
with the Emperor, France, Spain and Great Britain (1728) 
The Case of the Hessian Forces, in the Pay of Great Britain 
Impartially and Freely Examined; With some-reflections on the 
present conjuncture of Affairs. In Answer to a late Pamphlet 
0 
entitled, Considerations on the present state of affairs. 
The conduct of Queen Elizabeth, Towards the Neighbouring 
Nations- and particularly Spain- compared with that of James I 
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The Cöndu t of the Late Administration, with regard-t. o 
Foreign Affairs from 1722 to 1742, wherein that 'of the Right 
Honorable the Earl of Orford (late Sir Robert Walpole) is 
Particularly Vindicated. In a letter to a certain 
Right Honorable Gentleman, Member of the Present Parliament. 
(1744) 
Considerations on the Present State of Affairs in Europe, and 
particularly with Regard to the Number of Forces in the Pay 
of Great Britain (1730) 
The Danverian History of the Affairs of Europe, for the 
Memorable Year 1731. With the present state of Gibraltar, and 
an Exact Description of it, and of the Spanish Works before it. 
Also at Dunkirk and the late transactions there. With curions 
plans of both those places (1732) 
A Defence of the Measures of the Present Administration (1731) 
( D. Defoe) A Plan of the English Commerce (1728) 
T. English, The Crisis- or, Impartial Judgement upon Public 
Affairs (2nd ed. 1731) 
The Evident Advanta ges to Great Britain and its Allies from the 
App roaching War; Esp ecially, in Matters of Trade (1727) 
frequently attributed to D. Defoe 
J. Gee The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered 
(1729) 
(J. Hervey, Lord) Observations on the Writings of the 
Craftsman (1730) 
(J. Hervey, Lord) Farther Observations on the Writings of 
the Craftsman (1730) 
(J. Hervey, Lord) A Summary Account of the State of Dunkirk 
and the Negotiations relating thereto (1730) 
44.5 
(B. Hoadly, Bishop of Salisbury) An Enquiry into the Reasons 
of the Conduct of Great Britain, with relation to the Preser. t 
State of Affairs in Europe (1727) 
(B. Hoadly, Bishop of Salisbury) A Defence of the Enquiry.. (1729) 
The Importance of the Ostend Company Considered (1726) 
Lord Blunder's Confession ... (1733) 
Memoirs of the Life and Administration of the late Andrew- 
Hercules de Fleury ... (1743) 
The Natural Probability of a Lasting Peace in Europe; shown from 
the circumstances of the Great Powers, as they are now 
situated- compared with the state of affairs when the Treaties 
of Ryswick and Utrecht were severally concluded (1732) 
A New Norfolk Ballad, concerning the late Vienna Treaty (1731) 
Observations on the Conduct of Great Britain, with regard to 
the Negotiations and other Transactions Abroad (1729) 
The Observations on the Treaty of Seville Examined (1730) 
The Pretensions of Don Carlos considered: With a view to the 
Treaty of Seville, and the Nature of Feudal Tenures (1730) 
(W. Pulteney) A Short View of the State of Affairs, with 
Relations to Great Britain, for four years past- with some 
remarkson the Treaty lately Published and a Pamphlet entitled, 
Observations upon it. (1730) 
(W. Pulteney) The Politics on Both Sides with regard to 
Foreign Affairs, stated from their own writings, and examined 
by the course of events, with some observations on the present 
state of affairs in Great Britain, and the Effects of our 
Negotiations for several years past (1734) 
(W. Pulteney) A Review of all that hath pass'd between the 
courts of Great Britain and Spain, relating to our trade and 
navigation from the year 1721... (1739) 
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J. Ralph, A Critical History of the Administration of 
Sir Robert Walpole (1743) 
Reasons against War by an old Whig (1727) 
Relation des deux rebellions arrivees a Constantinople... 
(The Hague 1737) 
A series of Wisdom and Policy, Manifested in a Review of our 
Foreign Negotiations and Transactions for Several Years Past 
(1735) 
Some Considerations on the National Debts, the Sinking Fund 
and the State of Public Credit (1729) 
Some Farther Remarks on a late Pamphlet, entitled - Observations 
on the conduct of Great Britain- particularly with Relation 
to the Spanish Depredations and Letters of Reprisal... (1729) 
Some Observations on the Assiento Trade (1728) 
Some Observations on the Present State of'Affairs in a Letter 
to a-Member of the House of Commons... (1731) 
The Squire and the Cardinal, An Excellent New Ballad (1730) 
The Treaty of Seville, and the Measures that have been taken 
for the last years, Impartially considered (1730) 
A View of the Depredations and Ravages Committed by the 
Spaniards on the British Trade and Navigation ... (1731) 
(R. Walpole) Observations upon the Treaty between the Crowns 
to Great Britain, France, and Spain, concluded at Seville... 
(1729) 
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Newspapers 
The London newspapers of the period, held in the British 
Library and the Bodleian Library, have been used, and, due 
to the number of titles, are not listed separately. In 
addition, the following provincial newspapers have been 
consulted (in order of first date of publication). 
Worcester Post Man 
Newcastle Courant 
Weekly Courant (Nottingham) 
Norwich Courant 
Suffolk Mercury: or, St. Edmund's-Bury Post 
Kentish Post 
Leeds Mercury 
Cirencester Post 
York Mercury 
Northampton Mercury 
Ipswich Journal 
Derby Post-Ilan 
Chester Weekly Journal 
Newcastle Weekly Mercury 
Reading Mercury 
Farley's Bristol Newspaper 
York Courant 
Nottingham Post 
Manchester Weekly Courant 
Kendal Weekly Courant 
Derby Mercury 
Adam's Weekly Courant (Chester) 
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Documents, Correspondence, Memoirs etc. 
Acts of Assemby, Passed in the Island of Jamaica 1681-1737 
7 
Avon Arneth, Die Relation der Botschafter Venedigs uber 
±f 
11 
osterreich in achtzehnten Jahrhundert (Vienna, 1863) . 
A. Boyer, The Political State of Great Britathn (1725-1731) 
R. Beatson, A Chronological Register of Both Houses of the 
British Parliament 1708-1807 (3 vols; London, 1807) 
R. Beatson, Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain from 
1727 to 1783 (6 vols., London, 1804) 
The Works of Lord Bolingbroke (4 vols., 1844) 
The Letters and Correspondence of Henry St. John, Lord Viscount 
Bolingbroke, (ed. ) G. Parke (4 vols., 1798) 
British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689-1787 (London, edited 
for the Royal Historical Society. 
I. Siveden, 1689-1727 (ed. ) J. F. Chance, Camden Third series, 
vol. "XXXII C1922) 
III. Denmark, 1689-178y (ed. ) J. F. Chance, Camden Third 
Series, vol. XXXV (1925) 
IV. France, 1721-1727 (ed. ) L. G. Wickham Legg, Camden Third 
Series, vol. XXXVIII (1927) 
_ 
V. Sweden, 1727-1789 (ed. ) J. F. Chance, Camden Third Series, 
Vol. XXXIX (1928) 
VI. France, 1727-1744 (ed. ) L. G. Wickham Legg, Camden Third 
Series, Vol. XLIII (1930) 
C. H. T. Bussemaker (ed. ) Een Ifemorie over de"Republiek uit 
1728', Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch 
Genootschap, XXX (1909), pp. 96-197 
J. Chamberlayne, Magnae Britanniae Notitia;, or The Present 
State of Great Britain (28th ed. , 1727) 
Chesterfield, Philip, Fourth Earl of, The Letters of Phili 
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Dormer Stanhope, Fourth Earl of Chesterfield (eds. ) 
B. Dobree, (6 vols., London, 1932) 
The Diary of James Clegg of Chapel en le Frith (ed. ) V. S. Doe 
W. Cobbett, Parliamentary History of England, (36 vole., 1806- 
20), VII-X 
G. " Colman the younger, Posthumous 
letters from various 
celebrated men addressed to Francis Colman and George Colman 
the elder ((1820) 
Diary of Mary, Countess Cowper, 1714-1720 (ed. ) J. Cowper 
(2nd ed., 1865) 
Culloden Papers (ed. ) H. R. Duff (1815) 
More Culloden Papers Vol. 3 1725-1745, (ed. ) D. Warren 
(Inverness 1927) 
L. Demoulin, 'Les Lettres du nonce de Flandre Giuseppe Spinelli 
ä Domenico Riviera a propos du conclave de 1730, ' Bulletin de 
l'Institut Historique Belge de Rome, 42, (1972), pp. 369-400 
Memoires du Prince Eugene de savoie ecrits par hui-meme (in 
fact by Prince de Ligne) (Paris, 1810) 
M. Eyre-Matcham, A Forgotten John Russell being letters to a man 
of business 1724-51 (1905) 
Die Memoiren des kammerherrn friedrich Ernst von Fabrice, 1683- 
1750 (ed. ) R. Grieser (Hildesheim, 1956) 
Memoirs of Frederica Sophia Wilhemina Margravine of Bareith 
(2 vols., 1829) 
Briefwechsel' Friedrichs des Grossen mit Grumbkow und 
Maupertius, 1731-59 (ed. ) R. Koser (Leipzig, 1898) 
Albrecht Hallers Tagebucher seiner reisen nach Deutschland, 
ýý 
f` 
Holland und England 1723-27 (ed. ) E. Hintzsche (St. Gallen, 
1948) 
E. Hermann, Diplomatische Beitrage zur Russischen Geschichte 
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aus dem königlich shchsischen Haupstaatsarchiv zu Dresden 
1728-34 (St. Petersburg, 1870) 
Hervey, John, Earl of Bristol, Letter-Books' of Johri Hervey, 
First Earl of Bristol, 1651-1750 (3 vols., Wells, 1894) III 
Hervey, John Lord, Some Materials towards Memoirs of the 
Reign of King George II by John, Lord Hervey (ed. ) 
R. Sedgwick, (3 vols., London, 1931) 
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